en；　however；　the　evil　stops　here；　the　price　may　be　worth　paying；　for　the　publicity　and　discussion　which；　though　not　an　invariable；　are　a　natural　accompaniment　of　any；　even　nominal；　representation。　In　the　modern　Kingdom　of　Greece；　for　example；*　it　can　hardly　be　doubted；　that　the　placehunters　who　chiefly　compose　the　representative　assembly；　though　they　contribute　little　or　nothing　directly　to　good　government；　nor　even　much　temper　the　arbitrary　power　of　the　executive；　yet　keep　up　the　idea　of　popular　rights；　and　conduce　greatly　to　the　real　liberty　of　the　press　which　exists　in　that　country。　This　benefit；　however；　is　entirely　dependent　on　the　co…existence　with　the　popular　body　of　an　hereditary　king。　If；　instead　of　struggling　for　the　favours　of　the　chief　ruler；　these　selfish　and　sordid　factions　struggled　for　the　chief　place　itself；　they　would　certainly；　as　in　Spanish　America；　keep　the　country　in　a　state　of　chronic　revolution　and　civil　war。　A　despotism；　not　even　legal；　but　of　illegal　violence；　would　be　alternately　exercised　by　a　succession　of　political　adventurers；　and　the　name　and　forms　of　representation　would　have　no　effect　but　to　prevent　despotism　from　attaining　the　stability　and　security　by　which　alone　its　evils　can　be　mitigated；　or　its　few　advantages　realised。
  *　Written　before　the　salutary　revolution　of　1862；　which；　provoked　by　popular　disgust　at　the　system　of　governing　by　corruption；　and　the　general　demoralisation　of　political　men；　has　opened　to　that　rapidly　improving　people　a　new　and　hopeful　chance　of　real　constitutional　government。
  The　preceding　are　the　cases　in　which　representative　government　cannot　permanently　exist。　There　are　others　in　which　it　possibly　might　exist；　but　in　which　some　other　form　of　government　would　be　preferable。　These　are　principally　when　the　people；　in　order　to　advance　in　civilisation；　have　some　lesson　to　learn；　some　habit　not　yet　acquired；　to　the　acquisition　of　which　representative　government　is　likely　to　be　an　impediment。　　　The　most　obvious　of　these　cases　is　the　one　already　considered；　in　which　the　people　have　still　to　learn　the　first　lesson　of　civilisation；　that　of　obedience。　A　race　who　have　been　trained　in　energy　and　courage　by　struggles　with　Nature　and　their　neighbours；　but　who　have　not　yet　settled　down　into　permanent　obedience　to　any　common　superior；　would　be　little　likely　to　acquire　this　habit　under　the　collective　government　of　their　own　body。　A　representative　assembly　drawn　from　among　themselves　would　simply　reflect　their　own　turbulent　insubordination。　It　would　refuse　its　authority　to　all　proceedings　which　would　impose；　on　their　savage　independence；　any　improving　restraint。　The　mode　in　which　such　tribes　are　usually　brought　to　submit　to　the　primary　conditions　of　civilised　society　is　through　the　necessities　of　warfare；　and　the　despotic　authority　indispensable　to　military　command。　A　military　leader　is　the　only　superior　to　whom　they　will　submit；　except　occasionally　some　prophet　supposed　to　be　inspired　from　above；　or　conjurer　regarded　as　possessing　miraculous　power。　These　may　exercise　a　temporary　ascendancy；　but　as　it　is　merely　personal；　it　rarely　effects　any　change　in　the　general　habits　of　the　people；　unless　the　prophet；　like　Mahomet；　is　also　a　military　chief；　and　goes　forth　the　armed　apostle　of　a　new　religion；　or　unless　the　military　chiefs　ally　themselves　with　his　influence；　and　turn　it　into　a　prop　for　their　own　government。　　　A　people　are　no　less　unfitted　for　representative　government　by　the　contrary　fault　to　that　last　specified；　by　extreme　passiveness；　and　ready　submission　to　tyranny。　If　a　people　thus　prostrated　by　character　and　circumstances　could　obtain　representative　institutions；　they　would　inevitably　choose　their　tyrants　as　their　representatives；　and　the　yoke　would　be　made　heavier　on　them　by　the　contrivance　which　prima　facie　might　be　expected　to　lighten　it。　On　the　contrary；　many　a　people　has　gradually　emerged　from　this　condition　by　the　aid　of　a　central　authority；　whose　position　has　made　it　the　rival；　and　has　ended　by　making　it　the　master；　of　the　local　despots；　and　which；　above　all；　has　been　single。　French　history；　from　Hugh　Capet　to　Richelieu　and　Louis　XIV。；　is　a　continued　example　of　this　course　of　things。　Even　when　the　King　was　scarcely　so　powerful　as　many　of　his　chief　feudatories；　the　great　advantage　which　he　derived　from　being　but　one　has　been　recognised　by　French　historians。　To　him　the　eyes　of　all　the　locally　oppressed　were　turned；　he　was　the　object　of　hope　and　reliance　throughout　the　kingdom；　while　each　local　potentate　was　only　powerful　within　a　more　or　less　confined　space。　