The　confusion　of　personal　right　with　real　right　may　be　likewise
  shown　by　reference　to　a　difference　of　view　in　connection　with
  another　contract；　falling　under　the　head　of　contracts　of　hiring　（B　II。
  I）；　namely；　the　contract　of　lease　（jus　incolatus）。　The　question　is
  raised　as　to　whether　a　proprietor　when　he　has　sold　a　house　or　a
  piece　of　ground　held　on　lease；　before　the　expiry　of　the　period　of
  lease；　was　bound　to　add　the　condition　of　the　continuance　of　the
  lease　to　the　contract　of　purchase；　or　whether　it　should　be　held　that
  〃purchase　breaks　hire；〃　of　course　under　reservation　of　a　period　of
  warning　determined　by　the　nature　of　the　subject　in　use。　In　the
  former　view；　a　house　or　farm　would　be　regarded　as　having　a　burden
  lying　upon　it；　constituting　a　real　right　acquired　in　it　by　the　lessee；
  and　this　might　well　enough　be　carried　out　by　a　clause　merely　indorsing
  or　ingrossing　the　contract　of　lease　in　the　deed　of　sale。　But　as　it
  would　no　longer　then　be　a　simple　lease；　another　contract　would
  properly　be　required　to　be　conjoined；　a　matter　which　few　lessors　would
  be　disposed　to　grant。　The　proposition；　then；　that　〃Purchase　breaks
  hire〃　holds　in　principle；　for　the　full　right　in　a　thing　as　a
  property　overbears　all　personal　right；　which　is　inconsistent　with
  it。　But　there　remains　a　right　of　action　to　the　lessee；　on　the　ground
  of　a　personal　right　for　indemnification　on　account　of　any　loss　arising
  from　breaking　of　the　contract。
  EPISODICAL　SECTION。　The　Ideal　Acquisition　of　External
  Objects　of　the　Will。
  32。　The　Nature　and　Modes　of　Ideal　Acquisition。
  I　call　that　mode　of　acquisition　ideal　which　involves　no　causality　in
  time；　and　which　is　founded　upon　a　mere　idea　of　pure　reason。　It　is
  nevertheless　actual；　and　not　merely　imaginary　acquisition：　and　it　is
  not　called　real　only　because　the　act　of　acquisition　is　not
  empirical。　This　character　of　the　act　arises　from　the　peculiarity
  that　the　person　acquiring　acquires　from　another　who　either　is　not　yet；
  and　who　can　only　be　regarded　as　a　possible　being；　or　who　is　just
  ceasing　to　be；　or　who　no　longer　is。　Hence　such　a　mode　of　attaining
  to　possession　is　to　be　regarded　as　a　mere　practical　idea　of　reason。
  There　are　three　modes　of　ideal　acquisition：
  I。　Acquisition　by　usucapion；
  II。　Acquisition　by　inheritance　or　succession；
  III。　Acquisition　by　undying　merit　（meritum　immortale）；　or　the
  claim　by　right　to　a　good　name　at　death。
  These　three　modes　of　acquisition　can；　as　a　matter　of　fact；　only　have
  effect　in　a　public　juridical　state　of　existence；　but　they　are　not
  founded　merely　upon　the　civil　constitution　or　upon　arbitrary　statutes；
  they　are　already　contained　a　priori　in　the　conception　of　the　state
  of　nature；　and　are　thus　necessarily　conceivable　prior　to　their
  empirical　manifestation。　The　laws　regarding　them　in　the　civil
  constitution　ought　to　be　regulated　by　that　rational　conception。
  33。　I。　Acquisition　by　Usucapion。
  （Acquisitio　per　Usucapionem）。
  I　may　acquire　the　property　of　another　merely　by　long　possession
  and　use　of　it　（usucapio）。　Such　property　is　not　acquired；　because　I　may
  legitimately　presume　that　his　consent　is　given　to　this　effect　（per
  consensum　praesumptum）；　nor　because　I　can　assume　that；　as　he　does
  not　oppose　my　acquisition　of　it；　he　has　relinquished　or　abandoned　it
  as　his　（rem　derelictam）。　But　I　acquire　it　thus　because；　even　if
  there　were　any　one　actually　raising　a　claim　to　this　property　as　its
  true　owner；　I　may　exclude　him　on　the　ground　of　my　long　possession　of
  it；　ignore　his　previous　existence；　and　proceed　as　if　he　existed　during
  the　time　of　my　possession　as　a　mere　abstraction；　although　I　may　have
  been　subsequently　apprized　of　his　reality　as　well　as　of　his　claim。
  This　mode　of　acquisition　is　not　quite　correctly　designated　acquisition
  by　prescription　（per　praescriptionem）；　for　the　exclusion　of　all
  other　claimants　is　to　be　regarded　as　only　the　consequence　of　the
  usucapion；　and　the　process　of　acquisition　must　have　gone　before　the
  right　of　exclusion。　The　rational　possibility　of　such　a　mode　of
  acquisition　has　now　to　be　proved。
  Any　one　who　does　not　exercise　a　continuous　possessory　activity
  （actus　possessorius）　in　relation　to　a　thing　as　his　is　regarded　with
  good　right　as　one　who　does　not　at　all　exist　as　its　possessor。　For　he
  cannot　complain　of　lesion　so　long　as　he　does　not　qualify　himself
  with　a　title　as　its　possessor。　And　even　if　he　should　afterwards　lay
