by　the　First；　subject　to　the　restriction　that　they　should　not　nominate　any　of　their　own　members。　Such　an　assembly；　emanating　like　the　American　Senate　from　popular　choice；　only　once　removed；　would　not　be　considered　to　clash　with　democratic　institutions；　and　would　probably　acquire　considerable　popular　influence。　From　the　mode　of　its　nomination　it　would　be　peculiarly　unlikely　to　excite　the　jealousy　of；　to　come　into　hostile　collision　with；　the　popular　House。　It　would；　moreover　（due　provision　being　made　for　the　representation　of　the　minority）；　be　almost　sure　to　be　well　composed；　and　to　comprise　many　of　that　class　of　highly　capable　men；　who；　either　from　accident　or　for　want　of　showy　qualities；　had　been　unwilling　to　seek；　or　unable　to　obtain；　the　suffrages　of　a　popular　constituency。　　　The　best　constitution　of　a　Second　Chamber　is　that　which　embodies　the　greatest　number　of　elements　exempt　from　the　class　interests　and　prejudices　of　the　majority；　but　having　in　themselves　nothing　offensive　to　democratic　feeling。　I　repeat；　however；　that　the　main　reliance　for　tempering　the　ascendancy　of　the　majority　can　be　placed　in　a　Second　Chamber　of　any　kind。　The　character　of　a　representative　government　is　fixed　by　the　constitution　of　the　popular　House。　Compared　with　this；　all　other　questions　relating　to　the　form　of　government　are　insignificant。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　14　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Executive　in　a　Representative　Government。
  IT　WOULD　be　out　of　place；　in　this　treatise；　to　discuss　the　question　into　what　departments　or　branches　the　executive　business　of　government　may　most　conveniently　be　divided。　In　this　respect　the　exigencies　of　different　governments　are　different；　and　there　is　little　probability　that　any　great　mistake　will　be　made　in　the　classification　of　the　duties　when　men　are　willing　to　begin　at　the　beginning；　and　do　not　hold　themselves　bound　by　the　series　of　accidents　which；　in　an　old　government　like　ours；　has　produced　the　existing　division　of　the　public　business。　It　may　be　sufficient　to　say　that　the　classification　of　functionaries　should　correspond　to　that　of　subjects；　and　that　there　should　not　be　several　departments　independent　of　one　another　to　superintend　different　parts　of　the　same　natural　whole；　as　in　our　own　military　administration　down　to　a　recent　period；　and　in　a　less　degree　even　at　present。　Where　the　object　to　be　attained　is　single　（such　as　that　of　having　an　efficient　army）；　the　authority　commissioned　to　attend　to　it　should　be　single　likewise。　The　entire　aggregate　of　means　provided　for　one　end　should　be　under　one　and　the　same　control　and　responsibility。　If　they　are　divided　among　independent　authorities；　the　means；　with　each　of　those　authorities；　become　ends；　and　it　is　the　business　of　nobody　except　the　head　of　the　Government；　who　is　probably　without　the　appropriate　departmental　experience；　to　take　care　of　the　real　end。　The　different　classes　of　means　are　not　combined　and　adapted　to　one　another　under　the　guidance　of　any　leading　idea；　and　while　every　department　pushes　forward　its　own　requirements；　regardless　of　those　of　the　rest；　the　purpose　of　the　work　is　perpetually　sacrificed　to　the　work　itself。　　　As　a　general　rule；　every　executive　function；　whether　superior　or　subordinate；　should　be　the　appointed　duty　of　some　given　individual。　It　should　be　apparent　to　all　the　world　who　did　everything；　and　through　whose　default　anything　was　left　undone。　Responsibility　is　null　when　nobody　knows　who　is　responsible。　Nor；　even　when　real；　can　it　be　divided　without　being　weakened。　To　maintain　it　at　its　highest　there　must　be　one　person　who　receives　the　whole　praise　of　what　is　well　done；　the　whole　blame　of　what　is　ill。　There　are；　however；　two　modes　of　sharing　responsibility：　by　one　it　is　only　enfeebled；　by　the　other；　absolutely　destroyed。　It　is　enfeebled　when　the　concurrence　of　more　than　one　functionary　is　required　to　the　same　act。　Each　one　among　them　has　still　a　real　responsibility；　if　a　wrong　has　been　done；　none　of　them　can　say　he　did　not　do　it；　he　is　as　much　a　participant　as　an　accomplice　is　in　an　offence：　if　there　has　been　legal　criminality　they　may　all　be　punished　legally；　and　their　punishment　needs　not　be　less　severe　than　if　there　had　been　only　one　person　concerned。　But　it　is　not　so　with　the　penalties；　any　more　than　with　the　rewards；　of　opinion：　these　are　always　diminished　by　being　shared。　Where　there　has　been　no　definite　legal　offence；　no　corruption　or　malversation；　only　an　error　or　an　imprudence；　or　what　may　pass　for　such；　every　participator　has　an　excuse　to　himself　and　to　the　world；　in　the　fact　that　other　persons　are　jointly　involved　with　him。　