ind　is　always　thinking…what　can　this　be？　For　all　practical　processes　of　thinking　have　limits…they　all　go　on　for　the　sake　of　something　outside　the　process；　and　all　theoretical　processes　come　to　a　close　in　the　same　way　as　the　phrases　in　speech　which　express　processes　and　results　of　thinking。　Every　such　linguistic　phrase　is　either　definitory　or　demonstrative。　Demonstration　has　both　a　starting…point　and　may　be　said　to　end　in　a　conclusion　or　inferred　result；　even　if　the　process　never　reaches　final　completion；　at　any　rate　it　never　returns　upon　itself　again　to　its　starting…point；　it　goes　on　assuming　a　fresh　middle　term　or　a　fresh　extreme；　and　moves　straight　forward；　but　circular　movement　returns　to　its　starting…point。　Definitions；　too；　are　closed　groups　of　terms。　　　Further；　if　the　same　revolution　is　repeated；　mind　must　repeatedly　think　the　same　object。　　　Further；　thinking　has　more　resemblance　to　a　coming　to　rest　or　arrest　than　to　a　movement；　the　same　may　be　said　of　inferring。　　　It　might　also　be　urged　that　what　is　difficult　and　enforced　is　incompatible　with　blessedness；　if　the　movement　of　the　soul　is　not　of　its　essence；　movement　of　the　soul　must　be　contrary　to　its　nature。　It　must　also　be　painful　for　the　soul　to　be　inextricably　bound　up　with　the　body；　nay　more；　if；　as　is　frequently　said　and　widely　accepted；　it　is　better　for　mind　not　to　be　embodied；　the　union　must　be　for　it　undesirable。　　　Further；　the　cause　of　the　revolution　of　the　heavens　is　left　obscure。　It　is　not　the　essence　of　soul　which　is　the　cause　of　this　circular　movement…that　movement　is　only　incidental　to　soul…nor　is；　a　fortiori；　the　body　its　cause。　Again；　it　is　not　even　asserted　that　it　is　better　that　soul　should　be　so　moved；　and　yet　the　reason　for　which　God　caused　the　soul　to　move　in　a　circle　can　only　have　been　that　movement　was　better　for　it　than　rest；　and　movement　of　this　kind　better　than　any　other。　But　since　this　sort　of　consideration　is　more　appropriate　to　another　field　of　speculation；　let　us　dismiss　it　for　the　present。　　　The　view　we　have　just　been　examining；　in　company　with　most　theories　about　the　soul；　involves　the　following　absurdity：　they　all　join　the　soul　to　a　body；　or　place　it　in　a　body；　without　adding　any　specification　of　the　reason　of　their　union；　or　of　the　bodily　conditions　required　for　it。　Yet　such　explanation　can　scarcely　be　omitted；　for　some　community　of　nature　is　presupposed　by　the　fact　that　the　one　acts　and　the　other　is　acted　upon；　the　one　moves　and　the　other　is　moved；　interaction　always　implies　a　special　nature　in　the　two　interagents。　All；　however；　that　these　thinkers　do　is　to　describe　the　specific　characteristics　of　the　soul；　they　do　not　try　to　determine　anything　about　the　body　which　is　to　contain　it；　as　if　it　were　possible；　as　in　the　Pythagorean　myths；　that　any　soul　could　be　clothed　upon　with　any　body…an　absurd　view；　for　each　body　seems　to　have　a　form　and　shape　of　its　own。　It　is　as　absurd　as　to　say　that　the　art　of　carpentry　could　embody　itself　in　flutes；　each　art　must　use　its　tools；　each　soul　its　body。
  4
  There　is　yet　another　theory　about　soul；　which　has　commended　itself　to　many　as　no　less　probable　than　any　of　those　we　have　hitherto　mentioned；　and　has　rendered　public　account　of　itself　in　the　court　of　popular　discussion。　Its　supporters　say　that　the　soul　is　a　kind　of　harmony；　for　（a）　harmony　is　a　blend　or　composition　of　contraries；　and　（b）　the　body　is　compounded　out　of　contraries。　Harmony；　however；　is　a　certain　proportion　or　composition　of　the　constituents　blended；　and　soul　can　be　neither　the　one　nor　the　other　of　these。　Further；　the　power　of　originating　movement　cannot　belong　to　a　harmony；　while　almost　all　concur　in　regarding　this　as　a　principal　attribute　of　soul。　It　is　more　appropriate　to　call　health　（or　generally　one　of　the　good　states　of　the　body）　a　harmony　than　to　predicate　it　of　the　soul。　The　absurdity　becomes　most　apparent　when　we　try　to　attribute　the　active　and　passive　affections　of　the　soul　to　a　harmony；　the　necessary　readjustment　of　their　conceptions　is　difficult。　Further；　in　using　the　word　'harmony'　we　have　one　or　other　of　two　cases　in　our　mind；　the　most　proper　sense　is　in　relation　to　spatial　magnitudes　which　have　motion　and　position；　where　harmony　means　the　disposition　and　cohesion　of　their　parts　in　such　a　manner　as　to　prevent　the　introduction　into　the　whole　of　anything　homogeneous　with　it；　and　the　secondary　sense；　derived　from　the　former；　is　that　in　which　it　means　the　ratio　between　the　constituents　so　blended；　in　neither　of　these　senses　is　it　plausible　to　predicate　it　of　soul。　