〃equity〃　and　〃the　right　of　necessity；〃　the　equivocations　involved
  arise　from　an　interchange　of　the　objective　and　subjective　grounds　that
  enter　into　the　application　of　the　principles　of　right；　when　viewed
  respectively　by　reason　or　by　a　judicial　tribunal。　What　one　may　have
  good　grounds　for　recognising　as　right；　in　itself；　may　not　find
  confirmation　in　a　court　of　justice；　and　what　he　must　consider　to　be
  wrong；　in　itself；　may　obtain　recognition　in　such　a　court。　And　the
  reason　of　this　is　that　the　conception　of　right　is　not　taken　in　the　two
  cases　in　one　and　the　same　sense。
  DIVISION
  DIVISION　OF　THE　SCIENCE　OF　RIGHT。
  A。　General　Division　of　the　Duties　of　Right。
  （Juridical　Duties）。
  In　this　division　we　may　very　conveniently　follow　Ulpian；　if　his
  three　formulae　are　taken　in　a　general　sense；　which　may　not　have　been
  quite　clearly　in　his　mind；　but　which　they　are　capable　of　being
  developed　into　or　of　receiving。　They　are　the　following：
  1。　Honeste　vive。　〃Live　rightly。〃　juridical　rectitude；　or　honour
  （honestas　juridica）；　consists　in　maintaining　one's　own　worth　as　a
  man　in　relation　to　others。　This　duty　may　be　rendered　by　the
  proposition：　〃Do　not　make　thyself　a　mere　means　for　the　use　of
  others；　but　be　to　them　likewise　an　end。〃　This　duty　will　be　explained
  in　the　next　formula　as　an　obligation　arising　out　of　the　right　of
  humanity　in　our　own　person　（lex　justi）。
  2。　Neminem　laede。　〃Do　wrong　to　no　one。〃　This　formula　may　be　rendered
  so　as　to　mean：　〃Do　no　wrong　to　any　one；　even　if　thou　shouldst　be　under
  the　necessity；　in　observing　this　duty；　to　cease　from　all　connection
  with　others　and　to　avoid　all　society〃　（lex　juridica）。
  3。　Suum　cuique　tribue。　〃Assign　to　every　one　what　is　his　own。〃　This
  may　be　rendered；　〃Enter；　if　wrong　cannot　be　avoided；　into　a　society
  with　others　in　which　every　one　may　have　secured　to　him　what　is　his
  own。〃　If　this　formula　were　to　be　simply　translated；　〃Give　every　one
  his　own；〃　it　would　express　an　absurdity；　for　we　cannot　give　any　one
  what　he　already　has。　If　it　is　to　have　a　definite　meaning；　it　must
  therefore　run　thus：　〃Enter　into　a　state　in　which　every　one　can　have
  what　is　his　own　secured　against　the　action　of　every　other〃　（lex
  justitiae）。
  These　three　classical　formulae；　at　the　same　time；　represent
  principles　which　suggest　a　division　of　the　system　of　juridical
  duties　into　internal　duties；　external　duties；　and　those　connecting
  duties　which　contain　the　latter　as　deduced　from　the　principle　of　the
  former　by　subsumption。
  B。　Universal　Division　of　Rights。
  I。　Natural　Right　and　Positive　Right。　The　system　of　rights；　viewed　as
  a　scientific　system　of　doctrines；　is　divided　into　natural　right　and
  positive　right。　Natural　right　rests　upon　pure　rational　principles　a
  priori；　positive　or　statutory　right　is　what　proceeds　from　the　will
  of　a　legislator。
  II。　Innate　Right　and　Acquired　Right。　The　system　of　rights　may
  again　be　regarded　in　reference　to　the　implied　powers　of　dealing
  morally　with　others　as　bound　by　obligations；　that　is；　as　furnishing
  a　legal　title　of　action　in　relation　to　them。　Thus　viewed；　the　system
  is　divided　into　innate　right　and　acquired　right。　Innate　right　is
  that　right　which　belongs　to　every　one　by　nature；　independent　of　all
  juridical　acts　of　experience。　Acquired　right　is　that　right　which　is
  founded　upon　such　juridical　acts。
  Innate　right　may　also　be　called　the　〃internal　mine　and　thine〃
  （meum　vel　tuum　internum）　for　external　right　must　always　be　acquired。
  There　is　only　one　Innate　Right；　the　Birthright　of　Freedom。
  Freedom　is　independence　of　the　compulsory　will　of　another；　and　in　so
  far　as　it　can　coexist　with　the　freedom　of　all　according　to　a　universal
  law；　it　is　the　one　sole　original；　inborn　right　belonging　to　every
  man　in　virtue　of　his　humanity。　There　is；　indeed；　an　innate　equality
  belonging　to　every　man　which　consists　in　his　right　to　be　independent
  of　being　bound　by　others　to　anything　more　than　that　to　which　he　may
  also　reciprocally　bind　them。　It　is；　consequently；　the　inborn　quality
  of　every　man　in　virtue　of　which　he　ought　to　be　his　own　master　by　right
  （sui　juris）。　There　is；　also；　the　natural　quality　of　justness
  attributable　to　a　man　as　naturally　of　unimpeachable　right　（justi）；
  because　be　has　done　no　wrong　to　any　one　prior　to　his　own　juridical
  actions。　And；　further；　there　is　also　the　innate　right　of　common　action
  on　the　part　of　every　man；　so　that　he　may　do　towards　others　what　does
