ative；　on　leaving　his　constituents；　enters　at　once　into　a　courtly　or　aristocratic　atmosphere；　whose　influences　all　tend　to　deflect　his　course　into　a　different　direction　from　the　popular　one；　to　tone　down　any　democratic　feelings　which　he　may　have　brought　with　him；　and　make　him　forget　the　wishes　and　grow　cool　to　the　interests　of　those　who　chose　him…　the　obligation　of　a　frequent　return　to　them　for　a　renewal　of　his　commission　is　indispensable　to　keeping　his　temper　and　character　up　to　the　right　mark。　Even　three　years；　in　such　circumstances；　are　almost　too　long　a　period；　and　any　longer　term　is　absolutely　inadmissible。　Where；　on　the　contrary；　democracy　is　the　ascendant　power；　and　still　tends　to　increase；　requiring　rather　to　be　moderated　in　its　exercise　than　encouraged　to　any　abnormal　activity；　where　unbounded　publicity；　and　an　ever…present　newspaper　press；　give　the　representative　assurance　that　his　every　act　will　be　immediately　known；　discussed；　and　judged　by　his　constituents；　and　that　he　is　always　either　gaining　or　losing　ground　in　the　estimation；　while　by　the　same　means　the　influence　of　their　sentiments；　and　all　other　democratic　influences；　are　kept　constantly　alive　and　active　in　his　own　mind…less　than　five　years　would　hardly　be　a　sufficient　period　to　prevent　timid　subserviency。　The　change　which　has　taken　place　in　English　politics　as　to　all　these　features　explains　why　annual　Parliaments；　which　forty　years　ago　stood　prominently　in　front　of　the　creed　of　the　more　advanced　reformers；　are　so　little　cared　for　and　so　seldom　heard　of　at　present。　It　deserves　consideration　that；　whether　the　term　is　short　or　long；　during　the　last　year　of　it　the　members　are　in　position　in　which　they　would　always　be　if　Parliaments　were　annual：　so　that　if　the　term　were　very　brief；　there　would　virtually　be　annual　Parliaments　during　a　great　proportion　of　all　time。　As　things　now　are；　the　period　of　seven　years；　though　of　unnecessary　length；　is　hardly　worth　altering　for　any　benefit　likely　to　be　produced；　especially　since　the　possibility；　always　impending；　of　an　earlier　dissolution　keeps　the　motives　for　standing　well　with　constituents　always　before　the　member's　eyes。　　　Whatever　may　be　the　term　most　eligible　for　the　duration　of　the　mandate；　it　might　seem　natural　that　the　individual　member　should　vacate　his　seat　at　the　expiration　of　that　term　from　the　day　of　his　election；　and　that　there　should　be　no　general　renewal　of　the　whole　House。　A　great　deal　might　be　said　for　this　system　if　there　were　any　practical　object　in　recommending　it。　But　it　is　condemned　by　much　stronger　reasons　than　can　be　alleged　in　its　support。　One　is；　that　there　would　be　no　means　of　promptly　getting　rid　of　a　majority　which　had　pursued　a　course　offensive　to　the　nation。　The　certainty　of　a　general　election　after　a　limited；　which　would　often　be　a　nearly　expired；　period；　and　the　possibility　of　it　at　any　time　when　the　minister　either　desires　it　for　his　own　sake；　or　thinks　that　it　would　make　him　popular　with　the　country；　tend　to　prevent　that　wide　divergence　between　the　feelings　of　the　assembly　and　those　of　the　constituency；　which　might　subsist　indefinitely　if　the　majority　of　the　House　had　always　several　years　of　their　term　still　to　run…　if　it　received　new　infusions　drop　by　drop；　which　would　be　more　likely　to　assume　than　to　modify　the　qualities　of　the　mass　they　were　joined　to。　It　is　as　essential　that　the　general　sense　of　the　House　should　accord　in　the　main　with　that　of　the　nation　as　is　that　distinguished　individuals　should　be　forfeiting　their　seats；　to　give　free　utterance　to　the　most　unpopular　sentiments。　There　is　another　reason；　of　much　weight；　against　the　gradual　and　partial　renewal　of　a　representative　assembly。　It　is　useful　that　there　should　be　a　periodical　general　muster　of　opposing　forces；　to　gauge　the　state　of　the　national　mind；　and　ascertain；　beyond　dispute；　the　relative　strength　of　different　parties　and　opinions。　This　is　not　done　conclusively　by　any　partial　renewal；　even　where；　as　in　some　of　the　French　constitutions；　a　large　fraction；　a　fifth　or　a　third；　go　out　at　once。　　　The　reasons　for　allowing　to　the　executive　the　power　of　dissolution　will　be　considered　in　a　subsequent　chapter；　relating　to　the　constitution　and　functions　of　the　Executive　in　a　representative　government。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　12　　　　　　　Ought　Pledges　to　be　Required　from　Members　of　Parliament？
