have　in　fact　attained　in　the　second　part　of　this　work。　　　With　this；　then；　I　bring　my　entire　critical　undertaking　to　a　close。　I　shall　hasten　to　the　doctrinal　part；　in　order；　as　far　as　possible；　to　snatch　from　my　advancing　years　what　time　may　yet　be　favourable　to　the　task。　It　is　obvious　that　no　separate　division　of　doctrine　is　reserved　for　the　faculty　of　judgement；　seeing　that；　with　judgement；　critique　takes　the　place　of　theory；　but；　following　the　division　of　philosophy　into　theoretical　and　practical；　and　of　pure　philosophy　in　the　same　way；　the　whole　ground　will　be　covered　by　the　metaphysics　of　nature　and　of　morals。
  INTRODUCTION。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I。　Division　of　Philosophy。
  Philosophy　may　be　said　to　contain　the　principles　of　the　rational　cognition　that　concepts　afford　us　of　things　（not　merely；　as　with　logic；　the　principles　of　the　form　of　thought　in　general　irrespective　of　the　objects）；　and；　thus　interpreted；　the　course；　usually　adopted；　of　dividing　it　into　theoretical　and　practical　is　perfectly　sound。　But　this　makes　imperative　a　specific　distinction　on　the　part　of　the　concepts　by　which　the　principles　of　this　rational　cognition　get　their　object　assigned　to　them；　for　if　the　concepts　are　not　distinct　they　fail　to　justify　a　division；　which　always　presupposes　that　the　principles　belonging　to　the　rational　cognition　of　the　several　parts　of　the　science　in　question　are　themselves　mutually　exclusive。　　　Now　there　are　but　two　kinds　of　concepts；　and　these　yield　a　corresponding　number　of　distinct　principles　of　the　possibility　of　their　objects。　The　concepts　referred　to　are　those　of　nature　and　that　of　freedom。　By　the　first　of　these；　a　theoretical　cognition　from　a　priori　principles　becomes　possible。　In　respect　of　such　cognition；　however；　the　second；　by　its　very　concept；　imports　no　more　than　a　negative　principle　（that　of　simple　antithesis）；　while　for　the　determination　of　the　will；　on　the　other　hand；　it　establishes　fundamental　principles　which　enlarge　the　scope　of　its　activity；　and　which　on　that　account　are　called　practical。　Hence　the　division　of　philosophy　falls　properly　into　two　parts；　quite　distinct　in　their　principles…a　theoretical；　as　philosophy　of　nature；　and　a　practical；　as　philosophy　of　morals　（for　this　is　what　the　practical　legislation　of　reason　by　the　concept　of　freedom　is　called）。　Hitherto；　however；　in　the　application　of　these　expressions　to　the　division　of　the　different　principles；　and　with　them　to　the　division　of　philosophy；　a　gross　misuse　of　the　terms　has　prevailed；　for　what　is　practical　according　to　concepts　of　nature　bas　been　taken　as　identical　with　what　is　practical　according　to　the　concept　of　freedom；　with　the　result　that　a　division　has　been　made　under　these　heads　of　theoretical　and　practical；　by　which；　in　effect；　there　has　been　no　division　at　all　（seeing　that　both　parts　might　have　similar　principles）。　　　The　will…for　this　is　what　is　said…is　the　faculty　of　desire　and；　as　such；　is　just　one　of　the　many　natural　causes　in　the　world；　the　one；　namely；　which　acts　by　concepts；　and　whatever　is　represented　as　possible　（or　necessary）　through　the　efficacy　of　will　is　called　practically　possible　（or　necessary）：　the　intention　being　to　distinguish　its　possibility　（or　necessity）　from　the　physical　possibility　or　necessity　of　an　effect　the　causality　of　whose　cause　is　not　determined　to　its　production　by　concepts　（but　rather；　as　with　lifeless　matter；　by　mechanism；　and；　as　with　the　lower　animals；　by　instinct）。　Now；　the　question　in　respect　of　the　practical　faculty：　whether；　that　is　to　say；　the　concept；　by　which　the　causality　of　the　will　gets　its　rule；　is　a　concept　of　nature　or　of　freedom；　is　here　left　quite　open。　　　The　latter　distinction；　however；　is　essential。　For；　let　the　concept　determining　the　causality　be　a　concept　of　nature；　and　then　the　principles　are　technically…practical；　but；　let　it　be　a　concept　of　freedom；　and　they　are　morally…practical。　Now；　in　the　division　of　a　rational　science　the　difference　between　objects　that　require　different　principles　for　their　cognition　is　the　difference　on　which　everything　turns。　Hence　technically…practical　principles　belong　to　theoretical　philosophy　（natural　science）；　whereas　those　morally…practical　alone　form　the　second　part；　that　is；　practical　philosophy　（ethical　science）。　　　All　technically…practical　rules　（i。e。；　those　of　art　and　skill　generally；　or　even　of　prudence；　as　a　skill　in　exercising　an　influence　over　men　and　their　wills）　must；　so　far　as　their　principles　rest　upon　concepts；　be　reckoned　only　as　corollaries　to　theoretical　philosophy。　