sense；　that　the　ultimate　decision　should　rest　undividedly　with　the　minister　himself：　but　neither　ought　they　to　be　looked　upon；　or　to　look　upon　themselves；　as　ciphers；　or　as　capable　of　being　reduced　to　such　at　his　pleasure。　The　advisers　attached　to　a　powerful　and　perhaps　self…willed　man　ought　to　be　placed　under　conditions　which　make　it　impossible　for　them；　without　discredit；　not　to　express　an　opinion；　and　impossible　for　him　not　to　listen　to　and　consider　their　recommendations；　whether　he　adopts　them　or　not。　The　relation　which　ought　to　exist　between　a　chief　and　this　description　of　advisers　is　very　accurately　hit　by　the　constitution　of　the　Council　of　the　Governor…General　and　those　of　the　different　Presidencies　in　India。　These　Councils　are　composed　of　persons　who　have　professional　knowledge　of　Indian　affairs；　which　the　Governor…General　and　Governors　usually　lack；　and　which　it　would　not　be　desirable　to　require　of　them。　As　a　rule；　every　member　of　Council　is　expected　to　give　an　opinion；　which　is　of　course　very　often　a　simple　acquiescence：　but　if　there　is　a　difference　of　sentiment；　it　is　at　the　option　of　every　member；　and　is　the　invariable　practice；　to　record　the　reasons　of　his　opinion：　the　Governor…General；　or　Governor；　doing　the　same。　In　ordinary　cases　the　decision　is　according　to　the　sense　of　the　majority；　the　Council；　therefore；　has　a　substantial　part　in　the　government：　but　if　the　Governor…General；　or　Governor；　thinks　fit；　he　may　set　aside　even　their　unanimous　opinion；　recording　his　reasons。　The　result　is；　that　the　chief　is　individually　and　effectively　responsible　for　every　act　of　the　Government。　The　members　of　Council　have　only　the　responsibility　of　advisers；　but　it　is　always　known；　from　documents　capable　of　being　produced；　and　which　if　called　for　by　Parliament　or　public　opinion　always　are　produced；　what　each　has　advised；　and　what　reasons　he　gave　for　his　advice：　while；　from　their　dignified　position；　and　ostensible　participation　in　all　acts　of　government；　they　have　nearly　as　strong　motives　to　apply　themselves　to　the　public　business；　and　to　form　and　express　a　well…considered　opinion　on　every　part　of　it；　as　if　the　whole　responsibility　rested　with　themselves。　　　This　mode　of　conducting　the　highest　class　of　administrative　business　is　one　of　the　most　successful　instances　of　the　adaptation　of　means　to　ends　which　political　history；　not　hitherto　very　prolific　in　works　of　skill　and　contrivance；　has　yet　to　show。　It　is　one　of　the　acquisitions　with　which　the　art　of　politics　has　been　enriched　by　the　experience　of　the　East　India　Company's　rule；　and；　like　most　of　the　other　wise　contrivances　by　which　India　has　been　preserved　to　this　country；　and　an　amount　of　good　government　produced　which　is　truly　wonderful　considering　the　circumstances　and　the　materials；　it　is　probably　destined　to　perish　in　the　general　holocaust　which　the　traditions　of　Indian　government　seem　fated　to　undergo；　since　they　have　been　placed　at　the　mercy　of　public　ignorance；　and　the　presumptuous　vanity　of　political　men。　Already　an　outcry　is　raised　for　abolishing　the　Councils；　as　a　superfluous　and　expensive　clog　on　the　wheels　of　government：　while　the　clamour　has　long　been　urgent；　and　is　daily　obtaining　more　countenance　in　the　highest　quarters；　for　the　abrogation　of　the　professional　civil　service　which　breeds　the　men　that　compose　the　Councils；　and　the　existence　of　which　is　the　sole　guarantee　for　their　being　of　any　value。
  A　most　important　principle　of　good　government　in　a　popular　constitution　is　that　no　executive　functionaries　should　be　appointed　by　popular　election：　neither　by　the　votes　of　the　people　themselves；　nor　by　those　of　their　representatives。　The　entire　business　of　government　is　skilled　employment；　the　qualifications　for　the　discharge　of　it　are　of　that　special　and　professional　kind　which　cannot　be　properly　judged　of　except　by　persons　who　have　themselves　some　share　of　those　qualifications；　or　some　practical　experience　of　them。　The　business　of　finding　the　fittest　persons　to　fill　public　employments…　not　merely　selecting　the　best　who　offer；　but　looking　out　for　the　absolutely　best；　and　taking　note　of　all　fit　persons　who　are　met　with；　that　they　may　be　found　when　wanted…　is　very　laborious；　and　requires　a　delicate　as　well　as　highly　conscientious　discernment；　and　as　there　is　no　public　duty　which　is　in　general　so　badly　performed；　so　there　is　none　for　which　it　is　of　greater　importance　to　enforce　the　utmost　practicable　amount　of　personal　responsibility；　by　imposing　it　as　a　special　obligation　on　high　functionaries　in　the　several　departments。　All　subordinate　public　officers　who　are　not　appointed　by　some　mode　of　public　competition　should　be　selected　on　the　direct　responsibility　of　the　minister　under　whom　they　serve。　