juridical　act　on　my　part。　But　the　assumption　of　this　act　at　the　same
  time　involves　the　admission　that　I　am　obliged　reciprocally　to
  observe　a　similar　abstention　towards　every　other　in　respect　of　what　is
  externally　theirs；　for　the　obligation　in　question　arises　from　a
  universal　rule　regulating　the　external　juridical　relations。　Hence　I　am
  not　obliged　to　let　alone　what　another　person　declares　to　be　externally
  his；　unless　every　other　person　likewise　secures　me　by　a　guarantee　that
  he　will　act　in　relation　to　what　is　mine；　upon　the　same　principle。　This
  guarantee　of　reciprocal　and　mutual　abstention　from　what　belongs　to
  others　does　not　require　a　special　juridical　act　for　its　establishment；
  but　is　already　involved　in　the　conception　of　an　external　obligation　of
  right；　on　account　of　the　universality　and　consequently　the　reciprocity
  of　the　obligatoriness　arising　from　a　universal　Rule。　Now　a　single
  will；　in　relation　to　an　external　and　consequently　contingent
  possession；　cannot　serve　as　a　compulsory　law　for　all；　because　that
  would　be　to　do　violence　to　the　freedom　which　is　in　accordance　with
  universal　laws。　Therefore　it　is　only　a　will　that　binds　every　one；
  and　as　such　a　common；　collective；　and　authoritative　will；　that　can
  furnish　a　guarantee　of　security　to　all。　But　the　state　of　men　under　a
  universal；　external；　and　public　legislation；　conjoined　with
  authority　and　power；　is　called　the　civil　state。　There　can　therefore　be
  an　external　mine　and　thine　only　in　the　civil　state　of　society。
  Consequence。…　It　follows；　as　a　corollary；　that；　if　it　is　juridically
  possible　to　have　an　external　object　as　one's　own；　the　individual
  subject　of　possession　must　be　allowed　to　compel　or　constrain　every
  person　with　whom　a　dispute　as　to　the　mine　or　thine　of　such　a
  possession　may　arise；　to　enter　along　with　himself　into　the　relations
  of　a　civil　constitution。
  9。　There　May；　However；　Be　an　External　Mine　and　Thine　Found　as
  a　Fact　in　the　State　of　Nature；　but　it　is　only　Provisory。
  Natural　right　in　the　state　of　a　civil　constitution　means　the　forms
  of　right　which　may　be　deduced　from　principles　a　priori　as　the
  conditions　of　such　a　constitution。　It　is　therefore　not　to　be　infringed
  by　the　statutory　laws　of　such　a　constitution；　and　accordingly　the
  juridical　principle　remains　in　force；　that；　〃Whoever　proceeds　upon　a
  maxim　by　which　it　becomes　impossible　for　me　to　have　an　object　of　the
  exercise　of　my　will　as　mine；　does　me　a　lesion　or　injury。〃　For　a
  civil　constitution　is　only　the　juridical　condition　under　which　every
  one　has　what　is　his　own　merely　secured　to　him；　as　distinguished　from
  its　being　specially　assigned　and　determined　to　him。　All　guarantee；
  therefore；　assumes　that　everyone　to　whom　a　thing　is　secured　is　already
  in　possession　of　it　as　his　own。　Hence；　prior　to　the　civil
  constitution…　or　apart　from　it…　an　external　mine　and　thine　must　be
  assumed　as　possible；　and　along　with　it　a　right　to　compel　everyone　with
  whom　we　could　come　into　any　kind　of　intercourse　to　enter　with　us
  into　a　constitution　in　which　what　is　mine　or　thine　can　be　secured。
  There　may　thus　be　a　possession　in　expectation　or　in　preparation　for
  such　a　state　of　security；　as　can　only　be　established　on　the　law　of　the
  common　will；　and　as　it　is　therefore　in　accordance　with　the　possibility
  of　such　a　state；　it　constitutes　a　provisory　or　temporary　juridical
  possession；　whereas　that　possession　which　is　found　in　reality　in　the
  civil　state　of　society　will　be　a　peremptory　or　guaranteed
  possession。　Prior　to　entering　into　this　state；　for　which　he　is
  naturally　prepared；　the　individual　rightfully　resists　those　who　will
  not　adapt　themselves　to　it；　and　who　would　disturb　him　in　his　provisory
  possession；　because；　if　the　will　of　all　except　himself　were　imposing
  upon　him　an　obligation　to　withdraw　from　a　certain　possession；　it　would
  still　be　only　a　one…sided　or　unilateral　will；　and　consequently　it
  would　have　just　as　little　legal　title…　which　can　be　properly　based
  only　on　the　universalized　will…　to　contest　a　claim　of　right　as　he
  would　have　to　assert　it。　Yet　be　has　the　advantage　on　his　side；　of
  being　in　accord　with　the　conditions　requisite　to　the　introduction
  and　institution　of　a　civil　form　of　society。　In　a　word；　the　mode　in
  which　anything　external　may　be　held　as　one's　own　in　the　state　of
  nature；　is　just　physical　possession　with　a　presumption　of　right　thus
  far　in　its　favour；　that　by　union　of　the　wills　of　all　in　a　public
  legislation　it　will　be　made　juridical；　and　in　this　expectation　it
