osition　in　the　representative　body：　what　might　we　expect　if　they　were　made　by　the　body　itself？　Numerous　bodies　never　regard　special　qualifications　at　all。　Unless　a　man　is　fit　for　the　gallows；　he　is　thought　to　be　about　as　fit　as　other　people　for　almost　anything　for　which　he　can　offer　himself　as　a　candidate。　When　appointments　made　by　a　public　body　are　not　decided；　as　they　almost　always　are；　by　party　connection　or　private　jobbing；　a　man　is　appointed　either　because　he　has　a　reputation；　often　quite　undeserved；　for　general　ability；　or　frequently　for　no　better　reason　than　that　he　is　personally　popular。　　　It　has　never　been　thought　desirable　that　Parliament　should　itself　nominate　even　the　members　of　a　Cabinet。　It　is　enough　that　it　virtually　decides　who　shall　be　prime　minister；　or　who　shall　be　the　two　or　three　individuals　from　whom　the　prime　minister　shall　be　chosen。　In　doing　this　it　merely　recognises　the　fact　that　a　certain　person　is　the　candidate　of　the　party　whose　general　policy　commands　its　support。　In　reality；　the　only　thing　which　Parliament　decides　is；　which　of　two；　or　at　most　three；　parties　or　bodies　of　men；　shall　furnish　the　executive　government：　the　opinion　of　the　party　itself　decides　which　of　its　members　is　fittest　to　be　placed　at　the　head。　According　to　the　existing　practice　of　the　British　Constitution；　these　things　seem　to　be　on　as　good　a　footing　as　they　can　be。　Parliament　does　not　nominate　any　minister；　but　the　Crown　appoints　the　head　of　the　administration　in　conformity　to　the　general　wishes　and　inclinations　manifested　by　Parliament；　and　the　other　ministers　on　the　recommendation　of　the　chief；　while　every　minister　has　the　undivided　moral　responsibility　of　appointing　fit　persons　to　the　other　offices　of　administration　which　are　not　permanent。　In　a　republic；　some　other　arrangement　would　be　necessary：　but　the　nearer　it　approached　in　practice　to　that　which　has　long　existed　in　England；　the　more　likely　it　would　be　to　work　well。　Either；　as　in　the　American　republic；　the　head　of　the　Executive　must　be　elected　by　some　agency　entirely　independent　of　the　representative　body；　or　the　body　must　content　itself　with　naming　the　prime　minister；　and　making　him　responsible　for　the　choice
  of　his　associates　and　subordinates。　To　all　these　considerations；　at　least　theoretically；　I　fully　anticipate　a　general　assent：　though；　practically；　the　tendency　is　strong　in　representative　bodies　to　interfere　more　and　more　in　the　details　of　administration；　by　virtue　of　the　general　law；　that　whoever　has　the　strongest　power　is　more　and　more　tempted　to　make　an　excessive　use　of　it；　and　this　is　one　of　the　practical　dangers　to　which　the　futurity　of　representative　governments　will　be　exposed。　　　But　it　is　equally　true；　though　only　of　late　and　slowly　beginning　to　be　acknowledged；　that　a　numerous　assembly　is　as　little　fitted　for　the　direct　business　of　legislation　as　for　that　of　administration。　There　is　hardly　any　kind　of　intellectual　work　which　so　much　needs　to　be　done；　not　only　by　experienced　and　exercised　minds；　but　by　minds　trained　to　the　task　through　long　and　laborious　study；　as　the　business　of　making　laws。　This　is　a　sufficient　reason；　were　there　no　other；　why　they　can　never　be　well　made　but　by　a　committee　of　very　few　persons。　A　reason　no　less　conclusive　is；　that　every　provision　of　a　law　requires　to　be　framed　with　the　most　accurate　and　long…sighted　perception　of　its　effect　on　all　the　other　provisions；　and　the　law　when　made　should　be　capable　of　fitting　into　a　consistent　whole　with　the　previously　existing　laws。　It　is　impossible　that　these　conditions　should　be　in　any　degree　fulfilled　when　laws　are　voted　clause　by　clause　in　a　miscellaneous　assembly。　The　incongruity　of　such　a　mode　of　legislating　would　strike　all　minds；　were　it　not　that　our　laws　are　already；　as　to　form　and　construction；　such　a　chaos；　that　the　confusion　and　contradiction　seem　incapable　of　being　made　greater　by　any　addition　to　the　mass。　　　Yet　even　now；　the　utter　unfitness　of　our　legislative　machinery　for　its　purpose　is　making　itself　practically　felt　every　year　more　and　more。　The　mere　time　necessarily　occupied　in　getting　through　Bills　renders　Parliament　more　and　more　incapable　of　passing　any；　except　on　detached　and　narrow　points。　If　a　Bill　is　prepared　which　even　attempts　to　deal　with　the　whole　of　any　subject　（and　it　is　impossible　to　legislate　properly　on　any　part　without　having　the　whole　present　to　the　mind）；　it　hangs　over　from　session　to　session　through　sheer　impossibility　of　finding　time　to　dispose　of　it。　