legislative　power；　and　yet　it　would　be　made　binding　upon　the　people；
  which；　on　the　principle　that　〃No　one　can　serve　two　masters；〃　is　a
  contradiction。
  II。　The　Right　of　Nations　and　International　Law。
  （Jus　Gentium）。
  53。　Nature　and　Division　of　the　Right　of　Nations。
  The　individuals；　who　make　up　a　people；　may　be　regarded　as　natives　of
  the　country　sprung　by　natural　descent　from　a　common　ancestry
  （congeniti）；　although　this　may　not　hold　entirely　true　in　detail。
  Again；　they　may　be　viewed　according　to　the　intellectual　and
  juridical　relation；　as　born　of　a　common　political　mother；　the
  republic；　so　that　they　constitute；　as　it　were；　a　public　family　or
  nation　（gens；　natio）　whose　members　are　all　related　to　each　other　as
  citizens　of　the　state。　As　members　of　a　state；　they　do　not　mix　with
  those　who　live　beside　them　in　the　state　of　nature；　considering　such　to
  be　ignoble。　Yet　these　savages；　on　account　of　the　lawless　freedom
  they　have　chosen；　regard　themselves　as　superior　to　civilized
  peoples；　and　they　constitute　tribes　and　even　races；　but　not　states。
  The　public　right　of　states　（jus　publicum　civitatum）；　in　their
  relations　to　one　another；　is　what　we　have　to　consider　under　the
  designation　of　the　〃right　of　nations。〃　Wherever　a　state；　viewed　as　a
  moral　person；　acts　in　relation　to　another　existing　in　the　condition　of
  natural　freedom；　and　consequently　in　a　state　of　continual　war；　such
  right　takes　it　rise。
  The　right　of　nations　in　relation　to　the　state　of　war　may　be
  divided　into：　1。　the　right　of　going　to　war；　2。　right　during　war；　and
  3。　right　after　war；　the　object　of　which　is　to　constrain　the　nations
  mutually　to　pass　from　this　state　of　war　and　to　found　a　common
  constitution　establishing　perpetual　peace。　The　difference　between
  the　right　of　individual　men　or　families　as　related　to　each　other　in
  the　state　of　nature；　and　the　right　of　the　nations　among　themselves；
  consists　in　this；　that　in　the　right　of　nations　we　have　to　consider　not
  merely　a　relation　of　one　state　to　another　as　a　whole；　but　also　the
  relation　of　the　individual　persons　in　one　state　to　the　individuals
  of　another　state；　as　well　as　to　that　state　as　a　whole。　This
  difference；　however；　between　the　right　of　nations　and　the　right　of
  individuals　in　the　mere　state　of　nature；　requires　to　be　determined
  by　elements　which　can　easily　be　deduced　from　the　conception　of　the
  latter。
  54。　Elements　of　the　Right　of　Nations。
  The　elements　of　the　right　of　nations　are　as　follows：
  1。　States；　viewed　as　nations；　in　their　external　relations　to　one
  another…　like　lawless　savages…　are　naturally　in　a　non…juridical
  condition；
  2。　This　natural　condition　is　a　state　of　war　in　which　the　right　of
  the　stronger　prevails；　and　although　it　may　not　in　fact　be　always　found
  as　a　state　of　actual　war　and　incessant　hostility；　and　although　no　real
  wrong　is　done　to　any　one　therein；　yet　the　condition　is　wrong　in　itself
  in　the　highest　degree；　and　the　nations　which　form　states　contiguous　to
  each　other　are　bound　mutually　to　pass　out　of　it；
  3。　An　alliance　of　nations；　in　accordance　with　the　idea　of　an
  original　social　contract；　is　necessary　to　protect　each　other　against
  external　aggression　and　attack；　but　not　involving　interference　with
  their　several　internal　difficulties　and　disputes；
  4。　This　mutual　connection　by　alliance　must　dispense　with　a
  distinct　sovereign　power；　such　as　is　set　up　in　the　civil　constitution；
  it　can　only　take　the　form　of　a　federation；　which　as　such　may　be
  revoked　on　any　occasion；　and　must　consequently　be　renewed　from　time　to
  time。
  This　is　therefore　a　right　which　comes　in　as　an　accessory　（in
  subsidium）　of　another　original　right；　in　order　to　prevent　the
  nations　from　falling　from　right　and　lapsing　into　the　state　of　actual
  war　with　each　other。　It　thus　issues　in　the　idea　of　a　foedus
  amphictyonum。
  55。　Right　of　Going　to　War　as　related　to　the
  Subjects　of　the　State。
  We　have　then　to　consider；　in　the　first　place；　the　original　right
  of　free　states　to　go　to　war　with　each　other　as　being　still　in　a
  state　of　nature；　but　as　exercising　this　right　in　order　to　establish
  some　condition　of　society　approaching　the　juridical　And；　first　of　all；
  the　question　arises　as　to　what　right　the　state　has　in　relation　to
  its　own　subjects；　to　use　them　in　order　to　make　war　against　other
  states；　to　employ　their　property　and　even　their　lives　for　this
  purpose；　or　at　least　to　expose　them　to　hazard　and　danger；　and　all　this
