Hindoo　supposes　that　some　supernatural　penalty　would　follow；
  indeed；　he　generally　gives　definiteness　to　it　by　retaining　a
  Brahmin　to　starve　himself　vicariously；　and　no　Hindoo　doubts　what
  would　come　of　causing　a　Brahmin's　death。　We　cannot　but　suppose
  that　the　Brehon　rule　of　fasting　was　once　thought　to　have　been
  enforced　in　some　similar　way。　Caesar　states　that　the　Druids
  believed　in　the　immortality　and　transmigration　of　the　soul；　and
  considered　it　the　key　of　their　system。　A　Druid　may　thus　very　well
  have　taught　that　penal　consequences　in　another　world　would　follow
  the　creditor's　death　by　starvation；　and　there　is　perhaps　a　pale
  reflection　of　this　doctrine　in　the　language　of　the　Senchus　Mor：
  'He　who　does　not　give　a　pledge　to　fasting　is　an　evader　of　all；　he
  who　disregards　all　things　shall　not　be　paid　by　God　or　man。'　But
  an　Irish　Brehon　could　scarcely　make　any　distinct　assertion　on　the
  subject；　since　fasting　had　now　become　a　specific　ordinance　of　the
  Christian　Church；　and　its　condition　and　spiritual　effects　were
  expressly　defined　by　the　Christian　priesthood。　Theoretically；　I
  should　state；　a　person　who　refused　unjustly　to　yield　to　fasting
  had　his　legal　liabilities　considerably　increased；　at　least；
  according　to　the　dicta　of　the　Brehon　commentators；　but　such
  provisions　only　bring　us　to　the　difficulty　of　which　I　first
  spoke；　and　raise　anew　the　question　of　the　exact　value　of　legal
  rules　at　a　period　when　Courts　of　Justice　are　not　as　yet　armed
  with　resistless　powers　of　compelling　attendance　and　submission。
  If　we　are　justified　in　tracing　the　pedigree　of　the　Brehon
  Code　to　a　system　enforced　by　supernatural　sanctions；　we　are　able
  to　contrast　it　in　various　ways　with　other　bodies　of　law　in
  respect　of　its　mode　of　development。　It　closely　resembles　the
  Hindoo　law；　inasmuch　as　it　consists　of　what　was　in　all
  probability　an　original　basis　of　Aryan　usage　vastly　enlarged　by　a
  superstructure　of　interpretation　which　a　long　succession　of
  professional　commentators　have　elected；　but　it　cannot　have　had
  any　such　sacredness；　and　consequently　any　such　authority；　as　the
  Brahminical　jurisprudence。　Both　the　Brahmins　and　the　Brehons
  assume　that　Kings　and　Judges　will　enforce　their　law；　and
  emphatically　enjoin　on　them　its　enforcement；　but；　while　the
  Brahmin　could　declare　that　neglect　or　disobedience　would　be
  followed　by　endless　degradation　and　torment；　the　Brehon　could
  only　assert　that　the　unlearned　brother　who　pronounced　a　false
  judgment　would　find　blotches　come　on　his　cheeks；　and　that　the
  Chief　who　allowed　sound　usage　to　be　departed　from　would　bring　bad
  weather　on　his　country。　The　development　of　the　Brehon　law　was
  again　parallel　to　that　which　there　is　strong　reason　for　supposing
  the　Roman　law　to　have　allowed　in　early　times。　The　writer　of　the
  Preface　to　the　Third　Volume；　from　which　I　have　more　than　once
  quoted；　cites　some　observations　which　I　published　several　years
  ago　on　the　subject　of　the　extension　of　the　Roman　jurisprudence　by
  the　agency　known　as　the　Responsa　Prudentum；　the　accumulated
  answers　（or；　as　the　Brehon　phrase　is；　the　judgments）　of　many
  successive　generations　of　famous　Roman　lawyers；　and　he　adopts　my
  account　as　giving　the　most　probable　explanation　of　the　growth　of
  the　Brehon　law。　But　in　the　Roman　State　a　test　was　always　applied
  to　the　'answers　of　the　learned；'　which　was　not　applied；　or　not
  systematically　applied；　to　the　judgments　of　the　Brehons。　We　never
  know　the　Romans　except　as　subject　to　one　of　the　strongest　of
  central　governments；　which　armed　the　law　courts　with　the　force　at
  its　command。　Although　the　Roman　system　did　not　work　exactly　in
  the　way　to　which　our　English　experience　has　accustomed　us；　there
  can；　of　course；　be　no　doubt　that　the　ultimate　criterion　of　the
  validity　of　professional　legal　opinion　at　Rome；　as　elsewhere；　was
  the　action　of　Courts　of　Justice　enforcing　rights　and　duties　in
