do　wrong　in　offering　resistance；　but　such　a　one　would　really　not　be　my
  enemy。
  61。　Perpetual　Peace　and　a　Permanent　Congress　of　Nations。
  The　natural　state　of　nations　as　well　as　of　individual　men　is　a　state
  which　it　is　a　duty　to　pass　out　of；　in　order　to　enter　into　a　legal
  state。　Hence；　before　this　transition　occurs；　all　the　right　of
  nations　and　all　the　external　property　of　states　acquirable　or
  maintainable　by　war　are　merely　provisory；　and　they　can　only　become
  peremptory　in　a　universal　union　of　states　analogous　to　that　by　which　a
  nation　becomes　a　state。　It　is　thus　only　that　a　real　state　of　peace
  could　be　established。　But　with　the　too　great　extension　of　such　a　union
  of　states　over　vast　regions；　any　government　of　it；　and　consequently
  the　protection　of　its　individual　members；　must　at　last　become
  impossible；　and　thus　a　multitude　of　such　corporations　would　again
  bring　round　a　state　of　war。　Hence　the　perpetual　peace；　which　is　the
  ultimate　end　of　all　the　right　of　nations；　becomes　in　fact　an
  impracticable　idea。　The　political　principles；　however；　which　aim　at
  such　an　end；　and　which　enjoin　the　formation　of　such　unions　among　the
  states　as　may　promote　a　continuous　approximation　to　a　perpetual　peace；
  are　not　impracticable；　they　are　as　practicable　as　this　approximation
  itself；　which　is　a　practical　problem　involving　a　duty；　and　founded
  upon　the　right　of　individual　men　and　states。
  Such　a　union　of　states；　in　order　to　maintain　peace；　may　be　called
  a　permanent　congress　of　nations；　and　it　is　free　to　every
  neighbouring　state　to　join　in　it。　A　union　of　this　kind；　so　far　at
  least　as　regards　the　formalities　of　the　right　of　nations　in　respect　of
  the　preservation　of　peace；　was　presented　in　the　first　half　of　this
  century；　in　the　Assembly　of　the　States…General　at　the　Hague。　In　this
  Assembly　most　of　the　European　courts；　and　even　the　smallest　republics；
  brought　forward　their　complaints　about　the　hostilities　which　were
  carried　on　by　the　one　against　the　other。　Thus　the　whole　of　Europe
  appeared　like　a　single　federated　state；　accepted　as　umpire　by　the
  several　nations　in　their　public　differences。　But　in　place　of　this
  agreement；　the　right　of　nations　afterwards　survived　only　in　books；
  it　disappeared　from　the　cabinets；　or；　after　force　had　been　already
  used；　it　was　relegated　in　the　form　of　theoretical　deductions　to　the
  obscurity　of　archives。
  By　such　a　congress　is　here　meant　only　a　voluntary　combination　of
  different　states　that　would　be　dissoluble　at　any　time；　and　not　such
  a　union　as　is　embodied　in　the　United　States　of　America；　founded　upon　a
  political　constitution；　and　therefore　indissoluble。　It　is　only　by　a
  congress　of　this　kind　that　the　idea　of　a　public　right　of　nations　can
  be　established；　and　that　the　settlement　of　their　differences　by　the
  mode　of　a　civil　process；　and　not　by　the　barbarous　means　of　war；　can　be
  realized。
  III。　The　Universal　Right　of　Mankind。
  （Jus　Cosmopoliticum）
  62。　Nature　and　Conditions　of　Cosmopolitical　Right。
  The　rational　idea　of　a　universal；　peaceful；　if　not　yet　friendly；
  union　of　all　the　nations　upon　the　earth　that　may　come　into　active
  relations　with　each　other；　is　a　juridical　principle；　as
  distinguished　from　philanthropic　or　ethical　principles。　Nature　has
  enclosed　them　altogether　within　definite　boundaries；　in　virtue　of
  the　spherical　form　of　their　abode　as　a　globus　terraqueus；　and　the
  possession　of　the　soil　upon　which　an　inhabitant　of　the　earth　may
  live　can　only　be　regarded　as　possession　of　a　part　of　a　limited　whole
  and；　consequently；　as　a　part　to　which　every　one　has　originally　a
  right。　Hence　all　nations　originally　hold　a　community　of　the　soil；
  but　not　a　juridical　community　of　possession　（communio）；　nor
  consequently　of　the　use　or　proprietorship　of　the　soil；　but　only　of　a
  possible　physical　intercourse　（commercium）　by　means　of　it。　In　other
  words；　they　are　placed　in　such　thoroughgoing　relations　of　each　to
  all　the　rest　that　they　may　claim　to　enter　into　intercourse　with　one
  another；　and　they　have　a　right　to　make　an　attempt　in　this　direction；
  while　a　foreign　nation　would　not　be　entitled　to　treat　them　on　this
  account　as　enemies。　This　right；　in　so　far　as　it　relates　to　a
  possible　union　of　all　nations；　in　respect　of　certain　laws
  universally　regulating　their　intercourse　with　each　other；　may　be
  called　〃cosmopolitical　right〃　（jus　cosmopoliticum）。
  It　may　appear　that　seas　put　nations　out　of　all　communion　with　each
  other。　But　this　is　not　so；　for　by　means　of　commerce；　seas　form　the
