The　King　has　no　voice；　directly　or　indirectly；　in　the　choice　of
  judges；　public　prosecutors；　bishops；　curés；　collectors　and　assessors
  of　the　taxes；　commissaries　of　police；　district　and　departmental
  administrators；　mayors；　and　municipal　officers。　　At　most；　should　an
  administrator　violate　a　law；　he　may　annul　his　acts　and　suspend　him；
  but　the　Assembly；　the　superior　power；　has　the　right　to　cancel　this
  suspension。　…　As　to　the　armed　force；　of　which　he　is　supposed　to　be
  the　commander…in…chief；　this　escapes　from　him　entirely：　the　National
  Guard　is　not　to　receive　orders　from　him；　the　gendarmerie　and　the
  troops　are　bound　to　respond　to　the　requisitions　of　the　municipal
  authorities；　whom　the　King　can　neither　select　nor　displace：　in
  short；　local　action　of　any　kind　…　that　is　to　say；　all　effective
  action　…　is　denied　to　him。　…　The　executive　instrument　is　purposely
  destroyed。　　The　connection　which　existed　between　the　wheels　of　the
  extremities　and　the　central　shaft　is　broken；　and　henceforth；
  incapable　of　distributing　its　energy；　this　shaft；　in　the　hands　of
  the　monarch；　stands　still　or　else　turns　to　no　purpose。　　The　King；
  〃supreme　head　of　the　general　administration；　of　the　army；　and　of　the
  navy；　guardian　of　public　peace　and　order；　hereditary　representative
  of　the　nation；〃　is　without　the　means；　in　spite　of　his　lofty　titles；
  of　directly　applying　his　pretended　powers；　of　causing　a　schedule　of
  assessments　to　be　drawn　up　in　a　refractory　commune；　of　compelling
  payment　by　a　delinquent　tax…payer；　of　enforcing　the　free　circulation
  of　a　convoy　of　grain；　of　executing　the　judgment　of　a　court；　of
  suppressing　an　outbreak；　or　of　securing　protection　to　persons　and
  property。　　For　he　can　bring　no　constraint　to　bear　on　the　agents　who
  are　declared　to　be　subordinate　to　him；　he　has　no　resources　but　those
  of　warning　and　persuasion。　　He　sends　to　each　Departmental　Assembly
  the　decrees　which　he　has　sanctioned；　requesting　it　to　transmit　them
  and　cause　them　to　be　carried　out；　he　receives　its　correspondence　and
  bestows　his　censure　or　approval　…　and　that　is　all。　　He　is　merely　a
  powerless　medium　of　communication；　a　herald　or　public　advertiser；　a
  sort　of　central　echo；　sonorous　and　empty；　to　which　news　is　brought；
  and　from　which　laws　depart；　to　spread　abroad　like　a　common　rumor。
  Such　as　he　is；　and　thus　diminished；　he　is　still　considered　to　be　too
  strong。　　He　is　deprived　of　the　right　of　pardon；　〃which　severs　the
  last　artery　of　monarchical　government。〃＇6＇　　All　sorts　of　precautions
  are　taken　against　him。　　He　cannot　declare　war　without　a　decree　of
  the　Assembly；　he　is　obliged　to　bring　war　to　an　end　on　the　decree　of
  the　Assembly；　he　cannot　make　a　treaty　of　peace；　an　alliance；　or　a
  commercial　treaty；　without　the　ratification　of　these　by　the
  Assembly。　　It　is　expressly　declared　that　he　is　to　nominate　but　two…
  thirds　of　the　rear…admirals；　one…half　of　the　lieutenant…generals；
  field…marshals；　captains　of　Vessels　and　colonels　of　the　gendarmerie；
  one…third　of　the　colonels　and　lieutenant…colonels　of　the　line；　and　a
  sixth　of　the　naval　lieutenants。　　He　must　not　allow　troops　to　stay　or
  pass　within　30；000　yards　of　the　Assembly。　　His　guard　must　not
  consist　of　more　than　1；800　men；　duly　verified；　and　protected　against
  his　seductions　by　the　civil　oath。　　The　heir…presumptive　must　not
  leave　the　country　without　the　Assembly's　assent。　　It　is　the　Assembly
  which　is　to　regulate　by　law　the　education　of　his　son　during
  minority。　…　All　these　precautions　are　accompanied　with　threats。
  There　are　against　him　five　possible　causes　of　dethronement；　against
  his　responsible　Ministers；　eight　causes　for　condemnation　to　from
  twelve　to　twenty　years　of　constraint；　and　eight　grounds　for
  condemnations　to　death。＇7＇　　Everywhere　between　the　lines　of　the
  Constitution；　we　read　the　constant　disposition　to　assume　an　attitude
  of　defense；　the　secret　dread　of　treachery；　the　conviction　that
  executive　power；　of　whatever　kind；　is　in　its　nature　inimical　to　the
  public　welfare。　…　For　withholding　the　nomination　of　judges；　the
  reason　alleged　is　that　〃the　Court　and　the　Ministers　are　the　most
  contemptible　portion　of　the　nation。〃＇8＇　　If　the　nomination　of
  Ministers　is　conceded；　it　is　on　the　ground　that〃　Ministers　appointed
  by　the　people　would　necessarily　be　too　highly　esteemed。〃　The
  principle　is　that　〃the　legislative　body　alone　must　possess　the
  confidence　of　the　people；〃　that　royal　authority　corrupts　its
  depository；　and　that　executive　power　is　always　tempted　to　commit
