1790
  THE　CRITIQUE　OF　JUDGEMENT
  by　Immanuel　Kant
  translated　by　James　Creed　Meredith
  PREFACE　TO　THE　FIRST　EDITION　1790。
  The　faculty　of　knowledge　from　a　priori　principles　may　be　called　pure　reason；　and　the　general　investigation　into　its　possibility　and　bounds　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason。　This　is　permissible　although　〃pure　reason；〃　as　was　the　case　with　the　same　use　of　terms　in　our　first　work；　is　only　intended　to　denote　reason　in　its　theoretical　employment；　and　although　there　is　no　desire　to　bring　under　review　its　faculty　as　practical　reason　and　its　special　principles　as　such。　That　Critique　is；　then；　an　investigation　addressed　simply　to　our　faculty　of　knowing　things　a　priori。　Hence　it　makes　our　cognitive　faculties　its　sole　concern；　to　the　exclusion　of　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure　and　the　faculty　of　desire；　and　among　the　cognitive　faculties　it　confines　its　attention　to　understanding　and　its　a　priori　principles；　to　the　exclusion　of　judgement　and　reason；　（faculties　that　also　belong　to　theoretical　cognition；）　because　it　turns　out　in　the　sequel　that　there　is　no　cognitive　faculty　other　than　understanding　capable　of　affording　constitutive　a　priori　principles　of　knowledge。　Accordingly　the　critique　which　sifts　these　faculties　one　and　all；　so　as　to　try　the　possible　claims　of　each　of　the　other　faculties　to　a　share　in　the　clear　possession　of　knowledge　from　roots　of　its　own；　retains　nothing　but　what　understanding　prescribes　a　priori　as　a　law　for　nature　as　the　complex　of　phenomena…the　form　of　these　being　similarly　furnished　a　priori。　All　other　pure　concepts　it　relegates　to　the　rank　of　ideas；*　which　for　our　faculty　of　theoretical　cognition　are　transcendent；　though　they　are　not　without　their　use　nor　redundant；　but　discharge　certain　functions　as　regulative　principles。**　For　these　concepts　serve　partly　to　restrain　the　officious　pretentions　of　understanding；　which；　presuming　on　its　ability　to　supply　a　priori　the　conditions　of　the　possibility　of　all　things　which　it　is　capable　of　knowing；　behaves　as　if　it　had　thus　determined　these　bounds　as　those　of　the　possibility　of　all　things　generally；　and　partly　also　to　lead　understanding；　in　its　study　of　nature；　according　to　a　principle　of　completeness；　unattainable　as　this　remains　for　it；　and　so　to　promote　the　ultimate　aim　of　all　knowledge。
  *＇The　word　is　defined　in　SS　17　&　SS　57　Remark　I。　See　Critique　of　Pure　Reason；　〃Of　the　Conceptions　of　Pure　Reason〃　…　Section　1　&　2：　〃I　understand　by　idea　a　necessary　conception　of　reason；　to　which　no　corresponding　object　can　be　discovered　in　the　world　of　sense。〃　（Ibid。；　Section　2。）　〃They　contain　a　certain　perfection；　attainable　by　no　possible　empirical　cognition；　and　they　give　to　reason　a　systematic　unity；　to　which　the　unity　of　experience　attempts　to　approximate；　but　can　never　completely　attain。〃　（Ibid。；　〃Ideal　of　Pure　Reason〃）。　　　**＇Cf。　Critique　of　Pure　Reason；　Appendix。＇
  Properly；　therefore；　it　was　understanding　which；　so　far　as　it　contains　constitutive　a　priori　cognitive　principles；　has　its　special　realm；　and　one；　moreover；　in　our　faculty　of　knowledge　that　the　Critique；　called　in　a　general　way　that　of　pure　reason　was　intended　to　establish　in　secure　but　particular　possession　against　all　other　competitors。　In　the　same　way　reason；　which　contains　constitutive　a　priori　principles　solely　in　respect　of　the　faculty　of　desire；　gets　its　holding　assigned　to　it　by　The　Critique　of　Practical　Reason。　　　But　now　comes　judgement；　which　in　the　order　of　our　cognitive　faculties　forms　a　middle　term　between　understanding　and　reason。　Has　it　also　got　independent　a　priori　principles？　If　so；　are　they　constitutive；　or　are　they　merely　regulative；　thus　indicating　no　special　realm？　And　do　they　give　a　rule　a　priori　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　and　displeasure；　as　the　middle　term　between　the　faculties　of　cognition　and　desire；　just　as　understanding　prescribes　laws　a　priori　for　the　former　and　reason　for　the　latter？　This　is　the　topic　to　which　the　present　Critique　is　devoted。　　　A　critique　of　pure　reason；　i。e。；　of　our　faculty　of　judging　on　a　priori　principles；　would　be　incomplete　if　the　critical　examination　of　judgement；　which　is　a　faculty　of　knowledge；　and　as　such　lays　claim　to　independent　principles；　were　not　dealt　with　separately。　Still；　however；　its　principles　cannot；　in　a　system　of　pure　philosophy；　form　a　separate　constituent　part　intermediate　between　the　theoretical　and　practical　divisions；　but　may　when　needful　be　annexed　to　one　or　other　as　occasion　requires。　