  holds　comparatively；　as　a　kind　of　potential　juridical　possession。
  This　prerogative　of　right；　as　arising　from　the　fact　of　empirical
  possession；　is　in　accordance　with　the　formula：　〃It　is　well　for　those
  who　are　in　possession〃　（Beati　possidentes）。　It　does　not　consist　in　the
  fact　that；　because　the　possessor　has　the　presumption　of　being　a
  rightful　man；　it　is　unnecessary　for　him　to　bring　forward　proof　that　he
  possesses　a　certain　thing　rightfully；　for　this　position　applies　only
  to　a　case　of　disputed　right。　But　it　is　because　it　accords　with　the
  postulate　of　the　practical　reason；　that　everyone　is　invested　with
  the　faculty　of　having　as　his　own　any　external　object　upon　which　he　has
  exerted　his　will；　and；　consequently；　all　actual　possession　is　a
  state　whose　rightfulness　is　established　upon　that　postulate　by　an
  anterior　act　of　will。　And　such　an　act；　if　there　be　no　prior　possession
  of　the　same　object　by　another　opposed　to　it；　does；　therefore；
  provisionally　justify　and　entitle　me；　according　to　the　law　of　external
  freedom；　to　restrain　anyone　who　refuses　to　enter　with　me　into　a
  state　of　public　legal　freedom　from　all　pretension　to　the　use　of　such
  an　object。　For　such　a　procedure　is　requisite；　in　conformity　with　the
  postulate　of　reason；　in　order　to　subject　to　my　proper　use　a　thing
  which　would　otherwise　be　practically　annihilated；　as　regards　all
  proper　use　of　it。
  CH2
  FIRST　PART。　PRIVATE　RIGHT。
  The　System　of　those　Laws　Which　Require　No　External　Promulgation。
  CHAPTER　II。　The　Mode　of　Acquiring　Anything　External。
  10。　The　General　Principle　of　External　Acquisition。
  I　acquire　a　thing　when　I　act　（efficio）　so　that　it　becomes　mine。　An
  external　thing　is　originally　mine　when　it　is　mine　even　without　the
  intervention　of　a　juridical　act。　An　acquisition　is　original　and
  primary　when　it　is　not　derived　from　what　another　had　already　made
  his　own。
  There　is　nothing　external　that　is　as　such　originally　mine；　but
  anything　external　may　be　originally　acquired　when　it　is　an　object　that
  no　other　person　has　yet　made　his。　A　state　in　which　the　mine　and
  thine　are　in　common　cannot　be　conceived　as　having　been　at　any　time
  original。　Such　a　state　of　things　would　have　to　be　acquired　by　an
  external　juridical　act；　although　there　may　be　an　original　and　common
  possession　of　an　external　object。　Even　if　we　think　hypothetically　of　a
  state　in　which　the　mine　and　thine　would　be　originally　in　common　as　a
  communio　mei　et　tui　originaria；　it　would　still　have　to　be
  distinguished　from　a　primeval　communion　（communio　primaeva）　with
  things　in　common；　sometimes　supposed　to　be　founded　in　the　first　period
  of　the　relations　of　right　among　men；　and　which　could　not　be　regarded
  as　based　upon　principles　like　the　former；　but　only　upon　history。
  Even　under　that　condition　the　historic　communio；　as　a　supposed
  primeval　community；　would　always　have　to　be　viewed　as　acquired　and
  derivative　（communio　derivativa）。
  The　principle　of　external　acquisition；　then；　may　be　expressed
  thus：　〃Whatever　I　bring　under　my　power　according　to　the　law　of
  external　freedom；　of　which　as　an　object　of　my　free　activity　of　will
  I　have　the　capability　of　making　use　according　to　the　postulate　of
  the　practical　reason；　and　which　I　will　to　become　mine　in　conformity
  with　the　idea　of　a　possible　united　common　will；　is　mine。〃
  The　practical　elements　（momenta　attendenda）　constitutive　of　the
  process　of　original　acquisition　are：
  1。　Prehension　or　seizure　of　an　object　which　belongs　to　no　one；
  for；　if　it　belonged　already　to　some　one；　the　act　would　conflict　with
  the　freedom　of　others；　that　is；　according　to　universal　laws。　This　is
  the　taking　possession　of　an　object　of　my　free　activity　of　will　in
  space　and　time；　the　possession；　therefore；　into　which　I　thus　put
  myself　is　sensible　or　physical　possession　（possessio　phenomenon）；
  2。　Declaration　of　the　possession　of　this　object　by　formal
  designation　and　the　act　of　my　freewill　in　interdicting　every　other
  person　from　using　it　as　his；
  3。　Appropriation；　as　the　act；　in　idea；　of　an　externally
  legislative　common　will；　by　which　all　and　each　are　obliged　to
  respect　and　act　in　conformity　with　my　act　of　will。
  The　validity　of　the　last　element　in　the　process　of　acquisition；　as
  that　on　which　the　conclusion　that　〃the　external　object　is　mine〃　rests；
  is　what　makes　the　possession　valid　as　a　purely　rational　and
  juridical　possession　（possessio　noumenon）。　It　is　founded　upon　the　fact
  that；　as　all　these　acts　are　jur