good　know　that　they　are　evils？
  Men。　Certainly　not。
  Soc。　Is　it　not　obvious　that　those　who　are　ignorant　of　their　nature
  do　not　desire　them；　but　they　desire　what　they　suppose　to　be　goods
  although　they　are　really　evils；　and　if　they　are　mistaken　and　suppose
  the　evils　to　be　good　they　really　desire　goods？
  Men。　Yes；　in　that　case。
  Soc。　Well；　and　do　those　who；　as　you　say；　desire　evils；　and　think
  that　evils　are　hurtful　to　the　possessor　of　them；　know　that　they　will
  be　hurt　by　them？
  Men。　They　must　know　it。
  Soc。　And　must　they　not　suppose　that　those　who　are　hurt　are　miserable
  in　proportion　to　the　hurt　which　is　inflicted　upon　them？
  Men。　How　can　it　be　otherwise？
  Soc。　But　are　not　the　miserable　ill…fated？
  Men。　Yes；　indeed。
  Soc。　And　does　any　one　desire　to　be　miserable　and　ill…fated？
  Men。　I　should　say　not；　Socrates。
  Soc。　But　if　there　is　no　one　who　desires　to　be　miserable；　there　is　no
  one；　Meno；　who　desires　evil；　for　what　is　misery　but　the　desire　and
  possession　of　evil？
  Men。　That　appears　to　be　the　truth；　Socrates；　and　I　admit　that　nobody
  desires　evil。
  Soc。　And　yet；　were　you　not　saying　just　now　that　virtue　is　the　desire
  and　power　of　attaining　good？
  Men。　Yes；　I　did　say　so。
  Soc。　But　if　this　be　affirmed；　then　the　desire　of　good　is　common　to
  all；　and　one　man　is　no　better　than　another　in　that　respect？
  Men。　True。
  Soc。　And　if　one　man　is　not　better　than　another　in　desiring　good；
  he　must　be　better　in　the　power　of　attaining　it？
  Men。　Exactly。
  Soc。　Then；　according　to　your　definition；　virtue　would　appear　to　be
  the　power　of　attaining　good？
  Men。　I　entirely　approve；　Socrates；　of　the　manner　in　which　you　now
  view　this　matter。
  Soc。　Then　let　us　see　whether　what　you　say　is　true　from　another　point
  of　view；　for　very　likely　you　may　be　right：…You　affirm　virtue　to　be　the
  power　of　attaining　goods？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　the　goods　which　mean　are　such　as　health　and　wealth　and
  the　possession　of　gold　and　silver；　and　having　office　and　honour　in　the
  state…those　are　what　you　would　call　goods？
  Men。　Yes；　I　should　include　all　those。
  Soc。　Then；　according　to　Meno；　who　is　the　hereditary　friend　of　the
  great　king；　virtue　is　the　power　of　getting　silver　and　gold；　and
  would　you　add　that　they　must　be　gained　piously；　justly；　or　do　you　deem
  this　to　be　of　no　consequence？　And　is　any　mode　of　acquisition；　even
  if　unjust　and　dishonest；　equally　to　be　deemed　virtue？
  Men。　Not　virtue；　Socrates；　but　vice。
  Soc。　Then　justice　or　temperance　or　holiness；　or　some　other　part　of
  virtue；　as　would　appear；　must　accompany　the　acquisition；　and　without
  them　the　mere　acquisition　of　good　will　not　be　virtue。
  Men。　Why；　how　can　there　be　virtue　without　these？
  Soc。　And　the　non…acquisition　of　gold　and　silver　in　a　dishonest
  manner　for　oneself　or　another；　or　in　other　words　the　want　of　them；　may
  be　equally　virtue？
  Men。　True。
  Soc。　Then　the　acquisition　of　such　goods　is　no　more　virtue　than　the
  non…acquisition　and　want　of　them；　but　whatever　is　accompanied　by
  justice　or　honesty　is　virtue；　and　whatever　is　devoid　of　justice　is
  vice。
  Men。　It　cannot　be　otherwise；　in　my　judgment。
  Soc。　And　were　we　not　saying　just　now　that　justice；　temperance；　and
  the　like；　were　each　of　them　a　part　of　virtue？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　so；　Meno；　this　is　the　way　in　which　you　mock　me。
  Men。　Why　do　you　say　that；　Socrates？
  Soc。　Why；　because　I　asked　you　to　deliver　virtue　into　my　hands
  whole　and　unbroken；　and　I　gave　you　a　pattern　according　to　which　you
  were　to　frame　your　answer；　and　you　have　forgotten　already；　and　tell　me
  that　virtue　is　the　power　of　attaining　good　justly；　or　with　justice；
  and　justice　you　acknowledge　to　be　a　part　of　virtue。
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　Then　it　follows　from　your　own　admissions；　that　virtue　is
  doing　what　you　do　with　a　part　of　virtue；　for　justice　and　the　like
  are　said　by　you　to　be　parts　of　virtue。
  Men。　What　of　that？
  Soc。　What　of　that！　Why；　did　not　I　ask　you　to　tell　me　the　nature　of
  virtue　as　a　whole？　And　you　are　very　far　from　telling　me　this；　but
  declare　every　action　to　be　virtue　which　is　done　with　a　part　of　virtue；
