cannot　be　moved　at　all；　manifestly　it　cannot　be　moved　by　itself。　　　Of　all　the　opinions　we　have　enumerated；　by　far　the　most　unreasonable　is　that　which　declares　the　soul　to　be　a　self…moving　number；　it　involves　in　the　first　place　all　the　impossibilities　which　follow　from　regarding　the　soul　as　moved；　and　in　the　second　special　absurdities　which　follow　from　calling　it　a　number。　How　we　to　imagine　a　unit　being　moved？　By　what　agency？　What　sort　of　movement　can　be　attributed　to　what　is　without　parts　or　internal　differences？　If　the　unit　is　both　originative　of　movement　and　itself　capable　of　being　moved；　it　must　contain　difference。　　　Further；　since　they　say　a　moving　line　generates　a　surface　and　a　moving　point　a　line；　the　movements　of　the　psychic　units　must　be　lines　（for　a　point　is　a　unit　having　position；　and　the　number　of　the　soul　is；　of　course；　somewhere　and　has　position）。　　　Again；　if　from　a　number　a　number　or　a　unit　is　subtracted；　the　remainder　is　another　number；　but　plants　and　many　animals　when　divided　continue　to　live；　and　each　segment　is　thought　to　retain　the　same　kind　of　soul。　　　It　must　be　all　the　same　whether　we　speak　of　units　or　corpuscles；　for　if　the　spherical　atoms　of　Democritus　became　points；　nothing　being　retained　but　their　being　a　quantum；　there　must　remain　in　each　a　moving　and　a　moved　part；　just　as　there　is　in　what　is　continuous；　what　happens　has　nothing　to　do　with　the　size　of　the　atoms；　it　depends　solely　upon　their　being　a　quantum。　That　is　why　there　must　be　something　to　originate　movement　in　the　units。　If　in　the　animal　what　originates　movement　is　the　soul；　so　also　must　it　be　in　the　case　of　the　number；　so　that　not　the　mover　and　the　moved　together；　but　the　mover　only；　will　be　the　soul。　But　how　is　it　possible　for　one　of　the　units　to　fulfil　this　function　of　originating　movement？　There　must　be　some　difference　between　such　a　unit　and　all　the　other　units；　and　what　difference　can　there　be　between　one　placed　unit　and　another　except　a　difference　of　position？　If　then；　on　the　other　hand；　these　psychic　units　within　the　body　are　different　from　the　points　of　the　body；　there　will　be　two　sets　of　units　both　occupying　the　same　place；　for　each　unit　will　occupy　a　point。　And　yet；　if　there　can　be　two；　why　cannot　there　be　an　infinite　number？　For　if　things　can　occupy　an　indivisible　lace；　they　must　themselves　be　indivisible。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　the　points　of　the　body　are　identical　with　the　units　whose　number　is　the　soul；　or　if　the　number　of　the　points　in　the　body　is　the　soul；　why　have　not　all　bodies　souls？　For　all　bodies　contain　points　or　an　infinity　of　points。　　　Further；　how　is　it　possible　for　these　points　to　be　isolated　or　separated　from　their　bodies；　seeing　that　lines　cannot　be　resolved　into　points？
  5
  The　result　is；　as　we　have　said；　that　this　view；　while　on　the　one　side　identical　with　that　of　those　who　maintain　that　soul　is　a　subtle　kind　of　body；　is　on　the　other　entangled　in　the　absurdity　peculiar　to　Democritus'　way　of　describing　the　manner　in　which　movement　is　originated　by　soul。　For　if　the　soul　is　present　throughout　the　whole　percipient　body；　there　must；　if　the　soul　be　a　kind　of　body；　be　two　bodies　in　the　same　place；　and　for　those　who　call　it　a　number；　there　must　be　many　points　at　one　point；　or　every　body　must　have　a　soul；　unless　the　soul　be　a　different　sort　of　number…other；　that　is；　than　the　sum　of　the　points　existing　in　a　body。　Another　consequence　that　follows　is　that　the　animal　must　be　moved　by　its　number　precisely　in　the　way　that　Democritus　explained　its　being　moved　by　his　spherical　psychic　atoms。　What　difference　does　it　make　whether　we　speak　of　small　spheres　or　of　large　units；　or；　quite　simply；　of　units　in　movement？　One　way　or　another；　the　movements　of　the　animal　must　be　due　to　their　movements。　Hence　those　who　combine　movement　and　number　in　the　same　subject　lay　themselves　open　to　these　and　many　other　similar　absurdities。　It　is　impossible　not　only　that　these　characters　should　give　the　definition　of　soul…it　is　impossible　that　they　should　even　be　attributes　of　it。　The　point　is　clear　if　the　attempt　be　made　to　start　from　this　as　the　account　of　soul　and　explain　from　it　the　affections　and　actions　of　the　soul；　e。g。　reasoning；　sensation；　pleasure；　pain；　&c。　For；　to　repeat　what　we　have　said　earlier；　movement　and　number　do　not　facilitate　even　conjecture　about　the　derivative　properties　of　soul。　　　Such　are　the　three　ways　in　which　soul　has　traditionally　been　defined；　one　group　of　thinkers　declared　it　to　be　that　which　is　most　originative　of　movement　because　it　moves　itself；　another　group　to　be　the　subtlest　and　most　nearly　incorporeal　of　all　kinds　of　body。　