  claim　to　the　thing　when　another　has　already　taken　possession　of　it；　he
  only　says　he　was　once　on　a　time　owner　of　it；　but　not　that　he　is　so
  still；　or　that　his　possession　has　continued　without　interruption　as
  a　juridical　fact。　It　can；　therefore；　only　be　a　juridical　process　of
  possession；　that　has　been　maintained　without　interruption　and　is
  proveable　by　documentary　fact；　that　any　one　can　secure　for　himself
  what　is　his　own　after　ceasing　for　a　long　time　to　make　use　of　it。
  For；　suppose　that　the　neglect　to　exercise　this　possessory　activity
  had　not　the　effect　of　enabling　another　to　found　upon　his　hitherto
  lawful；　undisputed　and　bona　fide　possession；　and　irrefragable　right　to
  continue　in　its　possession　so　that　he　may　regard　the　thing　that　is
  thus　in　his　possession　as　acquired　by　him。　Then　no　acquisition　would
  ever　become　peremptory　and　secured；　but　all　acquisition　would　only
  be　provisory　and　temporary。　This　is　evident　on　the　ground　that　there
  are　no　historical　records　available　to　carry　the　investigation　of　a
  title　back　to　the　first　possessor　and　his　act　of　acquisition。　The
  presumption　upon　which　acquisition　by　usucapion　is　founded　is；
  therefore；　not　merely　its　conformity　to　right　as　allowed　and　just；　but
  also　the　presumption　of　its　being　right　（praesumtio　juris　et　de　jure）；
  and　its　being　assumed　to　be　in　accordance　with　compulsory　laws
  （suppositio　legalis）。　Anyone　who　has　neglected　to　embody　his
  possessory　act　in　a　documentary　title　has　lost　his　claim　to　the
  right　of　being　possessor　for　the　time；　and　the　length　of　the　period　of
  his　neglecting　to　do　so…　which　need　not　necessarily　be　particularly
  defined…　can　be　referred　to　only　as　establishing　the　certainty　of　this
  neglect。　And　it　would　contradict　the　postulate　of　the　juridically
  practical　reason　to　maintain　that　one　hitherto　unknown　as　a　possessor；
  and　whose　possessory　activity　has　at　least　been　interrupted；　whether
  by　or　without　fault　of　his　own；　could　always　at　any　time　re…acquire
  a　property；　for　this　would　be　to　make　all　ownership　uncertain　（dominia
  rerum　incerta　facere）。
  But　if　he　is　a　member　of　the　commonwealth　or　civil　union；　the
  state　may　maintain　his　possession　for　him　vicariously；　although　it　may
  be　interrupted　as　private　possession；　and　in　that　case　the　actual
  possessor　will　not　be　able　to　prove　a　title　of　acquisition　even　from　a
  first　occupation；　nor　to　found　upon　a　title　of　usucapion。　But；　in
  the　state　of　nature；　usucapion　is　universally　a　rightful　ground　of
  holding；　not　properly　as　a　juridical　mode　of　requiring　a　thing；　but　as
  a　ground　for　maintaining　oneself　in　possession　of　it　where　there　are
  no　juridical　acts。　A　release　from　juridical　claims　is　commonly　also
  called　acquisition。　The　prescriptive　title　of　the　older　possessor；
  therefore；　belongs　to　the　sphere　of　natural　right　（est　juris　naturae）。
  34。　II。　Acquisition　by　Inheritance。
  （Acquisitio　haereditatis）。
  Inheritance　is　constituted　by　the　transfer　（translatio）　of　the
  property　or　goods　of　one　who　is　dying　to　a　survivor；　through　the
  consent　of　the　will　of　both。　The　acquisition　of　the　heir　who　takes　the
  estate　（haeredis　instituti）　and　the　relinquishment　of　the　testator　who
  leaves　it；　being　the　acts　that　constitute　the　exchange　of　the　mine　and
  thine；　take　place　in　the　same　moment　of　time…　in　articulo　mortis…
  and　just　when　the　testator　ceases　to　be。　There　is　therefore　no　special
  act　of　transfer　（translatio）　in　the　empirical　sense；　for　that　would
  involve　two　successive　acts；　by　which　the　one　would　first　divest
  himself　of　his　possession；　and　the　other　would　thereupon　enter　into
  it。　Inheritance　as　constituted　by　a　simultaneous　double　act　is；
  therefore；　an　ideal　mode　of　acquisition。　Inheritance　is
  inconceivable　in　the　state　of　nature　without　a　testamentary
  disposition　（dispositio　ultimae　voluntatis）；　and　the　question　arises
  as　to　whether　this　mode　of　acquisition　is　to　be　regarded　as　a　contract
  of　succession；　or　a　unilateral　act　instituting　an　heir　by　a　will
  （testamentum）。　The　determination　of　this　question　depends　on　the
  further　question；　whether　and　how；　in　the　very　same　moment　in　which
  one　individual　ceases　to　be；　there　can　be　a　transition　of　his　property
  to　another　person。　Hence　the　problem；　as　to　how　a　mode　of
  acquisition　by　inheritance　is　possible；　must　be　investigated
  independently　of　the　various　possible　forms　in　which　it　is　practically
  carried　out；　and　which　can　have　place　only　in　a　commonwealth。
  〃It　is　possible　to　acqu