be　true　that　the　principle　of　the　Nebraska　Bill　was　the　cause
  that　led　to　the　adoption　of　these　measures。　　It　is　now　more　than
  fifty　years　since　the　last　of　these　States　adopted　its　system　of
  emancipation。
  If　the　Nebraska　Bill　is　the　real　author　of　the　benevolent　works；
  it　is　rather　deplorable　that　it　has　for　so　long　a　time　ceased
  working　altogether。　　Is　there　not　some　reason　to　suspect　that　it
  was　the　principle　of　the　Revolution；　and　not　the　principle　of　the
  Nebraska　Bill；　that　led　to　emancipation　in　these　old　States？
  Leave　it　to　the　people　of　these　old　emancipating　States；　and　I　am
  quite　certain　they　will　decide　that　neither　that　nor　any　other
  good　thing　ever　did　or　ever　will　come　of　the　Nebraska　Bill。
  In　the　course　of　my　main　argument；　Judge　Douglas　interrupted　me
  to　say　that　the　principle　of　the　Nebraska　Bill　was　very　old；　that
  it　originated　when　God　made　man；　and　placed　good　and　evil　before
  him；　allowing　him　to　choose　for　himself；　being　responsible　for
  the　choice　he　should　make。　　At　the　time　I　thought　this　was　merely
  playful；　and　I　answered　it　accordingly。　　But　in　his　reply　to　me
  he　renewed　it　as　a　serious　argument。　　In　seriousness；　then；　the
  facts　of　this　proposition　are　not　true　as　stated。　　God　did　not
  place　good　and　evil　before　man；　telling　him　to　make　his　choice。
  On　the　contrary；　he　did　tell　him　there　was　one　tree　of　the　fruit
  of　which　he　should　not　eat；　upon　pain　of　certain　death。　　I　should
  scarcely　wish　so　strong　a　prohibition　against　slavery　in
  Nebraska。
  But　this　argument　strikes　me　as　not　a　little　remarkable　in
  another　particularin　its　strong　resemblance　to　the　old　argument
  for　the　divine　right　of　kings。〃　By　the　latter；　the　king　is　to　do
  just　as　he　pleases　with　his　white　subjects；　being　responsible　to
  God　alone。　　By　the　former；　the　white　man　is　to　do　just　as　he
  pleases　with　his　black　slaves；　being　responsible　to　God　alone。
  The　two　things　are　precisely　alike；　and　it　is　but　natural　that
  they　should　find　similar　arguments　to　sustain　them。
  I　had　argued　that　the　application　of　the　principle　of　self…
  government；　as　contended　for；　would　require　the　revival　of　the
  African　slave　trade；　that　no　argument　could　be　made　in　favor　of　a
  man's　right　to　take　slaves　to　Nebraska　which　could　not　be　equally
  well　made　in　favor　of　his　right　to　bring　them　from　the　coast　of
  Africa。　　The　Judge　replied　that　the　Constitution　requires　the
  suppression　of　the　foreign　slave　trade；　but　does　not　require　the
  prohibition　of　slavery　in　the　Territories。　　That　is　a　mistake　in
  point　of　fact。　　The　Constitution　does　not　require　the　action　of
  Congress　in　either　case；　and　it　does　authorize　it　in　both。　　And
  so　there　is　still　no　difference　between　the　cases。
  In　regard　to　what　I　have　said　of　the　advantage　the　slave　States
  have　over　the　free　in　the　matter　of　representation；　the　Judge
  replied　that　we　in　the　free　States　count　five　free　negroes　as
  five　white　people；　while　in　the　slave　States　they　count　five
  slaves　as　three　whites　only；　and　that　the　advantage；　at　last；　was
  on　the　side　of　the　free　States。
  Now；　in　the　slave　States　they　count　free　negroes　just　as　we　do；
  and　it　so　happens　that；　besides　their　slaves；　they　have　as　many
  free　negroes　as　we　have；　and　thirty　thousand　over。　　Thus；　their
  free　negroes　more　than　balance　ours；　and　their　advantage　over　us；
  in　consequence　of　their　slaves；　still　remains　as　I　stated　it。
  In　reply　to　my　argument　that　the　compromise　measures　of　1850　were
  a　system　of　equivalents；　and　that　the　provisions　of　no　one　of
  them　could　fairly　be　carried　to　other　subjects　without　its
  corresponding　equivalent　being　carried　with　it；　the　Judge　denied
  outright　that　these　measures　had　any　connection　with　or
  dependence　upon　each　other。　　This　is　mere　desperation。　　If　they
  had　no　connection；　why　are　they　always　spoken　of　in　connection？
  Why　has　he　so　spoken　of　them　a　thousand　times？　　Why　has　he
  constantly　called　them　a　series　of　measures？　　Why　does　everybody
  call　them　a　compromise？　　Why　was　California　kept　out　of　the　Union
  six　or　seven　months；　if　it　was　not　because　of　its　connection　with
  the　other　measures？　　Webster's　leading　definition　of　the　verb　〃to
  compromise〃　is　〃to　adjust　and　settle　a　difference；　by　mutual
  agreement；　with　concessions　of　claims　by　the　parties。〃　This
  conveys　precisely　the　popular　understanding　of　the　word
  〃compromise。
  We　knew；　before　the　Judge　told　us；　that　these　measures　passed
  separately；　and　in　distinct　bills；　and　that　no　two　of　them　were
