power　of　the　Federal　Government　ought　to　extend；　and　whether　by　the　Constitution　it　did　extend；　to　making　roads　and　canals　at　the　cost　of　the　Union。　It　is　only　in　transactions　with　foreign　powers　that　the　authority　of　the　Federal　Government　is　of　necessity　complete。　On　every　other　subject；　the　question　depends　on　how　closely　the　people　in　general　wish　to　draw　the　federal　tie；　what　portion　of　their　local　freedom　of　action　they　are　willing　to　surrender；　in　order　to　enjoy　more　fully　the　benefit　of　being　one　nation。
  *　Mr。　Calhoun。
  Respecting　the　fitting　constitution　of　a　federal　government　within　itself　much　need　not　be　said。　It　of　course　consists　of　a　legislative　branch　and　an　executive；　and　the　constitution　of　each　is　amenable　to　the　same　principles　as　that　of　representative　governments　generally。　As　regards　the　mode　of　adapting　these　general　principles　to　a　federal　government；　the　provision　of　the　American　Constitution　seems　exceedingly　judicious；　that　Congress　should　consist　of　two　Houses；　and　that　while　one　of　them　is　constituted　according　to　population；　each　State　being　entitled　to　representatives　in　the　ratio　of　the　number　of　its　inhabitants；　the　other　should　represent　not　the　citizens；　but　the　State　Governments；　and　every　State；　whether　large　or　small；　should　be　represented　in　it　by　the　same　number　of　members。　This　provision　precludes　any　undue　power　from　being　exercised　by　the　more　powerful　States　over　the　rest；　and　guarantees　the　reserved　rights　of　the　State　Governments；　by　making　it　impossible；　as　far　as　the　mode　of　representation　can　prevent；　that　any　measure　should　pass　Congress　unless　approved　not　only　by　a　majority　of　the　citizens；　but　by　a　majority　of　the　States。　I　have　before　adverted　to　the　further　incidental　advantage　obtained　of　raising　the　standard　of　qualifications　in　one　of　the　Houses。　Being　nominated　by　select　bodies；　the　Legislatures　of　the　various　States；　whose　choice；　for　reasons　already　indicated；　is　more　likely　to　fall　on　eminent　men　than　any　popular　election…　who　have　not　only　the　power　of　electing　such；　but　a　strong　motive　to　do　so；　because　the　influence　of　their　State　in　the　general　deliberations　must　be　materially　affected　by　the　personal　weight　and　abilities　of　its　representatives；　the　Senate　of　the　United　States；　thus　chosen；　has　always　contained　nearly　all　the　political　men　of　established　and　high　reputation　in　the　Union：　while　the　Lower　House　of　Congress　has；　in　the　opinion　of　competent　observers；　been　generally　as　remarkable　for　the　absence　of　conspicuous　personal　merit　as　the　Upper　House　for　its　presence。　　　When　the　conditions　exist　for　the　formation　of　efficient　and　durable　Federal　Unions；　the　multiplication　of　them　is　always　a　benefit　to　the　world。　It　has　the　same　salutary　effect　as　any　other　extension　of　the　practice　of　co…operation；　through　which　the　weak；　by　uniting；　can　meet　on　equal　terms　with　the　strong。　By　diminishing　the　number　of　those　petty　states　which　are　not　equal　to　their　own　defence；　it　weakens　the　temptations　to　an　aggressive　policy；　whether　working　directly　by　arms；　or　through　the　prestige　of　superior　power。　It　of　course　puts　an　end　to　war　and　diplomatic　quarrels；　and　usually　also　to　restrictions　on　commerce；　between　the　States　composing　the　Union；　while；　in　reference　to　neighbouring　nations；　the　increased　military　strength　conferred　by　it　is　of　a　kind　to　be　almost　exclusively　available　for　defensive；　scarcely　at　all　for　aggressive；　purposes。　A　federal　government　has　not　a　sufficiently　concentrated　authority　to　conduct　with　much　efficiency　any　war　but　one　of　self…defence；　in　which　it　can　rely　on　the　voluntary　co…operation　of　every　citizen：　nor　is　there　anything　very　flattering　to　national　vanity　or　ambition　in　acquiring；　by　a　successful　war；　not　subjects；　nor　even　fellow…citizens；　but　only　new；　and　perhaps　troublesome；　independent　members　of　the　confederation。　The　warlike　proceedings　of　the　Americans　in　Mexico　were　purely　exceptional；　having　been　carried　on　principally　by　volunteers；　under　the　influence　of　the　migratory　propensity　which　prompts　individual　Americans　to　possess　themselves　of　unoccupied　land；　and　stimulated；　if　by　any　public　motive；　not　by　that　of　national　aggrandisement；　but　by　the　purely　sectional　purpose　of　extending　slavery。　There　are　few　signs　in　the　proceedings　of　Americans；　nationally　or　individually；　that　the　desire　of　territorial　acquisition　for　their　country　as　such　has　any　considerable　power　over　them。　Their　hankering　after　Cuba　is；　in　the　same　manner；　merely　sectional；　and　the　northern　States；　those　opposed　to　slavery；　have　never　in　any　way　favoured　it。　　　