  conformity　with　such　opinion。　But　in　ancient　Ireland　it　is　at
  least　doubtful　whether　there　was　ever；　in　our　sense　of　the　words；
  a　central　government；　it　is　also　doubtful　whether　the　public
  force　at　the　command　of　any　ruler　or　rulers　was　ever
  systematically　exerted　through　the　mechanism　of　Courts　of
  Justice；　and　it　is　at　least　a　tenable　view　that　the　institutions
  which　stood　in　the　place　of　Courts　of　Justice　only　exercised
  jurisdiction　through　the　voluntary　submission　of　intending
  litigants。
  Perhaps；　however；　from　our　present　point　of　view；　the
  strongest　contrast　is　between　the　ancient　law　of　Ireland　and　the
  law　of　England　at　a　period　which　an　English　lawyer　would　not　call
  recent。　The　administration　of　justice　in　England；　from
  comparatively　early　times；　has　been　more　strongly　centralised
  than　in　any　other　European　country；　but　in　Ireland　there　was　no
  central　government　to　nerve　the　arm　of　the　law。　The　process　of
  the　English　Courts　has　for　centuries　past　been　practically
  irresistible；　the　process　of　the　Irish　Courts；　even　if　it　was
  compulsory；　was　at　the　utmost　extremely　weak。　The　Irish　law　was
  developed　by　hereditary　commentators；　but　we　in　England　have
  always　attributed　far　less　authority　than　does　any　European
  Continental　community　to　the　unofficial　commentaries　of　the　most
  learned　writers　of　textbooks。　We　obtain　our　law；　and　adjust　it　to
  the　needs　of　each　successive　generation；　either　through
  legislative　enactment　or　through　the　decisions　of　our　judges　on
  isolated　groups　of　facts　established　by　the　most　laborious
  methods。　But；　as　I　have　already　stated；　the　opinion　to　which　I
  incline　is；　that　no　part　of　the　Brehon　law　had　its　origin　in
  legislation。　The　author　of　innovation　and　improvement　was　the
  learned　Brehon；　and　the　Brehon　appears　to　have　invented　at
  pleasure　the　facts　which　he　used　as　the　framework　for　his　legal
  doctrine。　His　invention　was　necessarily　limited　by　his
  experience；　and　hence　the　cases　suggested　in　the　law…tracts
  possess　great　interest；　as　throwing　light　on　the　society　amid
  which　they　were　composed；　but　these　cases　seem　to　be　purely
  hypothetical；　and　only　intended　to　illustrate　the　rule　which
  happens　to　be　under　discussion。
  In　the　volume　of　my　own　to　which　I　referred　a　few　moments　ago
  I　said　of　the　early　Roman　law　that　'great　influence　must　have
  been　exercised　（over　it）　by　the　want　of　any　distinct　check　on　the
  suggestion　or　invention　of　possible　questions。　When　the　data　can
  be　multiplied　at　pleasure；　the　facilities　for　evolving　a　general
  rule　are　immensely　increased。　As　the　law　is　administered　among
  ourselves　（in　England）　the　judge　cannot　travel　out　of　the　sets　of
  facts　exhibited　before　him　or　before　his　predecessors。
  Accordingly；　each　group　of　circumstances　which　is　adjudicated
  upon　receives；　to　employ　a　Gallicism；　a　sort　of　consecration。　It
  acquires　certain　qualities　which　distinguish　it　from　every　other
  case；　genuine　or　hypothetical。'　I　do　not　think　it　can　be　doubted
  that　this　English　practice　of　never　declaring　a　legal　rule
  authoritatively　until　a　state　of　facts　arises　to　which　it　can　be
  fitted；　is　the　secret　of　the　apparent　backwardness　and　barrenness
  of　English　law　at　particular　epochs；　as　contrasted　with　the
  richness　and　reasonableness　of　other　systems　which　it　more　than
  rivals　in　its　present　condition。　It　is　true；　as　I　said　before；
  even　of　the　Brehon　law；　that　it　does　not　wholly　disappoint　the
  patriotic　expectations　entertained　of　it。　When　they　are
  disencumbered　of　archaic　phrase　and　form；　there　are　some　things
  remarkably　modern　in　it。　I　quite　agree　with　one　of　the　Editors
  that；　in　the　ancient　Irish　Law　of　Civil　Wrong；　there　is　a
  singularly　close　approach　to　modern　doctrines　on　the　subject　of
  Contributory　Negligence；　and　I　have　found　it　possible　to　extract
  from　the　quaint　texts　of　the　Book　of　Aicill　some　extremely
  sensible　rulings　on　the　difficult