ent　can　a　multitude　of　insignificant　political　units　be　welded　into　a　people；　with　common　feelings　of　cohesion；　power　enough　to　protect　itself　against　conquest　or　foreign　aggression；　and　affairs　sufficiently　various　and　considerable　of　its　own　to　occupy　worthily　and　expand　to　fit　proportions　the　social　and　political　intelligence　of　the　population。
  *　Italy；　which　alone　can　be　quoted　as　an　exception；　is　only　so　in　regard　to　the　final　stage　of　its　transformation。　The　more　difficult　previous　advance　from　the　city　isolation　of　Florence；　Pisa；　or　Milan；　to　the　provincial　unity　of　Tuscany　or　Lombardy；　took　place　in　the　usual　manner。
  For　these　several　reasons；　kingly　government；　free　from　the　control　（though　perhaps　strengthened　by　the　support）　of　representative　institutions；　is　the　most　suitable　form　of　polity　for　the　earliest　stages　of　any　community；　not　excepting　a　city…community　like　those　of　ancient　Greece：　where；　accordingly；　the　government　of　kings；　under　some　real　but　no　ostensible　or　constitutional　control　by　public　opinion；　did　historically　precede　by　an　unknown　and　probably　great　duration　all　free　institutions；　and　gave　place　at　last；　during　a　considerable　lapse　of　time；　to　oligarchies　of　a　few　families。　　　A　hundred　other　infirmities　or　short…comings　in　a　people　might　be　pointed　out；　which　pro　tanto　disqualify　them　from　making　the　best　use　of　representative　government；　but　in　regard　to　these　it　is　not　equally　obvious　that　the　government　of　One　or　a　Few　would　have　any　tendency　to　cure　or　alleviate　the　evil。　Strong　prejudices　of　any　kind；　obstinate　adherence　to　old　habits；　positive　defects　of　national　character；　or　mere　ignorance；　and　deficiency　of　mental　cultivation；　if　prevalent　in　a　people；　will　be　in　general　faithfully　reflected　in　their　representative　assemblies：　and　should　it　happen　that　the　executive　administration；　the　direct　management　of　public　affairs；　is　in　the　hands　of　persons　comparatively　free　from　these　defects；　more　good　would　frequently　be　done　by　them　when　not　hampered　by　the　necessity　of　carrying　with　them　the　voluntary　assent　of　such　bodies。　But　the　mere　position　of　the　rulers　does　not　in　these；　as　it　does　in　the　other　cases　which　we　have　examined；　of　itself　invest　them　with　interests　and　tendencies　operating　in　the　beneficial　direction。　From　the　general　weaknesses　of　the　people　or　of　the　state　of　civilisation；　the　One　and　his　counsellors；　or　the　Few；　are　not　likely　to　be　habitually　exempt；　except　in　the　case　of　their　being　foreigners；　belonging　to　a　superior　people　or　a　more　advanced　state　of　society。　Then；　indeed；　the　rulers　may　be；　to　almost　any　extent；　superior　in　civilisation　to　those　over　whom　they　rule；　and　subjection　to　a　foreign　government　of　this　description；　notwithstanding　its　inevitable　evils；　is　of　ten　of　the　greatest　advantage　to　a　people；　carrying　them　rapidly　through　several　stages　of　progress；　and　clearing　away　obstacles　to　improvement　which　might　have　lasted　indefinitely　if　the　subject　population　had　been　left　unassisted　to　its　native　tendencies　and　chances。　In　a　country　not　under　the　dominion　of　foreigners；　the　only　cause　adequate　to　producing　similar　benefits　is　the　rare　accident　of　a　monarch　of　extraordinary　genius。　There　have　been　in　history　a　few　of　these；　who；　happily　for　humanity；　have　reigned　long　enough　to　render　some　of　their　improvements　permanent；　by　leaving　them　under　the　guardianship　of　a　generation　which　had　grown　up　under　their　influence。　Charlemagne　may　be　cited　as　one　instance；　Peter　the　Great　is　another。　Such　examples　however　are　so　unfrequent　that　they　can　only　be　classed　with　the　happy　accidents　which　have　so　often　decided　at　a　critical　moment　whether　some　leading　portion　of　humanity　should　make　a　sudden　start；　or　sink　back　towards　barbarism：　chances　like　the　existence　of　Themistocles　at　the　time　of　the　Persian　invasion；　or　of　the　first　or　third　William　of　Orange。　　　It　would　be　absurd　to　construct　institutions　for　the　mere　purpose　of　taking　advantage　of　such　possibilities；　especially　as　men　of　this　calibre；　in　any　distinguished　position；　do　not　require　despotic　power　to　enable　them　to　exert　great　influence；　as　is　evidenced　by　the　three　last　mentioned。　The　case　most　requiring　consideration　in　reference　to　institutions　is　the　not　very　uncommon　one　in　which　a　small　but　leading　portion　of　the　population；　from　difference　of　race；　more　civilised　origin；　or　other　peculiarities　of　circumstance；　are　markedly　superior　in　civilisation　and　general　character　to　the　remainder。　