case　of　local　bodies；　besides　the　function　of　electing；　many　citizens　in　turn　have　the　chance　of　being　elected；　and　many；　either　by　selection　or　by　rotation；　fill　one　or　other　of　the　numerous　local　executive　offices。　In　these　positions　they　have　to　act　for　public　interests；　as　well　as　to　think　and　to　speak；　and　the　thinking　cannot　all　be　done　by　proxy。　It　may　be　added；　that　these　local　functions；　not　being　in　general　sought　by　the　higher　ranks；　carry　down　the　important　political　education　which　they　are　the　means　of　conferring　to　a　much　lower　grade　in　society。　The　mental　discipline　being　thus　a　more　important　feature　in　local　concerns　than　in　the　general　affairs　of　the　State；　while　there　are　not　such　vital　interests　dependent　on　the　quality　of　the　administration；　a　greater　weight　may　be　given　to　the　former　consideration；　and　the　latter　admits　much　more　frequently　of　being　postponed　to　it　than　in　matters　of　general　legislation　and　the　conduct　of　imperial　affairs。　　　The　proper　constitution　of　local　representative　bodies　does　not　present　much　difficulty。　The　principles　which　apply　to　it　do　not　differ　in　any　respect　from　those　applicable　to　the　national　representation。　The　same　obligation　exists；　as　in　the　case　of　the　more　important　function；　for　making　the　bodies　elective；　and　the　same　reasons　operate　as　in　that　case；　but　with　still　greater　force；　for　giving　them　a　widely　democratic　basis：　the　dangers　being　less；　and　the　advantages；　in　point　of　popular　education　and　cultivation；　in　some　respects　even　greater。　As　the　principal　duty　of　the　local　bodies　consists　of　the　imposition　and　expenditure　of　local　taxation；　the　electoral　franchise　should　vest　in　all　who　contribute　to　the　local　rates；　to　the　exclusion　of　all　who　do　not。　I　assume　that　there　is　no　indirect　taxation；　no　octroi　duties；　or　that　if　there　are；　they　are　supplementary　only；　those　on　whom　their　burden　falls　being　also　rated　to　a　direct　assessment。　The　representation　of　minorities　should　be　provided　for　in　the　same　manner　as　in　the　national　Parliament；　and　there　are　the　same　strong　reasons　for　plurality　of　votes。　Only；　there　is　not　so　decisive　an　objection；　in　the　inferior　as　in　the　higher　body；　to　making　the　plural　voting　depend　（as　in　some　of　the　local　elections　of　our　own　country）　on　a　mere　money　qualification：　for　the　honest　and　frugal　dispensation　of　money　forms　so　much　larger　a　part　of　the　business　of　the　local　than　of　the　national　body；　that　there　is　more　justice　as　well　as　policy　in　allowing　a　greater　proportional　influence　to　those　who　have　a　larger　money　interest　at　stake。　　　In　the　most　recently　established　of　our　local　representative　institutions；　the　Boards　of　Guardians；　the　justices　of　peace　of　the　district　sit　ex　officio　along　with　the　elected　members；　in　number　limited　by　law　to　a　third　of　the　whole。　In　the　peculiar　constitution　of　English　society　I　have　no　doubt　of　the　beneficial　effect　of　this　provision。　It　secures　the　presence；　in　these　bodies；　of　a　more　educated　class　than　it　would　perhaps　be　practicable　to　attract　thither　on　any　other　terms；　and　while　the　limitation　in　number　of　the　ex　officio　members　precludes　them　from　acquiring　predominance　by　mere　numerical　strength；　they；　as　a　virtual　representation　of　another　class；　having　sometimes　a　different　interest　from　the　rest；　are　a　check　upon　the　class　interests　of　the　farmers　or　petty　shopkeepers　who　form　the　bulk　of　the　elected　Guardians。　A　similar　commendation　cannot　be　given　to　the　constitution　of　the　only　provincial　boards　we　possess；　the　Quarter　Sessions；　consisting　of　the　justices　of　peace　alone；　on　whom；　over　and　above　their　judicial　duties；　some　of　the　most　important　parts　of　the　administrative　business　of　the　country　depend　for　their　performance。　The　mode　of　formation　of　these　bodies　is　most　anomalous；　they　being　neither　elected；　nor；　in　any　proper　sense　of　the　term；　nominated；　but　holding　their　important　functions；　like　the　feudal　lords　to　whom　they　succeeded；　virtually　by　right　of　their　acres：　the　appointment　vested　in　the　Crown　（or；　speaking　practically；　in　one　of　themselves；　the　Lord　Lieutenant）　being　made　use　of　only　as　a　means　of　excluding　any　one　who　it　is　thought　would　do　discredit　to　the　body；　or；　now　and　then；　one　who　is　on　the　wrong　side　in　politics。　The　institution　is　the　most　aristocratic　in　principle　which　now　remains　in　England；　far　more　so　than　the　House　of　Lords；　for　it　grants　public　money　and　disposes　of　important　public　interests；　not　in　conjunction　with　a　popular　assembly；　but　alone。　It　is　clung　to　with　proportionate　tenacity　by　our　aristocratic　classes；　but　is　obviously　at　variance　with　all　the　principles　which　are　the　foundation　of　representative　government。　