  abuses　and　to　engage　in　conspiracies。　　If　it　is　provided　for　in　the
  Constitution　it　is　with　regret；　through　the　necessity　of　the　case；
  and　on　the　condition　of　its　being　trammeled　by　impediments；　it　will
  prove　so　much　the　less　baneful　in　proportion　as　it　is　restrained；
  guarded；　threatened；　and　denounced。　…　A　position　of　this　kind　is
  manifestly　intolerable；　and　only　a　man　as　passive　as　Louis　XVI。
  could　have　put　up　with　it。　　Do　what　he　will；　however；　he　cannot　make
  it　a　tenable　one。　　In　vain　does　he　scrupulously　adhere　to　the
  Constitution；　and　fulfill　it　to　the　letter。　　Because　he　is　powerless
  the　Assembly　regards　him　as　lukewarm；　and　imputes　to　him　the
  friction　of　the　machine　which　is　not　under　his　control。　　If　he
  presumes　once　to　exercise　his　veto　it　is　rebellion；　and　the
  rebellion　of　an　official　against　his　superior；　which　is　the
  Assembly；　the　rebellion　of　a　subject　against　his　Sovereign；　which　is
  the　people。　　In　this　case　dethronement　is　proper；　and　the　Assembly
  has　only　to　pass　the　decree；　the　people　have　simply　to　execute　the
  act；　and　the　Constitution　ends　in　a　Revolution。　…　A　piece　of
  machinery　of　this　stamp　breaks　down　through　its　own　movement。　　In
  conformity　with　the　philosophic　theory　the　two　wheels　of　government
  must　be　separated；　and　to　do　this　they　have　to　be　disconnected　and
  isolated　one　from　the　other。　　In　conformity　with　the　popular　creed；
  the　driving…wheel　　must　be　subordinated　and　its　influence
  neutralized：　to　do　this　it　is　necessary　to　reduce　its　energy　to　a
  minimum；　break　up　its　connections；　and　raise　it　up　in　the　air　to
  turn　round　like　a　top；　or　to　remain　there　as　an　obstacle　to
  something　else。　　It　is　certain　that；　after　much　ill…usage　as　a
  plaything；　it　will　finally　be　removed　as　a　hindrance。
  II。　　THE　CREATION　OF　POPULAR　DEMOCRACY。
  Administrative　powers。　…　The　Assembly　on　the　hierarchy。　…　Grades
  abolished。　…　Collective　powers。　…　Election　introduced；　and　the
  influence　of　subordinates　in　all　branches　of　the　service。　…
  Certainty　of　disorganization。　…　Power　in　the　hands　of　municipal
  bodies。
  Let　us　leave　the　center　of　government　and　go　to　the　extremities；　and
  observe　the　various　administrations　in　working　operation。＇9＇
  For　any　service　to　work　well　and　with　precision；　there　must　be　a
  single　and　unique　chief　who　can　appoint；　pay；　punish　and　dismiss　his
  subordinates。　…　For；　on　the　one　hand；　he　stands　alone　and　feels　his
  responsibility；　he　brings　to　bear　on　the　management　of　affairs　a
  degree　of　attention　and　consistency；　a　tact　and　a　power　of
  initiation　of　which　a　committee　is　incapable；　corporate　follies　or
  defects　do　not　involve　any　one　in　particular；　and　authority　is
  effective　only　when　it　is　in　one　hand。　…　On　the　other　hand；　being
  master；　he　can　rely　on　the　subalterns　whom　he　has　himself　selected；
  whom　he　controls　through　their　hopes　or　fears；　and　whom　he
  discharges　if　they　do　not　perform　their　duties；　otherwise　he　has　no
  hold　on　them　and　they　are　not　instruments　to　be　depended　on。　　Only
  on　these　conditions　can　a　railway　manager　be　sure　that　his　pointsmen
  are　on　the　job。　　Only　on　these　conditions　can　the　foreman　of　a
  foundry　engage　to　execute　work　by　a　given　day。　　In　every　public　or
  private　enterprise；　direct；　immediate　authority　is　the　only　known；
  the　only　human　and　possible　way　to　ensure　the　obedience　and
  punctuality　of　agents。　…　Administration　is　thus　carried　on　in　all
  countries；　by　one　or　several　series　of　functionaries；　each　under
  some　central　manager　who　holds　the　reins　in　his　single　grasp。＇10＇
  This　is　all　reversed　in　the　new　Constitution。　　In　the　eyes　of　our
  legislators　obedience　must　be　spontaneous　and　never　compulsory；　and；
  in　the　suppression　of　despotism；　they　suppress　government。　　The
  general　rule　in　the　hierarchy　which　they　establish　is　that　the
  subordinates　should　be　independent　of　their　superior；　for　he　must
  neither　appoint　nor　displace　them：　the　only　right　he　has　is　to　give
  them　advice　and　remonstrate　with　them。＇11＇　　At　best；　in　certain
  cases；　he　can　annul　their　acts　and　inflict　on　them　a　provisional
  suspension　of　their　functions；　which　can　be　contested　and　is
  revocable。＇12＇　We　see；　thus；　that　none　of　the　local　powers　are
  delegated　by　the　central　power；　the　latter　is　simply　like　a　man
  without　either　hands　or　arms；　seated　in　a　gilt　chair。　　The　Minister
  of　the　Finances　cannot　appoint　or　dismiss　either　an　assessor　or　a
  collector；　the　Minister　of　the　Interior；　not　one　of　the
  departmental；　district；　or　communal　administrators；　the　Minister　of