carried　out；　and　which　can　have　place　only　in　a　commonwealth。
  〃It　is　possible　to　acquire　by　being　instituted　or　appointed　heir
  in　a　testamentary　disposition。〃　For　the　testator　Caius　promises　and
  declares　in　his　last　will　to　Titius；　who　knows　nothing　of　this
  promise；　to　transfer　to　him　his　estate　in　case　of　death；　but　thus
  continuing　as　long　as　he　lives　sole　owner　of　it。　Now　by　a　mere
  unilateral　act　of　will；　nothing　can　in　fact　be　transmitted　to
  another　person；　as　in　addition　to　the　promise　of　the　one　party　there
  is　required　acceptance　（acceptatio）　on　the　part　of　the　other；　and　a
  simultaneous　bilateral　act　of　will　（voluntas　simultanea）　which；
  however；　is　here　awanting。　So　long　as　Caius　lives；　Titius　cannot
  expressly　accept　in　order　to　enter　on　acquisition；　because　Caius　has
  only　promised　in　case　of　death；　otherwise　the　property　would　be　for
  a　moment　at　least　in　common　possession；　which　is　not　the　will　of　the
  testator。　However；　Titius　acquires　tacitly　a　special　right　to　the
  inheritance　as　a　real　right。　This　is　constituted　by　the　sole　and
  exclusive　right　to　accept　the　estate　（jus　in　re　jacente）；　which　is
  therefore　called　at　that　point　of　time　a　haereditas　jacens。　Now　as
  every　man…　because　he　must　always　gain　and　never　lose　by　it…
  necessarily；　although　tacitly；　accepts　such　a　right；　and　as　Titius
  after　the　death　of　Caius　is　in　this　position；　he　may　acquire　the
  succession　as　heir　by　acceptance　of　the　promise。　And　the　estate　is　not
  in　the　meantime　entirely　without　an　owner　（res　nullius）；　but　is　only
  in　abeyance　or　vacant　（vacua）；　because　he　has　exclusively　the　right　of
  choice　as　to　whether　he　will　actually　make　the　estate　bequeathed　to
  him　his　own　or　not。
  Hence　testaments　are　valid　according　to　mere　natural　right　（sunt
  juris　naturae）。　This　assertion　however；　is　to　be　understood　in　the
  sense　that　they　are　capable　and　worthy　of　being　introduced　and
  sanctioned　in　the　civil　state；　whenever　it　is　instituted。　For　it　is
  only　the　common　will　in　the　civil　state　that　maintains　the
  possession　of　the　inheritance　or　succession；　while　it　hangs　between
  acceptance　or　rejection　and　specially　belongs　to　no　particular
  individual。
  35。　III。　The　Continuing　Right　of　a　Good　Name
  after　Death。　（Bona　fama　Defuncti）。
  It　would　be　absurd　to　think　that　a　dead　person　could　possess
  anything　after　his　death；　when　he　no　longer　exists　in　the　eye　of　the
  law；　if　the　matter　in　question　were　a　mere　thing。　But　a　good　name　is　a
  congenital　and　external；　although　merely　ideal；　possession；　which
  attaches　inseparably　to　the　individual　as　a　person。　Now　we　can　and
  must　abstract　here　from　all　consideration　as　to　whether　the　persons
  cease　to　be　after　death　or　still　continue　as　such　to　exist；　because；
  in　considering　their　juridical　relation　to　others；　we　regard　persons
  merely　according　to　their　humanity　and　as　rational　beings　（homo
  noumenon）。　Hence　any　attempt　to　bring　the　reputation　or　good　name　of　a
  person　into　evil　and　false　repute　after　death；　is　always　questionable；
  even　although　a　well…founded　charge　may　be　allowed…　for　to　that　extent
  the　brocard　〃De　mortuis　nil　nisi　bene〃*　is　wrong。　Yet　to　spread
  charges　against　one　who　is　absent　and　cannot　defend　himself；　shows
  at　least　a　want　of　magnanimity。
  *＇Let　nothing　be　said　of　the　dead　but　what　is　favourable。＇
  By　a　blameless　life　and　a　death　that　worthily　ends　it；　nothing
  ends　it；　it　is　admitted　that　a　man　may　acquire　a　（negatively）　good
  reputation　constituting　something　that　is　his　own；　even　when　he　no
  longer　exists　in　the　world　of　sense　as　a　visible　person　（homo
  phaenomenon）。　It　is　further　held　that　his　survivors　and　successors…
  whether　relatives　or　strangers…　are　entitled　to　defend　his　good　name
  as　a　matter　of　right；　on　the　ground　that　unproved　accusations
  subject　them　all　to　the　danger　of　similar　treatment　after　death。　Now
  that　a　man　when　dead　can　yet　acquire　such　a　right　is　a　peculiar　and；
  nevertheless；　an　undeniable　manifestation　in　fact；　of　the　a　priori
  law…giving　reason　thus　extending　its　law　of　command　or　prohibition
  beyond　the　limits　of　the　present　life。　If　some　one　then　spreads　a
  charge　regarding　a　dead　person　that　would　have　dishonoured　him　when
  living；　or　even　made　him　despicable；　any　one　who　can　adduce　a　proof
  that　this　accusation　is　intentionally　false　and　untrue　may　publicly
  declare　him　who　thus　brings　the　dead　person　into　ill　repute　to　be　a
  calumniator；　and　affix　dishonour　to　him　in　turn。　This　would　not　be
