questions　point　to　what　is　in　itself　morally　wrong。
  But　in　relation　to　a　court　of　justice…　and　generally　in　the　civil
  state…　if　it　be　assumed　there　are　no　other　means　of　getting　to　the
  truth　in　certain　cases　than　by　an　oath；　it　must　be　adopted。　In
  regard　to　religion；　under　the　supposition　that　every　one　has　it；　it
  may　be　utilized　as　a　necessary　means　（in　causu　necessitatis）；　in
  behoof　of　the　legitimate　procedure　of　a　court　of　justice。　The　court
  uses　this　form　of　spiritual　compulsion　（tortura　spiritualis）　as　an
  available　means；　in　conformity　with　the　superstitious　propensity　of
  mankind；　for　the　ascertainment　of　what　is　concealed；　and　therefore
  holds　itself　justified　in　so　doing。　The　legislative　power；　however；　is
  fundamentally　wrong　in　assigning　this　authority　to　the　judicial　power；
  because　even　in　the　civil　state　any　compulsion　with　regard　to　the
  taking　of　oaths　is　contrary　to　the　inalienable　freedom　of　man。
  Official　oaths；　which　are　usually　promissory；　being　taken　on
  entering　upon　an　office；　to　the　effect　that　the　individual　has　sincere
  intention　to　administer　his　functions　dutifully；　might　well　be　changed
  into　assertory　oaths；　to　be　taken　at　the　end　of　a　year　or　more　of
  actual　administration；　the　official　swearing　to　the　faithfulness　of
  his　discharge　of　duty　during　that　time。　This　would　bring　the
  conscience　more　into　action　than　the　promissory　oath；　which　always
  gives　room　for　the　internal　pretext　that；　with　the　best　intention；　the
  difficulties　that　arose　during　the　administration　of　the　official
  function　were　not　foreseen。　And；　further；　violations　of　duty；　under
  the　prospect　of　their　being　summed　up　by　future　censors；　would　give
  rise　to　more　anxiety　as　to　censure　than　when　they　are　merely
  represented；　one　after　the　other；　and　forgotten。
  As　regards　an　oath　taken　concerning　a　matter　of　belief　（de
  credulitate）；　it　is　evident　that　no　such　oath　can　be　demanded　by　a
  court。　1。　For；　first；　it　contains　in　itself　a　contradiction。　Such
  belief；　as　intermediate　between　opinion　and　knowledge；　is　a　thing　on
  which　one　might　venture　to　lay　a　wager　but　not　to　swear　an　oath。　2。
  And；　second；　the　judge　who　imposes　an　oath　of　belief；　in　order　to
  ascertain　anything　pertinent　to　his　own　purpose　or　even　to　the
  common　good；　commits　a　great　offence　against　the　conscientiousness
  of　the　party　taking　such　an　oath。　This　he　does　in　regard　both　to　the
  levity　of　mind；　which　he　thereby　helps　to　engender；　and　to　the
  stings　of　conscience　which　a　man　must　feel　who　to…day　regards　a
  subject　from　a　certain　point　of　view；　but　who　will　very　probably
  to…morrow　find　it　quite　improbable　from　another　point　of　view。　Any
  one；　therefore；　who　is　compelled　to　take　such　an　oath；　is　subjected　to
  an　injury。
  Transition　from　the　Mine　and　Thine　in　the　State
  of　Nature　to　the　Mine　and　Thine　in　the
  Juridical　State　Generally。
  41。　Public　Justice　as　Related　to　the　Natural
  and　the　Civil　State。
  The　juridical　state　is　that　relation　of　men　to　one　another　which
  contains　the　conditions　under　which　it　is　alone　possible　for　every　one
  to　obtain　the　right　that　is　his　due。　The　formal　principle　of　the
  possibility　of　actually　participating　in　such　right；　viewed　in
  accordance　with　the　idea　of　a　universally　legislative　will；　is
  public　justice。　Public　justice　may　be　considered　in　relation　either　to
  the　possibility；　or　actuality；　or　necessity　of　the　possession　of
  objects…　regarded　as　the　matter　of　the　activity　of　the　will…　according
  to　laws。　It　may　thus　be　divided　into　protective　justice　（justitia
  testatrix）；　commutative　justice　（justitia　commutativa）；　and
  distributive　justice　（justitia　distributiva）；　in　the　first　mode　of
  justice；　the　law　declares　merely　what　relation　is　internally　right
  in　respect　of　form　（lex　justi）；　in　the　second；　it　declares　what　is
  likewise　externally　in　accord　with　a　law　in　respect　of　the　object；　and
  what　possession　is　rightful　（lex　juridica）；　and　in　the　third；　it
  declares　what　is　right；　and　what　is　just；　and　to　what　extent；　by　the
  judgement　of　a　court　in　any　particular　case　coming　under　the　given
  law。　In　this　latter　relation；　the　public　court　is　called　the　justice
  of　the　country；　and　the　question　whether　there　actually　is　or　is　not
  such　an　administration　of　public　justice　may　be　regarded　as　the　most
  important　of　all　juridical　interests。
  The　non…juridical　state　is　that　condition　of　society　in　which
  there　is　no　distributive　justice。　It　is　commonly　called　the　natural
