n　its　technic　（as　in　the　case　of　organic　bodies）；　when　we　read　into　it　our　own　concept　of　an　end　to　assist　our　estimate　of　its　product。　In　this　case　what　is　represented　is　not　a　mere　finality　of　nature　in　the　form　of　the　thing；　but　this　very　product　as　a　natural　end。　Although　our　concept　that　nature；　in　its　empirical　laws；　is　subjectively　final　in　its　forms　is　in　no　way　a　concept　of　the　object；　but　only　a　principle　of　judgement　for　providing　itself　with　concepts　in　the　vast　multiplicity　of　nature；　so　that　it　may　be　able　to　take　its　bearings；　yet；　on　the　analogy　of　an　end；　as　it　were　a　regard　to　our　cognitive　faculties　is　here　attributed　to　nature。　Natural　beauty　may；　therefore；　be　looked　on　as　the　presentation　of　the　concept　of　formal；　i。　e。；　merely　subjective；　finality　and　natural　ends　as　the　presentation　of　the　concept　of　a　real；　i。e。；　objective；　finality。　The　former　of　these　we　estimate　by　taste　（aesthetically　by　means　of　the　feeling　of　pleasure）；　the　latter　by　understanding　and　reason　（logically　according　to　concepts）。　　　On　these　considerations　is　based　the　division　of　the　Critique　of　judgement　into　that　of　the　aesthetic　and　the　teleological　judgement。　By　the　first　is　meant　the　faculty　of　estimating　formal　finality　（otherwise　called　subjective）　by　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure；　by　the　second；　the　faculty　of　estimating　the　real　finality　（objective）　of　nature　by　understanding　and；　reason。　　　In　a　Critique　of　judgement　the　part　dealing　with　aesthetic　judgement　is　essentially　relevant；　as　it　alone　contains　a　principle　introduced　by　judgement　completely　a　priori　as　the　basis　of　its　reflection　upon　nature。　This　is　the　principle　of　nature's　formal　finality　for　our　cognitive　faculties　in　its　particular　（empirical）　laws…a　principle　without　which　understanding　could　not　feel　itself　at　home　in　nature：　whereas　no　reason　is　assignable　a　priori；　nor　is　so　much　as　the　possibility　of　one　apparent　from　the　concept　of　nature　as　an　object　of　experience；　whether　in　its　universal　or　in　its　particular　aspects；　why　there　should　be　objective　ends　of　nature；　i。　e。；　things　only　possible　as　natural　ends。　But　it　is　only　judgement　that；　without　being　itself　possessed　a　priori　of　a　principle　in　that　behalf；　in　actually　occurring　cases　（of　certain　products）　contains　the　rule　for　making　use　of　the　concept　of　ends　in　the　interest　of　reason；　after　that　the　above　transcendental　principle　has　already　prepared　understanding　to　apply　to　nature　the　concept　of　an　end　（at　least　in　respect　of　its　form）。　　　But　the　transcendental　principle　by　which　a　finality　of　nature　in　its　subjective　reference　to　our　cognitive　faculties；　is　represented　in　the　form　of　a　thing　as　a　principle　of　its　estimation；　leaves　quite　undetermined　the　question　of　where　and　in　what　cases　we　have　to　make　our　estimate　of　the　object　as　a　product　according　to　a　principle　of　finality；　instead　of　simply　according　to　universal　laws　of　nature。　It　resigns　to　the　aesthetic　judgement　the　task　of　deciding　the　conformity　of　this　product　（in　its　form）　to　our　cognitive　faculties　as　a　question　of　taste　（a　matter　which　the　aesthetic　judgement　decides；　not　by　any　harmony　with　concepts；　but　by　feeling）。　On　the　other　hand；　judgement　as　teleologically　employed　assigns　the　determinate　conditions　under　which　something　（e。　g。；　an　organized　body）　is　to　be　estimated　after　the　idea　of　an　end　of　nature。　But　it　can　adduce　no　principle　from　the　concept　of　nature；　as　an　object　of　experience；　to　give　it　its　authority　to　ascribe　a　priori　to　nature　a　reference　to　ends；　or　even　only　indeterminately　to　assume　them　from　actual　experience　in　the　case　of　such　products。　The　reason　of　this　is　that；　in　order　to　be　able　merely　empirically　to　cognize　objective　finality　in　a　certain　object；　many　particular　experiences　must　be　collected　and　reviewed　under　the　unity　of　their　principle。　Aesthetic　judgement　is；　therefore；　a　special　faculty　of　estimating　according　to　a　rule；　but　not　according　to　concepts。　The　teleological　is　not　a　special　faculty；　but　only　general　reflective　judgement　proceeding；　as　it　always　does　in　theoretical　cognition；　according　to　concepts；　but　in　respect　of　certain　objects　of　nature；　following　special　principles…those；　namely；　of　a　judgement　that　is　merely　reflective　and　does　not　determine　objects。　Hence；　as　regards　its　application；　it　belongs　to　the　theoretical　part　of　philosophy；　and　on　account　of　its　special　principles；　which　are　not　determinant；　as　principles　belonging　to　doctrine　have　to　be；　it　must　also　form　a　special　part　of　the　Critique。　On　the　other　hand；　the　aesthetic　judgement　contributes　nothing　to　the　cognition　of　its　objects。　Hence　it　must　only　be　allocated　to　the　Critique　of　the　judging　subject　and　of　its　faculties　of　knowledge　so　far　as　these　are　capable　of　possessing　a　priori　principles；　be　their　use　（theoretical　or　practical）　otherwise　what　it　may…a　Critique　which　is　the　propaedeutic　of　all　philosophy。
