owers　brought　into　play　by　this　representation　are　here　engaged　in　a　free　play；　since　no　definite　concept　restricts　them　to　a　particular　rule　of　cognition。　Hence　the　mental　state　in　this　representation　must　be　one　of　a　feeling　of　the　free　play　of　the　powers　of　representation　in　a　given　representation　for　a　cognition　in　general。　Now　a　representation；　whereby　an　object　is　given；　involves；　in　order　that　it　may　become　a　source　of　cognition　at　all；　imagination　for　bringing　together　the　manifold　of　intuition；　and　understanding　for　the　unity　of　the　concept　uniting　the　representations。　This　state　of　free　play　of　the　cognitive　faculties　attending　a　representation　by　which　an　object　is　given　must　admit　of　universal　communication：　because　cognition；　as　a　definition　of　the　object　with　which　given　representations　（in　any　subject　whatever）　are　to　accord；　is　the　one　and　only　representation　which　is　valid　for　everyone。　　　As　the　subjective　universal　communicability　of　the　mode　of　representation　in　a　judgement　of　taste　is　to　subsist　apart　from　the　presupposition　of　any　definite　concept；　it　can　be　nothing　else　than　the　mental　state　present　in　the　free　play　of　imagination　and　understanding　（so　far　as　these　are　in　mutual　accord；　as　is　requisite　for　cognition　in　general）；　for　we　are　conscious　that　this　subjective　relation　suitable　for　a　cognition　in　general　must　be　just　as　valid　for　every　one；　and　consequently　as　universally　communicable；　as　is　any　indeterminate　cognition；　which　always　rests　upon　that　relation　as　its　subjective　condition。　　　Now　this　purely　subjective　（aesthetic）　estimating　of　the　object；　or　of　the　representation　through　which　it　is　given；　is　antecedent　to　the　pleasure　in　it；　and　is　the　basis　of　this　pleasure　in　the　harmony　of　the　cognitive　faculties。　Again；　the　above…described　universality　of　the　subjective　conditions　of　estimating　objects　forms　the　sole　foundation　of　this　universal　subjective　validity　of　the　delight　which　we　connect　with　the　representation　of　the　object　that　we　call　beautiful。　　　That　an　ability　to　communicate　one's　mental　state；　even　though　it　be　only　in　respect　of　our　cognitive　faculties；　is　attended　with　a　pleasure；　is　a　fact　which　might　easily　be　demonstrated　from　the　natural　propensity　of　mankind　to　social　life；　i。e。；　empirically　and　psychologically。　But　what　we　have　here　in　view　calls　for　something　more　than　this。　In　a　judgement　of　taste；　the　pleasure　felt　by　us　is　exacted　from　every　one　else　as　necessary；　just　as　if；　when　we　call　something　beautiful；　beauty　was　to　be　regarded　as　a　quality　of　the　object　forming　part　of　its　inherent　determination　according　to　concepts；　although　beauty　is　for　itself；　apart　from　any　reference　to　the　feeling　of　the　subject；　nothing。　But　the　discussion　of　this　question　must　be　reserved　until　we　have　answered　the　further　one　of　whether；　and　how；　aesthetic　judgements　are　possible　a　priori。　　　At　present　we　are　exercised　with　the　lesser　question　of　the　way　in　which　we　become　conscious；　in　a　judgement　of　taste；　of　a　reciprocal　subjective　common　accord　of　the　powers　of　cognition。　Is　it　aesthetically　by　sensation　and　our　mere　internal　sense？　Or　is　it　intellectually　by　consciousness　of　our　intentional　activity　in　bringing　these　powers　into　play？　　　Now　if　the　given　representation　occasioning　the　judgement　of　taste　were　a　concept　which　united　understanding　and　imagination　in　the　estimate　of　the　object　so　as　to　give　a　cognition　of　the　object；　the　consciousness　of　this　relation　would　be　intellectual　（as　in　the　objective　schematism　of　judgement　dealt　with　in　the　Critique）。　But；　then；　in　that　case　the　judgement　would　not　be　laid　down　with　respect　to　pleasure　and　displeasure；　and　so　would　not　be　a　judgement　of　taste。　But；　now；　the　judgement　of　taste　determines　the　object；　independently　of　concepts；　in　respect　of　delight　and　of　the　predicate　of　beauty。　There　is；　therefore；　no　other　way　for　the　subjective　unity　of　the　relation　in　question　to　make　itself　known　than　by　sensation。　The　quickening　of　both　faculties　（imagination　and　understanding）　to　an　indefinite；　but　yet；　thanks　to　the　given　representation；　harmonious　activity；　such　as　belongs　to　cognition　generally；　is　the　sensation　whose　universal　communicability　is　postulated　by　the　judgement　of　taste。　An　objective　relation　can；　of　course；　only　be　thought；　yet　in　so　far　as；　in　respect　of　its　conditions；　it　is　subjective；　it　may　be　felt　in　its　effect　upon　the　mind；　and；　in　the　case　of　a　relation　（like　that　of　the　powers　of　representation　to　a　faculty　of　cognition　generally）　which　does　not　rest　on　any　concept；　no　other　consciousness　of　it　is　possible　beyond　that　through　sensation　of　its　effect　upon　the　mind　…an　effect　consisting　in　the　more　facile　play　of　both　mental　powers　（imagination　and　understanding）　as　quickened　by　their　mutual　accord。　A　representation　which　is　singular　and　independent　of　comparison　with　other　representations；　and；　being　such；　yet　accords　with　the　conditions　of　the　universality　that　is　the　general　concern　of　understanding；　is　one　that　brings　the　cognitive　faculties　into　that　proportionate　accord　which　we　require　for　all　cognition　and　which　we　therefore　deem　valid　for　every　one　who　is　so　constituted　as　to　judge　by　means　of　understanding　and　sense　conjointly　（i。e。；　for　every　man）。
