existence　upon　the　earth。　Now　that　possession　proper　to　all　men　upon
  the　earth；　which　is　prior　to　all　their　particular　juridical　acts；
  constitutes　an　original　possession　in　common　（communio　possessionis
  originaria）。　The　conception　of　such　an　original；　common　possession
  of　things　is　not　derived　from　experience；　nor　is　it　dependent　on
  conditions　of　time；　as　is　the　case　with　the　imaginary　and
  indemonstrable　fiction　of　a　primaeval　community　of　possession　in
  actual　history。　Hence　it　is　a　practical　conception　of　reason；
  involving　in　itself　the　only　principle　according　to　which　men　may
  use　the　place　they　happen　to　occupy　on　the　surface　of　the　earth；　in
  accordance　with　laws　of　right。
  14。　The　Juridical　Act　of　this　Original
  Acquisition　is　Occupancy。
  The　act　of　taking　possession　（apprehensio）；　being　at　its　beginning
  the　physical　appropriation　of　a　corporeal　thing　in　space　（possessionis
  physicae）；　can　accord　with　the　law　of　the　external　freedom　of　all；
  under　no　other　condition　than　that　of　its　priority　in　respect　of　time。
  In　this　relation　it　must　have　the　characteristic　of　a　first　act　in　the
  way　of　taking　possession；　as　a　free　exercise　of　will。　The　activity
  of　will；　however；　as　determining　that　the　thing…　in　this　case　a
  definite　separate　place　on　the　surface　of　the　earth…　shall　be　mine；
  being　an　act　of　appropriation；　cannot　be　otherwise　in　the　case　of
  original　acquisition　than　individual　or　unilateral　（voluntas
  unilateralis　s。　propria）。　Now；　occupancy　is　the　acquisition　of　an
  external　object　by　an　individual　act　of　will。　The　original　acquisition
  of　such　an　object　as　a　limited　portion　of　the　soil　can　therefore
  only　be　accomplished　by　an　act　of　occupation。
  The　possibility　of　this　mode　of　acquisition　cannot　be　intuitively
  apprehended　by　pure　reason　in　any　way；　nor　established　by　its
  principles；　but　is　an　immediate　consequence　from　the　postulate　of
  the　practical　reason。　The　will　as　practical　reason；　however；　cannot
  justify　external　acquisition　otherwise　than　only　in　so　far　as　it　is
  itself　included　in　an　absolutely　authoritative　will；　with　which　it
  is　united　by　implication；　or；　in　other　words；　only　in　so　far　as　it
  is　contained　within　a　union　of　the　wills　of　all　who　come　into
  practical　relation　with　each　other。　For　an　individual；　unilateral
  will…　and　the　same　applies　to　a　dual　or　other　particular　will…
  cannot　impose　on　all　an　obligation　which　is　contingent　in　itself。　This
  requires　an　omnilateral　or　universal　will；　which　is　not　contingent；
  but　a　priori；　and　which　is　therefore　necessarily　united　and
  legislative。　Only　in　accordance　with　such　a　principle　can　there　be
  agreement　of　the　active　free…will　of　each　individual　with　the
  freedom　of　all；　and　consequently　rights　in　general；　or　even　the
  possibility　of　an　external　mine　and　thine。
  15。　It　is　Only　within　a　Civil　Constitution　that　Anything　can
  be　Acquired　Peremptorily；　whereas　in　the　State　of　Nature
  Acquisition　can　only　be　Provisory。
  A　civil　constitution　is　objectively　necessary　as　a　duty；　although
  subjectively　its　reality　is　contingent。　Hence；　there　is　connected　with
  it　a　real　natural　law　of　right；　to　which　all　external　acquisition　is
  subjected。
  The　empirical　title　of　acquisition　has　been　shown　to　be
  constituted　by　the　taking　physical　possession　（apprehensio　physica）　as
  founded　upon　an　original　community　of　right　in　all　to　the　soil。　And
  because　a　possession　in　the　phenomenal　sphere　of　sense　can　only　be
  subordinated　to　that　possession　which　is　in　accordance　with　rational
  conceptions　of　right；　there　must　correspond　to　this　physical　act　of
  possession　a　rational　mode　of　taking　possession　by　elimination　of
  all　the　empirical　conditions　in　space　and　time。　This　rational　form
  of　possession　establishes　the　proposition　that　〃whatever　I　bring　under
  my　power　in　accordance　with　laws　of　external　freedom；　and　will　that　it
  shall　be　mine；　becomes　mine。〃
  The　rational　title　of　acquisition　can　therefore　only　lie
  originally　in　the　idea　of　the　will　of　all　united　implicitly；　or
  necessarily　to　be　united；　which　is　here　tacitly　assumed　as　an
  indispensable　condition　（conditio　sine　qua　non）。　For　by　a　single
  will　there　cannot　be　imposed　upon　others　an　obligation　by　which　they
  would　not　have　been　otherwise　bound。　But　the　fact　formed　by　wills
  actually　and　universally　united　in　a　legislation　constitutes　the　civil
  state　of　society。　Hence；　it　is　only　in　conformity　with　the　idea　of　a
  civil　state　of　society；　or　in　reference　to　it　and　its　realization；
