from　the　quaint　texts　of　the　Book　of　Aicill　some　extremely
  sensible　rulings　on　the　difficult　subject　of　the　Measure　of
  Damages；　for　which　it　would　be　vain　to　study　the　writings　of　Lord
  Coke；　though　these　last　are　relatively　of　much　later　date。　But
  the　Brehon　law　pays　heavily　for　this　apparent　anticipation　of　the
  modern　legal　spirit。　It　must　be　confessed　that　most　of　it　has　a
  strong　air　of　fancifulness　and　unreality。　It　seems　as　if　the
  Brehon　lawyer；　after　forming　（let　us　say）　a　conception　of　a
  particular　kind　of　injury；　set　himself；　as　a　sort　of　mental
  exercise；　to　devise　all　the　varieties　of　circumstance　under　which
  the　wrong　could　be　committed；　and　then　to　determine　the　way　in
  which　some　traditional　principle　of　redress　could　be　applied　to
  the　cases　supposed。　This　indulgence　of　his　imagination　drew　him
  frequently　into　triviality　or　silliness；　and　led　to　an
  extraordinary　multiplication　of　legal　detail。　Four　pages　of　the
  Book　of　Aicill　（a　very　large　proportion　of　an　ancient　body　of
  law）　are　concerned　with　injuries　received　from　dogs　in
  dog…fights；　and　they　set　forth　in　the　most　elaborate　way　the
  modification　of　the　governing　rule　required　in　the　case　of　the
  owners　　in　the　case　of　the　spectators　　in　the　case　of　the
  'impartial　interposer'　　in　the　case　of　the　'half…interposer；'
  i。　e。　the　man　who　tries　to　separate　the　dogs　with　a　bias　in
  favour　of　one　of　them　　in　the　case　of　an　accidental　looker…on
  in　the　case　of　a　youth　under　age；　and　in　the　case　of　an　idiot。
  The　same　law…tract　deals　also　with　the　curious　subjects　of
  injuries　from　a　cat　stealing　in　a　kitchen；　from　women　using　their
  distaffs　in　a　woman…battle；　and　from　bees；　a　distinction　being
  drawn　between　the　case　in　which　the　sting　draws　blood　and　the
  case　in　which　it　does　not。　Numberless　other　instances　could　be
  given；　but　I　repeat　that　all　this　is　mixed　up　with　much　that　even
  now　has　juridical　interest；　and　with　much　which　in　that　state　of
  society　had　probably　the　greatest　practical　importance。
  It　is　not；　perhaps；　as　often　noticed　as　it　should　be　by
  English　writers　on　law　that　the　method　of　enunciating　legal
  principles　with　which　our　Courts　of　Justice　have　familiarised　us
  is　absolutely　peculiar　to　England　and　to　communities　under　the
  direct　influence　of　English　practice。　In　all　Western　societies；
  Legislation；　which　is　the　direct　issue　of　the　commands　of　the
  sovereign　state；　tends　more　and　more　to　become　the　exclusive
  source　of　law；　but　still　in　all　Continental　countries　other
  authorities　of　various　kinds　are　occasionally　referred　to；　among
  which　are　the　texts　of　the　Roman　Corpus　Juris；　commentaries　on
  Codes　and　other　bodies　of　written　law；　the　unofficial　writings　of
  famous　lawyers；　and　other　branches　of　the　vast　literature　of　law
  holding　at　most　a　secondary　place　in　the　estimation　of　the
  English　Judges　and　Bar。　Nowhere；　however；　is　anything　like　the
  same　dignity　as　with　us　attributed　to　a　decided　'case；'　and　I
  have　found　it　difficult　to　make　foreign　lawyers　understand　why
  their　English　brethren　should　bow　so　implicitly　to　what　Frenchmen
  term　the　'jurisprudence'　of　a　particular　tribunal。　From　one　point
  of　view　English　law　has　doubtless　suffered　through　this
  reluctance　to　invent　or　imagine　facts　aS　the　groundwork　of　rules；
  and　it　will　continue　to　bear　the　marks　of　the　injury　until
  legislative　re…arrangement　and　re…statement　fully　disclose　the
  stores　of　common　sense　which　are　at　present　concealed　by　its
  defects　of　language　and　form。　On　the　other　hand；　these　habits　of
  the　English　Courts　seem　to　be　closely　connected　with　one　of　the
  most　honourable　characteristics　of　the　English　system；　its
  extreme　carefulness　about　facts。　Nowhere　else　in　the　world　is
  there　the　same　respect　for　a　fact；　unless　the　respect　be　of
  English　origin。　The　feeling　is　not　shared　by　our　European
  contemporaries；　and　was　not　shared　by　our　remote　ancestors。　It
