Boy。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　are　there　not　here　four　equal　lines　which　contain　this
  space？
  Boy。　There　are。
  Soc。　Look　and　see　how　much　this　space　is。
  Boy。　I　do　not　understand。
  Soc。　Has　not　each　interior　line　cut　off　half　of　the　four　spaces？
  Boy。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　how　many　spaces　are　there　in　this　section？
  Boy。　Four。
  Soc。　And　how　many　in　this？
  Boy。　Two。
  Soc。　And　four　is　how　many　times　two？
  Boy。　Twice。
  Soc。　And　this　space　is　of　how　many　feet？
  Boy。　Of　eight　feet。
  Soc。　And　from　what　line　do　you　get　this　figure？
  Boy。　From　this。
  Soc。　That　is；　from　the　line　which　extends　from　corner　to　corner　of
  the　figure　of　four　feet？
  Boy。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　that　is　the　line　which　the　learned　call　the　diagonal。　And
  if　this　is　the　proper　name；　then　you；　Meno's　slave；　are　prepared　to
  affirm　that　the　double　space　is　the　square　of　the　diagonal？
  Boy。　Certainly；　Socrates。
  Soc。　What　do　you　say　of　him；　Meno？　Were　not　all　these　answers
  given　out　of　his　own　head？
  Men。　Yes；　they　were　all　his　own。
  Soc。　And　yet；　as　we　were　just　now　saying；　he　did　not　know？
  Men。　True。
  Soc。　But　still　he　had　in　him　those　notions　of　his…had　he　not？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　Then　he　who　does　not　know　may　still　have　true　notions　of　that
  which　he　does　not　know？
  Men。　He　has。
  Soc。　And　at　present　these　notions　have　just　been　stirred　up　in
  him；　as　in　a　dream；　but　if　he　were　frequently　asked　the　same
  questions；　in　different　forms；　he　would　know　as　well　as　any　one　at
  last？
  Men。　I　dare　say。
  Soc。　Without　any　one　teaching　him　he　will　recover　his　knowledge
  for　himself；　if　he　is　only　asked　questions？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　this　spontaneous　recovery　of　knowledge　in　him　is
  recollection？
  Men。　True。
  Soc。　And　this　knowledge　which　he　now　has　must　he　not　either　have
  acquired　or　always　possessed？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　But　if　he　always　possessed　this　knowledge　he　would　always
  have　known；　or　if　he　has　acquired　the　knowledge　he　could　not　have
  acquired　it　in　this　life；　unless　he　has　been　taught　geometry；　for　he
  may　be　made　to　do　the　same　with　all　geometry　and　every　other　branch　of
  knowledge。　Now；　has　any　one　ever　taught　him　all　this？　You　must　know
  about　him；　if；　as　you　say；　he　was　born　and　bred　in　your　house。
  Men。　And　I　am　certain　that　no　one　ever　did　teach　him。
  Soc。　And　yet　he　has　the　knowledge？
  Men。　The　fact；　Socrates；　is　undeniable。
  Soc。　But　if　he　did　not　acquire　the　knowledge　in　this　life；　then　he
  must　have　had　and　learned　it　at　some　other　time？
  Men。　Clearly　he　must。
  Soc。　Which　must　have　been　the　time　when　he　was　not　a　man？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　if　there　have　been　always　true　thoughts　in　him；　both　at　the
  time　when　he　was　and　was　not　a　man；　which　only　need　to　be　awakened
  into　knowledge　by　putting　questions　to　him；　his　soul　must　have
  always　possessed　this　knowledge；　for　he　always　either　was　or　was　not　a
  man？
  Men。　Obviously。
  Soc。　And　if　the　truth　of　all　things　always　existed　in　the　soul；　then
  the　soul　is　immortal。　Wherefore　be　of　good　cheer；　and　try　to　recollect
  what　you　do　not　know；　or　rather　what　you　do　not　remember。
  Men。　I　feel；　somehow；　that　I　like　what　you　are　saying。
  Soc。　And　I；　Meno；　like　what　I　am　saying。　Some　things　I　have　said
  of　which　I　am　not　altogether　confident。　But　that　we　shall　be　better
  and　braver　and　less　helpless　if　we　think　that　we　ought　to　enquire；
  than　we　should　have　been　if　we　indulged　in　the　idle　fancy　that　there
  was　no　knowing　and　no　use　in　seeking　to　know　what　we　do　not　know；…that
  is　a　theme　upon　which　I　am　ready　to　fight；　in　word　and　deed；　to　the
  utmost　of　my　power。
  Men。　There　again；　Socrates；　your　words　seem　to　me　excellent。
  Soc。　Then；　as　we　are　agreed　that　a　man　should　enquire　about　that
  which　he　does　not　know；　shall　you　and　I　make　an　effort　to　enquire
  together　into　the　nature　of　virtue？
  Men。　By　all　means；　Socrates。　And　yet　I　would　much　rather　return　to
  my　original　question；　Whether　in　seeking　to　acquire　virtue　we　should
  regard　it　as　a　thing　to　be　taught；　or　as　a　gift　of　nature；　or　as
  coming　to　men　in　some　other　way？
  Soc。　Had　I　the　command　of　you　as　well　as　of　myself；　Meno；　I　would
  not　have　enquired　whether　virtue　is　given　by　instruction　or　not；　until