  that　anything　external　can　be　acquired。　Before　such　a　state　is
  realized；　and　in　anticipation　of　it；　acquisition；　which　would
  otherwise　be　derived；　is　consequently　only　provisory。　The
  acquisition　which　is　peremptory　finds　place　only　in　the　civil　state。
  Nevertheless；　such　provisory　acquisition　is　real　acquisition。　For；
  according　to　the　postulate　of　the　juridically　practical　reason；　the
  possibility　of　acquisition　in　whatever　state　men　may　happen　to　be
  living　beside　one　another；　and　therefore　in　the　state　of　nature　as
  well；　is　a　principle　of　private　right。　And　in　accordance　with　this
  principle；　every　one　is　justified　or　entitled　to　exercise　that
  compulsion　by　which　it　alone　becomes　possible　to　pass　out　of　the　state
  of　nature　and　to　enter　into　that　state　of　civil　society　which　alone
  can　make　all　acquisition　peremptory。
  It　is　a　question　as　to　how　far　the　right　of　taking　possession　of　the
  soil　extends。　The　answer　is；　So　far　as　the　capability　of　having　it
  under　one's　power　extends；　that　is；　just　as　far　as　he　who　wills　to
  appropriate　it　can　defend　it；　as　if　the　soil　were　to　say：　〃If　you
  cannot　protect　me；　neither　can　you　command　me。〃　In　this　way　the
  controversy　about　what　constitutes　a　free　or　closed　sea　must　be
  decided。　Thus；　within　the　range　of　a　cannon…shot　no　one　has　a　right　to
  intrude　on　the　coast　of　a　country　that　already　belongs　to　a　certain
  state；　in　order　to　fish　or　gather　amber　on　the　shore；　or　such　like。
  Further；　the　question　is　put；　〃Is　cultivation　of　the　soil；　by
  building；　agriculture；　drainage；　etc。；　necessary　in　order　to　its
  acquisition？〃　No。　For；　as　these　processes　as　forms　of　specification
  are　only　accidents；　they　do　not　constitute　objects　of　immediate
  possession　and　can　only　belong　to　the　subject　in　so　far　as　the
  substance　of　them　has　been　already　recognized　as　his。　When　it　is　a
  question　of　the　first　acquisition　of　a　thing；　the　cultivation　or
  modification　of　it　by　labour　forms　nothing　more　than　an　external
  sign　of　the　fact　that　it　has　been　taken　into　possession；　and　this
  can　be　indicated　by　many　other　signs　that　cost　less　trouble。　Again：
  〃May　any　one　be　hindered　in　the　act　of　taking　possession；　so　that
  neither　one　nor　other　of　two　competitors　shall　acquire　the　right　of
  priority；　and　the　soil　in　consequence　may　remain　for　all　time　free
  as　belonging　to　no　one？〃　Not　at　all。　Such　a　hindrance　cannot　be
  allowed　to　take　place；　because　the　second　of　the　two；　in　order　to　be
  enabled　to　do　this；　would　himself　have　to　be　upon　some　neighbouring
  soil；　where　he　also；　in　this　manner；　could　be　hindered　from　being；　and
  such　absolute　hindering　would　involve　a　contradiction。　It　would；
  however；　be　quite　consistent　with　the　right　of　occupation；　in　the　case
  of　a　certain　intervening　piece　of　the　soil；　to　let　it　lie　unused　as
  a　neutral　ground　for　the　separation　of　two　neighbouring　states；　but
  under　such　a　condition；　that　ground　would　actually　belong　to　them　both
  in　common；　and　would　not　be　without　an　owner　（res　nullius）；　just
  because　it　would　be　used　by　both　in　order　to　form　a　separation　between
  them。　Again：　〃May　one　have　a　thing　as　his；　on　a　soil　of　which　no　one
  has　appropriated　any　part　as　his　own？〃　Yes。　In　Mongolia；　for
  example；　any　one　may　let　lie　whatever　baggage　he　has；　or　bring　back
  the　horse　that　has　run　away　from　him　into　his　possession　as　his　own；
  because　the　whole　soil　belongs　to　the　people　generally；　and　the　use　of
  it　accordingly　belongs　to　every　individual。　But　that　any　one　can
  have　a　moveable　thing　on　the　soil　of　another　as　his　own　is　only
  possible　by　contract。　Finally；　there　is　the　question：　〃May　one　of
  two　neighbouring　nations　or　tribes　resist　another　when　attempting　to
  impose　upon　them　a　certain　mode　of　using　a　particular　soil；　as；　for
  instance；　a　tribe　of　hunters　making　such　an　attempt　in　relation　to　a
  pastoral　people；　or　the　latter　to　agriculturists　and　such　like？〃
  Certainly。　For　the　mode　in　which　such　peoples　or　tribes　may　settle
  themselves　upon　the　surface　of　the　earth；　provided　they　keep　within
  their　own　boundaries；　is　a　matter　of　mere　pleasure　and　choice　on　their
  own　part　（res　merae　facultatis）。
  As　a　further　question；　it　may　be　asked　whether；　when　neither
  nature　nor　chance；　but　merely　our　own　will；　brings　us　into　the
  neighbourhood　of　a　people　that　gives　no　promise　of　a　prospect　of
  entering　into　civil　union　with　us；　we　are　to　be　considered　entitled　in
  any　case　to　proceed　with　force　in　the　inten