  in　such　a　way　that　it　does　not　depend　upon　their　own　personal
  judgement　whether　they　will　march　into　the　field　of　war　or　not；　but
  the　supreme　command　of　the　sovereign　claims　to　settle　and　dispose　of
  them　thus。
  This　right　appears　capable　of　being　easily　established。　It　may　be
  grounded　upon　the　right　which　every　one　has　to　do　with　what　is　his　own
  as　he　will。　Whatever　one　has　made　substantially　for　himself；　he
  holds　as　his　incontestable　property。　The　following；　then；　is　such　a
  deduction　as　a　mere　jurist　would　put　forward。
  There　are　various　natural　products　in　a　country　which；　as　regards
  the　number　and　quantity　in　which　they　exist；　must　be　considered　as
  specially　produced　（artefacta）　by　the　work　of　the　state；　for　the
  country　would　not　yield　them　to　such　extent　were　it　not　under　the
  constitution　of　the　state　and　its　regular　administrative　government；
  or　if　the　inhabitants　were　still　living　in　the　state　of　nature。　Sheep；
  cattle；　domestic　fowl　the　most　useful　of　their　kind…　swine；　and　such
  like；　would　either　be　used　up　as　necessary　food　or　destroyed　by　beasts
  of　prey　in　the　district　in　which　I　live；　so　that　they　would　entirely
  disappear；　or　be　found　in　very　scant　supplies；　were　it　not　for　the
  government　securing　to　the　inhabitants　their　acquisitions　and
  property。　This　holds　likewise　of　the　population　itself；　as　we　see　in
  the　case　of　the　American　deserts；　and　even　were　the　greatest
  industry　applied　in　those　regions…　which　is　not　yet　done…　there
  might　be　but　a　scanty　population。　The　inhabitants　of　any　country　would
  be　but　sparsely　sown　here　and　there　were　it　not　for　the　protection
  of　government；　because　without　it　they　could　not　spread　themselves
  with　their　households　upon　a　territory　which　was　always　in　danger　of
  being　devastated　by　enemies　or　by　wild　beasts　of　prey；　and　further；　so
  great　a　multitude　of　men　as　now　live　in　any　one　country　could　not
  otherwise　obtain　sufficient　means　of　support。　Hence；　as　it　can　be　said
  of　vegetable　growths；　such　as　potatoes；　as　well　as　of　domesticated
  animals；　that　because　the　abundance　in　which　they　are　found　is　a
  product　of　human　labour；　they　may　be　used；　destroyed；　and　consumed
  by　man；　so　it　seems　that　it　may　be　said　of　the　sovereign；　as　the
  supreme　power　in　the　state；　that　he　has　the　right　to　lead　his
  subjects；　as　being　for　the　most　part　productions　of　his　own；　to　war；
  as　if　it　were　to　the　chase；　and　even　to　march　them　to　the　field　of
  battle；　as　if　it　were　on　a　pleasure　excursion。
  This　principle　of　right　may　be　supposed　to　float　dimly　before　the
  mind　of　the　monarch；　and　it　certainly　holds　true　at　least　of　the　lower
  animals　which　may　become　the　property　of　man。　But　such　a　principle
  will　not　at　all　apply　to　men；　especially　when　viewed　as　citizens　who
  must　be　regarded　as　members　of　the　state；　with　a　share　in　the
  legislation；　and　not　merely　as　means　for　others　but　as　ends　in
  themselves。　As　such　they　must　give　their　free　consent；　through　their
  representatives；　not　only　to　the　carrying　on　of　war　generally；　but
  to　every　separate　declaration　of　war；　and　it　is　only　under　this
  limiting　condition　that　the　state　has　a　right　to　demand　their　services
  in　undertakings　so　full　of　danger。
  We　would　therefore　deduce　this　right　rather　from　the　duty　of　the
  sovereign　to　the　people　than　conversely。　Under　this　relation；　the
  people　must　be　regarded　as　having　given　their　sanction；　and；　having
  the　right　of　voting；　they　may　be　considered；　although　thus　passive
  in　reference　to　themselves　individually；　to　be　active　in　so　far　as
  they　represent　the　sovereignty　itself。
  56。　Right　of　Going　to　War　in　relation
  to　Hostile　States。
  Viewed　as　in　the　state　of　nature；　the　right　of　nations　to　go　to
  war　and　to　carry　on　hostilities　is　the　legitimate　way　by　which　they
  prosecute　their　rights　by　their　own　power　when　they　regard
  themselves　as　injured；　and　this　is　done　because　in　that　state　the
  method　of　a　juridical　process；　although　the　only　one　proper　to
  settle　such　disputes；　cannot　be　adopted。
  The　threatening　of　war　is　to　be　distinguished　from　the　active　injury
  of　a　first　aggression；　which　again　is　distinguished　from　the　general
  outbreak　of　hostilities。　A　threat　or　menace　may　be　given　by　the　active
  preparation　of　armaments；　upon　which　a　right　of　prevention　（jus
  praeventionis）　is　founded　on　the　other　side；　or　merely　by　the
  formidable　increase　of　the　power　of　another　state　（potestas
  tremenda）　by　a