modifications　or　images　of　things　may　be　referred　to　the
  idea　of　God。
  Proof。…　There　is　no　modification　of　the　body；　whereof　the　mind　may　not　form
  some　clear　and　distinct　conception　（V：iv。）；　wherefore　it　can　bring　it　about；
  that　they　should　all　be　referred　to　the　idea　of　God　（I：xv。）。　Q。E。D。
  Prop。　XV。　He　who　clearly　and　distinctly　understands　himself
  and　his　emotions　loves　God；　and　so　much　the　more　in　proportion
  as　he　more　understands　himself　and　his　emotions。
  Proof。…　He　who　clearly　and　distinctly　understands　himself　and　his　emotions
  feels　pleasure　（III：liii。）；　and　this　pleasure　is　（by　the　last　Prop。）
  accompanied　by　the　idea　of　God；　therefore　（Def。　of　the　Emotions：vi。）　such　an
  one　loves　God；　and　（for　the　same　reason）　so　much　the　more　in　proportion　as
  he　more　understands　himself　and　his　emotions。　Q。E。D。
  Prop。　XVI。　This　love　towards　God　must
  hold　the　chief　place　in　the　mind。
  Proof。…　For　this　love　is　associated　with　all　the　modifications　of　the　body
  （V：xiv。）　and　is　fostered　by　them　all　（V：v。）；　therefore　（V：xi。）；　it　must　hold
  the　chief　place　in　the　mind。　Q。E。D。
  Prop。　XVII。　God　is　without　passions；
  neither　is　he　affected　by
  any　emotion　of　pleasure　or　pain。
  Proof。…　All　ideas；　in　so　far　as　they　are　referred　to　God；　are　true
  （II：xxxii。）；　that　is　（II：Def。iv。）　adequate；　and　therefore　（by　the　general
  Def。　of　the　Emotions）　God　is　without　passions。　Again；　God　cannot　pass　either
  to　a　greater　or　to　a　lesser　perfection　（I：xx。Coroll。ii。）；　therefore
  （by　Def。　of　the　Emotions：ii。；　&iii。）　he　is　not　affected　by　any　emotion　of
  pleasure　or　pain。
  Corollary。　Strictly　speaking；　God　does　not　love　or　hate　anyone。　For　God　（by
  the　foregoing　Prop。）　is　not　affected　by　any　emotion　of　pleasure　or　pain；
  consequently　（Def。　of　the　Emotions：vi。；　&vii。）　he　does　not　love　or　hate
  anyone。
  Prop。XVIII。　No　one　can　hate　God。
  Proof。…　The　idea　of　God　which　is　in　us　is　adequate　and　perfect　（II：xlvi。；
  II：xlvii。）；　wherefore；　in　so　far　as　we　contemplate　God；　we　are　active
  （III：iii。）　；　consequently　（III：lix。）　there　can　be　no　pain　accompanied　by　the
  idea　of　God；　in　other　words　（Def。　of　the　Emotions：vii。）；　no　one　can　hate
  God。　Q。E。D。
  Corollary。…　Love　towards　God　cannot　be　turned　into　hate。
  Note。…　It　may　be　objected　that；　as　we　understand　God　as　the　cause　of　all
  things；　we　by　that　very　fact　regard　God　as　the　cause　of　pain。　But　I　make
  answer；　that；　in　so　far　as　we　understand　the　causes　of　pain；　it　to　that
  extent　（V：iii。）　ceases　to　be　a　passion；　that　is；　it　ceases　to　be　pain
  （III：lix。）；　therefore；　in　so　far　as　we　understand　God　to　be　the　cause　of
  pain；　we　to　that　extent　feel　pleasure。
  Prop。　XIX。　He；　who　loves　God；
  cannot　endeavour　that　God
  should　love　him　in　return。
  Proof。…　For；　if　a　man　should　so　endeavour；　he　would　desire　（V：xvii。Coroll。）
  that　God；　whom　he　loves；　should　not　be　God；　and　consequently　he　would　desire
  to　feel　pain　（III：xix。）；　which　is　absurd　（III：xxviii。）。　Therefore；　he　who
  loves　God；　&c。　Q。E。D。
  Prop。　XX。　This　love　towards　God　cannot　be　stained　by　the
  emotion　of　envy　or　jealousy：　contrariwise；　it　is　the　more　fostered；
  in　proportion　as　we　conceive　a　greater　number　of　men　to　be
  joined　to　God　by　the　same　bond　of　love。
  Proof。…　This　love　towards　God　is　the　highest　good　which　we　can　seek　for
  under　the　guidance　of　reason　（IV：xxviii。）；　it　is　common　to　all　men
  （IV：xxxvi）；and　we　desire　that　all　should　rejoice　therein　（IV：xxxvii。）；
  therefore　（Def。　of　the　Emotions：xxiii）；　it　cannot　be　stained　by　the
  emotion　envy　nor　by；　the　emotion　of　jealousy；　（V：xviii。　see　definition　of
  Jealousy；　（III：xxxv。　Note）；　but；　contrariwise；　it　must　needs　be　the　more
  fostered；　in　proportion　as　we　conceive　a　greater　number　of　men　to　rejoice
  therein。　Q。E。D。
  Note。…　We　can　in　the　same　way；　show；　that　there　is　no　emotion　directly
  contrary　to　this　love；　whereby　this　love　can　be　destroyed；　therefore　we　may
  conclude；　that　this　love　towards　God　is　the　most　constant　of　all　the
  emotions；　and　that；　in　so　far　as　it　is　referred　to　the　body；　it　cannot　be
  destroyed；　unless　the　body　be　destroyed　also。　As　to　its　nature；　in　so　far　as
  it　is　referred　to　the　mind　only；　we　shall　presently　inquire。
  I　have　now　gone　through　all　the　remedies　against　the　emotions；　or　all
  that　the　mind；　considered　in　itself　alone；　can　do　against　them。　Whence　it
