clearly　there　can　be　no　other　teachers？
  Men。　No。
  Soc。　And　if　there　are　no　teachers；　neither　are　there　disciples？
  Men。　Agreed。
  Soc。　And　we　have　admitted　that　a　thing　cannot　be　taught　of　which
  there　are　neither　teachers　nor　disciples？
  Men。　We　have。
  Soc。　And　there　are　no　teachers　of　virtue　to　be　found　anywhere？
  Men。　There　are　not。
  Soc。　And　if　there　are　no　teachers；　neither　are　there　scholars？
  Men。　That；　I　think；　is　true。
  Soc。　Then　virtue　cannot　be　taught？
  Men。　Not　if　we　are　right　in　our　view。　But　I　cannot　believe；
  Socrates；　that　there　are　no　good　men：　And　if　there　are；　how　did　they
  come　into　existence？
  Soc。　I　am　afraid；　Meno；　that　you　and　I　are　not　good　for　much；　and
  that　Gorgias　has　been　as　poor　an　educator　of　you　as　Prodicus　has
  been　of　me。　Certainly　we　shall　have　to　look　to　ourselves；　and　try　to
  find　some　one　who　will　help　in　some　way　or　other　to　improve　us。　This　I
  say；　because　I　observe　that　in　the　previous　discussion　none　of　us
  remarked　that　right　and　good　action　is　possible　to　man　under　other
  guidance　than　that　of　knowledge　（episteme）；…and　indeed　if　this　be
  denied；　there　is　no　seeing　how　there　can　be　any　good　men　at　all。
  Men。　How　do　you　mean；　Socrates？
  Soc。　I　mean　that　good　men　are　necessarily　useful　or　profitable。　Were
  we　not　right　in　admitting　this？　It　must　be　so。
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　in　supposing　that　they　will　be　useful　only　if　they　are　true
  guides　to　us　of　action…there　we　were　also　right？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　But　when　we　said　that　a　man　cannot　be　a　good　guide　unless　he
  have　knowledge　（phrhonesis）；　this　we　were　wrong。
  Men。　What　do　you　mean　by　the　word　〃right〃？
  Soc。　I　will　explain。　If　a　man　knew　the　way　to　Larisa；　or　anywhere
  else；　and　went　to　the　place　and　led　others　thither；　would　he　not　be
  a　right　and　good　guide？
  Men。　Certainly。
  Soc。　And　a　person　who　had　a　right　opinion　about　the　way；　but　had
  never　been　and　did　not　know；　might　be　a　good　guide　also；　might　he　not？
  Men。　Certainly。
  Soc。　And　while　he　has　true　opinion　about　that　which　the　other　knows；
  he　will　be　just　as　good　a　guide　if　he　thinks　the　truth；　as　he　who
  knows　the　truth？
  Men。　Exactly。
  Soc。　Then　true　opinion　is　as　good　a　guide　to　correct　action　as
  knowledge；　and　that　was　the　point　which　we　omitted　in　our
  speculation　about　the　nature　of　virtue；　when　we　said　that　knowledge
  only　is　the　guide　of　right　action；　whereas　there　is　also　right
  opinion。
  Men。　True。
  Soc。　Then　right　opinion　is　not　less　useful　than　knowledge？
  Men。　The　difference；　Socrates；　is　only　that　he　who　has　knowledge
  will　always　be　right；　but　he　who　has　right　opinion　will　sometimes　be
  right；　and　sometimes　not。
  Soc。　What　do　you　mean？　Can　he　be　wrong　who　has　right　opinion；　so
  long　as　he　has　right　opinion？
  Men。　I　admit　the　cogency　of　your　argument；　and　therefore；
  Socrates；　I　wonder　that　knowledge　should　be　preferred　to　right
  opinion…or　why　they　should　ever　differ。
  Soc。　And　shall　I　explain　this　wonder　to　you？
  Men。　Do　tell　me。
  Soc。　You　would　not　wonder　if　you　had　ever　observed　the　images　of
  Daedalus；　but　perhaps　you　have　not　got　them　in　your　country？
  Men。　What　have　they　to　do　with　the　question？
  Soc。　Because　they　require　to　be　fastened　in　order　to　keep　them；
  and　if　they　are　not　fastened　they　will　play　truant　and　run　away。
  Men。　Well。　what　of　that？
  Soc。　I　mean　to　say　that　they　are　not　very　valuable　possessions　if
  they　are　at　liberty；　for　they　will　walk　off　like　runaway　slaves；　but
  when　fastened；　they　are　of　great　value；　for　they　are　really
  beautiful　works　of　art。　Now　this　is　an　illustration　of　the　nature　of
  true　opinions：　while　they　abide　with　us　they　are　beautiful　and
  fruitful；　but　they　run　away　out　of　the　human　soul；　and　do　not　remain
  long；　and　therefore　they　are　not　of　much　value　until　they　are　fastened
  by　the　tie　of　the　cause；　and　this　fastening　of　them；　friend　Meno；　is
  recollection；　as　you　and　I　have　agreed　to　call　it。　But　when　they　are
  bound；　in　the　first　place；　they　have　the　nature　of　knowledge；　and；
  in　the　second　place；　they　are　abiding。　And　this　is　why　knowledge　is
  more　honourable　and　excellent　than　true　opinion；　because　fastened　by　a
  chain。
  Men。　What　you　are　saying；　Socrates；　seems　to　be　very　like　the　truth。
  Soc。　I　too　speak　rather　in　ignorance；　I　only　conjecture。　And　yet
  that　knowledge　differs　from　true　opinion　is　no　matter　of　conjecture
