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管他三七二十一 更新:2021-02-19 00:30 字数:9322
ON DREAMS
by Aristotle
translated by J。 I。 Beare
1
WE must; in the next place; investigate the subject of the dream;
and first inquire to which of the faculties of the soul it presents
itself; i。e。 whether the affection is one which pertains to the
faculty of intelligence or to that of sense…perception; for these
are the only faculties within us by which we acquire knowledge。
If; then; the exercise of the faculty of sight is actual seeing;
that of the auditory faculty; hearing; and; in general that of the
faculty of sense…perception; perceiving; and if there are some
perceptions common to the senses; such as figure; magnitude; motion;
&c。; while there are others; as colour; sound; taste; peculiar 'each
to its own sense'; and further; if all creatures; when the eyes are
closed in sleep; are unable to see; and the analogous statement is
true of the other senses; so that manifestly we perceive nothing
when asleep; we may conclude that it is not by sense…perception we
perceive a dream。
But neither is it by opinion that we do so。 For 'in dreams' we not
only assert; e。g。 that some object approaching is a man or a horse
'which would be an exercise of opinion'; but that the object is
white or beautiful; points on which opinion without sense…perception
asserts nothing either truly or falsely。 It is; however; a fact that
the soul makes such assertions in sleep。 We seem to see equally well
that the approaching figure is a man; and that it is white。 'In
dreams'; too; we think something else; over and above the dream
presentation; just as we do in waking moments when we perceive
something; for we often also reason about that which we perceive。
So; too; in sleep we sometimes have thoughts other than the mere
phantasms immediately before our minds。 This would be manifest to
any one who should attend and try; immediately on arising from
sleep; to remember 'his dreaming experience'。 There are cases of
persons who have seen such dreams; those; for example; who believe
themselves to be mentally arranging a given list of subjects according
to the mnemonic rule。 They frequently find themselves engaged in
something else besides the dream; viz。 in setting a phantasm which
they envisage into its mnemonic position。 Hence it is plain that not
every 'phantasm' in sleep is a mere dream…image; and that the
further thinking which we perform then is due to an exercise of the
faculty of opinion。
So much at least is plain on all these points; viz。 that the faculty
by which; in waking hours; we are subject to illusion when affected by
disease; is identical with that which produces illusory effects in
sleep。 So; even when persons are in excellent health; and know the
facts of the case perfectly well; the sun; nevertheless; appears to
them to be only a foot wide。 Now; whether the presentative faculty
of the soul be identical with; or different from; the faculty of
sense…perception; in either case the illusion does not occur without
our actually seeing or 'otherwise' perceiving something。 Even to see
wrongly or to hear wrongly can happen only to one who sees or hears
something real; though not exactly what he supposes。 But we have
assumed that in sleep one neither sees; nor hears; nor exercises any
sense whatever。 Perhaps we may regard it as true that the dreamer sees
nothing; yet as false that his faculty of sense…perception is
unaffected; the fact being that the sense of seeing and the other
senses may possibly be then in a certain way affected; while each of
these affections; as duly as when he is awake; gives its impulse in
a certain manner to his 'primary' faculty of sense; though not in
precisely the same manner as when he is awake。 Sometimes; too; opinion
says 'to dreamers' just as to those who are awake; that the object
seen is an illusion; at other times it is inhibited; and becomes a
mere follower of the phantasm。
It is plain therefore that this affection; which we name 'dreaming';
is no mere exercise of opinion or intelligence; but yet is not an
affection of the faculty of perception in the simple sense。 If it were
the latter it would be possible 'when asleep' to hear and see in the
simple sense。
How then; and in what manner; it takes place; is what we have to
examine。 Let us assume; what is indeed clear enough; that the
affection 'of dreaming' pertains to sense…perception as surely as
sleep itself does。 For sleep does not pertain to one organ in
animals and dreaming to another; both pertain to the same organ。
But since we have; in our work On the Soul; treated of presentation;
and the faculty of presentation is identical with that of
sense…perception; though the essential notion of a faculty of
presentation is different from that of a faculty of
sense…perception; and since presentation is the movement set up by a
sensory faculty when actually discharging its function; while a
dream appears to be a presentation (for a presentation which occurs in
sleep…whether simply or in some particular way…is what we call a
dream): it manifestly follows that dreaming is an activity of the
faculty of sense…perception; but belongs to this faculty qua
presentative。
2
We can best obtain a scientific view of the nature of the dream
and the manner in which it originates by regarding it in the light
of the circumstances attending sleep。 The objects of
sense…perception corresponding to each sensory organ produce
sense…perception in us; and the affection due to their operation is
present in the organs of sense not only when the perceptions are
actualized; but even when they have departed。
What happens in these cases may be compared with what happens in the
case of projectiles moving in space。 For in the case of these the
movement continues even when that which set up the movement is no
longer in contact 'with the things that are moved'。 For that which set
them in motion moves a certain portion of air; and this; in turn;
being moved excites motion in another portion; and so; accordingly; it
is in this way that 'the bodies'; whether in air or in liquids;
continue moving; until they come to a standstill。
This we must likewise assume to happen in the case of qualitative
change; for that part which 'for example' has been heated by something
hot; heats 'in turn' the part next to it; and this propagates the
affection continuously onwards until the process has come round to its
oint of origination。 This must also happen in the organ wherein the
exercise of sense…perception takes place; since sense…perception; as
realized in actual perceiving; is a mode of qualitative change。 This
explains why the affection continues in the sensory organs; both in
their deeper and in their more superficial parts; not merely while
they are actually engaged in perceiving; but even after they have
ceased to do so。 That they do this; indeed; is obvious in cases
where we continue for some time engaged in a particular form of
perception; for then; when we shift the scene of our perceptive
activity; the previous affection remains; for instance; when we have
turned our gaze from sunlight into darkness。 For the result of this is
that one sees nothing; owing to the excited by the light still
subsisting in our eyes。 Also; when we have looked steadily for a
long while at one colour; e。g。 at white or green; that to which we
next transfer our gaze appears to be of the same colour。 Again if;
after having looked at the sun or some other brilliant object; we
close the eyes; then; if we watch carefully; it appears in a right
line with the direction of vision (whatever this may be); at first
in its own colour; then it changes to crimson; next to purple; until
it becomes black and disappears。 And also when persons turn away
from looking at objects in motion; e。g。 rivers; and especially those
which flow very rapidly; they find that the visual stimulations
still present themselves; for the things really at rest are then
seen moving: persons become very deaf after hearing loud noises; and
after smelling very strong odours their power of smelling is impaired;
and similarly in other cases。 These phenomena manifestly take place in
the way above described。
That the sensory organs are acutely sensitive to even a slight
qualitative difference 'in their objects' is shown by what happens
in the case of mirrors; a subject to which; even taking it
independently; one might devote close consideration and inquiry。 At
the same time it becomes plain from them that as the eye 'in seeing'