There　is　hardly　anything；　even　to　pecuniary　dishonesty；　for　which　men　will　not　feel　themselves　almost　absolved；　if　those　whose　duty　it　was　to　resist　and　remonstrate　have　failed　to　do　it；　still　more　if　they　have　given　a　formal　assent。　　　In　this　case；　however；　though　responsibility　is　weakened；　there　still　is　responsibility：　every　one　of　those　implicated　has　in　his　individual　capacity　assented　to；　and　joined　in；　the　act。　Things　are　much　worse　when　the　act　itself　is　only　that　of　a　majority…　a　Board；　deliberating　with　closed　doors；　nobody　knowing；　or；　except　in　some　extreme　case；　being　ever　likely　to　know；　whether　an　individual　member　voted　for　the　act　or　against　it。　Responsibility　in　this　case　is　a　mere　name。　〃Boards；〃　it　is　happily　said　by　Bentham；　〃are　screens。〃　What　〃the　Board〃　does　is　the　act　of　nobody；　and　nobody　can　be　made　to　answer　for　it。　The　Board　suffers；　even　in　reputation；　only　in　its　collective　character；　and　no　individual　member　feels　this　further　than　his　disposition　leads　him　to　identify　his　own　estimation　with　that　of　the　body…　a　feeling　often　very　strong　when　the　body　is　a　permanent　one；　and　he　is　wedded　to　it　for　better　for　worse；　but　the　fluctuations　of　a　modern　official　career　give　no　time　for　the　formation　of　such　an　esprit　de　corps；　which　if　it　exists　at　all；　exists　only　in　the　obscure　ranks　of　the　permanent　subordinates。　Boards；　therefore；　are　not　a　fit　instrument　for　executive　business；　and　are　only　admissible　in　it　when；　for　other　reasons；　to　give　full　discretionary　power　to　a　single　minister　would　be　worse。　　　On　the　other　hand；　it　is　also　a　maxim　of　experience　that　in　the　multitude　of　counsellors　there　is　wisdom；　and　that　a　man　seldom　judges　right；　even　in　his　own　concerns；　still　less　in　those　of　the　public；　when　he　makes　habitual　use　of　no　knowledge　but　his　own；　or　that　of　some　single　adviser。　There　is　no　necessary　incompatibility　between　this　principle　and　the　other。　It　is　easy　to　give　the　effective　power；　and　the　full　responsibility；　to　one；　providing　him　when　necessary　with　advisers；　each　of　whom　is　responsible　only　for　the　opinion　he　gives。　　　In　general；　the　head　of　a　department　of　the　executive　government　is　a　mere　politician。　He　may　be　a　good　politician；　and　a　man　of　merit；　and　unless　this　is　usually　the　case；　the　government　is　bad。　But　his　general　capacity；　and　the　knowledge　he　ought　to　possess　of　the　general　interests　of　the　country；　will　not；　unless　by　occasional　accident；　be　accompanied　by　adequate；　and　what　may　be　called　professional；　knowledge　of　the　department　over　which　he　is　called　to　preside。　Professional　advisers　must　therefore　be　provided　for　him。　Wherever　mere　experience　and　attainments　are　sufficient　wherever　the　qualities　required　in　a　professional　adviser　may　possibly　be　united　in　a　single　well…selected　individual　（as　in　the　case；　for　example；　of　a　law　officer）；　one　such　person　for　general　purposes；　and　a　staff　of　clerks　to　supply　knowledge　of　details；　meet　the　demands　of　the　case。　But；　more　frequently；　it　is　not　sufficient　that　the　minister　should　consult　some　one　competent　person；　and；　when　himself　not　conversant　with　the　subject；　act　implicitly　on　that　person's　advice。　It　is　often　necessary　that　he　should；　not　only　occasionally　but　habitually；　listen　to　a　variety　of　opinions；　and　inform　his　judgment　by　the　discussions　among　a　body　of　advisers。　This；　for　example；　is　emphatically　necessary　in　military　and　naval　affairs。　The　military　and　naval　ministers；　therefore；　and　probably　several　others；　should　be　provided　with　a　Council；　composed；　at　least　in　those　two　departments；　of　able　and　experienced　professional　men。　As　a　means　of　obtaining　the　best　men　for　the　purpose　under　every　change　of　administration；　they　ought　to　be　permanent：　by　which　I　mean；　that　they　ought　not；　like　the　Lords　of　the　Admiralty；　to　be　expected　to　resign　with　the　ministry　by　whom　they　were　appointed：　but　it　is　a　good　rule　that　all　who　hold　high　appointments　to　which　they　have　risen　by　selection；　and　not　by　the　ordinary　course　of　promotion；　should　retain　their　office　only　for　a　fixed　term；　unless　reappointed；　as　is　now　the　rule　with　Staff　appointments　in　the　British　army。　This　rule　renders　appointments　somewhat　less　likely　to　be　jobbed；　not　being　a　provision　for　life；　and　the　same　time　affords　a　means；　without　affront　to　any　one；　of　getting　rid　of　those　who　are　least　worth　keeping；　and　bringing　in　highly　qualified　persons　of　younger　standing；　for　whom　there　might　never　be　room　if　death　vacancies；　or　voluntary　resignations；　were　waited　for。　　　The　Councils　should　be　consultative　merely；　in　this　sense；　that　the　ultimate　decision　should　rest　undividedly　with　the　minister　himself：　but　neither　ou