  state　（status　naturalis）；　or　the　state　of　nature。　It　is　not　the　social
  state；　as　Achenwall　puts　it；　for　this　may　be　in　itself　an　artificial
  state　（status　artificialis）；　that　is　to　be　contradistinguished　from
  the　〃natural〃　state。　The　opposite　of　the　state　of　nature　is　the
  civil　state　（status　civilis）　as　the　condition　of　a　society　standing
  under　a　distributive　justice。　In　the　state　of　nature；　there　may　even
  be　juridical　forms　of　society　such　as　marriage；　parental　authority；
  the　household；　and　such　like。　For　none　of　these；　however；　does　any　law
  a　priori　lay　it　down　as　an　incumbent　obligation：　〃Thou　shalt　enter
  into　this　state。〃　But　it　may　be　said　of　the　juridical　state　that：　〃All
  men　who　may　even　involuntarily　come　into　relations　of　right　with　one
  another　ought　to　enter　into　this　state。〃
  The　natural　or　non…juridical　social　state　may　be　viewed　as　the
  sphere　of　private　right；　and　the　civil　state　may　be　specially　regarded
  as　the　sphere　of　public　right。　The　latter　state　contains　no　more　and
  no　other　duties　of　men　towards　each　other　than　what　may　be　conceived
  in　connection　with　the　former　state；　the　matter　of　private　right　is；
  in　short；　the　very　same　in　both。　The　laws　of　the　civil　state；
  therefore；　only　turn　upon　the　juridical　form　of　the　coexistence　of　men
  under　a　common　constitution；　and；　in　this　respect；　these　laws　must
  necessarily　be　regarded　and　conceived　as　public　laws。
  The　civil　union　（unio　civilis）　cannot；　in　the　strict　sense；　be
  properly　called　a　society；　for　there　is　no　sociality　in　common　between
  the　ruler　（imperans）　and　the　subject　（subditus）　under　a　civil
  constitution。　They　are　not　co…ordinated　as　associates　in　a　society
  with　each　other；　but　the　one　is　subordinated　to　the　other。　Those　who
  may　be　co…ordinated　with　one　another　must　consider　themselves　as
  mutually　equal；　in　so　far　as　they　stand　under　common　laws。　The　civil
  union　may　therefore　be　regarded　not　so　much　as　being；　but　rather　as
  making　a　society。
  42。　The　Postulate　of　Public　Right。
  From　the　conditions　of　private　right　in　the　natural　state；　there
  arises　the　postulate　of　public　right。　It　may　be　thus　expressed：　〃In
  the　relation　of　unavoidable　coexistence　with　others；　thou　shalt　pass
  from　the　state　of　nature　into　a　juridical　union　constituted　under
  the　condition　of　a　distributive　justice。〃　The　principle　of　this
  postulate　may　be　unfolded　analytically　from　the　conception　of　right　in
  the　external　relation；　contradistinguished　from　mere　might　as
  violence。
  No　one　is　under　obligation　to　abstain　from　interfering　with　the
  possession　of　others；　unless　they　give　him　a　reciprocal　guarantee
  for　the　observance　of　a　similar　abstention　from　interference　with
  his　possession。　Nor　does　he　require　to　wait　for　proof　by　experience　of
  the　need　of　this　guarantee；　in　view　of　the　antagonistic　disposition　of
  others。　He　is　therefore　under　no　obligation　to　wait　till　he　acquires
  practical　prudence　at　his　own　cost；　for　he　can　perceive　in　himself
  evidence　of　the　natural　inclination　of　men　to　play　the　master　over
  others；　and　to　disregard　the　claims　of　the　right　of　others；　when
  they　feel　themselves　their　superiors　by　might　or　fraud。　And　thus　it　is
  not　necessary　to　wait　for　the　melancholy　experience　of　actual
  hostility；　the　individual　is　from　the　first　entitled　to　exercise　a
  rightful　compulsion　towards　those　who　already　threaten　him　by　their
  very　nature。　Quilibet　praesumitur　malus；　donec　securitatem　dederit
  oppositi。
  So　long　as　the　intention　to　live　and　continue　in　this　state　of
  externally　lawless　freedom　prevails；　men　may　be　said　to　do　no　wrong　or
  injustice　at　all　to　one　another；　even　when　they　wage　war　against
  each　other。　For　what　seems　competent　as　good　for　the　one　is　equally
  valid　for　the　other；　as　if　it　were　so　by　mutual　agreement。　Uti
  partes　de　jure　suo　disponunt；　ita　jus　est。　But　generally　they　must
  be　considered　as　being　in　the　highest　state　of　wrong；　as　being　and
  willing　to　be　in　a　condition　which　is　not　juridical；　and　in　which；
  therefore；　no　one　can　be　secured　against　violence；　in　the　possession
  of　his　own。
  The　distinction　between　what　is　only　formally　and　what　is　also
  materially　wrong；　and　unjust；　finds　frequent　application　in　the
  science　of　right。　An　enemy　who；　on　occupying　a　besieged　fortress；
  instead　of　honourably　fulfilling　the　conditions　of　a　capitulation；
  maltreats　the　garrison　on　marching　out；　or　otherwise　violates　the
  agreement；　cannot　complain　of　inju