For　if　such　a　system　is　some　day　worked　out　under　the　general　name　of　metaphysic…and　its　full　and　complete　execution　is　both　possible　and　of　the　utmost　importance　for　the　employment　of　reason　in　all　departments　of　its　activity…the　critical　examination　of　the　ground　for　this　edifice　must　have　been　previously　carried　down　to　the　very　depths　of　the　foundations　of　the　faculty　of　principles　independent　of　experience；　lest　in　some　quarter　it　might　give　way；　and　sinking；　inevitably　bring　with　it　the　ruin　of　all。　　　We　may　readily　gather；　however；　from　the　nature　of　the　faculty　of　judgement　（whose　correct　employment　is　so　necessary　and　universally　requisite　that　it　is　just　this　faculty　that　is　intended　when　we　speak　of　sound　understanding）　that　the　discovery　of　a　peculiar　principle　belonging　to　it…and　some　such　it　must　contain　in　itself　a　priori；　for　otherwise　it　would　not　be　a　cognitive　faculty　the　distinctive　character　of　which　is　obvious　to　the　most　commonplace　criticism…must　be　a　task　involving　considerable　difficulties。　For　this　principle　is　one　which　must　not　be　derived　from　a　priori　concepts；　seeing　that　these　are　the　property　of　understanding；　and　judgement　is　only　directed　to　their　application。　It　has；　therefore；　itself　to　furnish　a　concept；　and　one　from　which；　properly；　we　get　no　cognition　of　a　thing；　but　which　it　can　itself　employ　as　a　rule　only…but　not　as　an　objective　rule　to　which　it　can　adapt　its　judgement；　because；　for　that；　another　faculty　of　judgement　would　again　be　required　to　enable　us　to　decide　whether　the　case　was　one　for　the　application　of　the　rule　or　not。　　　It　is　chiefly　in　those　estimates　that　are　called　aesthetic；　and　which　relate　to　the　beautiful　and　sublime；　whether　of　nature　or　of　art；　that　one　meets　with　the　above　difficulty　about　a　principle　（be　it　subjective　or　objective）。　And　yet　the　critical　search　for　a　principle　of　judgement　in　their　case　is　the　most　important　item　in　a　critique　of　this　faculty。　For；　although　they　do　not　of　themselves　contribute　a　whit　to　the　knowledge　of　things；　they　still　belong　wholly　to　the　faculty　of　knowledge；　and　evidence　an　immediate　bearing　of　this　faculty　upon　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure　according　to　some　a　priori　principle；　and　do　so　without　confusing　this　principle　with　what　is　capable　of　being　a　determining　ground　of　the　faculty　of　desire；　for　the　latter　has　its　principles　a　priori　in　concepts　of　reason。　Logical　estimates　of　nature；　however；　stand　on　a　different　footing。　They　deal　with　cases　in　which　experience　presents　a　conformity　to　law　in　things；　which　the　understanding's　general　concept　of　the　sensible　is　no　longer　adequate　to　render　intelligible　or　explicable；　and　in　which　judgement　may　have　recourse　to　itself　for　a　principle　of　the　reference　of　the　natural　thing　to　the　unknowable　supersensible　and；　indeed；　must　employ　some　such　principle；　though　with　a　regard　only　to　itself　and　the　knowledge　of　nature。　For　in　these　cases　the　application　of　such　an　a　priori　principle　for　the　cognition　of　what　is　in　the　world　is　both　possible　and　necessary；　and　withal　opens　out　prospects　which　are　profitable　for　practical　reason。　But　here　there　is　no　immediate　reference　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure。　But　this　is　precisely　the　riddle　in　the　principle　of　judgement　that　necessitates　a　separate　division　for　this　faculty　in　the　critique…for　there　was　nothing　to　prevent　the　formation　of　logical　estimates　according　to　concepts　（from　which　no　immediate　conclusion　can　ever　be　drawn　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure）　having　been　treated；　with　a　critical　statement　of　its　limitations；　in　an　appendage　to　the　theoretical　part　of　philosophy。　　　The　present　investigation　of　taste；　as　a　faculty　of　aesthetic　judgement；　not　being　undertaken　with　a　view　to　the　formation　or　culture　of　taste　（which　will　pursue　its　course　in　the　future；　as　in　the　past；　independently　of　such　inquiries）；　but　being　merely　directed　to　its　transcendental　aspects；　I　feel　assured　of　its　indulgent　criticism　in　respect　of　any　shortcomings　on　that　score。　But　in　all　that　is　relevant　to　the　transcendental　aspect　it　must　be　prepared　to　stand　the　test　of　the　most　rigorous　examination。　Yet　even　here　I　venture　to　hope　that　the　difficulty　of　unravelling　a　problem　so　involved　in　its　nature　may　serve　as　an　excuse　for　a　certain　amount　of　hardly　avoidable　obscurity　in　its　solution；　provided　that　the　accuracy　of　our　statement　of　the　principle　is　proved　with　all　requisite　clearness。　I　admit　that　the　mode　of　deriving　the　phenomena　of　judgement　from　that　principle　has　not　all　the　lucidity　that　is　rightly　demanded　elsewhere；　where　the　subject　is　cognition　by　concepts；　and　that　I　believe　I　h