At　his　hands；　refuge　and　protection　were　sought　from　every　part　of　the　country；　against　first　one；　then　another；　of　the　immediate　oppressors。　His　progress　to　ascendancy　was　slow；　but　it　resulted　from　successively　taking　advantage　of　opportunities　which　offered　themselves　only　to　him。　It　was；　therefore；　sure；　and；　in　proportion　as　it　was　accomplished；　it　abated；　in　the　oppressed　portion　of　the　community；　the　habit　of　submitting　to　oppression。　The　king's　interest　lay　in　encouraging　all　partial　attempts　on　the　part　of　the　serfs　to　emancipate　themselves　from　their　masters；　and　place　themselves　in　immediate　subordination　to　himself。　Under　his　protection　numerous　communities　were　formed　which　knew　no　one　above　them　but　the　King。　Obedience　to　a　distant　monarch　is　liberty　itself　compared　with　the　dominion　of　the　lord　of　the　neighbouring　castle：　and　the　monarch　was　long　compelled　by　necessities　of　position　to　exert　his　authority　as　the　ally；　rather　than　the　master；　of　the　classes　whom　he　had　aided　in　affecting　their　liberation。　In　this　manner　a　central　power；　despotic　in　principle　though　generally　much　restricted　in　practice；　was　mainly　instrumental　in　carrying　the　people　through　a　necessary　stage　of　improvement；　which　representative　government；　if　real；　would　most　likely　have　prevented　them　from　entering　upon。　Nothing　short　of　despotic　rule；　or　a　general　massacre；　could　have　effected　the　emancipation　of　the　serfs　in　the　Russian　Empire。　　　The　same　passages　of　history　forcibly　illustrate　another　mode　in　which　unlimited　monarchy　overcomes　obstacles　to　the　progress　of　civilisation　which　representative　government　would　have　had　a　decided　tendency　to　aggravate。　One　of　the　strongest　hindrances　to　improvement；　up　to　a　rather　advanced　stage；　is　an　inveterate　spirit　of　locality。　Portions　of　mankind；　in　many　other　respects　capable　of；　and　prepared　for；　freedom；　may　be　unqualified　for　amalgamating　into　even　the　smallest　nation。　Not　only　may　jealousies　and　antipathies　repel　them　from　one　another；　and　bar　all　possibility　of　voluntary　union；　but　they　may　not　yet　have　acquired　any　of　the　feelings　or　habits　which　would　make　the　union　real；　supposing　it　to　be　nominally　accomplished。　They　may；　like　the　citizens　of　an　ancient　community；　or　those　of　an　Asiatic　village；　have　had　considerable　practice　in　exercising　their　faculties　on　village　or　town　interests；　and　have　even　realised　a　tolerably　effective　popular　government　on　that　restricted　scale；　and　may　yet　have　but　slender　sympathies　with　anything　beyond；　and　no　habit　or　capacity　of　dealing　with　interests　common　to　many　such　communities。　　　I　am　not　aware　that　history　furnishes　any　example　in　which　a　number　of　these　political　atoms　or　corpuscles　have　coalesced　into　a　body；　and　learnt　to　feel　themselves　one　people；　except　through　previous　subjection　to　a　central　authority　common　to　all。*　It　is　through　the　habit　of　deferring　to　that　authority；　entering　into　its　plans　and　subserving　its　purposes；　that　a　people　such　as　we　have　supposed　receive　into　their　minds　the　conception　of　large　interests；　common　to　a　considerable　geographical　extent。　Such　interests；　on　the　contrary；　are　necessarily　the　predominant　consideration　in　the　mind　of　the　central　ruler；　and　through　the　relations；　more　or　less　intimate；　which　he　progressively　establishes　with　the　localities；　they　become　familiar　to　the　general　mind。　The　most　favourable　concurrence　of　circumstances　under　which　this　step　in　improvement　could　be　made；　would　be　one　which　should　raise　up　representative　institutions　without　representative　government；　a　representative　body；　or　bodies；　drawn　from　the　localities；　making　itself　the　auxiliary　and　instrument　of　the　central　power；　but　seldom　attempting　to　thwart　or　control　it。　The　people　being　thus　taken；　as　it　were；　into　council；　though　not　sharing　the　supreme　power；　the　political　education　given　by　the　central　authority　is　carried　home；　much　more　effectually　than　it　could　otherwise　be；　to　the　local　chiefs　and　to　the　population　generally；　while；　at　the　same　time；　a　tradition　is　kept　up　of　government　by　general　consent；　or　at　least；　the　sanction　of　tradition　is　not　given　to　government　without　it；　which；　when　consecrated　by　custom；　has　so　often　put　a　bad　end　to　a　good　beginning；　and　is　one　of　the　most　frequent　causes　of　the　sad　fatality　which　in　most　countries　has　stopped　improvement　in　so　early　a　stage；　because　the　work　of　some　one　period　has　been　so　done　as　to　bar　the　needful　work　of　the　ages　following。　Meanwhile；　it　may　be　laid　down　as　a　political　truth；　that　by　irresponsible　monarchy　rather　than　by　representative　government　can　a　multitude　of　insignificant　political　units　be　welded　into　a　people；　with　common　feelings　o