The　ministers；　all　but　the　chief；　will　naturally　be　selected　by　the　chief；　and　the　chief　himself；　though　really　designated　by　Parliament；　should　be；　in　a　regal　government；　officially　appointed　by　the　Crown。　The　functionary　who　appoints　should　be　the　sole　person　empowered　to　remove　any　subordinate　officer　who　is　liable　to　removal；　which　the　far　greater　number　ought　not　to　be；　except　for　personal　misconduct；　since　it　would　be　vain　to　expect　that　the　body　of　persons　by　whom　the　whole　detail　of　the　public　business　is　transacted；　and　whose　qualifications　are　generally　of　much　more　importance　to　the　public　than　those　of　the　minister　himself；　will　devote　themselves　to　their　profession；　and　acquire　the　knowledge　and　skill　on　which　the　minister　must　often　place　entire　dependence；　if　they　are　liable　at　any　moment　to　be　turned　adrift　for　no　fault；　that　the　minister　may　gratify　himself；　or　promote　his　political　interest；　by　appointing　somebody　else。　　　To　the　principle　which　condemns　the　appointment　of　executive　officers　by　popular　suffrage；　ought　the　chief　of　the　executive；　in　a　republican　government；　to　be　an　exception？　Is　it　a　good　rule；　which；　in　the　American　Constitution；　provides　for　the　election　of　the　President　once　in　every　four　years　by　the　entire　people？　The　question　is　not　free　from　difficulty。　There　is　unquestionably　some　advantage；　in　a　country　like　America；　where　no　apprehension　needs　be　entertained　of　a　coup　d'etat；　in　making　the　chief　minister　constitutionally　independent　of　the　legislative　body；　and　rendering　the　two　great　branches　of　the　government；　while　equally　popular　both　in　their　origin　and　in　their　responsibility；　an　effective　check　on　one　another。　The　plan　is　in　accordance　with　that　sedulous　avoidance　of　the　concentration　of　great　masses　of　power　in　the　same　hands；　which　is　a　marked　characteristic　of　the　American　Federal　Constitution。　But　the　advantage；　in　this　instance；　is　purchased　at　a　price　above　all　reasonable　estimates　of　its　value。　It　seems　far　better　that　the　chief　magistrate　in　a　republic　should　be　appointed　avowedly；　as　the　chief　minister　in　a　constitutional　monarchy　is　virtually；　by　the　representative　body。　In　the　first　place；　he　is　certain；　when　thus　appointed；　to　be　a　more　eminent　man。　The　party　which　has　the　majority　in　Parliament　would　then；　as　a　rule；　appoint　its　own　leader；　who　is　always　one　of　the　foremost；　and　often　the　very　foremost　person　in　political　life：　while　the　President　of　the　United　States；　since　the　last　survivor　of　the　founders　of　the　republic　disappeared　from　the　scene；　is　almost　always　either　an　obscure　man；　or　one　who　has　gained　any　reputation　he　may　possess　in　some　other　field　than　politics。　And　this；　as　I　have　before　observed；　is　no　accident；　but　the　natural　effect　of　the　situation。　The　eminent　men　of　a　party；　in　an　election　extending　to　the　whole　country；　are　never　its　most　available　candidates。　All　eminent　men　have　made　personal　enemies；　or　have　done　something；　or　at　the　lowest　professed　some　opinion；　obnoxious　to　some　local　or　other　considerable　division　of　the　community；　and　likely　to　tell　with　fatal　effect　upon　the　number　of　votes；　whereas　a　man　without　antecedents；　of　whom　nothing　is　known　but　that　he　professes　the　creed　of　the　party；　is　readily　voted　for　by　its　entire　strength。　Another　important　consideration　is　the　great　mischief　of　unintermitted　electioneering。　When　the　highest　dignity　in　the　State　is　to　be　conferred　by　popular　election　once　in　every　few　years；　the　whole　intervening　time　is　spent　in　what　is　virtually　a　canvass。　President；　ministers；　chiefs　of　parties；　and　their　followers；　are　all　electioneerers：　the　whole　community　is　kept　intent　on　the　mere　personalities　of　politics；　and　every　public　question　is　discussed　and　decided　with　less　reference　to　its　merits　than　to　its　expected　bearing　on　the　presidential　election。　If　a　system　had　been　devised　to　make　party　spirit　the　ruling　principle　of　action　in　all　public　affairs；　and　create　an　inducement　not　only　to　make　every　question　a　party　question；　but　to　raise　questions　for　the　purpose　of　founding　parties　upon　them；　it　would　have　been　difficult　to　contrive　any　means　better　adapted　to　the　purpose。　　　I　will　not　affirm　that　it　would　at　all　times　and　places　be　desirable　that　the　head　of　the　executive　should　be　so　completely　dependent　upon　the　votes　of　a　representative　assembly　as　the　Prime　Minister　is　in　England；　and　is　without　inconvenience。　If　it　were　thought　best　to　avoid　this；　he　might；　though　appointed　by　Parliament；　hold　his　office　for　a　fixed　period；　independent　of　a　parliam