  appears　that　the　mind's　power　over　the　emotions　consists：…
  I。　In　the　actual　knowledge　of　the　emotions　（V：iv。Note）。
  II。　In　the　fact　that　it　separates　the　emotions　from　the　thought　of　an
  external　cause；　which　we　conceive　confusedly　（V：ii。　and　V：iv。Note）。
  III。　In　the　fact；　that；　in　respect　to　time；　the　emotions　referred　to
  things；　which　we　distinctly　understand；　surpass　those　referred　to　what　we
  conceive　in　a　confused　and　fragmentary　manner　（V：vii。）。
  IV。　In　the　number　of　causes　whereby　those　modifications　（Affectiones。
  Camerer　reads　affectus　…　emotions）；　are　fostered；　which　have　regard　to　the
  common　properties　of　things　or　to　God　（V：ix。；　V：xi。）。
  V。　Lastly；　in　the　order　wherein　the　mind　can　arrange　and　associate；　one
  with　another；　its　own　emotions　（V：x。Note　and　V：xii。；　V：xiii。；　V：xiv。）。
  But；　in　order　that　this　power　of　the　mind　over　the　emotions　may　be　better
  understood；　it　should　be　specially　observed　that　the　emotions　are　called　by
  us　strong；　when　we　compare　the　emotion　of　one　man　with　the　emotion　of
  another；　and　see　that　one　man　is　more　troubled　than　another　by　the　same
  emotion；　or　when　we　are　comparing　the　various　emotions　of　the　same　man　one
  with　another；　and　find　that　he　is　more　affected　or　stirred　by　one　emotion
  than　by　another。　For　the　strength　of　every　emotion　is　defined　by　a
  comparison　of　our　own　power　with　the　power　of　an　external　cause。　Now　the
  power　of　the　mind　is　defined　by　knowledge　only；　and　its　infirmity　or　passion
  is　defined　by　the　privation　of　knowledge　only：　it　therefore　follows；　that
  that　mind　is　most　passive；　whose　greatest　part　is　made　up　of　inadequate
  ideas；　so　that　it　may　be　characterized　more　readily　by　its　passive　states
  than　by　its　activities：　on　the　other　hand；　that　mind　is　most　active；　whose
  greatest　part　is　made　up　of　adequate　ideas；　so　that；　although　it　may　contain
  as　many　inadequate　ideas　as　the　former　mind；　it　may　yet　be　more　easily
  characterized　by　ideas　attributable　to　human　virtue；　than　by　ideas　which
  tell　of　human　infirmity。　Again；　it　must　be　observed；　that　spiritual
  unhealthiness；　and　misfortunes　can　generally　be　traced　to　excessive　love　for
  something　which　is　subject　to　many　variations；　and　which　we　can　never　become
  masters　of。　For　no　one　is　solicitous　or　anxious　about　anything；　unless　he
  loves　it；　neither　do　wrongs；　suspicions；　enmities；　&c。　arise；　except　in
  regard　to　things　whereof　no　one　can　be　really　master。
  We　may　thus　readily　conceive　the　power　which　clear　and　distinct　knowledge；
  and　especially　that　third　kind　of　knowledge　（II：xlvii。Note）；　founded　on　the
  actual　knowledge　of　God；　possesses　over　the　emotions：　if　it　does　not
  absolutely　destroy　them；　in　so　far　as　they　are　passions　（V：iii。　and
  V：iv。Note）；　at　any　rate；　it　causes　them　to　occupy　a　very　small　part　of　the
  mind　（V：xiv。）。　Further；　it　begets　a　love　towards　a　thing　immutable　and
  eternal　（V：xv。）；　whereof　we　may　really　enter　into　possession　（II：xlv。）；
  neither　can　it　be　defiled　with　those　faults　which　are　inherent　in　ordinary
  love；　but　it　may　grow　from　strength　to　strength；　and　may　engross　the　greater
  part　of　the　mind；　and　deeply　penetrate　it。　And　now　I　have　finished　with　all
  that　concerns　this　present　life：　for；　as　I　said　in　the　beginning　of　this
  note；　I　have　briefly　described　all　the　remedies　against　the　emotions。　And
  this　everyone　may　readily　have　seen　for　himself；　if　he　has　attended　to
  what　is　advanced　in　the　present　note；　and　also　to　the　definitions　of　the
  mind　and　its　emotions；　and；　lastly；　to　Propositions　III：i。　and　III：iii。　It
  is　now；　therefore；　time　to　pass　on　to　those　matters；　which　appertain　to　the
  duration　of　the　mind；　without　relation　to　the　body。
  Prop。　XXI。　The　mind　can　only　imagine　anything；
  or　remember　what　is　past；　while　the　body　endures。
  Proof。…　The　mind　does　not　express　the　actual　existence　of　its　body；　nor　does
  it　imagine　the　modifications　of　the　body　as　actual；　except　while　the　body
  endures　（II：viii。Coroll。）；　and；　consequently　（II：xxvi。）；　it　does　not　imagine
  any　body　as　actually　existing；　except　while　its　own　body　endures。　Thus　it
  cannot　imagine　anything　（for　definition　of　Imagination；　see　II：xvii。Note）；
  or　remember　things　past；　except　while　the　body　endures　（see　definition　of
  Memory；　II：xviii。Note）。　Q。E。D。
  Prop。　XXII。　Neverthele