associated　in　the　body。
  Proof。…　The　order　and　connection　of　ideas　is　the　same　（II：vii。）　as　the　order
  and　connection　of　things；　and　vice　versa　the　order　and　connection　of　things
  is　the　same　（II：vi。Coroll。　and　II：vii。）　as　the　order　and　connection　of
  ideas。　Wherefore；　even　as　the　order　and　connection　of　ideas　in　the　mind
  takes　place　according　to　the　order　and　association　of　modifications　of　the
  body　（II：xviii。）；　so　vice　versa　（III：ii。）　the　order　and　connection　of
  modifications　of　the　body　takes　place　in　accordance　with　the　manner；　in
  which　thoughts　and　the　ideas　of　things　are　arranged　and　associated　in　the
  mind。　Q。E。D。
  PROP。II。　If　we　remove　a　disturbance　of　the　spirit；　or　emotion；
  from　the　thought　of　an　external　cause；　and　unite　it　to　other
  thoughts；　then　will　the　love　or　hatred　towards　that　external　cause；
  and　also　the　vacillations　of　spirit　which　arise　from　these
  emotions；　be　destroyed。
  Proof。…　That；　which　constitutes　the　reality　of　love　or　hatred；　is　pleasure
  or　pain；　accompanied　by　the　idea　of　an　external　cause　（Def。　of　the
  Emotions：vi。；&vii。）；　wherefore；　when　this　cause　is　removed；　the　reality　of
  love　or　hatred　is　removed　with　it；　therefore　these　emotions　and　those
  which　arise　therefrom　are　destroyed。　Q。E。D。
  Prop。III。　An　emotion；　which　is　a　passion；　ceases　to　be　a
  passion；　as　soon　as　we　form　a　clear　and　distinct　idea　thereof。
  Proof。…　An　emotion；　which　is　a　passion；　is　a　confused　idea　（by　the　general
  Def。　of　the　Emotions）。　If；　therefore；　we　form　a　clear　and　distinct　idea　of　a
  given　emotion；　that　idea　will　only　be　distinguished　from　the　emotion；　in　so
  far　as　it　is　referred　to　the　mind　only；　by　reason　（II：xxi。；&Note）；　therefore
  （III：iii。）；　the　emotion　will　cease　to　be　a　passion。　Q。E。D。
  Corollary。…　An　emotion　therefore　becomes　more　under　our　control；　and　the
  mind　is　less　passive　in　respect　to　it；　in　proportion　as　it　is　more　known　to
  us。
  Prop。IV。　There　is　no　modification　of　the　body；　whereof　we
  cannot　form　some　clear　and　distinct　conception。
  Proof。…　Properties　which　are　common　to　all　things　can　only　be　conceived
  adequately　（II：xxxviii。）；　therefore　（II：xii。and　Lemma。　ii。　after　II：xiii。）
  there　is　no　modification　of　the　body；　whereof　we　cannot　form　some　clear　and
  distinct　conception。　Q。E。D。
  Corollary。…　Hence　it　follows　that　there　is　no　emotion；　whereof　we　cannot
  form　some　clear　and　distinct　conception。　For　an　emotion　is　the　idea　of　a
  modification　of　the　body　（by　the　general　Def。　of　the　Emotions）；　and　must
  therefore　（by　the　preceding　Prop。）　involve　some　clear　and　distinct
  conception。
  Note。…　Seeing　that　there　is　nothing　which　is　not　followed　　by　an　effect
  （I：xxxvi。）；　and　that　we　clearly　and　distinctly　understand　whatever
  follows　from　an　idea；　which　in　us　is　adequate　（II：xl。）；　it　follows　that
  everyone　has　the　power　of　clearly　and　distinctly　understanding　himself　and
  his　emotions；　if　not　absolutely；　at　any　rate　in　part；　and　consequently　of
  bringing　it　about；　that　he　should　become　less　subject　to　them。　To　attain
  this　result；　therefore；　we　must　chiefly　direct　our　efforts　to　acquiring；　as
  far　as　possible；　a　clear　and　distinct　knowledge　of　every　emotion；　in　order
  that　the　mind　may　thus；　through　emotion；　be　determined　to　think　of　those
  things　which　it　clearly　and　distinctly　perceives；　and　wherein　it　fully
  acquiesces：　and　thus　that　the　emotion　itself　may　be　separated　from　the
  thought　of　an　external　cause；　and　may　be　associated　with　true　thoughts；
  whence　it　will　come　to　pass；　not　only　that　love；　hatred；　&c。　will　be
  destroyed　（V：ii。）；　but　also　that　the　appetites　or　desires；　which　are　wont　to
  arise　from　such　emotion；　will　become　incapable　of　being　excessive　（IV：lxi。）。
  For　it　must　be　especially　remarked；　that　the　appetite　through　which　a　man　is
  said　to　be　active；　and　that　through　which　he　is　said　to　be　passive　is　one
  and　the　same。　For　instance；　we　have　shown　that　human　nature　is　so
  constituted；　that　everyone　desires　his　fellow…men　to　live　after　his　own
  fashion　（III：xxxi。Note）；　in　a　man；　who　is　not　guided　by　reason；　this
  appetite　is　a　passion　which　is　called　ambition；　and　does　not　greatly　differ
  from　pride；　whereas　in　a　man；　who　lives　by　the　dictates　of　reason；　it　is　an
  activity　or　virtue　which　is　called　piety　（IV：xxxvii。Note。i。　and　second
  proof）。　In　like　manner　all　appetites　or　desires　are　only　passions；　in　so　far