  allowable　unless　it　were　legitimate　to　assume　that　the　dead　person　was
  injured　by　the　accusation；　although　he　is　dead；　and　that　a　certain
  just　satisfaction　was　done　to　him　by　an　apology；　although　he　no　longer
  sensibly　exists。　A　title　to　act　the　part　the　vindicator　of　the　dead
  person　does　not　require　to　be　established；　for　every　one　necessarily
  claims　this　of　himself；　not　merely　as　a　duty　of　virtue　regarded
  ethically；　but　as　a　right　belonging　to　him　in　virtue　of　his
  humanity。　Nor　does　the　vindicator　require　to　show　any　special　personal
  damage；　accruing　to　him　as　a　friend　or　relative；　from　a　stain　on　the
  character　of　the　deceased；　to　justify　him　in　proceeding　to　censure　it。
  That　such　a　form　of　ideal　acquisition；　and　even　a　right　in　an
  individual　after　death　against　survivors；　is　thus　actually　founded；
  cannot；　therefore；　be　disputed；　although　the　possibility　of　such　a
  right　is　not　capable　of　logical　deduction。
  There　is　no　ground　for　drawing　visionary　inferences　from　what　has
  just　been　stated；　to　the　presentiment　of　a　future　life　and　invisible
  relations　to　departed　souls。　For　the　considerations　connected　with
  this　right　turn　on　nothing　more　than　the　purely　moral　and　juridical
  relation　which　subsists　among　men；　even　in　the　present　life；　as
  rational　beings。　Abstraction　is；　however；　made　from　all　that　belongs
  physically　to　their　existence　in　space　and　time；　that　is；　men　are
  considered　logically　apart　from　these　physical　concomitants　of　their
  nature；　not　as　to　their　state　when　actually　deprived　of　them；　but　only
  in　so　far　as　being　spirits　they　are　in　a　condition　that　might
  realize　the　injury　done　them　by　calumniators。　Any　one　who　may
  falsely　say　something　against　me　a　hundred　years　hence　injures　me　even
  now。　For　in　the　pure　juridical　relation；　which　is　entirely　rational
  and　surprasensible；　abstraction　is　made　from　the　physical　conditions
  of　time；　and　the　calumniator　is　as　culpable　as　if　he　had　committed　the
  offence　in　my　lifetime；　only　this　will　not　be　tried　by　a　criminal
  process；　but　he　will　only　be　punished　with　that　loss　of　honour　he
  would　have　caused　to　another；　and　this　is　inflicted　upon　him　by　public
  opinion　according　to　the　lex　talionis。　Even　a　plagiarism　from　a　dead
  author；　although　it　does　not　tarnish　the　honour　of　the　deceased；　but
  only　deprives　him　of　a　part　of　his　property；　is　yet　properly
  regarded　as　a　lesion　of　his　human　right。
  CH3
  FIRST　PART。　PRIVATE　RIGHT。
  The　System　of　those　Laws　Which　Require　No　External　Promulgation。
  CHAPTER　III。　Acquisition　Conditioned　by　the　Sentence　of
  a　Public　Judicatory。
  36。　How　and　What　Acquisition　is　Subjectively　Conditioned
  by　the　Principle　of　a　Public　Court。
  Natural　right；　understood　simply　as　that　right　which　is　not
  statutory；　and　which　is　knowable　purely　a　priori；　by　every　man's
  reason；　will　include　distributive　justice　as　well　as　commutative
  justice。　It　is　manifest　that　the　latter；　as　constituting　the　justice
  that　is　valid　between　persons　in　their　reciprocal　relations　of
  intercourse　with　one　another；　must　belong　to　natural　right。　But　this
  holds　also　of　distributive　justice；　in　so　far　as　it　can　be　known　a
  priori；　and　decisions　or　sentences　regarding　it　must　be　regulated　by
  the　law　of　natural　right。
  The　moral　person　who　presides　in　the　sphere　of　justice　and
  administers　it　is　called　the　Court　of　justice；　and；　as　engaged　in
  the　process　of　official　duty；　the　judicatory；　the　sentence　delivered
  in　a　case；　is　the　judgement　（judicium）。　All　this　is　to　be　here
  viewed　a　priori；　according　to　the　rational　conditions　of　right；
  without　taking　into　consideration　how　such　a　constitution　is　to　be
  actually　established　or　organized；　for　which　particular　statutes；
  and　consequently　empirical　principles；　are　requisite。
  The　question；　then；　in　this　connection；　is　not　merely　〃What　is　right
  in　itself？〃　in　the　sense　in　which　every　man　must　determine　it　by　the
  judgement　of　reason；　but　〃What　is　right　as　applied　to　this　case？〃　that
  is；　〃What　is　right　and　just　as　viewed　by　a　court？〃　The　rational　and
  the　judicial　points　of　view　are　therefore　to　be　distinguished；　and
  there　are　four　cases　in　which　the　two　forms　of　judgement　have　a
  different　and　opposite　issue。　And　yet　they　may　co…exist　with　each
  other；　because　they　are　delivered　from　two　different；　yet　respectively
  true；　points　of　view：　the　one　from　regard　to　private　right；　the
  other　from　the　idea　of　public　right。　They　are：　I。　The　contract