action；　and　the　two　commands　moved　along　in　rear　of　the　works　so
  rapidly　that；　with　but　slight　resistance；　the　Confederates　abandoned
  the　guns　massed　near　the　centre。　　The　swinging　movement　of　Ricketts
  was　taken　up　successively　from　right　to　left　throughout　my　line；　and
  in　a　few　minutes　the　enemy　was　thoroughly　routed；　the　action；　though
  brief；　being　none　the　less　decisive。　　Lomax's　dismounted　cavalry　gave
  way　first；　but　was　shortly　followed　by　all　the　Confederate　infantry
  in　an　indescribable　panic；　precipitated　doubtless　by　fears　of　being
  caught　and　captured　in　the　pocket　formed　by　Tumbling　Run　and　the
  North　Fork　of　the　Shenandoah　River。　　The　stampede　was　complete；　the
  enemy　leaving　the　field　without　semblance　of　organization；　abandoning
  nearly　all　his　artillery　and　such　other　property　as　was　in　the　works；
  and　the　rout　extending　through　the　fields　and　over　the　roads　toward
  Woodstock；　Wright　and　Emory　in　hot　pursuit。
  Midway　between　Fisher's　Hill　and　Woodstock　there　is　some　high　ground；
  where　at　night…fall　a　small　squad　endeavored　to　stay　us　with　two
  pieces　of　artillery；　but　this　attempt　at　resistance　proved　fruitless；
  and；　notwithstanding　the　darkness；　the　guns　were　soon　captured。　　The
  chase　was　then　taken　up　by　Devin's　brigade　as　soon　as　it　could　be
  passed　to　the　front；　and　continued　till　after　daylight　the　next
  morning；　but　the　delays　incident　to　a　night　pursuit　made　it
  impossible　for　Devin　to　do　more　than　pick　up　stragglers。
  Our　success　was　very　great；　yet　I　had　anticipated　results　still　more
  pregnant。　　Indeed；　I　had　high　hopes　of　capturing　almost　the　whole　of
  Early's　army　before　it　reached　New　Market；　and　with　this　object　in
  view；　during　the　manoeuvres　of　the　21st　I　had　sent　Torbert　up　the
  Luray　Valley　with　Wilson's　division　and　two　of　Merritt's　brigades；　in
  the　expectation　that　he　would　drive　Wickham　out　of　the　Luray　Pass　by
  Early's　right；　and　by　crossing　the　Massanutten　Mountain　near　New
  Market；　gain　his　rear。　　Torbert　started　in　good　season；　and　after
  some　slight　skirmishing　at　Gooney　Run；　got　as　far　as　Milford；　but
  failed　to　dislodge　Wickham。　　In　fact；　he　made　little　or　no　attempt　to
  force　Wickham　from　his　position；　and　with　only　a　feeble　effort
  withdrew。　　I　heard　nothing　at　all　from　Torbert　during　the　22d；　and
  supposing　that　everything　was　progressing　favorably；　I　was　astonished
  and　chagrined　on　the　morning　of　the　23d；　at　Woodstock；　to　receive　the
  intelligence　that　he　had　fallen　back　to　Front　Royal　and　Buckton　ford。
  My　disappointment　was　extreme；　but　there　was　now　no　help　for　the
  situation　save　to　renew　and　emphasize　Torbert's　orders；　and　this　was
  done　at　once；　notwithstanding　that　I　thought；　the　delay；　had　so　much
  diminished　the　chances　of　his　getting　in　the　rear　of　Early　as　to　make
  such　a　result　a　very　remote　possibility；　unless；　indeed；　far　greater
  zeal　was　displayed　than　had　been　in　the　first　attempt　to　penetrate
  the　Luray　Valley。
  The　battle　of　Fisher's　Hill　was；　in　a　measure；　a　part　of　the　battle
  of　the　Opequon；　that　is　to　say；　it　was　an　incident　of　the　pursuit
  resulting　from　that　action。　　In　many　ways；　however；　it　was　much　more
  satisfactory；　and　particularly　so　because　the　plan　arranged　on　the
  evening　of　the　20th　was　carried　out　to　the　very　letter　by　Generals
  Wright；　Crook；　and　Emory；　not　only　in　all　their　preliminary
  manoeuvres；　but　also　during　the　fight　itself。　　The　only　drawback　was
  with　the　cavalry；　and　to　this　day　I　have　been　unable　to　account
  satisfactorily　for　Torbert's　failure。　　No　doubt；　Wickham's　position
  near　Milford　was　a　strong　one；　but　Torbert　ought　to　have　made　a
  fight。　　Had　he　been　defeated　in　this；　his　withdrawal　then　to　await
  the　result　at　Fisher's　Hill　would　have　been　justified；　but　it　does
  not　appear　that　he　made　any　serious　effort　of　all　to　dislodge　the
  Confederate　cavalry：　his　impotent　attempt　not　only　chagrined　me　very
  much；　but　occasioned　much　unfavorable　comment　throughout　the　army。
  We　reached　Woodstock　early　on　the　morning　of　the　23d；　and　halted
  there　some　little　time　to　let　the　troops　recover　their　organization；
  which　had　been　broken　in　the　night　march　they　had　just　made。　　When
  the　commands　had　closed　up　we　pushed　on　toward　Edinburg；　in　the　hope
  of　making　more　captures　at　Narrow　Passage　Creek；　but　the
  Confederates；　too　fleet　for　us；　got　away；　so　General　Wright　halted
  the　infantry　not　far　from　Edinburg；　till　rations　could　be　brought　the
  men。　　Meanwhile　I；　having　remained　at　Woodstock；　sent　Dedin's　brigade
