relieving　him。　　These　were　prompted　by　the　conditions　aloneby　the
  conduct　of　General　Warren　as　described；　and　my　consequent　lack　of
  confidence　in　him。
  It　will　be　remembered　that　in　my　conversation　with　General　Grant　on
  the　30th；　relative　to　the　suspension　of　operations　because　of　the
  mud；　I　asked　him　to　let　me　have　the　Sixth　Corps　to　help　me　in
  breaking　in　on　the　enemy's　right；　but　that　it　could　not　be　sent　me；
  it　will　be　recalled　also　that　the　Fifth　Corps　was　afterward　tendered
  and　declined。　　From　these　facts　it　has　been　alleged　that　I　was
  prejudiced　against　General　Warren；　but　this　is　not　true。　　As　we　had
  never　been　thrown　much　together　I　knew　but　little　of　him。　　I　had　no
  personal　objection　to　him；　and　certainly　could　have　none　to　his
  corps。　　I　was　expected　to　do　an　extremely　dangerous　piece　of　work；
  and　knowing　the　Sixth　Corps　wellmy　cavalry　having　campaigned　with
  it　so　successfully　in　the　Shenandoah　Valley；　I　naturally　preferred
  it；　and　declined　the　Fifth　for　no　other　reason。　　But　the　Sixth　could
  not　be　given；　and　the　turn　of　events　finally　brought　me　the　Fifth
  after　my　cavalry；　under　the　most　trying　difficulties；　had　drawn　the
  enemy　from　his　works；　and　into　such　a　position　as　to　permit　the
  realization　of　General　Grant's　hope　to　break　up　with　my　force　Lee's
  right　flank。　　Pickett's　isolation　offered　an　opportunity　which　we
  could　not　afford　to　neglect；　and　the　destruction　of　his　command　would
  fill　the　measure　of　General　Grant's　expectations　as　well　as　meet　my
  own　desires。　　The　occasion　was　not　an　ordinary　one；　and　as　I　thought
  that　Warren　had　not　risen　to　its　demand　in　the　battle；　I　deemed　it
  injudicious　and　unsafe　under　the　critical　conditions　existing　to
  retain　him　longer。　　That　I　was　justified　in　this　is　plain　to　all　who
  are　disposed　to　be　fair…minded；　so　with　the　following　extract　from
  General　Sherman's　review　of　the　proceedings　of　the　Warren　Court；　and
  with　which　I　am　convinced　the　judgment　of　history　will　accord；　I
  leave　the　subject：
  〃。。。。It　would　be　an　unsafe　and　dangerous　rule　to　hold　the　commander
  of　an　army　in　battle　to　a　technical　adherence　to　any　rule　of　conduct
  for　managing　his　command。　　He　is　responsible　for　results；　and　holds
  the　lives　and　reputations　of　every　officer　and　soldier　under　his
  orders　as　subordinate　to　the　great　endvictory。　　The　most　important
  events　are　usually　compressed　into　an　hour；　a　minute；　and　he　cannot
  stop　to　analyze　his　reasons。　　He　must　act　on　the　impulse；　the
  conviction；　of　the　instant；　and　should　be　sustained　in　his
  conclusions；　if　not　manifestly　unjust。　　The　power　to　command　men；　and
  give　vehement　impulse　to　their　joint　action；　is　something　which
  cannot　be　defined　by　words；　but　it　is　plain　and　manifest　in　battles；
  and　whoever　commands　an　army　in　chief　must　choose　his　subordinates　by
  reason　of　qualities　which　can　alone　be　tested　in　actual　conflict。
  〃No　one　has　questioned　the　patriotism；　integrity；　and　great
  intelligence　of　General　Warren。　　These　are　attested　by　a　long　record
  of　most　excellent　service；　but　in　the　clash　of　arms　at　and　near　Five
  Forks；　March　31　and　April　1；　1865；　his　personal　activity　fell　short
  of　the　standard　fixed　by　General　Sheridan；　on　whom　alone　rested　the
  great　responsibility　for　that　and　succeeding　days。
  〃My　conclusion　is　that　General　Sheridan　was　perfectly　justified　in
  his　action　in　this　case；　and　he　must　be　fully　and　entirely　sustained
  if　the　United　States　expects　great　victories　by　her　arms　in　the
  future。〃
  CHAPTER　VII。
  RESULT　OF　THE　BATTLE　OF　FIVE　FORKSRETREAT　OF　LEEAN　INTERCEPTED
  DESPATCHAT　AMELIA　COURT　HOUSEBATTLE　OF　SAILOR'S　CREEKTHE
  CONFEDERATES'　STUBBORN　RESISTANCEA　COMPLETE　VICTORYIMPORTANCE　OF
  THE　BATTLE。
  When　the　news　of　the　battle　at　Five　Forks　reached　General　Grant；　he
  realized　that　the　decisive　character　of　our　victory　would　necessitate
  the　immediate　abandonment　of　Richmond　and　Petersburg　by　the　enemy；
  and　fearing　that　Lee　would　escape　without　further　injury；　he　issued
  orders；　the　propriety　of　which　must　be　settled　by　history；　to　assault
  next　morning　the　whole　intrenched　line。　　But　Lee　could　not　retreat　at
  once。　　He　had　not　anticipated；　dissster　at　Five　Forks；　and　hence　was
  unprepared　to　withdraw　on　the　moment；　and　the　necessity　of　getting
  off　his　trains　and　munitions　of　war；　as　well　as　being　obliged　to
  cover　the　flight　of　the　Confederate　Government；　compelled　him　to　hold
  on　to　Richmond　and　Petersburg　till　the　afternoon　of　the　2d；　though
