of　the　intellective　faculty。　After　strong　stimulation　of　a　sense　we　are　less　able　to　exercise　it　than　before；　as　e。g。　in　the　case　of　a　loud　sound　we　cannot　hear　easily　immediately　after；　or　in　the　case　of　a　bright　colour　or　a　powerful　odour　we　cannot　see　or　smell；　but　in　the　case　of　mind　thought　about　an　object　that　is　highly　intelligible　renders　it　more　and　not　less　able　afterwards　to　think　objects　that　are　less　intelligible：　the　reason　is　that　while　the　faculty　of　sensation　is　dependent　upon　the　body；　mind　is　separable　from　it。　　　Once　the　mind　has　become　each　set　of　its　possible　objects；　as　a　man　of　science　has；　when　this　phrase　is　used　of　one　who　is　actually　a　man　of　science　（this　happens　when　he　is　now　able　to　exercise　the　power　on　his　own　initiative）；　its　condition　is　still　one　of　potentiality；　but　in　a　different　sense　from　the　potentiality　which　preceded　the　acquisition　of　knowledge　by　learning　or　discovery：　the　mind　too　is　then　able　to　think　itself。　　　Since　we　can　distinguish　between　a　spatial　magnitude　and　what　it　is　to　be　such；　and　between　water　and　what　it　is　to　be　water；　and　so　in　many　other　cases　（though　not　in　all；　for　in　certain　cases　the　thing　and　its　form　are　identical）；　flesh　and　what　it　is　to　be　flesh　are　discriminated　either　by　different　faculties；　or　by　the　same　faculty　in　two　different　states：　for　flesh　necessarily　involves　matter　and　is　like　what　is　snub…nosed；　a　this　in　a　this。　Now　it　is　by　means　of　the　sensitive　faculty　that　we　discriminate　the　hot　and　the　cold；　i。e。　the　factors　which　combined　in　a　certain　ratio　constitute　flesh：　the　essential　character　of　flesh　is　apprehended　by　something　different　either　wholly　separate　from　the　sensitive　faculty　or　related　to　it　as　a　bent　line　to　the　same　line　when　it　has　been　straightened　out。　　　Again　in　the　case　of　abstract　objects　what　is　straight　is　analogous　to　what　is　snub…nosed；　for　it　necessarily　implies　a　continuum　as　its　matter：　its　constitutive　essence　is　different；　if　we　may　distinguish　between　straightness　and　what　is　straight：　let　us　take　it　to　be　two…ness。　It　must　be　apprehended；　therefore；　by　a　different　power　or　by　the　same　power　in　a　different　state。　To　sum　up；　in　so　far　as　the　realities　it　knows　are　capable　of　being　separated　from　their　matter；　so　it　is　also　with　the　powers　of　mind。　　　The　problem　might　be　suggested：　if　thinking　is　a　passive　affection；　then　if　mind　is　simple　and　impassible　and　has　nothing　in　common　with　anything　else；　as　Anaxagoras　says；　how　can　it　come　to　think　at　all？　For　interaction　between　two　factors　is　held　to　require　a　precedent　community　of　nature　between　the　factors。　Again　it　might　be　asked；　is　mind　a　possible　object　of　thought　to　itself？　For　if　mind　is　thinkable　per　se　and　what　is　thinkable　is　in　kind　one　and　the　same；　then　either　（a）　mind　will　belong　to　everything；　or　（b）　mind　will　contain　some　element　common　to　it　with　all　other　realities　which　makes　them　all　thinkable。　　　（1）　Have　not　we　already　disposed　of　the　difficulty　about　interaction　involving　a　common　element；　when　we　said　that　mind　is　in　a　sense　potentially　whatever　is　thinkable；　though　actually　it　is　nothing　until　it　has　thought？　What　it　thinks　must　be　in　it　just　as　characters　may　be　said　to　be　on　a　writingtablet　on　which　as　yet　nothing　actually　stands　written：　this　is　exactly　what　happens　with　mind。　　　（Mind　is　itself　thinkable　in　exactly　the　same　way　as　its　objects　are。　For　（a）　in　the　case　of　objects　which　involve　no　matter；　what　thinks　and　what　is　thought　are　identical；　for　speculative　knowledge　and　its　object　are　identical。　（Why　mind　is　not　always　thinking　we　must　consider　later。）　（b）　In　the　case　of　those　which　contain　matter　each　of　the　objects　of　thought　is　only　potentially　present。　It　follows　that　while　they　will　not　have　mind　in　them　（for　mind　is　a　potentiality　of　them　only　in　so　far　as　they　are　capable　of　being　disengaged　from　matter）　mind　may　yet　be　thinkable。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　5