  to　press　the　enemy　under　every　favorable　opportunity；　and　if　possible
  prevent　him　from　halting　long　enough　to　reorganize。　　Notwithstanding
  Devin's　efforts　the　Confederates　managed　to　assemble　a　considerable
  force　to　resist　him；　and　being　too　weak　for　the　rearguard；　he　awaited
  the　arrival　of　Averell；　who；　I　had　informed　him；　would　be　hurried　to
  the　front　with　all　possible　despatch；　for　I　thought　that　Averell　must
  be　close　at　hand。　　It　turned　out；　however；　that　he　was　not　near　by　at
  all；　and；　moreover；　that　without　good　reason　he　had　refrained　from
  taking　any　part　whatever　in　pursuing　the　enemy　in　the　flight　from
  Fisher's　Hill；　and　in　fact　had　gone　into　camp　and　left　to　the
  infantry　the　work　of　pursuit。
  It　was　nearly　noon　when　Averell　came　up；　and　a　great　deal　of　precious
  time　had　been　lost。　　We　had　some　hot　words；　but　hoping　that　he　would
  retrieve　the　mistake　of　the　night　before；　I　directed　him　to　proceed
  to　the　front　at　once；　and　in　conjunction　with　Devin　close　with　the
  enemy。　　He　reached　Devin's　command　about　3　o'clock　in　the　afternoon；
  just　as　this　officer　was　pushing　the　Confederates　so　energetically
  that　they　were　abandoning　Mount　Jackson；　yet　Averell　utterly　failed
  to　accomplish　anything。　　Indeed；　his　indifferent　attack　was　not　at
  all　worthy　the　excellent　soldiers　he　commanded；　and　when　I　learned
  that　it　was　his　intention　to　withdraw　from　the　enemy's　front；　and
  this；　too；　on　the　indefinite　report　of　a　signal…officer　that　a
  〃brigade　or　division〃　of　Confederates　was　turning　his　right　flank；
  and　that　he　had　not　seriously　attempted　to　verify　the　information；　I
  sent　him　this　order：
  〃HEADQUARTERS　MIDDLE　MILITARY　DIVISION；
  〃Woodstock；　Va。；　Sept。　　23；　1864
  〃BREVET　MAJOR…GENERAL　AVERELL
  〃Your　report　and　report　of　signal…officer　received。　　I　do　not　want
  you　to　let　the　enemy　bluff　you　or　your　command；　and　I　want　you　to
  distinctly　understand　this　note。　　I　do　not　advise　rashness；　but　I　do
  desire　resolution　and　actual　fighting；　with　necessary　casualties；
  before　you　retire。　　There　must　now　be　no　backing　or　filling　by　you
  without　a　superior　force　of　the　enemy　actually　engaging　you。
  〃P。　H。　SHERIDAN；
  〃Major…General　Commanding。'
  Some　little　time　after　this　note　went　to　Averell；　word　was　brought　me
  that　he　had　already　carried　out　the　programme　indicated　when
  forwarding　the　report　of　the　expected　turning　of　his　right；　and　that
  he　had　actually　withdrawn　and　gone　into　camp　near　Hawkinsburg。　　I
  then　decided　to　relieve　him　from　the　command　of　his　division；　which　I
  did；　ordering　him　to　Wheeling；　Colonel　William　H。　Powell　being
  assigned　to　succeed　him。
  The　removal　of　Averell　was　but　the　culmination　of　a　series　of　events
  extending　back　to　the　time　I　assumed　command　of　the　Middle　Military
  Division。　　At　the　outset；　General　Grant；　fearing　discord　on　account
  of　Averell's　ranking　Torbert；　authorized　me　to　relieve　the　former
  officer；　but　I　hoped　that　if　any　trouble　of　this　sort　arose；　it　could
  be　allayed；　or　at　least　repressed；　during　the　campaign　against　Early；
  since　the　different　commands　would　often　have　to　act　separately。
  After　that；　the　dispersion　of　my　army　by　the　return　of　the　Sixth
  Corps　and　Torbert's　cavalry　to　the　Army　of　the　Potomac　would　take
  place；　I　thought；　and　this　would　restore　matters　to　their　normal
  condition　；　but　Averell's　dissatisfaction　began　to　show　itself
  immediately　after　his　arrival　at　Martinsburg；　on　the　14th　of　August；
  and；　except　when　he　was　conducting　some　independent　expedition；　had
  been　manifested　on　all　occasions　since。　　I　therefore　thought　that　the
  interest　of　the　service　would　be　subserved　by　removing　one　whose
  growing　indifference　might　render　the　best…laid　plans　inoperative。
  〃HEADQUARTERS　MIDDLE　MILITARY　DIVISION。
  〃HARRISONBURG；　VA。；　SEPT。　　25；　1864　11：30　P。　M。
  〃LIEUT…GENERAL　GRANT；　Comd'g；　City　Point；　Va。
  〃I　have　relieved　Averell　from　his　command。　　Instead　of　following　the
  enemy　when　he　was　broken　at　Fisher's　Hill　（so　there　was　not　a　cavalry
  organization　left）；　he　went　into　camp　and　let　me　pursue　the　enemy　for
  a　distance　of　fifteen　miles；　with　infantry；　during　the　night。
  〃P。　H。　SHERIDAN；　Major…General。〃
  The　failure　of　Averell　to　press　the　enemy　the　evening　of　the　23d　gave
  Early　time　to　collect　his　scattered　forces　and　take　up　a　position　on
  the　east　side　of　the　North　Fork　of　the　Shenandoah；　his　left　resting
  on　the　west　side　of　that　stream　at　Rude's　Hill；　a　commanding　point
  about　two　miles　south　of　Mt。　　Jackson