  Definition　of　the　Beautiful　drawn　from　the　Second　Moment。
  The　beautiful　is　that　which；　apart　from　a　concept；　pleases　universally。
  THIRD　MOMENT。　Of　Judgements　of　Taste：　Moment　of　　　　　　　　　　the　relation　of　the　Ends　brought　under　Review　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　in　such　Judgements。
  SS　10。　Finality　in　general。
  Let　us　define　the　meaning　of　〃an　end〃　in　transcendental　terms　（i。e。；　without　presupposing　anything　empirical；　such　as　the　feeling　of　pleasure）。　An　end　is　the　object　of　a　concept　so　far　as　this　concept　is　regarded　as　the　cause　of　the　object　（the　real　ground　of　its　possibility）；　and　the　causality　of　a　concept　in　respect　of　its　object　is　finality　（forma　finalis）。　Where；　then；　not　the　cognition　of　an　object　merely；　but　the　object　itself　（its　form　or　real　existence）　as　an　effect；　is　thought　to　be　possible　only　through　a　concept　of　it；　there　we　imagine　an　end。　The　representation　of　the　effect　is　here　the　determining　ground　of　its　cause　and　takes　the　lead　of　it。　The　consciousness　of　the　causality　of　a　representation　in　respect　of　the　state　of　the　subject　as　one　tending　to　preserve　a　continuance　of　that　state；　may　here　be　said　to　denote　in　a　general　way　what　is　called　pleasure；　whereas　displeasure　is　that　representation　which　contains　the　ground　for　converting　the　state　of　the　representations　into　their　opposite　（for　hindering　or　removing　them）。　　　The　faculty　of　desire；　so　far　as　determinable　only　through　concepts；　i。e。；　so　as　to　act　in　conformity　with　the　representation　of　an　end；　would　be　the　Will。　But　an　object；　or　state　of　mind；　or　even　an　action　may；　although　its　possibility　does　not　necessarily　presuppose　the　representation　of　an　end；　be　called　final　simply　on　account　of　its　possibility　being　only　explicable　and　intelligible　for　us　by　virtue　of　an　assumption　on　our　part　of　fundamental　causality　according　to　ends；　i。e。；　a　will　that　would　have　so　ordained　it　according　to　a　certain　represented　rule。　Finality；　therefore；　may　exist　apart　from　an　end；　in　so　far　as　we　do　not　locate　the　causes　of　this　form　in　a　will；　but　yet　are　able　to　render　the　explanation　of　its　possibility　intelligible　to　ourselves　only　by　deriving　it　from　a　will。　Now　we　are　not　always　obliged　to　look　with　the　eye　of　reason　into　what　we　observe　（i。e。；　to　consider　it　in　its　possibility）。　So　we　may　at　least　observe　a　finality　of　form；　and　trace　it　in　objects…though　by　reflection　only…without　resting　it　on　an　end　（as　the　material　of　the　nexus　finalis）。
  SS　11。　The　sole　foundation　of　the　judgement　of　taste　　　　　　　　is　the　form　of　finality　of　an　object　（or　mode　of　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　representing　it）。
  Whenever　an　end　is　regarded　as　a　source　of　delight；　it　always　imports　an　interest　as　determining　ground　of　the　judgement　on　the　object　of　pleasure。　Hence　the　judgement　of　taste　cannot　rest　on　any　subjective　end　as　its　ground。　But　neither　can　any　representation　of　an　objective　end；　i。e。；　of　the　possibility　of　the　object　itself　on　principles　of　final　connection；　determine　the　judgement　of　taste；　and；　consequently；　neither　can　any　concept　of　the　good。　For　the　judgement　of　taste　is　an　aesthetic　and　not　a　cognitive　judgement；　and　so　does　not　deal　with　any　concept　of　the　nature　or　of　the　internal　or　external　possibility；　by　this　or　that　cause；　of　the　object；　but　simply　with　the　relative　bearing　of　the　representative　powers　so　far　as　determined　by　a　representation。　　　Now　this　relation；　present　when　an　object　is　characterized　as　beautiful；　is　coupled　with　the　feeling　of　pleasure。　This　pleasure　is　by　the　judgement　of　taste　pronounced　valid　for　every　one；　hence　an　agreeableness　attending　the　representation　is　just　as　incapable　of　containing　the　determining　ground　of　the　judgement　as　the　representation　of　the　perfection　of　the　object　or　the　concept　of　the　good。　We　are　thus　left　with　the　subjective　finality　in　the　representation　of　an　object；　exclusive　of　any　end　（objective　or　subjective）…consequently　the　bare　form　of　finality　in　the　representation　whereby　an　object　i