Under　those　conditions；　government　by　the　representatives　of　the　mass　would　stand　a　chance　of　depriving　them　of　much　of　the　benefit　they　might　derive　from　the　greater　civilisation　of　the　superior　ranks；　while　government　by　the　representatives　of　those　ranks　would　probably　rivet　the　degradation　of　the　multitude；　and　leave　them　no　hope　of　decent　treatment　except　by　ridding　themselves　of　one　of　the　most　valuable　elements　of　future　advancement。　The　best　prospect　of　improvement　for　a　people　thus　composed　lies　in　the　existence　of　a　constitutionally　unlimited；　or　at　least　a　practically　preponderant；　authority　in　the　chief　ruler　of　the　dominant　class。　He　alone　has　by　his　position　an　interest　in　raising　and　improving　the　mass　of　whom　he　is　not　jealous；　as　a　counterpoise　to　his　associates　of　whom　he　is。　And　if　fortunate　circumstances　place　beside　him；　not　as　controllers　but　as　subordinates；　a　body　representative　of　the　superior　caste；　which　by　its　objections　and　questionings；　and　by　its　occasional　outbreaks　of　spirit；　keeps　alive　habits　of　collective　resistance；　and　may　admit　of　being；　in　time　and　by　degrees；　expanded　into　a　really　national　representation　（which　is　in　substance　the　history　of　the　English　Parliament）；　the　nation　has　then　the　most　favourable　prospects　of　improvement　which　can　well　occur　to　a　community　thus　circumstanced　and　constituted。　　　Among　the　tendencies　which；　without　absolutely　rendering　a　people　unfit　for　representative　government；　seriously　incapacitate　them　from　reaping　the　full　benefit　of　it；　one　deserves　particular　notice。　There　are　two　states　of　the　inclinations；　intrinsically　very　different；　but　which　have　something　in　common；　by　virtue　of　which　they　often　coincide　in　the　direction　they　give　to　the　efforts　of　individuals　and　of　nations：　one　is；　the　desire　to　exercise　power　over　others；　the　other　is　disinclination　to　have　power　exercised　over　themselves。　　　The　difference　between　different　portions　of　mankind　in　the　relative　strength　of　these　two　dispositions　is　one　of　the　most　important　elements　in　their　history。　There　are　nations　in　whom　the　passion　for　governing　others　is　so　much　stronger　than　the　desire　of　personal　independence；　that　for　the　mere　shadow　of　the　one　they　are　found　ready　to　sacrifice　the　whole　of　the　other。　Each　one　of　their　number　is　willing；　like　the　private　soldier　in　an　army；　to　abdicate　his　personal　freedom　of　action　into　the　hands　of　his　general；　provided　the　army　is　triumphant　and　victorious；　and　he　is　able　to　flatter　himself　that　he　is　one　of　a　conquering　host；　though　the　notion　that　he　has　himself　any　share　in　the　domination　exercised　over　the　conquered　is　an　illusion。　A　government　strictly　limited　in　its　powers　and　attributions；　required　to　hold　its　hands　from　over…meddling；　and　to　let　most　things　go　on　without　its　assuming　the　part　of　guardian　or　director；　is　not　to　the　taste　of　such　a　people。　In　their　eyes　the　possessors　of　authority　can　hardly　take　too　much　upon　themselves；　provided　the　authority　itself　is　open　to　general　competition。　An　average　individual　among　them　prefers　the　chance；　however　distant　or　improbable；　of　wielding　some　share　of　power　over　his　fellow　citizens；　above　the　certainty；　to　himself　and　others；　of　having　no　unnecessary　power　exercised　over　them。　These　are　the　elements　of　a　people　of　place…hunters；　in　whom　the　course　of　politics　is　mainly　determined　by　place…hunting；　where　equality　alone　is　cared　for；　but　not　liberty；　where　the　contests　of　political　parties　are　but　struggles　to　decide　whether　the　power　of　meddling　in　everything　shall　belong　to　one　class　or　another；　perhaps　merely　to　one　knot　of　public　men　or　another；　where　the　idea　entertained　of　democracy　is　merely　that　of　opening　offices　to　the　competition　of　all　instead　of　a　few；　where；　the　more　popular　the　institutions；　the　more　innumerable　are　the　places　created；　and　the　more　monstrous　the　over…government　exercised　by　all　over　each；　and　by　the　executive　over　all。　It　would　be　as　unjust　as　it　would　be　ungenerous　to　offer　this；　or　anything　approaching　to　it；　as　an　unexaggerated　picture　of　the　French　people；　yet　the　degree　in　which　they　do　participate　in　this　type　of　character　has　caused　representative　government　by　a　limited　class　to　break　down　by　excess　of　corruption；　and　the　attempt　at　representative　government　by　the　whole　male　population　to　end　in　giving　one　man　the　power　of　consigning　any　number　of　the　rest；　without　trial；　to　Lambessa　or　Cayenne；　provided　he　allows　all　of　them　to　think　themselves　not　excluded　from　the　possibility　of　sharing　his　favours。　　　The　point　of　character　which；　beyond　any　other；　fits　the　people　of　this　country　for　representative　government　is　that　they　have　almost　universally　the　contrary　characteristic。　They　are　very　jealous　of　any　attempt　to　exercise　power　o