it　leaves　quite　undetermined。　judgement　by　the　a　priori　principle　of　its　estimation　of　nature　according　to　its　possible　particular　laws　provides　this　supersensible　substrate　（within　as　well　as　without　us）　with　determinability　through　the　intellectual　faculty。　But　reason　gives　determination　to　the　same　a　priori　by　its　practical　law。　Thus　judgement　makes　possible　the　transition　from　the　realm　of　the　concept　of　nature　to　that　of　the　concept　of　freedom。　　　In　respect　of　the　faculties　of　the　soul　generally；　regarded　as　higher　faculties；　i。e。；　as　faculties　containing　an　autonomy；　understanding　is　the　one　that　contains　the　constitutive　a　priori　principles　for　the　faculty　of　cognition　（the　theoretical　knowledge　of　nature）。　The　feeling　pleasure　and　displeasure　is　provided　for　by　the　judgement　in　its　independence　from　concepts　and　from　sensations　that　refer　to　the　determination　of　the　faculty　of　desire　and　would　thus　be　capable　of　being　immediately　practical。　For　the　faculty　of　desire　there　is　reason；　which　is　practical　without　mediation　of　any　pleasure　of　whatsoever　origin；　and　which　determines　for　it；　as　a　higher　faculty；　the　final　end　that　is　attended　at　the　same　time　with　pure　intellectual　delight　in　the　object。　judgement's　concept　of　a　finality　of　nature　falls；　besides；　under　the　head　of　natural　concepts；　but　only　as　a　regulative　principle　of　the　cognitive　faculties…although　the　aesthetic　judgement　on　certain　objects　（of　nature　or　of　art）　which　occasions　that　concept；　is　a　constitutive　principle　in　respect　of　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure。　The　spontaneity　in　the　play　of　the　cognitive　faculties　whose　harmonious　accord　contains　the　ground　of　this　pleasure；　makes　the　concept　in　question；　in　its　consequences；　a　suitable　mediating　link　connecting　the　realm　of　the　concept　of　nature　with　that　of　the　concept　of　freedom；　as　this　accord　at　the　same　time　promotes　the　sensibility　of　the　mind　for　or　moral　feeling。　The　following　table　may　facilitate　the　review　of　all　the　above　faculties　in　their　systematic　unity。*
  *It　has　been　thought　somewhat　suspicious　that　my　divisions　in　pure　philosophy　should　almost　always　come　out　threefold。　But　it　is　due　to　the　nature　of　the　case。　If　a　division　is　to　be　a　priori　it　must　be　either　analytic；　according　to　the　law　of　contradiction…and　then　it　is　always　twofold　（quodlibet　ens　est　aut　A　aut　non　A）…Or　else　it　is　synthetic。　If　it　is　to　be　derived　in　the　latter　case　from　a　priori　concepts　（not；　as　in　mathematics；　from　the　a　priori　intuition　corresponding　to　the　concept）；　then；　to　meet　the　requirements　of　synthetic　unity　in　general；　namely　（1）　a　condition；　（2）　a　conditioned；　（3）　the　concept　arising　from　the　union　of　the　conditioned　with　its　condition；　the　division　must　of　necessity　be　trichotomous。
  List　of　Mental　Faculties　　　　　　Cognitive　Faculties　　　　　　　　Cognitive　faculties　　　　　　　　　　　　　Understanding　　　　　　　　Feeling　of　pleasure　　　　　　　　　　　　　Judgement　　　　　　　　　　and　displeasure　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Reason　　　　　　　　Faculty　of　desire
  A　priori　Principles　　　　　　　　　　　　　Application　　　　　　　　Conformity　to　law　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Nature　　　　　　　　Finality　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Art　　　　　　　　Final　End　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Freedom
  SEC1｜BK1　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　PART　CRITIQUE　OF　AESTHETIC　JUDGEMENT　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　I。　ANALYTIC　OF　AESTHETIC　JUDGEMENT。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　BOOK　I。　Analytic　of　the　Beautiful。
  FIRST　MOMENT。　Of　the　Judgement　of　Taste*：　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Moment　of　Quality。
  *The　definition　of　taste　here　relied　upon　is　that　it　is　the　faculty　of　estimating　the　beautiful。　But　the　discovery　of　what　is　required　for　calling　an　object　beautiful　must　be　reserved　for　the　analysis　of　judgements　of　taste。　In　my　search　for　the　moments　to　which　attention　is　paid　by　this　judgement　in　its　reflection；　I　have　followed　the　guidance　of　the　logical　functions　of　judging　（for　a　judgement　of　taste　always　involves　a　reference　to　understanding）。　I　have　brought　the　moment　of　quality　first　under　review；　because　this　is　what　the　aesthetic　judgement　on　the　beautiful　looks　to　in　the　first　instance。
  SS　1。　The　judgement　of　taste　is　aesthetic。