  IX。　Joinder　of　the　Legislations　of　Understanding　and　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Reason　by　means　of　Judgement。
  Understanding　prescribes　laws　a　priori　for　nature　as　an　object　of　sense；　so　that　we　may　have　a　theoretical　knowledge　of　it　in　a　possible　experience。　Reason　prescribes　laws　a　priori　for　freedom　and　its　peculiar　causality　as　the　supersensible　in　the　subject；　so　that　we　may　have　a　purely　practical　knowledge。　The　realm　of　the　concept　of　nature　under　the　one　legislation；　and　that　of　the　concept　of　freedom　under　the　other；　are　completely　cut　off　from　all　reciprocal　influence；　that　they　might　severally　（each　according　to　its　own　principles）　exert　upon　the　other；　by　the　broad　gulf　that　divides　the　supersensible　from　phenomena。　The　concept　of　freedom　determines　nothing　in　respect　of　the　theoretical　cognition　of　nature；　and　the　concept　of　nature　likewise　nothing　in　respect　of　the　practical　laws　of　freedom。　To　that　extent；　then；　it　is　not　possible　to　throw　a　bridge　from　the　one　realm　to　the　other。　Yet　although　the　determining　grounds　of　causality　according　to　the　concept　of　freedom　（and　the　practical　rule　that　this　contains）　have　no　place　in　nature；　and　the　sensible　cannot　determine　the　supersensible　in　the　subject；　still　the　converse　is　possible　（not；　it　is　true；　in　respect　of　the　knowledge　of　nature；　but　of　the　consequences　arising　from　the　supersensible　and　bearing　on　the　sensible）。　So　much　indeed　is　implied　in　the　concept　of　a　causality　by　freedom；　the　operation　of　which；　in　conformity　with　the　formal　laws　of　freedom；　is　to　take　effect　in　the　word。　The　word　cause；　however；　in　its　application　to　the　supersensible　only　signifies　the　ground　that　determines　the　causality　of　things　of　nature　to　an　effect　in　conformity　with　their　appropriate　natural　laws；　but　at　the　same　time　also　in　unison　with　the　formal　principle　of　the　laws　of　reason…a　ground　which；　while　its　possibility　is　impenetrable；　may　still　be　completely　cleared　of　the　charge　of　contradiction　that　it　is　alleged　to　involve。*　The　effect　in　accordance　with　the　concept　of　freedom　is　the　final　end　which　（or　the　manifestation　of　which　in　the　sensible　world）　is　to　exist；　and　this　presupposes　the　condition　of　the　possibility　of　that　end　in　nature　（i。　e。；　in　the　nature　of　the　subject　as　a　being　of　the　sensible　world；　namely；　as　man）。　It　is　so　presupposed　a　priori；　and　without　regard　to　the　practical；　by　judgement。　This　faculty；　with　its　concept　of　a　finality　of　nature；　provides　us　with　the　mediating　concept　between　concepts　of　nature　and　the　concept　of　freedom…a　concept　that　makes　possible　the　transition　from　the　pure　theoretical　＇legislation　of　understanding＇　to　the　pure　practical　＇legislation　of　reason＇　and　from　conformity　to　law　in　accordance　with　the　former　to　final　ends　according　to　the　latter。　For　through　that　concept　we　cognize　the　possibility　of　the　final　end　that　can　only　be　actualized　in　nature　and　in　harmony　with　its　laws。
  *One　of　the　various　supposed　contradictions　in　this　complete　distinction　of　the　causality　of　nature　from　that　through　freedom　is　expressed　in　the　objection　that　when　I　speak　of　hindrances　opposed　by　nature　to　causality　according　to　laws　of　freedom　（moral　laws）　or　of　assistance　lent　to　it　by　nature；　I　am　all　the　time　admitting　an　influence　of　the　former　upon　the　latter。　But　the　misinterpretation　is　easily　avoided；　if　attention　is　only　paid　to　the　meaning　of　the　statement。　The　resistance　or　furtherance　is　not　between　nature　and　freedom；　but　between　the　former　as　phenomenon　and　the　effects　of　the　latter　as　phenomena　in　the　world　of　sense。　Even　the　causality　of　freedom　（of　pure　and　practical　reason）　is　the　causality　of　a　natural　cause　subordinated　to　freedom　（a　causality　of　the　subject　regarded　as　man；　and　consequently　as　a　phenomenon）；　and　one；　the　ground　of　whose　determination　is　contained　in　the　intelligible；　that　is　thought　under　freedom；　in　a　manner　that　is　not　further　or　otherwise　explicable　（just　as　in　the　case　of　that　intelligible　that　forms　the　supersensible　substrate　of　nature。）
  Understanding；　by　the　possibility　of　its　supplying　a　priori　laws　for　nature；　furnishes　a　proof　of　the　fact　that　nature　is　cognized　by　us　only　as　phenomenon；　and　in　so　doing　points　to　its　having　a　supersensible　substrate；　but　this　substrate　it　leaves　quite　undetermined。　judgement　by　the　a　priori　principle　of　its　estimation　of　nature　accor