  passed　by　the　votes　of　precisely　the　same　members。　　But　we　also
  know；　and　so　does　he　know；　that　no　one　of　them　could　have　passed
  both　branches　of　Congress　but　for　the　understanding　that　the
  others　were　to　pass　also。　　Upon　this　understanding；　each　got
  votes　which　it　could　have　got　in　no　other　way。　　It　is　this　fact
  which　gives　to　the　measures　their　true　character；　and　it　is　the
  universal　knowledge　of　this　fact　that　has　given　them　the　name　of
  〃compromises；〃　so　expressive　of　that　true　character。
  I　had　asked：　〃If；　in　carrying　the　Utah　and　New　Mexico　laws　to
  Nebraska；　you　could　clear　away　other　objection；　how　could　you
  leave　Nebraska　'perfectly　free'　to　introduce　slavery　before　she
  forms　a　constitution；　during　her　territorial　government；　while
  the　Utah　and　New　Mexico　laws　only　authorize　it　when　they　form
  constitutions　and　are　admitted　into　the　Union？〃　　To　this　Judge
  Douglas　answered　that　the　Utah　and　New　Mexico　laws　also
  authorized　it　before；　and　to　prove　this　he　read　from　one　of　their
  laws；　as　follows：　〃That　the　legislative　power　of　said　Territory
  shall　extend　to　all　rightful　subjects　of　legislation；　consistent
  with　the　Constitution　of　the　United　States　and　the　provisions　of
  this　act。〃
  Now　it　is　perceived　from　the　reading　of　this　that　there　is
  nothing　express　upon　the　subject；　but　that　the　authority　is
  sought　to　be　implied　merely　for　the　general　provision　of　〃all
  rightful　subjects　of　legislation。〃　In　reply　to　this　I　insist；　as
  a　legal　rule　of　construction；　as　well　as　the　plain；　popular　view
  of　the　matter；　that　the　express　provision　for　Utah　and　New　Mexico
  coming　in　with　slavery；　if　they　choose；　when　they　shall　form
  constitutions；　is　an　exclusion　of　all　implied　authority　on　the
  same　subject；　that　Congress　having　the　subject　distinctly　in
  their　minds　when　they　made　the　express　provision；　they　therein
  expressed　their　whole　meaning　on　that　subject。
  The　Judge　rather　insinuated　that　I　had　found　it　convenient　to
  forget　the　Washington　territorial　law　passed　in　1853。　　This　was　a
  division　of　Oregon；　organizing　the　northern　part　as　the　Territory
  of　Washington。　　He　asserted　that　by　this　act　the　Ordinance　of
  '87；　theretofore　existing　in　Oregon；　was　repealed；　that　nearly
  all　the　members　of　Congress　voted　for　it；　beginning　in　the　House
  of　Representatives　with　Charles　Allen　of　Massachusetts；　and
  ending　with　Richard　Yates　of　Illinois；　and　that　he　could　not
  understand　how　those　who　now　opposed　the　Nebraska　Bill　so　voted
  there；　unless　it　was　because　it　was　then　too　soon　after　both　the
  great　political　parties　had　ratified　the　compromises　of　1850；　and
  the　ratification　therefore　was　too　fresh　to　be　then　repudiated。
  Now　I　had　seen　the　Washington　act　before；　and　I　have　carefully
  examined　it　since；　and　I　aver　that　there　is　no　repeal　of　the
  Ordinance　of　'87；　or　of　any　prohibition　of　slavery；　in　it。　　In
  express　terms；　there　is　absolutely　nothing　in　the　whole　law　upon
  the　subjectin　fact；　nothing　to　lead　a　reader　to　think　of　the
  subject。　　To　my　judgment　it　is　equally　free　from　everything　from
  which　repeal　can　be　legally　implied；　but；　however　this　may　be；
  are　men　now　to　be　entrapped　by　a　legal　implication；　extracted
  from　covert　language；　introduced　perhaps　for　the　very　purpose　of
  entrapping　them？　　I　sincerely　wish　every　man　could　read　this　law
  quite　through；　carefully　watching　every　sentence　and　every　line
  for　a　repeal　of　the　Ordinance　of　'87；　or　anything　equivalent　to
  it。
  Another　point　on　the　Washington　act：　If　it　was　intended　to　be
  modeled　after　the　Utah　and　New　Mexico　acts；　as　Judge　Douglas
  insists；　why　was　it　not　inserted　in　it；　as　in　them；　that
  Washington　was　to　come　in　with　or　without　slavery　as　she　may
  choose　at　the　adoption　of　her　constitution？　　It　has　no　such
  provision　in　it；　and　I　defy　the　ingenuity　of　man　to　give　a　reason
  for　the　omission；　other　than　that　it　was　not　intended　to　follow
  the　Utah　and　New　Mexico　laws　in　regard　to　the　question　of
  slavery。
  The　Washington　act　not　only　differs　vitally　from　the　Utah　and　New
  Mexico　acts；　but　the　Nebraska　act　differs　vitally　from　both。　　By
  the　latter　act　the　people　are　left　〃perfectly　free〃　to　regulate
  their　own　domestic　concerns；　etc。；　but　in　all　the　former；　all
  their　laws　are　to　be　submitted　to　Congress；　and　if　disapproved
  are　to　be　null。　　The　Washington　act　goes　even　further；　it
  absolutely　prohibits　the　territorial　Legislature；　by　very　strong
  and　guarded　language；　from　establishing　banks　or　borrowing　money