  If　we　wish　to　discern　whether　anything　is　beautiful　or　not；　we　do　not　refer　the　representation　of　it　to　the　object　by　means　of　understanding　with　a　view　to　cognition；　but　by　means　of　the　imagination　（acting　perhaps　in　conjunction　with　understanding）　we　refer　the　representation　to　the　subject　and　its　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure。　The　judgement　of　taste；　therefore；　is　not　a　cognitive　judgement；　and　so　not　logical；　but　is　aesthetic…which　means　that　it　is　one　whose　determining　ground　cannot　be　other　than　subjective。　Every　reference　of　representations　is　capable　of　being　objective；　even　that　of　sensations　（in　which　case　it　signifies　the　real　in　an　empirical　representation）。　The　one　exception　to　this　is　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure。　This　denotes　nothing　in　the　object；　but　is　a　feeling　which　the　subject　has　of　itself　and　of　the　manner　in　which　it　is　affected　by　the　representation。　　　To　apprehend　a　regular　and　appropriate　building　with　one's　cognitive　faculties；　be　the　mode　of　representation　clear　or　confused；　is　quite　a　different　thing　from　being　conscious　of　this　representation　with　an　accompanying　sensation　of　delight。　Here　the　representation　is　referred　wholly　to　the　subject；　and　what　is　more　to　its　feeling　of　life…under　the　name　of　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure…and　this　forms　the　basis　of　a　quite　separate　faculty　of　discriminating　and　estimating；　that　contributes　nothing　to　knowledge。　All　it　does　is　to　compare　the　given　representation　in　the　subject　with　the　entire　faculty　of　representations　of　which　the　mind　is　conscious　in　the　feeling　of　its　state。　Given　representations　in　a　judgement　may　be　empirical；　and　so　aesthetic；　but　the　judgement　which　is　pronounced　by　their　means　is　logical；　provided　it　refers　them　to　the　object。　Conversely；　be　the　given　representations　even　rational；　but　referred　in　a　judgement　solely　to　the　subject　（to　its　feeling）；　they　are　always　to　that　extent　aesthetic。
  SS　2。　The　delight　which　determines　the　judgement　of　　　　　　　　　　　　taste　is　independent　of　all　interest。
  The　delight　which　we　connect　with　the　representation　of　the　real　existence　of　an　object　is　called　interest。　Such　a　delight；　therefore；　always　involves　a　reference　to　the　faculty　of　desire；　either　as　its　determining　ground；　or　else　as　necessarily　implicated　with　its　determining　ground。　Now；　where　the　question　is　whether　something　is　beautiful；　we　do　not　want　to　know；　whether　we；　or　any　one　else；　are；　or　even　could　be；　concerned　in　the　real　existence　of　the　thing；　but　rather　what　estimate　we　form　of　it　on　mere　contemplation　（intuition　or　reflection）。　If　any　one　asks　me　whether　I　consider　that　the　palace　I　see　before　me　is　beautiful；　I　may；　perhaps；　reply　that　I　do　not　care　for　things　of　that　sort　that　are　merely　made　to　be　gaped　at。　Or　I　may　reply　in　the　same　strain　as　that　Iroquois　sachem　who　said　that　nothing　in　Paris　pleased　him　better　than　the　eating…houses。　I　may　even　go　a　step　further　and　inveigh　with　the　vigour　of　a　Rousseau　against　the　vigour　of　a　great　against　the　vanity　of　the　of　the　people　on　such　superfluous　things。　Or；　in　fine；　I　may　quite　easily　persuade　myself　that　if　I　found　myself　on　an　uninhabited　island；　without　hope　of　ever　again　coming　among　men；　and　could　conjure　such　a　palace　into　existence　by　a　mere　wish；　I　should　still　not　trouble　to　do　so；　so　long　as　I　had　a　hut　there　that　was　comfortable　enough　for　me。　All　this　may　be　admitted　and　approved；　only　it　is　not　the　point　now　at　issue。　All　one　wants　to　know　is　whether　the　mere　representation　of　the　object　is　to　my　liking；　no　matter　how　indifferent　I　may　be　to　the　real　existence　of　the　object　of　this　representation。　It　is　quite　plain　that　in　order　to　say　that　the　object　is　beautiful；　and　to　show　that　I　have　taste；　everything　turns　on　the　meaning　which　I　can　give　to　this　representation；　and　not　on　any　factor　which　makes　me　dependent　on　the　real　existence　of　the　object。　Every　one　must　allow　that　a　judgement　on　the　beautiful　which　is　tinged　with　the　slightest　interest；　is　very　partial　and　not　a　pure　judgement　of　taste。　One　must　not　be　in　the　least　prepossessed　in　favour　of　the　real　existence　of　the　thing；　but　must　preserve　complete　indifference　in　this　respect；　in　order　to　play　the　part　of　judge　in　matters　of　taste。　　　This　proposition；　which　is　of　the　utmost　importance；　cannot　be　better　explained　than　by　contrasting　the　pure　disinterested*　delight　which　appears　in　the　judgement　of　taste　with　that　allied　to　an　interest…especially　if　we　can　also　assure　ourselves　that　there　are　no　other　kinds　of　interest　beyond　those　presently　to　be　mentioned。
  *A　judgement　upon　an　object　of　our　delight　may　be　wholly　disinterested　but　withal　very　interesting；　i。e。；　it　relies　on　no　interest；　but　it　produces　one。　Of　this　kind　are　all　pure　moral　judgements。　But；　of　themselves　judgements　of　taste　do　not　even　set　up　any　interest　whatsoever。　Only　in　society　is　it　interesting　to　have　taste…a　point　which　will　be　explained　in　the　sequel。
  SS　3。　Delight　in　the　agreeable　is　coupled　with　interest。
  That　is　agreeable　which　the　senses　find　pleasing　in　sensation。　This　at　once　affords　a　convenient　opportunity　for　condemn