For　they　only　touch　the　possibility　of　things　according　to　concepts　of　nature；　and　this　embraces；　not　alone　the　means　discoverable　in　nature　for　the　purpose；　but　even　the　will　itself　（as　a　faculty　of　desire；　and　consequently　a　natural　faculty）；　so　far　as　it　is　determinable　on　these　rules　by　natural　motives。　Still　these　practical　rules　are　not　called　laws　（like　physical　laws）；　but　only　precepts。　This　is　due　to　the　fact　that　the　will　does　not　stand　simply　under　the　natural　concept；　but　also　under　the　concept　of　freedom。　In　the　latter　connection　its　principles　are　called　laws；　and　these　principles；　with　the　addition　of　what　follows　them；　alone　constitute　the　second　at　practical　part　of　philosophy。　　　The　solution　of　the　problems　of　pure　geometry　is　not　allocated　to　a　special　part　of　that　science；　nor　does　the　art　of　land…surveying　merit　the　name　of　practical；　in　contradistinction　to　pure；　as　a　second　part　of　the　general　science　of　geometry；　and　with　equally　little；　or　perhaps　less；　right　can　the　mechanical　or　chemical　art　of　experiment　or　of　observation　be　ranked　as　a　practical　part　of　the　science　of　nature；　or；　in　fine；　domestic；　agricultural；　or　political　economy；　the　art　of　social　intercourse；　the　principles　of　dietetics；　or　even　general　instruction　as　to　the　attainment　of　happiness；　or　as　much　as　the　control　of　the　inclinations　or　the　restraining　of　the　affections　with　a　view　thereto；　be　denominated　practical　philosophy…not　to　mention　forming　these　latter　in　a　second　part　of　philosophy　in　general。　For；　between　them　all；　the　above　contain　nothing　more　than　rules　of　skill；　which　are　thus　only　technically　practical…the　skill　being　directed　to　producing　an　effect　which　is　possible　according　to　natural　concepts　of　causes　and　effects。　As　these　concepts　belong　to　theoretical　philosophy；　they　are　subject　to　those　precepts　as　mere　corollaries　of　theoretical　philosophy　（i。e。；　as　corollaries　of　natural　science）；　and　so　cannot　claim　any　place　in　any　special　philosophy　called　practical。　On　the　other　hand；　the　morally　practical　precepts；　which　are　founded　entirely　on　the　concept　of　freedom；　to　the　complete　exclusion　of　grounds　taken　from　nature　for　the　determination　of　the　will；　form　quite　a　special　kind　of　precepts。　These；　too；　like　the　rules　obeyed　by　nature；　are；　without　qualification；　called　laws…though　they　do　not；　like　the　latter；　rest　on　sensible　conditions；　but　upon　a　supersensible　principle…and　they　must　needs　have　a　separate　part　of　philosophy　allotted　to　them　as　their　own；　corresponding　to　the　theoretical　part；　and　termed　practical　philosophy　capable　　　Hence　it　is　evident　that　a　complex　of　practical　precepts　furnished　by　philosophy　does　not　form　a　special　part　of　philosophy；　co…ordinate　with　the　theoretical；　by　reason　of　its　precepts　being　practical…for　that　they　might　be；　notwithstanding　that　their　principles　were　derived　wholly　from　the　theoretical　knowledge　of　nature　（as　technically…practical　rules）。　But　an　adequate　reason　only　exists　where　their　principle；　being　in　no　way　borrowed　from　the　concept　of　nature；　which　is　always　sensibly　conditioned；　rests　consequently　on　the　supersensible；　which　the　concept　of　freedom　alone　makes　cognizable　by　means　of　its　formal　laws；　and　where；　therefore；　they　are　morally…practical；　i。　e。；　not　merely　precepts　and　its　and　rules　in　this　or　that　interest；　but　laws　independent　of　all　antecedent　reference　to　ends　or　aims。
  II。　The　Realm　of　Philosophy　in　General。
  The　employment　of　our　faculty　of　cognition　from　principles；　and　with　it　philosophy；　is　coextensive　with　the　applicability　of　a　priori　concepts。　　　Now　a　division　of　the　complex　of　all　the　objects　to　which　those　concepts　are　referred　for　the　purpose；　where　possible；　of　compassing　their　knowledge；　may　be　made　according　to　the　varied　competence　or　incompetence　of　our　faculty　in　that　connection。　　　Concepts；　so　far　as　they　are　referred　to　objects　apart　from　the　question　of　whether　knowledge　of　them　is　possible　or　not；　have　their　field；　which　is　determined　simply　by　the　relation　in　which　their　object　stands　to　our　faculty　of　cognition　in　general。　The　part　of　this　field　in　which　knowledge　is　possible　for　us　is　a　territory　（territorium）　for　these　concepts　and　the　requisite　cognitive　faculty。　The　part　of　the　territory　over　which　they　exercise　legislative　authority　is　the　realm　（ditio）　of　these　concepts；　and　their　appropriate　cognitive　faculty。　Empirical　concepts　have；　therefore；　their　territory；　doubtless；　in　nature　as　the　complex　of　all　sensible　objects；　but　they　have　no　realm　（only　a　dwelling…place；　domicilium）；　for；　although　they　are　formed　according　to　law；　they　are　not　themselves　legislative；　but　the　rules　founded　on　them　are　empirical　and；　consequentl