We　have　now　sufficiently　set　forth　the　difficulties　and　inconsistencies　to　which　these　theories　are　exposed。　It　remains　now　to　examine　the　doctrine　that　soul　is　composed　of　the　elements。　　　The　reason　assigned　for　this　doctrine　is　that　thus　the　soul　may　perceive　or　come　to　know　everything　that　is；　but　the　theory　necessarily　involves　itself　in　many　impossibilities。　Its　upholders　assume　that　like　is　known　only　by　like；　and　imagine　that　by　declaring　the　soul　to　be　composed　of　the　elements　they　succeed　in　identifying　the　soul　with　all　the　things　it　is　capable　of　apprehending。　But　the　elements　are　not　the　only　things　it　knows；　there　are　many　others；　or；　more　exactly；　an　infinite　number　of　others；　formed　out　of　the　elements。　Let　us　admit　that　the　soul　knows　or　perceives　the　elements　out　of　which　each　of　these　composites　is　made　up；　but　by　what　means　will　it　know　or　perceive　the　composite　whole；　e。g。　what　God；　man；　flesh；　bone　（or　any　other　compound）　is？　For　each　is；　not　merely　the　elements　of　which　it　is　composed；　but　those　elements　combined　in　a　determinate　mode　or　ratio；　as　Empedocles　himself　says　of　bone；
  The　kindly　Earth　in　its　broad…bosomed　moulds　　　　　　　Won　of　clear　Water　two　parts　out　of　eight；　　　　　　　And　four　of　Fire；　and　so　white　bones　were　formed。
  Nothing；　therefore；　will　be　gained　by　the　presence　of　the　elements　in　the　soul；　unless　there　be　also　present　there　the　various　formulae　of　proportion　and　the　various　compositions　in　accordance　with　them。　Each　element　will　indeed　know　its　fellow　outside；　but　there　will　be　no　knowledge　of　bone　or　man；　unless　they　too　are　present　in　the　constitution　of　the　soul。　The　impossibility　of　this　needs　no　pointing　out；　for　who　would　suggest　that　stone　or　man　could　enter　into　the　constitution　of　the　soul？　The　same　applies　to　'the　good'　and　'the　not…good'；　and　so　on。　　　Further；　the　word　'is'　has　many　meanings：　it　may　be　used　of　a　'this'　or　substance；　or　of　a　quantum；　or　of　a　quale；　or　of　any　other　of　the　kinds　of　predicates　we　have　distinguished。　Does　the　soul　consist　of　all　of　these　or　not？　It　does　not　appear　that　all　have　common　elements。　Is　the　soul　formed　out　of　those　elements　alone　which　enter　into　substances？　so　how　will　it　be　able　to　know　each　of　the　other　kinds　of　thing？　Will　it　be　said　that　each　kind　of　thing　has　elements　or　principles　of　its　own；　and　that　the　soul　is　formed　out　of　the　whole　of　these？　In　that　case；　the　soul　must　be　a　quantum　and　a　quale　and　a　substance。　But　all　that　can　be　made　out　of　the　elements　of　a　quantum　is　a　quantum；　not　a　substance。　These　（and　others　like　them）　are　the　consequences　of　the　view　that　the　soul　is　composed　of　all　the　elements。　　　It　is　absurd；　also；　to　say　both　（a）　that　like　is　not　capable　of　being　affected　by　like；　and　（b）　that　like　is　perceived　or　known　by　like；　for　perceiving；　and　also　both　thinking　and　knowing；　are；　on　their　own　assumption；　ways　of　being　affected　or　moved。　　　There　are　many　puzzles　and　difficulties　raised　by　saying；　as　Empedocles　does；　that　each　set　of　things　is　known　by　means　of　its　corporeal　elements　and　by　reference　to　something　in　soul　which　is　like　them；　and　additional　testimony　is　furnished　by　this　new　consideration；　for　all　the　parts　of　the　animal　body　which　consist　wholly　of　earth　such　as　bones；　sinews；　and　hair　seem　to　be　wholly　insensitive　and　consequently　not　perceptive　even　of　objects　earthy　like　themselves；　as　they　ought　to　have　been。　　　Further；　each　of　the　principles　will　have　far　more　ignorance　than　knowledge；　for　though　each　of　them　will　know　one　thing；　there　will　be　many　of　which　it　will　be　ignorant。　Empedocles　at　any　rate　must　conclude　that　his　God　is　the　least　intelligent　of　all　beings；　for　of　him　alone　is　it　true　that　there　is　one　thing；　Strife；　which　he　does　not　know；　while　there　is　nothing　which　mortal　beings　do　not　know；　for　ere　is　nothing　which　does　not　enter　into　their　composition。　　　In　general；　we　may　ask；　Why　has　not　everything　a　soul；　since　everything　either　is　an　element；　or　is　formed　out　of　one　or　several　or　all　of　the　elements？　Each　must　certainly　know　one　or　several　or　all。　　　The　problem　might　also　be　raised；　What　is　that　which　unifies　the　elements　into　a　soul？　The　elements　correspond；　it　would　appear；　to　the　matter；　what　unites　them；　whatever　it　is；　is　the　supremely　important　factor。　But　it　is　impossible　that　there　should　be　something　superior　to；　and　dominant　over；　the　soul　（and　a　fortiori　over　the　mind）；　it　is　reasonable　to　hold　that　mind　is　by　nature　most　primordial　and　dominant；　while　their　statement　that　it　is　the　elements　which　are　first　of　all　that　is。　　　All；　both　those　who　assert　that　the　soul；　because　of　its　knowledge　or　percep