Constitution　of　the　clergy。〃　　Cf。　　sitting　of　January　2；　1791；
  speech　by　the　Bishop　of　Clermont。
  ＇75＇　Duvergier；　law　of　May　7；　1791；　to　maintain　the　right　of
  nonjuring　priests　to　perform　mass　in　national　or　private　edifices。
  （Demanded　by　Talleyrand　and　Sieyès。）
  ＇76＇　〃Archives　Nationales；〃　F7；　3235。　　Letter　of　M。　　de　Chateau…
  Randon；　deputy　of　la　Lozère；　May　28；　1791。　　After　the　decree　of　May
  23rd；　all　the　functionaries　of　the　department　handed　in　their
  resignations。
  ＇77＇　Duvergier；　law　of　May　21…29；　1791。
  ＇78＇　Sauzay；　I。　　366；　538　to　593；　750。　　　Archives　Nationales；〃　F7；
  3235；　Letter　of　M。　　de　Chanteau…Randon；　May　10；　1791。　　　Mercure；
  April　23rd；　and　April　16；　1701。　　Articles　of　Mallet　du　Pan；　letter
  from　Bordeaux；　March　20；　1791。
  ＇79＇　Buchez　and　Roux；　XII；　77。　　Report　of　Gallois　and　Gensonné　sent
  to　La　Vendée　and　the　Deux　Sévres　（July　25；　1791）。　　　〃　Archives
  Nationales；〃　F7；　3253；　letter　of　the　Directory　of　the　Bas…Rhin
  （letter　of　January　7；　1792）。　　　〃　Le　District　de　Machecoul　de　1788
  à　1793；〃　by　Lallier。　　〃　Histoire　de　Joseph　Lebon；〃　by　Paris。
  Sauzay；　vol。　　I。　　and　II。　　in　full。
  ＇80＇　Mercure；　January　15th；　April　23rd；　May　16th　and　30th；　June　1st；
  November　23rd；　1791。　　　〃Le　District　de　Machecoul；〃　by　Lallier；
  173。　　　Sauzay；　I。　　295。　　　Lavirotte；　〃Annales　d'Arnay…le…Duc
  （February　5；　1792）。　　　〃Archives　Nationales；〃　F7；　3223。　　Petition
  of　a　number　of　the　inhabitants　of　Montpellier；　November　17；　1791。
  ＇81＇　Duvergier；　decree　of　November　29；　1791。　　　Mercure；　November
  30；　1791　（article　by　Mallet　du　Pan）。
  CHAPTER　III。　　THE　CONSTRUCTIONS　…　THE　CONSTITUTION　OF　1791。。
  That　which　is　called　a　Government　is　a　concert　of　powers；　each　with
  a　distinct　function；　and　all　working　towards　a　final　and　complete
  end。　　The　merit　of　a　Government　consists　in　the　attainment　of　this
  end；　the　worth　of　a　machine　depends　upon　the　work　it　accomplishes。
  The　important　thing　is　not　to　produce　a　good　mechanical　design　on
  paper；　but　to　see　that　the　machine　works　well　when　set　up　on　the
  ground。　　In　vain　might　its　founders　allege　the　beauty　of　their　plan
  and　the　logical　connection　of　their　theorems；　they　are　not　required
  to　furnish　either　plan　or　theorems；　but　an　instrument。
  Two　conditions　are　requisite　to　render　this　instrument　serviceable
  and　effective。　　In　the　first　place；　the　public　powers　must　harmonize
  with　each　other；　if　not；　one　will　neutralize　the　other；　in　the
  second　place　they　must　be　obeyed；　or　they　are　null。
  The　Constituent　Assembly　made　no　provision　for　securing　this　harmony
  or　this　obedience。　　In　the　machine　which　it　constructed　the　motions
  all　counteract　each　other；　the　impulse　is　not　transmitted；　the
  gearing　is　not　complete　between　the　center　and　the　extremities；　the
  large　central　and　upper　wheels　turn　to　no　purpose；　the　innumerable
  small　wheels　near　the　ground　break　or　get　out　of　order：　the　machine；
  by　virtue　of　its　own　mechanism；　remains　useless；　over…heated；　under
  clouds　of　waste　steam；　creaking　and　thumping　in　such　a　matter　as　to
  show　clearly　that　it　must　explode。
  I。
  Powers　of　the　Central　Government。　…　The　Assembly　on　the　partition　of
  power。　…　Rupture　of　every　tie　between　the　Legislature　and　the　King。
  …　The　Assembly　on　the　subordination　of　the　executive　power。　…　How
  this　is　nullified。　…　Certainty　of　a　conflict。　…　The　deposition　of
  the　King　is　inevitable。
  Let　us　first　consider　the　two　central　powers；　the　Assembly　and　the
  King。　…　Ordinarily　when　distinct　powers　of　different　origin　are
  established　by　a　Constitution；　it　makes；　in　the　case　of　conflict
  between　them；　a　provision　for　an　arbiter　in　the　institution　of　an
  Upper　Chamber。　　Each　of　these　powers；　at　least；　has　a　hold　on　the
  other。　　The　Assembly　must　have　one　on　the　King：　which　is　the　right
  to　refuse　taxation。　　The　King　must　have　one　on　the　Assembly：　which
  is　the　right　of　dissolving　it。　　Otherwise；　one　of　the　two　being
  disarmed；　the　other　becomes　omnipotent；　and；　consequently；　insane。
  The　peril　here　is　as　great　for　an　omnipotent　Assembly　as　it　is　for
  an　absolute　King。　　If　the　former　is　desirous　of　remaining　in　its
  right　mind；　it　needs　repression　and　control　as　much　as　the　latter。
  If　it　is　proper　for　the　Assembly　to　restrain　the　King　by　refusing
  him　subsidies；　it　is　proper　for　him　to　be　able　to　defend　himself　by
  appealing　to　the　electors。　…　But；　besides　these　extreme　measures；
  which　are　dangerous　and　rarely　resorted　to；　there　is　another　which
  is　ordinarily　employed　and　is　safe；　that　is；　the　right　for　the　King