  has　been　said　　and　the　remark　seems　to　me　a　very　just　one
  that　in　early　times　questions　of　fact　are　regarded　as　the
  simplest　of　all　questions。　Such　tests　of　truth　as　Ordeal　and
  Compurgation　satisfy　men's　minds　completely　and　easily；　and　the
  only　difficulty　recognised　is　the　discovery　of　the　legal
  tradition　and　its　application　to　the　results　of　the　test。　Up　to　a
  certain　point　no　doubt　our　own　mechanism　for　the　determination　of
  a　fact　is　also　a　mere　artifice。　We　take　as　our　criterion　of　truth
  the　unanimous　opinion　of　twelve　men　on　statements　made　before
  them。　But　then　the　mode　of　convincing；　or　attempting　to　convince；
  them　is　exactly　that　which　would　have　to　be　followed　if　it　were
  sought　to　obtain　a　decision　upon　evidence　from　the　very　highest
  human　intelligence。　The　old　procedure　was　sometimes　wholly
  senseless；　sometimes　only　distantly　rational；　the　modern　English
  procedure　is　at　most　imperfect；　and　some　of　its　imperfection
  arises　from　the　very　constitution　of　human　nature　and　human
  society。　I　quite　concur；　therefore；　in　the　ordinary　professional
  opinion　that　its　view　of　facts　and　its　modes　of　ascertaining　them
  are　the　great　glory　of　English　law。　I　am　afraid；　however；　that
  facts　must　always　be　the　despair　of　the　law　reformer。　Bentham
  seems　to　me　from　several　expressions　to　have　supposed　that　if　the
  English　Law　of　Evidence　were　re…constructed　on　his　principles
  questions　of　fact　would　cease　to　present　any　serious　difficulty。
  Almost　every　one　of　his　suggestions　has　been　adopted　by　the
  Legislature；　and　yet　enquiries　into　facts　become　more　protracted
  and　complex　than　ever。　The　truth　is　that　the　facts　of　human
  nature；　with　which　Courts　of　Justice　have　chiefly　to　deal；　are
  far　obscurer　and　more　intricately　involved　than　the　facts　of
  physical　nature；　and　the　difficulty　of　ascertaining　them　with
  precision　constantly　increases　in　our　age；　through　the　progress
  of　invention　and　enterprise；　through　the　ever…growing
  miscellaneousness　of　all　modern　communities；　and　through　the　ever
  quickening　play　of　modern　social　movements。　Possibly　we　may　see
  English　law　take　the　form　which　Bentham　hoped　for　and　laboured
  for；　every　successive　year　brings　us　in　some　slight　degree　nearer
  to　this　achievement；　and　consequently；　little　as　we　may　agree　in
  his　opinion　that　all　questions　of　law　are　the　effect　of　some
  judicial　delusion　or　legal　abuse；　we　may　reasonably　expect　them
  to　become　less　frequent　and　easier　of　solution。　But　neither　facts
  nor　the　modes　of　ascertaining　them　tend　in　the　least　to　simplify
  themselves；　and　in　no　conceivable　state　of　society　will　Courts　of
  Justice　enjoy　perpetual　vacation。
  I　have　been　at　some　pains　to　explain　what　sort　of　authority
  the　Irish　Brehon　law　did　not；　in　my　opinion；　possess。　The　'law　of
  nature'　had　lost　all　supernatural　sanction；　except　so　far　as　it
  coincided　with　the　'law　of　the　letter。'　It　had　not　yet　acquired；
  or　had　very　imperfectly　acquired；　that　binding　power　which　law
  obtains　when　the　State　exerts　the　public　force　through　Courts　of
  Justice　to　compel　obedience　to　it。　Had　it；　then；　any　authority　at
  all；　and　if　so；　what　sort　of　authority？　Part　of　the　answer　to
  this　question　I　endeavoured　to　give　three　years　ago　（'Village
  Communities；　in　the　East　and　West；'　pp。　56；　57）；　and　though　much
  more　might　be　said　on　the　subject；　I　defer　it　till　another
  opportunity。　So　far　as　the　Brehon　law　declared　actual　ancient　and
  indigenous　practices；　it　shared　in　the　obstinate　vitality　of　all
  customs　when　observed　by　a　society　distributed　into　corporate
  natural　groups。　But；　besides　this；　it　had　another　source　of
  influence　over　men's　minds；　in　the　bold　and　never　flagging
  self…assertion　of　the　class　which　expounded　it。　A　portion　of　the
  authority　enjoyed　by　the　Indian　Brahminical　jurisprudence　is
  undoubtedly　to　be　explained　in　the　same　way。　The　Brehon　could
  not；　like　the　Brahmin；　make　any　such