  happiest　natural　provision　for　their　intercourse。　And　the　more　there
  are　of　neighbouring　coastlands；　as　in　the　case　of　the　Mediterranean
  Sea；　this　intercourse　becomes　the　more　animated。　And　hence
  communications　with　such　lands；　especially　where　there　are　settlements
  upon　them　connected　with　the　mother　countries　giving　occasion　for　such
  communications；　bring　it　about　that　evil　and　violence　committed　in　one
  place　of　our　globe　are　felt　in　all。　Such　possible　abuse　cannot；
  however；　annul　the　right　of　man　as　a　citizen　of　the　world　to　attempt
  to　enter　into　communion　with　all　others；　and　for　this　purpose　to　visit
  all　the　regions　of　the　earth；　although　this　does　not　constitute　a
  right　of　settlement　upon　the　territory　of　another　people　（jus
  incolatus）；　for　which　a　special　contract　is　required。
  But　the　question　is　raised　as　to　whether；　in　the　case　of　newly
  discovered　countries；　a　people　may　claim　the　right　to　settle
  （accolatus）；　and　to　occupy　possessions　in　the　neighbourhood　of　another
  people　that　has　already　settled　in　that　region；　and　to　do　this　without
  their　consent。
  Such　a　right　is　indubitable；　if　the　new　settlement　takes　place　at
  such　a　distance　from　the　seat　of　the　former　that　neither　would
  restrict　or　injure　the　other　in　the　use　of　their　territory。　But　in　the
  case　of　nomadic　peoples；　or　tribes　of　shepherds　and　hunters　（such　as
  the　Hottentots；　the　Tungusi；　and　most　of　the　American　Indians）；
  whose　support　is　derived　from　wide　desert　tracts；　such　occupation
  should　never　take　place　by　force；　but　only　by　contract；　and　any　such
  contract　ought　never　to　take　advantage　of　the　ignorance　of　the
  original　dwellers　in　regard　to　the　cession　of　their　lands。　Yet　it　is
  commonly　alleged　that　such　acts　of　violent　appropriation　may　be
  justified　as　subserving　the　general　good　of　the　world。　It　appears　as
  if　sufficiently　justifying　grounds　were　furnished　for　them；　partly
  by　reference　to　the　civilization　of　barbarous　peoples　（as　by　a　pretext
  of　this　kind　even　Busching　tries　to　excuse　the　bloody　introduction
  of　the　Christian　religion　into　Germany）；　and　partly　by　founding　upon
  the　necessity　of　purging　one's　own　country　from　depraved　criminals；
  and　the　hope　of　their　improvement　or　that　of　their　posterity；　in
  another　continent　like　New　Holland。　But　all　these　alleged　good
  purposes　cannot　wash　out　the　stain　of　injustice　in　the　means
  employed　to　attain　them。　It　may　be　objected　that；　had　such
  scrupulousness　about　making　a　beginning　in　founding　a　legal　state　with
  force　been　always　maintained；　the　whole　earth　would　still　have　been　in
  a　state　of　lawlessness。　But　such　an　objection　would　as　little　annul
  the　conditions　of　right　in　question　as　the　pretext　of　the　political
  revolutionaries　that；　when　a　constitution　has　become　degenerate；　it
  belongs　to　the　people　to　transform　it　by　force。　This　would　amount
  generally　to　being　unjust　once　and　for　all；　in　order　thereafter　to
  found　justice　the　more　surely；　and　to　make　it　flourish。
  CONCLUSION
  Conclusion。
  If　one　cannot　prove　that　a　thing　is；　he　may　try　to　prove　that　it
  is　not。　And　if　he　succeeds　in　doing　neither　（as　often　occurs）；　he
  may　still　ask　whether　it　is　in　his　interest　to　accept　one　or　other
  of　the　alternatives　hypothetically；　from　the　theoretical　or　the
  practical　point　of　view。　In　other　words；　a　hypothesis　may　be
  accepted　either　in　order　to　explain　a　certain　phenomenon　（as　in
  astronomy　to　account　for　the　retrogression　and　stationariness　of　the
  planets）；　or　in　order　to　attain　a　certain　end；　which　again　may　be
  either　pragmatic；　as　belonging　merely　to　the　sphere　of　art；　or
  moral；　as　involving　a　purpose　which　it　is　a　duty　to　adopt　as　a　maxim
  of　action。　Now　it　is　evident　that　the　assumption　（suppositio）　of　the
  practicability　of　such　an　end；　though　presented　merely　as　a
  theoretical　and　problematical　judgement；　may　be　regarded　as
  constituting　a　duty；　and　hence　it　is　so　regarded　in　this　case。　For
  although　there　may　be　no　positive　obligation　to　believe　in　such　an
  end；　yet　even　if　there　were　not　the　least　theoretical　probability　of
  action　being　carried　out　in　accordance　with　it；　so　long　as　its
  impossibility　cannot　be　demonstrated；　there　still　remains　a　duty
  incumbent　upon　us　with　regard　to　it。
  Now；　as　a　matter　of　fact；　the　morally　practical　reason　utters　within
  us　its　irrevocable　veto：　There　shall　be　no　war。　So　there　ought　to　be
  no　war；　neither　between　me　and　you　in　the　condition　of　na