yed　in　the　cognition　of　external　objects。　　　But　that　subjective　side　of　a　representation　which　is　incapable　of　becoming　an　element　of　cognition；　is　the　pleasure　or　displeasure　connected　with　it；　for　through　it　I　cognize　nothing　in　the　object　of　the　representation；　although　it　may　easily　be　the　result　of　the　operation　of　some　cognition　or　other。　Now　the　finality　of　a　thing；　so　far　as　represented　in　our　perception　of　it；　is　in　no　way　a　quality　of　the　object　itself　（for　a　quality　of　this　kind　is　not　one　that　can　be　perceived）；　although　it　may　be　inferred　from　a　cognition　of　things。　In　the　finality；　therefore；　which　is　prior　to　the　cognition　of　an　object；　and　which；　even　apart　from　any　desire　to　make　use　of　the　representation　of　it　for　the　purpose　of　a　cognition；　is　yet　immediately　connected　with　it；　we　have　the　subjective　quality　belonging　to　it　that　is　incapable　of　becoming　a　constituent　of　knowledge。　Hence　we　only　apply　the　term　final　to　the　object　on　account　of　its　representation　being　immediately　coupled　with　the　feeling　of　pleasure：　and　this　representation　itself　is　an　aesthetic　representation　of　the　finality。　The　only　question　is　whether　such　a　representation　of　finality　exists　at　all。　　　If　pleasure　is　connected　with　the　mere　apprehension　（apprehensio）　of　the　form　of　an　object　of　intuition；　apart　from　any　reference　it　may　have　to　a　concept　for　the　purpose　of　a　definite　cognition；　this　does　not　make　the　representation　referable　to　the　object；　but　solely　to　the　subject。　In　such　a　case；　the　pleasure　can　express　nothing　but　the　conformity　of　the　object　to　the　cognitive　faculties　brought　into　play　in　the　reflective　judgement；　and　so　far　as　they　are　in　play；　and　hence　merely　a　subjective　formal　finality　of　the　object。　For　that　apprehension　of　forms　in　the　imagination　can　never　take　place　without　the　reflective　judgement；　even　when　it　has　no　intention　of　so　doing；　comparing　them　at　least　with　its　faculty　of　referring　intuitions　to　concepts。　If；　now；　in　this　comparison；　imagination　（as　the　faculty　of　intuitions　a　priori）　is　undesignedly　brought　into　accord　with　understanding　（as　the　faculty　of　concepts）；　by　means　of　a　given　representation；　and　a　feeling　of　pleasure　is　thereby　aroused；　then　the　object　must　be　regarded　as　final　for　the　reflective　judgement。　A　judgement　of　this　kind　is　an　aesthetic　judgement　upon　the　finality　of　the　object；　which　does　not　depend　upon　any　present　concept　of　the　object；　and　does　not　provide　one。　When　the　form　of　an　object　（as　opposed　to　the　matter　of　its　representation；　as　sensation）　is；　in　the　mere　act　of　reflecting　upon　it；　without　regard　to　any　concept　to　be　obtained　from　it；　estimated　as　the　ground　of　a　pleasure　in　the　representation　of　such　an　object；　then　this　pleasure　is　also　judged　to　be　combined　necessarily　with　the　representation　of　it；　and　so　not　merely　for　the　subject　apprehending　this　form；　but　for　all　in　general　who　pass　judgement。　The　object　is　then　called　beautiful；　and　the　faculty　of　judging　by　means　of　such　a　pleasure　（and　so　also　with　universal　validity）　is　called　taste。　For　since　the　ground　of　the　pleasure　is　made　to　reside　merely　in　the　form　of　the　object　for　reflection　generally；　consequently　not　in　any　sensation　of　the　object；　and　without　any　reference；　either；　to　any　concept　that　might　have　something　or　other　in　view；　it　is　with　the　conformity　to　law　in　the　empirical　employment　of　judgement　generally　（unity　of　imagination　and　understanding）　in　the　subject；　and　with　this　alone；　that　the　representation　of　the　object　in　reflection；　the　conditions　of　which　are　universally　valid　a　priori；　accords。　And；　as　this　accordance　of　the　object　with　the　faculties　of　the　subject　is　contingent；　it　gives　rise　to　a　representation　of　a　finality　on　the　part　of　the　object　in　respect　of　the　cognitive　faculties　of　the　subject。　　　Here；　now；　is　a　pleasure　which…as　is　the　case　with　all　pleasure　or　displeasure　that　is　not　brought　about　through　the　agency　of　the　concept　of　freedom　（i。e。；　through　the　antecedent　determination　of　the　higher　faculty　of　desire　by　means　of　pure　reason）…no　concepts　could　ever　enable　us　to　regard　as　necessarily　connected　with　the　representation　of　an　object。　It　must　always　be　only　through　reflective　perception　that　it　is　cognized　as　conjoined　with　this　representation。　As　with　all　empirical　judgements；　it　is；　consequently；　unable　to　announce　objective　necessity　or　lay　claim　to　a　priori　validity。　But；　then；　the　judgement　of　taste　in　fact　only　lays　claim；　like　every　other　empirical　judgement；　to　be　valid　for　every　one；　and；　despite　its　inner　contingency　this　is　always　possible。　