In　a　County　Board　there　is　not　the　same　justification　as　in　Boards　of　Guardians；　for　even　an　admixture　of　ex　officio　with　elected　members：　since　the　business　of　a　county　being　on　a　sufficiently　large　scale　to　be　an　object　of　interest　and　attraction　to　country　gentlemen；　they　would　have　no　more　difficulty　in　getting　themselves　elected　to　the　Board　than　they　have　in　being　returned　to　Parliament　as　county　members。　In　regard　to　the　proper　circumscription　of　the　constituencies　which　elect　the　local　representative　bodies；　the　principle　which；　when　applied　as　an　exclusive　and　unbending　rule　to　parliamentary　representation；　is　inappropriate；　namely　community　of　local　interests；　is　here　the　only　just　and　applicable　one。　The　very　object　of　having　a　local　representation　is　in　order　that　those　who　have　any　interest　in　common；　which　they　do　not　share　with　the　general　body　of　their　countrymen；　may　manage　that　joint　interest　by　themselves：　and　the　purpose　is　contradicted　if　the　distribution　of　the　local　representation　follows　any　other　rule　than　the　grouping　of　those　joint　interests。　There　are　local　interests　peculiar　to　every　town；　whether　great　or　small；　and　common　to　all　its　inhabitants：　every　town；　therefore；　without　distinction　of　size；　ought　to　have　its　municipal　council。　It　is　equally　obvious　that　every　town　ought　to　have　but　one。　The　different　quarters　of　the　same　town　have　seldom　or　never　any　material　diversities　of　local　interest；　they　all　require　to　have　the　same　things　done；　the　same　expenses　incurred；　and；　except　as　to　their　churches；　which　it　is　probably　desirable　to　leave　under　simply　parochial　management；　the　same　arrangements　may　be　made　to　serve　for　all。　Paving；　lighting；　water　supply；　drainage；　port　and　market　regulations；　cannot　without　great　waste　and　inconvenience　be　different　for　different　quarters　of　the　same　town。　The　subdivision　of　London　into　six　or　seven　independent　districts；　each　with　its　separate　arrangements　for　local　business　（several　of　them　without　unity　of　administration　even　within　themselves）；　prevents　the　possibility　of　consecutive　or　well　regulated　cooperation　for　common　objects；　precludes　any　uniform　principle　for　the　discharge　of　local　duties；　compels　the　general　government　to　take　things　upon　itself　which　would　be　best　left　to　local　authorities　if　there　were　any　whose　authority　extended　to　the　entire　metropolis；　and　answers　no　purpose　but　to　keep　up　the　fantastical　trappings　of　that　union　of　modern　jobbing　and　antiquated　foppery；　the　Corporation　of　the　City　of　London。　　　Another　equally　important　principle　is；　that　in　each　local　circumscription　there　should　be　but　one　elected　body　for　all　local　business；　not　different　bodies　for　different　parts　of　it。　Division　of　labour　does　not　mean　cutting　up　every　business　into　minute　fractions；　it　means　the　union　of　such　operations　as　are　fit　to　be　performed　by　the　same　persons；　and　the　separation　of　such　as　can　be　better　performed　by　different　persons。　The　executive　duties　of　the　locality　do　indeed　require　to　be　divided　into　departments；　for　the　same　reason　as　those　of　the　State；　because　they　are　of　diverse　kinds；　each　requiring　knowledge　peculiar　to　itself；　and　needing；　for　its　due　performance；　the　undivided　attention　of　a　specially　qualified　functionary。　But　the　reasons　for　subdivision　which　apply　to　the　execution　do　not　apply　to　the　control。　The　business　of　the　elective　body　is　not　to　do　the　work；　but　to　see　that　it　is　properly　done；　and　that　nothing　necessary　is　left　undone。　This　function　can　be　fulfilled　for　all　departments　by　the　same　superintending　body；　and　by　a　collective　and　comprehensive　far　better　than　by　a　minute　and　microscopic　view。　It　is　as　absurd　in　public　affairs　as　it　would　be　in　private　that　every　workman　should　be　looked　after　by　a　superintendent　to　himself。　The　Government　of　the　Crown　consists　of　many　departments；　and　there　are　many　ministers　to　conduct　them；　but　those　ministers　have　not　a　Parliament　apiece　to　keep　them　to　their　duty。　The　local；　like　the　national　Parliament；　has　for　its　proper　business　to　consider　the　interest　of　the　locality　as　a　whole；　composed　of　parts　all　of　which　must　be　adapted　to　one　another；　and　attended　to　in　the　order　and　ratio　of　their　importance。　　　There　is　another　very　weighty　reason　for　uniting　the　control　of　all　the　business　of　a　locality　under　one　body。　The　greatest　imperfection　of　popular　local　institutions；　and　the　chief　cause　of　the　failure　which　so　often　attends　them；　is　the　low　calibre　of　the　men　by　whom　they　are　almost　always　carried　on。　That　these　should　be　of　a　very　miscellaneous　character　is；　indeed；　p