  as　they　spring　from　inadequate　ideas；　the　same　results　are　accredited　to
  virtue；　when　they　are　aroused　or　generated　by　adequate　ideas。　For　all
  desires；　whereby　we　are　determined　to　any　given　action；　may　arise　as　much
  from　adequate　as　from　inadequate　ideas　（IV：lix。）。　Than　this　remedy　for　the
  emotions　（to　return　to　the　point　from　which　I　started）；　which　consists　in　a
  true　knowledge　thereof；　nothing　more　excellent；　being　within　our　power；　can
  be　devised。　For　the　mind　has　no　other　power　save　that　of　thinking　and　of
  forming；　adequate　ideas；　as　we　have　shown　above　（III：iii。）。
  Prop。V。　An　emotion　towards　a　thing；　which　we　conceive
  simply；　and　not　as　necessary；　or　as　contingent；　or　as　possible；　is；
  other　conditions　being　equal；　greater　than　any　other　emotion。
  Proof。…　An　emotion　towards　a　thing；　which　we　conceive　to　be　free；　is　greater
  than　one　towards　what　we　conceive　to　be　necessary　（III：xlix。）；　and；
  consequently；　still　greater　than　one　towards　what　we　conceive　as　possible；
  or　contingent　（IV：xi。）。　But　to　conceive　a　thing　as　free　can　be　nothing　else
  than　to　conceive　it　simply；　while　we　are　in　ignorance　of　the　causes　whereby
  it　has　been　determined　to　action　（II：xxxv。Note）；　therefore；　an　emotion
  towards　a　thing　which　we　conceive　simply　is；　other　conditions　being　equal；
  greater　than　one；　which　we　feel　towards　what　is　necessary；　possible；　or
  contingent；　and；　consequently；　it　is　the　greatest　of　all。　Q。E。D。
  Prop。VI。　The　mind　has　greater　power　over　the　emotions　and　is
  less　subject　thereto；　in　so　far　as　it　understands　all　things　as
  necessary。
  Proof。…　The　mind　understands　all　things　to　be　necessary　（I：xxix。）　and　to　be
  determined　to　existence　and　operation　by　an　infinite　chain　of　causes；
  therefore　（by　the　foregoing　Proposition）；　it　thus　far　brings　it　about；　that
  it　is　less　subject　to　the　emotions　arising　therefrom；　and　（III：xlviii。）
  feels　less　emotion　towards　the　things　themselves。　Q。E。D。
  Note。…　The　more　this　knowledge；　that　things　are　necessary；　is　applied　to
  particular　things；　which　we　conceive　more　distinctly　and　vividly；　the
  greater　is　the　power　of　the　mind　over　the　emotions；　as　experience　also
  testifies。　For　we　see；　that　the　pain　arising　from　the　loss　of　any　good　is
  mitigated；　as　soon　as　the　man　who　has　lost　it　perceives；　that　it　could　not
  by　any　means　have　been　preserved。　So　also　we　see　that　no　one　pities　an
  infant；　because　it　cannot　speak；　walk；　or　reason；　or　lastly；　because　it
  passes　so　many　years；　as　it　were；　in　unconsciousness。　Whereas；　if　most
  people　were　born　full…grown　and　only　one　here　and　there　as　an　infant；
  everyone　would　pity　the　infants；　because　infancy　would　not　then　be　looked　on
  as　a　state　natural　and　necessary；　but　as　a　fault　or　delinquency　in　Nature；
  and　we　may　note　several　other　instances　of　the　same　sort。
  Prop。VII。　Emotions　which　are　aroused　or　spring　from　reason；　if
  we　take　account　of　time；　are　stronger　than　those；　which　are
  attributable　to　particular　objects　that　we　regard　as　absent。
  Proof。…　We　do　not　regard　a　thing　as　absent；　by　reason　of　the　emotion
  wherewith　we　conceive　it；　but　by　reason　of　the　body；　being　affected　by
  another　emotion　excluding　the　existence　of　the　said　thing　（II：xvii。）。
  Wherefore；　the　emotion；　which　is　referred　to　the　thing　which　we　regard　as
  absent；　is　not　of　a　nature　to　overcome　the　rest　of　a　man's　activities　and
  power　（IV：vi。）；　but　is；　on　the　contrary；　of　a　nature　to　be　in　some　sort
  controlled　by　the　emotions；　which　exclude　the　existence　of　its　external
  cause　（IV：ix。）。　But　an　emotion　which　springs　from　reason　is　necessarily
  referred　to　the　common　properties　of　things　（see　the　def。　of　reason　in
  II：xl。Note。ii。）；　which　we　always　regard　as　present　（for　there　can　be　nothing
  to　exclude　their　present　existence）；　and　which　we　always　conceive　in　the
  same　manner　（II：xxxviii。）。　Wherefore　an　emotion　of　this　kind　always　remains
  the　same；　and　consequently　（V：Ax。i。）　emotions；　which　are　contrary　thereto
  and　are　not　kept　going　by　their　external　causes；　will　be　obliged　to　adapt
  themselves　to　it　more　and　more；　until　they　are　no　longer　contrary　to　it；　to
  this　extent　the　emotion　which　springs　from　reason　is　more　powerful。　Q。E。D。
  Prop。VIII。　An　emotion　is　stronger　in　proportion　to　the　number　of
  simultaneous　concurrent　causes　whereby　it　is　aroused。
  Proof。…　Many　simulta