  to　take　his　ministers　from　the　Chamber。　　Generally；　the　leaders　of
  the　majority　form　the　ministry；　their　nomination　being　the　means　of
  restoring　harmony　between　the　King　and　Assembly；　they　are　at　once
  men　belonging　to　the　Assembly　and　men　belonging　to　the　King。
  Through　this　expedient　not　only　is　the　confidence　of　the　Assembly
  assured；　since　the　Government　remains　in　the　hands　of　its　leaders；
  but　also　it　is　under　restraint　because　these　become　simultaneously
  both　powerful　and　responsible。　　Placed　at　the　head　of　all　branches
  of　the　service；　they　are；　before　proposing　it　or　accepting　it；　in　a
  position　to　judge　whether　a　law　is　useful　and　practicable。　　Nothing
  is　so　healthy　for　a　majority　as　a　ministry　composed　of　its　own
  chiefs；　nothing　is　so　effective　in　repressing　rashness　or
  intemperance。　　A　railway　conductor　is　not　willing　that　his
  locomotive　should　be　deprived　of　coal；　nor　to　have　the　rails　he　is
  about　to　run　on　broken　up。　…　This　arrangement；　with　all　its
  drawbacks　and　inconveniences；　is　the　best　one　yet　arrived　at　by
  human　experience　for　the　security　of　societies　against　despotism　and
  anarchy。　　For　the　absolute　power　which　establishes　or　saves　them　may
  also　oppress　or　exhaust　them；　there　is　a　gradual　substitution　of
  differentiated　powers；　held　together　through　the　mediation　of　a
  third　umpire；　caused　by　reciprocal　dependence　and　an　which　is　common
  to　both。
  Experience；　however；　is　unimportant　to　the　members　of　the
  Constituent　Assembly；　under　the　banner　of　principles　they　sunder　one
  after　another　all　the　ties　which　keep　the　two　powers　together
  harmoniously。　…　There　must　not　be　an　Upper　Chamber；　because　this
  would　be　an　asylum　or　a　nursery　for　aristocrats。　　Moreover；　〃the
  nation　being　of　one　mind；〃　it　is　averse　to　〃the　creation　of
  different　organs。〃　So；　applying　ready…made　formulas　and　metaphors；
  they　continue　to　produce　ideological　definitions　and　distinctions。
  The　King　must　not　have　a　hold　on　the　legislative　body：　the　executive
  is　an　arm；　whose　business　it　is　to　obey；　it　is　absurd　for　the　arm　to
  constrain　or　direct　the　head。　　Scarcely　is　the　monarch　allowed　a
  delaying　veto。　　Sieyès　here　enters　with　his　protest　declaring　that
  this　is　a　〃lettre　de　cachet＇1＇　launched　against　the　universal　will；〃
  and　there　is　excluded　from　the　action　of　the　veto　the　articles　of
  the　Constitution；　all　money…bills；　and　some　other　laws。　…　…Neither
  the　monarch　nor　the　electors　of　the　Assembly　are　to　convoke　the
  Assembly；　he　has　no　voice　in　or　oversight　of　the　details　of　its
  formation；　the　electors　are　to　meet　together　and　vote　without　his
  summons　or　supervision。　　Once　the　Assembly　is　elected　he　can　neither
  adjourn　nor　dissolve　it。　　He　cannot　even　propose　a　law；＇2＇　per…
  mission　is　only　granted　to　him　〃to　invite　it　to　take　a　subject　into
  consideration。〃　He　is　limited　to　his　executive　duties；　and　still
  more；　a　sort　of　wall　is　built　up　between　him　and　the　Assembly；　and
  the　opening　in　it；　by　which　each　could　take　the　other's　hand；　is
  carefully　closed　up。　　The　deputies　are　forbidden　to　become　ministers
  throughout　the　term　of　their　service　and　for　two　years　afterwards。
  This　is　because　fears　are　entertained　that　they　might　be　corrupted
  through　contact　with　the　Court；　and；　again；　whoever　the　ministers
  might　be；　there　is　no　disposition　to　accept　their　ascendancy。＇3＇　　If
  one　of　them　is　admitted　into　the　Assembly　it　is　not　for　the　purpose
  of　giving　advice；　but　to　furnish　information；　reply　to
  interrogatories；　and　make　protestations　of　his　zeal　in　humble　terms
  and　in　a　dubious　position。＇4＇　　By　virtue　of　being　a　royal　agent　he
  is　under　suspicion　like　the　King　himself；　and　he　is　sequestered　in
  his　bureau　as　the　King　is　sequestered　in　his　palace。…　Such　is　the
  spirit　of　the　Constitution：　by　force　of　the　theory；　and　the　better
  to　secure　a　separation　of　the　powers；＇5＇　a　common　understanding
  between　them　is　for　ever　rendered　impossible；　and　to　make　up　for
  this　impossibility　there　remains　nothing　but　to　make　one　the　master
  and　the　other　the　clerk。
  This　they　did　not　fail　to　do；　and　for　greater　security；　the　latter
  is　made　an　honorary　clerk；　The　executive　power　is　conferred　on　him
  nominally　and　in　appearance；　he　does　not　possess　it　in　fact；　care
  having　been　taken　to　place　it　in　other　hands。　…　In　effect；　all
  executive　agents　and　all　secondary　and　local　powers　are　elective。
  The　King　has　no　voice；　directly　or　indirectly；　in　the　choice　of
  judge