It　matters　not　though　the　Bill　may　have　been　deliberately　drawn　up　by　the　authority　deemed　the　best　qualified；　with　all　appliances　and　means　to　boot；　or　by　a　select　commission；　chosen　for　their　conversancy　with　the　subject；　and　having　employed　years　in　considering　and　digesting　the　particular　measure；　it　cannot　be　passed；　because　the　House　of　Commons　will　not　forego　the　precious　privilege　of　tinkering　it　with　their　clumsy　hands。　The　custom　has　of　late　been　to　some　extent　introduced；　when　the　principle　of　a　Bill　has　been　affirmed　on　the　second　reading；　of　referring　it　for　consideration　in　detail　to　a　Select　Committee：　but　it　has　not　been　found　that　this　practice　causes　much　less　time　to　be　lost　afterwards　in　carrying　it　through　the　Committee　of　the　whole　House：　the　opinions　or　private　crotchets　which　have　been　overruled　by　knowledge　always　insist　on　giving　themselves　a　second　chance　before　the　tribunal　of　ignorance。　Indeed；　the　practice　itself　has　been　adopted　principally　by　the　House　of　Lords；　the　members　of　which　are　less　busy　and　fond　of　meddling；　and　less　jealous　of　the　importance　of　their　individual　voices；　than　those　of　the　elective　House。　And　when　a　Bill　of　many　clauses　does　succeed　in　getting　itself　discussed　in　detail；　what　can　depict　the　state　in　which　it　comes　out　of　Committee！　Clauses　omitted　which　are　essential　to　the　working　of　the　rest；　incongruous　ones　inserted　to　conciliate　some　private　interest；　or　some　crotchety　member　who　threatens　to　delay　the　Bill；　articles　foisted　in　on　the　motion　of　some　sciolist　with　a　mere　smattering　of　the　subject；　leading　to　consequences　which　the　member　who　introduced　or　those　who　supported　the　Bill　did　not　at　the　moment　foresee；　and　which　need　an　amending　Act　in　the　next　session　to　correct　their　mischiefs。　　　It　is　one　of　the　evils　of　the　present　mode　of　managing　these　things　that　the　explaining　and　defending　of　a　Bill；　and　of　its　various　provisions；　is　scarcely　ever　performed　by　the　person　from　whose　mind　they　emanated；　who　probably　has　not　a　seat　in　the　House。　Their　defence　rests　upon　some　minister　or　member　of　Parliament　who　did　not　frame　them；　who　is　dependent　on　cramming　for　all　his　arguments　but　those　which　are　perfectly　obvious；　who　does　not　know　the　full　strength　of　his　case；　nor　the　best　reasons　by　which　to　support　it；　and　is　wholly　incapable　of　meeting　unforeseen　objections。　This　evil；　as　far　as　Government　bills　are　concerned；　admits　of　remedy；　and　has　been　remedied　in　some　representative　constitutions；　by　allowing　the　Government　to　be　represented　in　either　House　by　persons　in　its　confidence；　having　a　right　to　speak；　though　not　to　vote。　　　If　that；　as　yet　considerable；　majority　of　the　House　of　Commons　who　never　desire　to　move　an　amendment　or　make　a　speech　would　no　longer　leave　the　whole　regulation　of　business　to　those　who　do；　if　they　would　bethink　themselves　that　better　qualifications　for　legislation　exist；　and　may　be　found　if　sought　for；　than　a　fluent　tongue　and　the　faculty　of　getting　elected　by　a　constituency；　it　would　soon　be　recognised　that；　in　legislation　as　well　as　administration；　the　only　task　to　which　a　representative　assembly　can　possibly　be　competent　is　not　that　of　doing　the　work；　but　of　causing　it　to　be　done；　of　determining　to　whom　or　to　what　sort　of　people　it　shall　be　confided；　and　giving　or　withholding　the　national　sanction　to　it　when　performed。　Any　government　fit　for　a　high　state　of　civilisation　would　have　as　one　of　its　fundamental　elements　a　small　body；　not　exceeding　in　number　the　members　of　a　Cabinet；　who　should　act　as　a　Commission　of　legislation；　having　for　its　appointed　office　to　make　the　laws。　If　the　laws　of　this　country　were；　as　surely　they　will　soon　be；　revised　and　put　into　a　connected　form；　the　Commission　of　Codification　by　which　this　is　effected　should　remain　as　a　permanent　institution；　to　watch　over　the　work；　protect　it　from　deterioration；　and　make　further　improvements　as　often　as　required。　No　one　would　wish　that　this　body　should　of　itself　have　any　power　of　enacting　laws：　the　Commission　would　only　embody　the　element　of　intelligence　in　their　construction；　Parliament　would　represent　that　of　will。　No　measure　would　become　a　law　until　expressly　sanctioned　by　Parliament：　and　Parliament；　or　either　House；　would　have　the　power　not　only　of　rejecting　but　of　sending　back　a　Bill　to　the　Commission　for　reconsideration　or　improvement。　Either　House　might　also　exercise　its　initiative；　by　referring　any　subject　to　the　Commission；　with　directions　to　prepare　a　law。　The　Commission；　of　course；　would　have　no　power　of　refusing　its　instrumentality　to　any　legislation　which　the　country　desired。　Instructions；　concurred　in　by　both　Houses；　to　draw　up　a　Bill　which　should　effect　a　particular　purpose；　would　be　imperative　on　the　Commissioners；　unless　they　preferred　to　resign　the