The　question　may　present　itself　（as　in　Italy　at　its　present　uprising）　whether　a　country；　which　is　determined　to　be　united；　should　form　a　complete　or　a　merely　federal　union。　The　point　is　sometimes　necessarily　decided　by　the　mere　territorial　magnitude　of　the　united　whole。　There　is　a　limit　to　the　extent　of　country　which　can　advantageously　be　governed；　or　even　whose　government　can　be　conveniently　superintended；　from　a　single　centre。　There　are　vast　countries　so　governed；　but　they；　or　at　least　their　distant　provinces；　are　in　general　deplorably　ill　administered；　and　it　is　only　when　the　inhabitants　are　almost　savages　that　they　could　not　manage　their　affairs　better　separately。　This　obstacle　does　not　exist　in　the　case　of　Italy；　the　size　of　which　does　not　come　up　to　that　of　several　very　efficiently　governed　single　states　in　past　and　present　times。　The　question　then　is　whether　the　different　parts　of　the　nation　require　to　be　governed　in　a　way　so　essentially　different　that　it　is　not　probable　the　same　Legislature；　and　the　same　ministry　or　administrative　body；　will　give　satisfaction　to　them　all。　Unless　this　be　the　case；　which　is　a　question　of　fact；　it　is　better　for　them　to　be　completely　united。　That　a　totally　different　system　of　laws；　and　very　different　administrative　institutions；　may　exist　in　two　portions　of　a　country　without　being　any　obstacle　to　legislative　unity　is　proved　by　the　case　of　England　and　Scotland。　Perhaps；　however；　this　undisturbed　co…existence　of　two　legal　systems；　under　one　united　legislature；　making　different　laws　for　the　two　sections　of　the　country　in　adaptation　to　the　previous　differences；　might　not　be　so　well　preserved；　or　the　same　confidence　might　not　be　felt　in　its　preservation；　in　a　country　whose　legislators　were　more　possessed　（as　is　apt　to　be　the　case　on　the　Continent）　with　the　mania　for　uniformity。　A　people　having　that　unbounded　toleration　which　is　characteristic　of　this　country　for　every　description　of　anomaly；　so　long　as　those　whose　interests　it　concerns　do　not　feel　aggrieved　by　it；　afforded　an　exceptionally　advantageous　field　for　trying　this　difficult　experiment。　In　most　countries；　if　it　was　an　object　to　retain　different　systems　of　law；　it　might　probably　be　necessary　to　retain　distinct　legislatures　as　guardians　of　them；　which　is　perfectly　compatible　with　a　national　Parliament　and　King；　or　a　national　Parliament　without　a　King；　supreme　over　the　external　relations　of　all　the　members　of　the　body。　　　Whenever　it　is　not　deemed　necessary　to　maintain　permanently；　in　the　different　provinces；　different　systems　of　jurisprudence；　and　fundamental　institutions　grounded　on　different　principles；　it　is　always　practicable　to　reconcile　minor　diversities　with　the　maintenance　of　unity　of　government。　All　that　is　needful　is　to　give　a　sufficiently　large　sphere　of　action　to　the　local　authorities。　Under　one　and　the　same　central　government　there　may　be　local　governors；　and　provincial　assemblies　for　local　purposes。　It　may　happen；　for　instance；　that　the　people　of　different　provinces　may　have　preferences　in　favour　of　different　modes　of　taxation。　If　the　general　legislature　could　not　be　depended　on　for　being　guided　by　the　members　for　each　province　in　modifying　the　general　system　of　taxation　to　suit　that　province；　the　Constitution　might　provide　that　as　many　of　the　expenses　of　the　government　as　could　by　any　possibility　be　made　local　should　be　defrayed　by　local　rates　imposed　by　the　provincial　assemblies；　and　that　those　which　must　of　necessity　be　general；　such　as　the　support　of　an　army　and　navy；　should；　in　the　estimates　for　the　year；　be　apportioned　among　the　different　provinces　according　to　some　general　estimate　of　their　resources；　the　amount　assigned　to　each　being　levied　by　the　local　assembly　on　the　principles　most　acceptable　to　the　locality；　and　paid　en　bloc　into　the　national　treasury。　A　practice　approaching　to　this　existed　even　in　the　old　French　monarchy；　so　far　as　regarded　the　pays　d'etats；　each　of　which；　having　consented　or　been　required　to　furnish　a　fixed　sum；　was　left　to　assess　it　upon　the　inhabitants　by　its　own　officers；　thus　escaping　the　grinding　despotism　of　the　royal　intendants　and　subdelegues；　and　this　privilege　is　always　mentioned　as　one　of　the　advantages　which　mainly　contributed　to　render　them；　as　some　of　them　were；　the　most　flourishing　provinces　of　France。　　　Identity　of　central　government　is　compatible　with　many　different　degrees　of　centralisation；　not　only　administrative；　but　even　legislative。　A　people　may　have　the　desire；　and　the　capacity；　for　a　closer　union　than　one　merely　federal；　while　yet　their　local　peculiarities　and　antecedents　render　considerable　diversities　desirable　in　the　details　of　their　gover