  SHOULD　A　member　of　the　legislature　be　bound　by　the　instructions　of　his　constituents？　Should　he　be　the　organ　of　their　sentiments；　or　of　his　own？　their　ambassador　to　a　congress；　or　their　professional　agent；　empowered　not　only　to　act　for　them；　but　to　judge　for　them　what　ought　to　be　done？　These　two　theories　of　the　duty　of　a　legislator　in　a　representative　government　have　each　its　supporters；　and　each　is　the　recognised　doctrine　of　some　representative　governments。　In　the　Dutch　United　Provinces；　the　members　of　the　States　General　were　mere　delegates；　and　to　such　a　length　was　the　doctrine　carried；　that　when　any　important　question　arose　which　had　not　been　provided　for　in　their　instructions；　they　had　to　refer　back　to　their　constituents；　exactly　as　an　ambassador　does　to　the　government　from　which　he　is　accredited。　In　this　and　most　other　countries　which　possess　representative　constitutions；　law　and　custom　warrant　a　member　of　Parliament　in　voting　according　to　his　opinion　of　right；　however　different　from　that　of　his　constituents：　but　there　is　a　floating　notion　of　the　opposite　kind；　which　has　considerable　practical　operation　on　many　minds；　even　of　members　of　Parliament；　and　often　makes　them；　independently　of　desire　for　popularity；　or　concern　for　their　re…election；　feel　bound　in　conscience　to　let　their　conduct；　on　questions　on　which　their　constituents　have　a　decided　opinion；　be　the　expression　of　that　opinion　rather　than　of　their　own。　Abstractedly　from　positive　law；　and　from　the　historical　traditions　of　any　particular　people；　which　of　these　notions　of　the　duty　of　a　representative　is　the　true　one？　　　Unlike　the　questions　which　we　have　hitherto　treated；　this　is　not　a　question　of　constitutional　legislation；　but　of　what　may　more　properly　be　called　constitutional　morality…　the　ethics　of　representative　government。　It　does　not　so　much　concern　institutions；　as　the　temper　of　mind　which　the　electors　ought　to　bring　to　the　discharge　of　their　functions；　the　ideas　which　should　prevail　as　to　the　moral　duties　of　an　elector。　For　let　the　system　of　representation　be　what　it　may；　it　will　be　converted　into　one　of　mere　delegation　if　the　electors　so　choose。　As　long　as　they　are　free　not　to　vote；　and　free　to　vote　as　they　like；　they　cannot　be　prevented　from　making　their　vote　depend　on　any　condition　they　think　fit　to　annex　to　it。　By　refusing　to　elect　any　one　who　will　not　pledge　himself　to　all　their　opinions；　and　even；　if　they　please；　to　consult　with　them　before　voting　on　any　important　subject　not　foreseen；　they　can　reduce　their　representative　to　their　mere　mouthpiece；　or　compel　him　in　honour；　when　no　longer　willing　to　act　in　that　capacity；　to　resign　his　seat。　And　since　they　have　the　power　of　doing　this；　the　theory　of　the　Constitution　ought　to　suppose　that　they　will　wish　to　do　it；　since　the　very　principle　of　constitutional　government　requires　it　to　be　assumed　that　political　power　will　be　abused　to　promote　the　particular　purposes　of　the　holder；　not　because　it　always　is　so；　but　because　such　is　the　natural　tendency　of　things；　to　guard　against　which　is　the　especial　use　of　free　institutions。　However　wrong；　therefore；　or　however　foolish；　we　may　think　it　in　the　electors　to　convert　their　representative　into　a　delegate；　that　stretch　of　the　electoral　privilege　being　a　natural　and　not　improbable　one；　the　same　precautions　ought　to　be　taken　as　if　it　were　certain。　We　may　hope　that　the　electors　will　not　act　on　this　notion　of　the　use　of　the　suffrage；　but　a　representative　government　needs　to　be　so　framed　that；　even　if　they　do；　they　shall　not　be　able　to　effect　what　ought　not　to　be　in　the　power　of　any　body　of　persons…　class　legislation　for　their　own　benefit。　　　When　it　is　said　that　the　question　is　only　one　of　political　morality；　this　does　not　extenuate　its　importance。　Questions　of　constitutional　morality　are　of　no　less　practical　moment　than　those　relating　to　the　constitution　itself。　The　very　existence　of　some　governments；　and　all　that　renders　others　endurable；　rests　on　the　practical　observance　of　doctrines　of　constitutional　morality；　traditional　notions　in　the　minds　of　the　several　constituted　authorities；　which　modify　the　use　that　might　otherwise　be　made　of　their　powers。　In　unbalanced　governments…　pure　monarchy；　pure　aristocracy；　pure　democracy…　such　maxims　are　the　only　barrier　which　restrains　the　government　from　the　utmost　excesses　in　the　direction　of　its　characteristic　tendency。　In　imperfectly　balanced　governments；　where　some　attempt　is　made　to　set　constitutional　limits　to　the　impulses　of　the　strongest　power；　but　where　that　power　is　strong　enough　to　overstep　them　with　at　least　temporary　impunity；　it　is　only　by　doctrines　of　constitutional　morality；　recognised　and　sustained　by　opinion；　that　any　regard　at　all　is　preserved　for　the　checks　and　limitations　of　the　constitution。　In　well…balanced　governments；　in　which　the　supreme　power　is　divided；　and　each　sharer　is　protected　against　the　usurpations　of　the　others　in　the