  Since　in　every　class　of　things；　as　in　nature　as　a　whole；　we　find　two　factors　involved；　（1）　a　matter　which　is　potentially　all　the　particulars　included　in　the　class；　（2）　a　cause　which　is　productive　in　the　sense　that　it　makes　them　all　（the　latter　standing　to　the　former；　as　e。g。　an　art　to　its　material）；　these　distinct　elements　must　likewise　be　found　within　the　soul。　　　And　in　fact　mind　as　we　have　described　it　is　what　it　is　what　it　is　by　virtue　of　becoming　all　things；　while　there　is　another　which　is　what　it　is　by　virtue　of　making　all　things：　this　is　a　sort　of　positive　state　like　light；　for　in　a　sense　light　makes　potential　colours　into　actual　colours。　　　Mind　in　this　sense　of　it　is　separable；　impassible；　unmixed；　since　it　is　in　its　essential　nature　activity　（for　always　the　active　is　superior　to　the　passive　factor；　the　originating　force　to　the　matter　which　it　forms）。　　　Actual　knowledge　is　identical　with　its　object：　in　the　individual；　potential　knowledge　is　in　time　prior　to　actual　knowledge；　but　in　the　universe　as　a　whole　it　is　not　prior　even　in　time。　Mind　is　not　at　one　time　knowing　and　at　another　not。　When　mind　is　set　free　from　its　present　conditions　it　appears　as　just　what　it　is　and　nothing　more：　this　alone　is　immortal　and　eternal　（we　do　not；　however；　remember　its　former　activity　because；　while　mind　in　this　sense　is　impassible；　mind　as　passive　is　destructible）；　and　without　it　nothing　thinks。
  6
  The　thinking　then　of　the　simple　objects　of　thought　is　found　in　those　cases　where　falsehood　is　impossible：　where　the　alternative　of　true　or　false　applies；　there　we　always　find　a　putting　together　of　objects　of　thought　in　a　quasi…unity。　As　Empedocles　said　that　'where　heads　of　many　a　creature　sprouted　without　necks'　they　afterwards　by　Love's　power　were　combined；　so　here　too　objects　of　thought　which　were　given　separate　are　combined；　e。g。　'incommensurate'　and　'diagonal'：　if　the　combination　be　of　objects　past　or　future　the　combination　of　thought　includes　in　its　content　the　date。　For　falsehood　always　involves　a　synthesis；　for　even　if　you　assert　that　what　is　white　is　not　white　you　have　included　not　white　in　a　synthesis。　It　is　possible　also　to　call　all　these　cases　division　as　well　as　combination。　However　that　may　be；　there　is　not　only　the　true　or　false　assertion　that　Cleon　is　white　but　also　the　true　or　false　assertion　that　he　was　or　will　he　white。　In　each　and　every　case　that　which　unifies　is　mind。　　　Since　the　word　'simple'　has　two　senses；　i。e。　may　mean　either　（a）　'not　capable　of　being　divided'　or　（b）　'not　actually　divided'；　there　is　nothing　to　prevent　mind　from　knowing　what　is　undivided；　e。g。　when　it　apprehends　a　length　（which　is　actually　undivided）　and　that　in　an　undivided　time；　for　the　time　is　divided　or　undivided　in　the　same　manner　as　the　line。　It　is　not　possible；　then；　to　tell　what　part　of　the　line　it　was　apprehending　in　each　half　of　the　time：　the　object　has　no　actual　parts　until　it　has　been　divided：　if　in　thought　you　think　each　half　separately；　then　by　the　same　act　you　divide　the　time　also；　the　half…lines　becoming　as　it　were　new　wholes　of　length。　But　if　you　think　it　as　a　whole　consisting　of　these　two　possible　parts；　then　also　you　think　it　in　a　time　which　corresponds　to　both　parts　together。　（But　what　is　not　quantitatively　but　qualitatively　simple　is　thought　in　a　simple　time　and　by　a　simple　act　of　the　soul。）　　　But　that　which　mind　thinks　and　the　time　in　which　it　thinks　are　in　this　case　divisible　only　incidentally　and　not　as　such。　For　in　them　too　there　is　something　indivisible　（though；　it　may　be；　not　isolable）　which　gives　unity　to　the　time　and　the　whole　of　length；　and　this　is　found　equally　in　every　continuum　whether　temporal　or　spatial。　　　Points　and　similar　instances　of　things　that　divide；　themselves　being　indivisible；　are　realized　in　consciousness　in　the　same　manner　as　privations。　　　A　similar　account　may　be　given　of　all　other　cases；　e。g。　how　evil　or　black　is　cognized；　they　are　cognized；　in　a　sense；　by　means　of　their　contraries。　That　which　cognizes　must　have　an　element　of　potentiality　in　its　being；　and　one　of　the　contraries　must　be　in　it。　But　if　there　is　anything　that　has　no　contrary；　then　it　knows　itself　and　is　actually　and　possesses　independent　existence。　　　Assertion　is　the　saying　of　something　concerning　something；　e。g。　affirmation；　and　is　in　every　case　either　true　or　false：　this　is　not　always　the　case　with　mind：　the　thinking　of　the　definition　in　the　sense　of　the　constitutive　essence　is　never　in　error　nor　is　it　the　assertion　of　something　concerning　something；　but；　just　as　while　the　seeing　of　the　special　object　of　sight　can　never　be　in　error；　the　belief　that　the　white　object　seen　is　a　man　may　be　mistaken；　so　too　in　the　case　of　objects　which　are　without　matter。
  7
  Actual　knowledge　is　identical　with　its　object：　potential　knowledge　in　the　individual　is　in　time　prior　to　actual　knowledge　but　in　the　universe　it　has　no　priority　even　in　time；　for　all　things　that　come　into　being　arise　from　what　actually　is。　In　the　case　of　sense　clearly　the　sensitive　faculty　already　was　potentially　what　the　object　makes　it　to　be　actually；　the　faculty　is　not　affected　or　altered。　This　must　therefore　be　a　different　kind　from　movement；　for　movement　is；　as　we　saw；　an　activity　of　what　is　imperfect；　activity　in　the　unqualified　sense；　i。e。　that　of　wh