  we　had　first　ascertained　〃what　it　is。〃　But　as　you　think　only　of
  controlling　me　who　am　your　slave；　and　never　of　controlling
  yourself；…such　being　your　notion　of　freedom；　I　must　yield　to　you；
  for　you　are　irresistible。　And　therefore　I　have　now　to　enquire　into　the
  qualities　of　a　thing　of　which　I　do　not　as　yet　know　the　nature。　At
  any　rate；　will　you　condescend　a　little；　and　allow　the　question
  〃Whether　virtue　is　given　by　instruction；　or　in　any　other　way；〃　to　be
  argued　upon　hypothesis？　As　the　geometrician；　when　he　is　asked
  whether　a　certain　triangle　is　capable　being　inscribed　in　a　certain
  circle；　will　reply：　〃I　cannot　tell　you　as　yet；　but　I　will　offer　a
  hypothesis　which　may　assist　us　in　forming　a　conclusion：　If　the
  figure　be　such　that　when　you　have　produced　a　given　side　of　it；　the
  given　area　of　the　triangle　falls　short　by　an　area　corresponding　to　the
  part　produced；　then　one　consequence　follows；　and　if　this　is　impossible
  then　some　other；　and　therefore　I　wish　to　assume　a　hypothesis　before
  I　tell　you　whether　this　triangle　is　capable　of　being　inscribed　in
  the　circle〃：…that　is　a　geometrical　hypothesis。　And　we　too；　as　we
  know　not　the　nature　and　…qualities　of　virtue；　must　ask；　whether　virtue
  is　or　not　taught；　under　a　hypothesis：　as　thus；　if　virtue　is　of　such
  a　class　of　mental　goods；　will　it　be　taught　or　not？　Let　the　first
  hypothesis　be…that　virtue　is　or　is　not　knowledge；…in　that　case　will　it
  be　taught　or　not？　or；　as　we　were　just　now　saying；　remembered〃？　For
  there　is　no　use　in　disputing　about　the　name。　But　is　virtue　taught　or
  not？　or　rather；　does　not　everyone　see　that　knowledge　alone　is　taught？
  Men。　I　agree。
  Soc。　Then　if　virtue　is　knowledge；　virtue　will　be　taught？
  Men。　Certainly。
  Soc。　Then　now　we　have　made　a　quick　end　of　this　question：　if　virtue
  is　of　such　a　nature；　it　will　be　taught；　and　if　not；　not？
  Men。　Certainly。
  Soc。　The　next　question　is；　whether　virtue　is　knowledge　or　of　another
  species？
  Men。　Yes；　that　appears　to　be　the　…question　which　comes　next　in
  order。
  Soc。　Do　we　not　say　that　virtue　is　a　good？…This　is　a　hypothesis　which
  is　not　set　aside。
  Men。　Certainly。
  Soc。　Now；　if　there　be　any　sort…of　good　which　is　distinct　from
  knowledge；　virtue　may　be　that　good；　but　if　knowledge　embraces　all
  good；　then　we　shall　be　right　in　think　in　that　virtue　is　knowledge？
  Men。　True。
  Soc。　And　virtue　makes　us　good？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　if　we　are　good；　then　we　are　profitable；　for　all　good　things
  are　profitable？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　Then　virtue　is　profitable？
  Men。　That　is　the　only　inference。
  Soc。　Then　now　let　us　see　what　are　the　things　which　severally
  profit　us。　Health　and　strength；　and　beauty　and　wealth…these；　and　the
  like　of　these；　we　call　profitable？
  Men。　True。
  Soc。　And　yet　these　things　may　also　sometimes　do　us　harm：　would　you
  not　think　so？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　what　is　the　guiding　principle　which　makes　them　profitable
  or　the　reverse？　Are　they　not　profitable　when　they　are　rightly　used；
  and　hurtful　when　they　are　not　rightly　used？
  Men。　Certainly。
  Soc。　Next；　let　us　consider　the　goods　of　the　soul：　they　are
  temperance；　justice；　courage；　quickness　of　apprehension；　memory；
  magnanimity；　and　the　like？
  Men。　Surely。
  Soc。　And　such　of　these　as　are　not　knowledge；　but　of　another　sort；
  are　sometimes　profitable　and　sometimes　hurtful；　as；　for　example；
  courage　wanting　prudence；　which　is　only　a　sort　of　confidence？　When　a
  man　has　no　sense　he　is　harmed　by　courage；　but　when　he　has　sense　he
  is　profited？
  Men。　True。
  Soc。　And　the　same　may　be　said　of　temperance　and　quickness　of
  apprehension；　whatever　things　are　learned　or　done　with　sense　are
  profitable；　but　when　done　without　sense　they　are　hurtful？
  Men。　Very　true。
  Soc。　And　in　general；　all　that　the　attempts　or　endures；　when　under
  the　guidance　of　wisdom；　ends　in　happiness；　but　when　she　is　under　the
  guidance　of　folly；　in　the　opposite？
  Men。　That　appears　to　be　true。
  Soc。　If　then　virtue　is　a　quality　of　the　soul；　and　is　admitted　to
  be　profitable；　it　must　be　wisdom　or　prudence；　since　none　of　the　things
  of　the　soul　are　either　profitable　or　hurtful　in　themselves；　but　they
  are　all　made　profitable　or　hurtful　by　the　addition　of　wisdom　or　of
  folly；　and　therefore　and　therefore　if　virtue　is　profitable；　virtue
  must　be　a　sort　of　wisdom　or　prudence？
  Men。　I　quite　agree。
  Soc。　And　the　other　goods；　such