  before　that　Parke；　Ord；　and　Wright　had　carried　his　outer
  intrenchments　at　several　points；　thus　materially　shortening　the　line
  of　investment。
  The　night　of　the　1st　of　April；　General　Humphreys's　corps…the　Second…
  had　extended　its　left　toward　the　White　Oak　road；　and　early　next
  morning；　under　instructions　from　General　Grant；　Miles's　division　of
  that　corps　reported　to　me；　and　supporting　him　with　Ayres's　and
  Crawford's　divisions　of　the　Fifth　Corps；　I　then　directed　him　to
  advance　toward　Petersburg　and　attack　the　enemy's　works　at　the
  intersection　of　the　Claiborne　and　White　Oak　roads。
  Such　of　the　enemy　as　were　still　in　the　works　Miles　easily　forced
  across　Hatcher's　Run；　in　the　direction　of　Sutherland's　depot；　but　the
  Confederates　promptly　took　up　a　position　north　of　the　little　stream；
  and　Miles　being　anxious　to　attack；　I　gave　him　leave；　but　just　at　this
  time　General　Humphreys　came　up　with　a　request　to　me　from　General
  Meade　to　return　Miles。　　On　this　request　I　relinquished　command　of　the
  division；　when；　supported　by　the　Fifth　Corps　it　could　have　broken　in
  the　enemy's　right　at　a　vital　point；　and　I　have　always　since　regretted
  that　I　did　so；　for　the　message　Humphreys　conveyed　was　without
  authority　from　General　Grant；　by　whom　Miles　had　been　sent　to　me；　but
  thinking　good　feeling　a　desideratum　just　then；　and　wishing　to　avoid
  wrangles；　I　faced　the　Fifth　Corps　about　and　marched　it　down　to　Five
  Forks；　and　out　the　Ford　road　to　the　crossing　of　Hatcher's　Run。　　After
  we　had　gone；　General　Grant；　intending　this　quarter　of　the　field　to　be
  under　my　control；　ordered　Humphreys　with　his　other　two　divisions　to
  move　to　the　right；　in　toward　Petersburg。　　This　left　Miles　entirely
  unsupported；　and　his　gallant　attack　made　soon　after　was　unsuccessful
  at　first；　but　about　3　o'clock　in　the　afternoon　he　carried　the　point
  which　covered　the　retreat　from　Petersburg　and　Richmond。
  Merritt　had　been　sent　westward；　meanwhile；　in　the　direction　of　Ford's
  Station；　to　break　the　enemy's　horse　which　had　been　collecting　to　the
  north　of　Hatcher's　Run。　　Meeting；　with　but　little　opposition；　Merritt
  drove　this　cavalry　force　in　a　northerly　direction　toward　Scott's
  Corners；　while　the　Fifth　Corps　was　pushed　toward　Sutherland's　depot；
  in　the　hope　of　coming　in　on　the　rear　of　the　force　that　was
  confronting　Miles　when　I　left　him。　　Crawford　and　Merritt　engaged　the
  enemy　lightly　just　before　night；　but　his　main　column；　retreating
  along　the　river　road　south　of　the　Appomattox；　had　got　across　Namozine
  Creek；　and　the　darkness　prevented　our　doing　more　than　to　pick　up　some
  stragglers。　　The　next　morning　the　pursuit　was　resumed；　the　cavalry
  again　in　advance；　the　Fifth　Corps　keeping　up　with　it　all　the　while；
  and　as　we　pressed　our　adversaries　hundreds　and　hundreds　of　prisoners；
  armed　and　unarmed；　fell　into　our　hands；　together　with　many　wagons　and
  five　pieces　of　artillery。　　At　Deep　Creek　the　rearguard　turned　on　us；
  and　a　severe　skirmish　took　place。　　Merritt；　finding　the　enemy　very
  strong；　was　directed　to　await　the　arrival　of　Crook　and　for　the　rear
  division　of　the　Fifth　Corps；　but　by　the　time　they　reached　the　creek；
  darkness　had　again　come　to　protect　the　Confederates；　and　we　had　to　be
  content　with　meagre　results　at　that　point。
  》From　the　beginning　it　was　apparent　that　Lee；　in　his　retreat；　was
  making　for　Amelia　Court　House；　where　his　columns　north　and　south　of
  the　Appomattox　River　could　join；　and　where；　no　doubt；　he　expected　to
  meet　supplies；　so　Crook　was　ordered　to　march　early　on　April　4　to
  strike　the　Danville　railroad；　between　Jettersville　and　Burkeville；
  and　then　move　south　along　the　railroad　toward　JettersVille；　Merritt
  to　move　toward　Amelia　Court　House；　and　the　Fifth　Corps　to
  Jettersville　itself。
  The　Fifth　Corps　got　to　Jettersville　about　5　in　the　afternoon；　and　I
  immediately　intrenched　it　across　the　Burkeville　road　with　the
  determination　to　stay　there　till　the　main　army　could　come　up；　for　I
  hoped　we　could　force　Lee　to　surrender　at　Amelia　Court　House；　since　a
  firm　hold　on　Jettersville　would　cut　him　off　from　his　line　of　retreat
  toward　Burkeville。
  Accompanied　only　by　my　escortthe　First　United　States　Cavalry；　about
  two　hundred　strongI　reached　Jettersville　some　little　time　before
  the　Fifth　Corps；　and　having　nothing　else　at　hand　I　at　once　deployed
  this　handful　of　men　to　cover　the　crossroads　till　the　arrival　of　the
  corps。　　Just　as　the　troopers　were　deploying；　a　man　on　a　mule；　heading
  for　Burkeville；　rode　into　my　pickets。　　He　was　arrested；　of　cou