  not　infringe　their　rights　or　take　away　anything　that　is　theirs
  unless　they　are　willing　to　appropriate　it；　such　merely　to
  communicate　thought；　to　narrate　anything；　or　to　promise　something
  whether　truly　and　honestly；　or　untruly　and　dishonestly　（veriloquim　aut
  falsiloquim）；　for　it　rests　entirely　upon　these　others　whether　they
  will　believe　or　trust　in　it　or　not。*　　But　all　these　rights　or　titles
  are　already　included　in　the　principle　of　innate　freedom；　and　are　not
  really　distinguished　from　it；　even　as　dividing　members　under　a
  higher　species　of　right。
  *It　is　customary　to　designate　every　untruth　that　is　spoken
  intentionally　as　such；　although　it　may　be　in　a　frivolous　manner　a　lie；
  or　falsehood　（mendacium）；　because　it　may　do　harm；　at　least　in　so　far
  as　any　one　who　repeats　it　in　good　faith　may　be　made　a　laughing…stock
  of　to　others　on　account　of　his　easy　credulity。　But　in　the　juridical
  sense；　only　that　untruth　is　called　a　lie　which　immediately　infringes
  the　right　of　another；　such　as　a　false　allegation　of　a　contract
  having　been　concluded；　when　the　allegation　is　put　forward　in　order
  to　deprive　some　one　of　what　is　his　（falsiloquim　dolosum）。　This
  distinction　of　conceptions　so　closely　allied　is　not　without
  foundation；　because　on　the　occasion　of　a　simple　statement　of　one's
  thoughts；　it　is　always　free　for　another　to　take　them　as　he　may；　and
  yet　the　resulting　repute；　that　such　a　one　is　a　man　whose　word　cannot
  be　trusted；　comes　so　close　to　the　opprobrium　of　directly　calling　him　a
  liar；　that　the　boundary…line　separating　what；　in　such　a　case；
  belongs　to　jurisprudence；　and　what　is　special　to　ethics；　can　hardly　be
  otherwise　drawn。
  The　reason　why　such　a　division　into　separate　rights　has　been
  introduced　into　the　system　of　natural　right；　viewed　as　including　all
  that　is　innate；　was　not　without　a　purpose。　Its　object　was　to　enable
  proof　to　be　more　readily　put　forward　in　case　of　any　controversy
  arising　about　an　acquired　right；　and　questions　emerging　either　with
  reference　to　a　fact　that　might　be　in　doubt；　or；　if　that　were
  established；　in　reference　to　a　right　under　dispute。　For　the　party
  repudiating　an　obligation；　and　on　whom　the　burden　of　proof　（onus
  probandi）　might　be　incumbent；　could　thus　methodically　refer　to　his
  innate　right　of　freedom　as　specified　under　various　relations　in
  detail；　and　could　therefore　found　upon　them　equally　as　different
  titles　of　right。
  In　the　relation　of　innate　right；　and　consequently　of　the　internal
  mine　and　thine；　there　is　therefore　not　rights；　but　only　one　right。
  And；　accordingly；　this　highest　division　of　rights　into　innate　and
  acquired；　which　evidently　consists　of　two　members　extremely　unequal　in
  their　contents　is　properly　placed　in　the　introduction；　and　the
  subdivisions　of　the　science　of　right　may　be　referred　in　detail　to
  the　external　mine　and　thine。
  C。　Methodical　Division　of　the　Science　of　Right。
  The　highest　division　of　the　system　of　natural　right　should　not　be…
  as　it　is　frequently　put…　into　〃natural　right〃　and　〃social　right；〃
  but　into　natural　right　and　civil　right。　The　first　constitutes
  private　right；　the　second；　public　right。　For　it　is　not　the　〃social
  state〃　but　the　〃civil　state〃　that　is　opposed　to　the　〃state　of　nature〃；
  for　in　the　〃state　of　nature〃　there　may　well　be　society　of　some　kind；
  but　there　is　no　〃civil〃　society；　as　an　institution　securing　the　mine
  and　thine　by　public　laws。　It　is　thus　that　right；　viewed　under
  reference　to　the　state　of　nature；　is　specially　called　private　right。
  The　whole　of　the　principles　of　right　will　therefore　fall　to　be
  expounded　under　the　two　subdivisions　of　private　right　and　public
  right。
  CH1
  FIRST　PART。　PRIVATE　RIGHT。
  The　System　of　those　Laws　Which　Require　No　External　Promulgation。
  CHAPTER　I。　Of　the　Mode　of　Having　Anything　External　as　One's　Own。
  1。　The　Meaning　of　〃Mine〃　in　Right
  （Meum　Juris）。
  Anything　is　〃Mine〃　by　right；　or　is　rightfully　mine；　when　I　am　so
  connected　with　it；　that　if　any　other　person　should　make　use　of　it
  without　my　consent；　he　would　do　me　a　lesion　or　injury。　The
  subjective　condition　of　the　use　of　anything　is　possession　of　it。
  An　external　thing；　however　as　such　could　only　be　mine；　if　I　may
  assume　it　to　be　possible　that　I　can　be　wronged　by　the　use　which
  another　might　make　of　it　when　it　is　not　actually　in　my　possession。
  Hence　it　would　be　a　contradiction　to　have　anything　external　as　one's
  own；　we