  with　me。　There　are　not　many　things　which　I　profess　to　know；　but　this
  is　most　certainly　one　of　them。
  Men。　Yes；　Socrates；　and　you　are　quite　right　in　saying　so。
  Soc。　And　am　I　not　also　right　in　saying　that　true　opinion　leading　the
  way　perfects　action　quite　as　well　as　knowledge？
  Men。　There　again；　Socrates；　I　think　you　are　right。
  Soc。　Then　right　opinion　is　not　a　whit　inferior　to　knowledge；　or　less
  useful　in　action；　nor　is　the　man　who　has　right　opinion　inferior　to　him
  who　has　knowledge？
  Men。　True。
  Soc。　And　surely　the　good　man　has　been　acknowledged　by　us　to　be
  useful？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　Seeing　then　that　men　become　good　and　useful　to　states；　not　only
  because　they　have　knowledge；　but　because　they　have　right　opinion；
  and　that　neither　knowledge　nor　right　opinion　is　given　to　man　by　nature
  or　acquired　by　him…（do　you　imagine　either　of　them　to　be　given　by
  nature？
  Men。　Not　I。）
  Soc。　Then　if　they　are　not　given　by　nature；　neither　are　the　good　by
  nature　good？
  Men。　Certainly　not。
  Soc。　And　nature　being　excluded；　then　came　the　question　whether
  virtue　is　acquired　by　teaching？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　If　virtue　was　wisdom　＇or　knowledge＇；　then；　as　we　thought；　it
  was　taught？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　if　it　was　taught　it　was　wisdom？
  Men。　Certainly。
  Soc。　And　if　there　were　teachers；　it　might　be　taught；　and　if　there
  were　no　teachers；　not？
  Men。　True。
  Soc。　But　surely　we　acknowledged　that　there　were　no　teachers　of
  virtue？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　Then　we　acknowledged　that　it　was　not　taught；　and　was　not
  wisdom？
  Men。　Certainly。
  Soc。　And　yet　we　admitted　that　it　was　a　good？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　the　right　guide　is　useful　and　good？
  Men。　Certainly。
  Soc。　And　the　only　right　guides　are　knowledge　and　true
  opinion…these　are　the　guides　of　man；　for　things　which　happen　by　chance
  are　not　under　the　guidance　of　man：　but　the　guides　of　man　are　true
  opinion　and　knowledge。
  Men。　I　think　so　too。
  Soc。　But　if　virtue　is　not　taught；　neither　is　virtue　knowledge。
  Men。　Clearly　not。
  Soc。　Then　of　two　good　and　useful　things；　one；　which　is　knowledge；
  has　been　set　aside；　and　cannot　be　supposed　to　be　our　guide　in
  political　life。
  Men。　I　think　not。
  Soc。　And　therefore　not　by　any　wisdom；　and　not　because　they　were
  wise；　did　Themistocles　and　those　others　of　whom　Anytus　spoke　govern
  states。　This　was　the　reason　why　they　were　unable　to　make　others　like
  themselves…because　their　virtue　was　not　grounded　on　knowledge。
  Men。　That　is　probably　true；　Socrates。
  Soc。　But　if　not　by　knowledge；　the　only　alternative　which　remains
  is　that　statesmen　must　have　guided　states　by　right　opinion；　which　is
  in　politics　what　divination　is　in　religion；　for　diviners　and　also
  prophets　say　many　things　truly；　but　they　know　not　what　they　say。
  Men。　So　I　believe。
  Soc。　And　may　we　not；　Meno；　truly　call　those　men　〃divine〃　who；　having
  no　understanding；　yet　succeed　in　many　a　grand　deed　and　word？
  Men。　Certainly。
  Soc。　Then　we　shall　also　be　right　in　calling　divine　those　whom　we
  were　just　now　speaking　of　as　diviners　and　prophets；　including　the
  whole　tribe　of　poets。　Yes；　and　statesmen　above　all　may　be　said　to　be
  divine　and　illumined；　being　inspired　and　possessed　of　God；　in　which
  condition　they　say　many　grand　things；　not　knowing　what　they　say。
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　the　women　too；　Meno；　call　good　men　divine…do　they　not？
  and　the　Spartans；　when　they　praise　a　good　man；　say　〃that　he　is　a
  divine　man。〃
  Men。　And　I　think；　Socrates；　that　they　are　right；　although　very
  likely　our　friend　Anytus　may　take　offence　at　the　word。
  Soc。　I　da　not　care；　as　for　Anytus；　there　will　be　another　opportunity
  of　talking　with　him。　To　sum　up　our　enquiry…the　result　seems　to　be；
  if　we　are　at　all　right　in　our　view；　that　virtue　is　neither　natural　nor
  acquired；　but　an　instinct　given　by　God　to　the　virtuous。　Nor　is　the
  instinct　accompanied　by　reason；　unless　there　may　be　supposed　to　be
  among　statesmen　some　one　who　is　capable　of　educating　statesmen。　And　if
  there　be　such　an　one；　he　may　be　said　to　be　among　the　living　what　Homer
  says　that　Tiresias　was　among　the　dead；　〃he　alone　has　understanding；
  but　the　rest　are　flitting　shades〃；　and　he　and　his　virtue　in　like
  manner　will　be　a　reality　among　s