The　only　point　that　is　strange　or　out　of　the　way　about　it　is　that　it　is　not　an　empirical　concept；　but　a　feeling　of　pleasure　（and　so　not　a　concept　at　all）；　that　is　yet　exacted　from　every　one　by　the　judgement　of　taste；　just　as　if　it　were　a　predicate　united　to　the　cognition　of　the　object；　and　that　is　meant　to　be　conjoined　with　its　representation。　　　A　singular　empirical　judgement；　as　for　example；　the　judgement　of　one　who　perceives　a　movable　drop　of　water　in　a　rock…crystal；　rightly　looks　to　every　one　finding　the　fact　as　stated；　since　the　judgement　has　been　formed　according　to　the　universal　conditions　of　the　determinant　judgement　under　the　laws　of　a　possible　experience　generally。　In　the　same　way；　one　who　feels　pleasure　in　simple　reflection　on　the　form　of　an　object；　without　having　any　concept　in　mind；　rightly　lays　claim　to　the　agreement　of　every　one；　although　this　judgement　is　empirical　and　a　singular　judgement。　For　the　ground　of　this　pleasure　is　found　in　the　universal；　though　subjective；　condition　of　reflective　judgements；　namely　the　final　harmony　of　an　object　（be　it　a　product　of　nature　or　of　art）　with　the　mutual　relation　of　the　faculties　of　cognition　（imagination　and　understanding）；　which　are　requisite　for　every　empirical　cognition。　The　pleasure　in　judgements　of　taste　is；　therefore；　dependent　doubtless　on　an　empirical　representation；　and　cannot　be　united　a　priori　to　any　concept　（one　cannot　determine　a　priori　what　object　will　be　in　accordance　with　taste　or　not…one　must　find　out　the　object　that　is　so）；　but　then　it　is　only　made　the　determining　ground　of　this　judgement　by　virtue　of　our　consciousness　of　its　resting　simply　upon　reflection　and　the　universal；　though　only　subjective；　conditions　of　the　harmony　of　that　reflection　with　the　knowledge　of　objects　generally；　for　which　the　form　of　the　object　is　final。　　　This　is　why　judgements　of　taste　are　subjected　to　a　critique　in　respect　of　their　possibility。　For　their　possibility　presupposes　an　a　priori　principle；　although　that　principle　is　neither　a　cognitive　principle　for　understanding　nor　a　practical　principle　for　the　will；　and　is　thus　in　no　way　determinant　a　priori。　　　Susceptibility　to　pleasure　arising　from　reflection　on　the　forms　of　things　（whether　of　nature　or　of　art）　betokens；　however；　not　only　a　finality　on　the　part　of　objects　in　their　relation　to　the　reflective　judgement　in　the　subject；　in　accordance　with　the　concept　of　nature；　but　also；　conversely；　a　finality　on　the　part　of　the　subject；　answering　to　the　concept　of　freedom；　in　respect　of　the　form；　or　even　formlessness　of　objects。　The　result　is　that　the　aesthetic　judgement　refers　not　merely；　as　a　judgement　of　taste；　to　the　beautiful；　but　also；　as　springing　from　a　higher　intellectual　feeling；　to　the　sublime。　Hence　the　above…mentioned　Critique　of　Aesthetic　judgement　must　be　divided　on　these　lines　into　two　main　parts。
  VIII。　The　Logical　Representation　of　the　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Finality　of　Nature。
  There　are　two　ways　in　which　finality　may　be　represented　in　an　object　given　in　experience。　It　may　be　made　to　turn　on　what　is　purely　subjective。　In　this　case　the　object　is　considered　in　respect　of　its　form　as　present　in　apprehension　（apprehensio）　prior　to　any　concept；　and　the　harmony　of　this　form　with　the　cognitive　faculties；　promoting　the　combination　of　the　intuition　with　concepts　for　cognition　generally；　is　represented　as　a　finality　of　the　form　of　the　object。　Or；　on　the　other　hand；　the　representation　of　finality　may　be　made　to　turn　on　what　is　objective；　in　which　case　it　is　represented　as　the　harmony　of　the　form　of　the　object　with　the　possibility　of　the　thing　itself　according　to　an　antecedent　concept　of　it　containing　the　ground　of　this　form。　We　have　seen　that　the　representation　of　the　former　kind　of　finality　rests　on　the　pleasure　immediately　felt　in　mere　reflection　on　the　form　of　the　object。　But　that　of　the　latter　kind　of　finality；　as　it　refers　the　form　of　the　object；　not　to　the　subject's　cognitive　faculties　engaged　in　its　apprehension；　but　to　a　definite　cognition　of　the　object　under　a　given　concept；　bas　nothing　to　do　with　a　feeling　of　pleasure　in　things；　but　only　understanding　and　its　estimate　of　them。　Where　the　concept　of　an　object　is　given；　the　function　of　judgement；　in　its　employment　of　that　concept　for　cognition；　consists　in　presentation　（exhibitio）；　i。　e。；　in　placing　beside　the　concept　an　intuition　corresponding　to　it。　Here　it　may　be　that　our　own　imagination　is　the　agent　employed；　as　in　the　case　of　art；　where　we　realize　a　preconceived　concept　of　an　object　which　we　set　before　ourselves　as　an　end。　Or　the　agent　may　be　nature　in　its　technic　（as　in　the　case　of　organic　bodies）；　when　we　read　into　it　our　own　concept　of　an　end　to