That　soul　is　a　harmony　in　the　sense　of　the　mode　of　composition　of　the　parts　of　the　body　is　a　view　easily　refutable；　for　there　are　many　composite　parts　and　those　variously　compounded；　of　what　bodily　part　is　mind　or　the　sensitive　or　the　appetitive　faculty　the　mode　of　composition？　And　what　is　the　mode　of　composition　which　constitutes　each　of　them？　It　is　equally　absurd　to　identify　the　soul　with　the　ratio　of　the　mixture；　for　the　mixture　which　makes　flesh　has　a　different　ratio　between　the　elements　from　that　which　makes　bone。　The　consequence　of　this　view　will　therefore　be　that　distributed　throughout　the　whole　body　there　will　be　many　souls；　since　every　one　of　the　bodily　parts　is　a　different　mixture　of　the　elements；　and　the　ratio　of　mixture　is　in　each　case　a　harmony；　i。e。　a　soul。　　　From　Empedocles　at　any　rate　we　might　demand　an　answer　to　the　following　question　for　he　says　that　each　of　the　parts　of　the　body　is　what　it　is　in　virtue　of　a　ratio　between　the　elements：　is　the　soul　identical　with　this　ratio；　or　is　it　not　rather　something　over　and　above　this　which　is　formed　in　the　parts？　Is　love　the　cause　of　any　and　every　mixture；　or　only　of　those　that　are　in　the　right　ratio？　Is　love　this　ratio　itself；　or　is　love　something　over　and　above　this？　Such　are　the　problems　raised　by　this　account。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　if　the　soul　is　different　from　the　mixture；　why　does　it　disappear　at　one　and　the　same　moment　with　that　relation　between　the　elements　which　constitutes　flesh　or　the　other　parts　of　the　animal　body？　Further；　if　the　soul　is　not　identical　with　the　ratio　of　mixture；　and　it　is　consequently　not　the　case　that　each　of　the　parts　has　a　soul；　what　is　that　which　perishes　when　the　soul　quits　the　body？　　　That　the　soul　cannot　either　be　a　harmony；　or　be　moved　in　a　circle；　is　clear　from　what　we　have　said。　Yet　that　it　can　be　moved　incidentally　is；　as　we　said　above；　possible；　and　even　that　in　a　sense　it　can　move　itself；　i。e。　in　the　sense　that　the　vehicle　in　which　it　is　can　be　moved；　and　moved　by　it；　in　no　other　sense　can　the　soul　be　moved　in　space。　　　More　legitimate　doubts　might　remain　as　to　its　movement　in　view　of　the　following　facts。　We　speak　of　the　soul　as　being　pained　or　pleased；　being　bold　or　fearful；　being　angry；　perceiving；　thinking。　All　these　are　regarded　as　modes　of　movement；　and　hence　it　might　be　inferred　that　the　soul　is　moved。　This；　however；　does　not　necessarily　follow。　We　may　admit　to　the　full　that　being　pained　or　pleased；　or　thinking；　are　movements　（each　of　them　a　'being　moved'）；　and　that　the　movement　is　originated　by　the　soul。　For　example　we　may　regard　anger　or　fear　as　such　and　such　movements　of　the　heart；　and　thinking　as　such　and　such　another　movement　of　that　organ；　or　of　some　other；　these　modifications　may　arise　either　from　changes　of　place　in　certain　parts　or　from　qualitative　alterations　（the　special　nature　of　the　parts　and　the　special　modes　of　their　changes　being　for　our　present　purpose　irrelevant）。　Yet　to　say　that　it　is　the　soul　which　is　angry　is　as　inexact　as　it　would　be　to　say　that　it　is　the　soul　that　weaves　webs　or　builds　houses。　It　is　doubtless　better　to　avoid　saying　that　the　soul　pities　or　learns　or　thinks　and　rather　to　say　that　it　is　the　man　who　does　this　with　his　soul。　What　we　mean　is　not　that　the　movement　is　in　the　soul；　but　that　sometimes　it　terminates　in　the　soul　and　sometimes　starts　from　it；　sensation　e。g。　coming　from　without　inwards；　and　reminiscence　starting　from　the　soul　and　terminating　with　the　movements；　actual　or　residual；　in　the　sense　organs。　　　The　case　of　mind　is　different；　it　seems　to　be　an　independent　substance　implanted　within　the　soul　and　to　be　incapable　of　being　destroyed。　If　it　could　be　destroyed　at　all；　it　would　be　under　the　blunting　influence　of　old　age。　What　really　happens　in　respect　of　mind　in　old　age　is；　however；　exactly　parallel　to　what　happens　in　the　case　of　the　sense　organs；　if　the　old　man　could　recover　the　proper　kind　of　eye；　he　would　see　just　as　well　as　the　young　man。　The　incapacity　of　old　age　is　due　to　an　affection　not　of　the　soul　but　of　its　vehicle；　as　occurs　in　drunkenness　or　disease。　Thus　it　is　that　in　old　age　the　activity　of　mind　or　intellectual　apprehension　declines　only　through　the　decay　of　some　other　inward　part；　mind　itself　is　impassible。　Thinking；　loving；　and　hating　are　affections　not　of　mind；　but　of　that　which　has　mind；　so　far　as　it　has　it。　That　is　why；　when　this　vehicle　decays；　memory　and　love　cease；　they　were　activities　not　of　mind；　but　of　the　composite　which　has　perished；　mind　is；　no　doubt；　something　more　divine　and　impassible。　That　the　soul　cannot　be　moved　is　therefore　clear　from　what　we　have　said；　and　if　it　cannot　be　moved　at　all；　manifestly　it　cannot　be　moved　by　itself。　　　Of　all　the　opinions　we　have　enume