  as　though　you　had　told　me　and　I　must　already　know　the　whole　of　virtue；
  and　this　too　when　frittered　away　into　little　pieces。　And；　therefore；
  my　dear　I　fear　that　I　must　begin　again　and　repeat　the　same　question：
  What　is　virtue？　for　otherwise；　I　can　only　say；　that　every　action
  done　with　a　part　of　virtue　is　virtue；　what　else　is　the　meaning　of
  saying　that　every　action　done　with　justice　is　virtue？　Ought　I　not　to
  ask　the　question　over　again；　for　can　any　one　who　does　not　know
  virtue　know　a　part　of　virtue？
  Men。　No；　I　do　not　say　that　he　can。
  Soc。　Do　you　remember　how；　in　the　example　of　figure；　we　rejected　any
  answer　given　in　terms　which　were　as　yet　unexplained　or　unadmitted？
  Men。　Yes；　Socrates；　and　we　were　quite　right　in　doing　so。
  Soc。　But　then；　my　friend；　do　not　suppose　that　we　can　explain　to　any
  one　the　nature　of　virtue　as　a　whole　through　some　unexplained　portion
  of　virtue；　or　anything　at　all　in　that　fashion；　we　should　only　have
  to　ask　over　again　the　old　question；　What　is　virtue？　Am　I　not　right？
  Men。　I　believe　that　you　are。
  Soc。　Then　begin　again；　and　answer　me；　What；　according　to　you　and
  your　friend　Gorgias；　is　the　definition　of　virtue？
  Men。　O　Socrates；　I　used　to　be　told；　before　I　knew　you；　that　you
  were　always　doubting　yourself　and　making　others　doubt；　and　now　you　are
  casting　your　spells　over　me；　and　I　am　simply　getting　bewitched　and
  enchanted；　and　am　at　my　wits'　end。　And　if　I　may　venture　to　make　a　jest
  upon　you；　you　seem　to　me　both　in　your　appearance　and　in　your　power
  over　others　to　be　very　like　the　flat　torpedo　fish；　who　torpifies　those
  who　come　near　him　and　touch　him；　as　you　have　now　torpified　me；　I
  think。　For　my　soul　and　my　tongue　are　really　torpid；　and　I　do　not
  know　how　to　answer　you；　and　though　I　have　been　delivered　of　an
  infinite　variety　of　speeches　about　virtue　before　now；　and　to　many
  persons…and　very　good　ones　they　were；　as　I　thought…at　this　moment　I
  cannot　even　say　what　virtue　is。　And　I　think　that。　you　are　very　wise　in
  not　voyaging　and　going　away　from　home；　for　if　you　did　in　other
  places　as　do　in　Athens；　you　would　be　cast　into　prison　as　a　magician。
  Soc。　You　are　a　rogue；　Meno；　and　had　all　but　caught　me。
  Men。　What　do　you　mean；　Socrates？
  Soc。　I　can　tell　why　you　made　a　simile　about　me。
  Men。　Why？
  Soc。　In　order　that　I　might　make　another　simile　about　you。　For　I　know
  that　all　pretty　young　gentlemen　like　to　have　pretty　similes　made　about
  them…as　well　they　may…but　I　shall　not　return　the　compliment。　As　to
  my　being　a　torpedo；　if　the　torpedo　is　torpid　as　well　as　the　cause　of
  torpidity　in　others；　then　indeed　I　am　a　torpedo；　but　not　otherwise；
  for　I　perplex　others；　not　because　I　am　clear；　but　because　I　am　utterly
  perplexed　myself。　And　now　I　know　not　what　virtue　is；　and　you　seem　to
  be　in　the　same　case；　although　you　did　once　perhaps　know　before　you
  touched　me。　However；　I　have　no　objection　to　join　with　you　in　the
  enquiry。
  Men。　And　how　will　you　enquire；　Socrates；　into　that　which　you　do
  not　know？　What　will　you　put　forth　as　the　subject　of　enquiry？　And　if
  you　find　what　you　want；　how　will　you　ever　know　that　this　is　the
  thing　which　you　did　not　know？
  Soc。　I　know；　Meno；　what　you　mean；　but　just　see　what　a　tiresome
  dispute　you　are　introducing。　You　argue　that　man　cannot　enquire
  either　about　that　which　he　knows；　or　about　that　which　he　does　not
  know；　for　if　he　knows；　he　has　no　need　to　enquire；　and　if　not；　he
  cannot；　for　he　does　not　know　the；　very　subject　about　which　he　is　to
  enquire。
  Men。　Well；　Socrates；　and　is　not　the　argument　sound？
  Soc。　I　think　not。
  Men。　Why　not？
  Soc。　I　will　tell　you　why：　I　have　heard　from　certain　wise　men　and
  women　who　spoke　of　things　divine　that…
  Men。　What　did　they　say？
  Soc。　They　spoke　of　a　glorious　truth；　as　I　conceive。
  Men。　What　was　it？　and　who　were　they？
  Soc。　Some　of　them　were　priests　and　priestesses；　who　had　studied
  how　they　might　be　able　to　give　a　reason　of　their　profession：　there；
  have　been　poets　also；　who　spoke　of　these　things　by　inspiration；　like
  Pindar；　and　many　others　who　were　inspired。　And　they　say…mark；　now；　and
  see　whether　their　words　are　true…they　say　that　the　soul　of　man　is
  immortal；　and　at　one　time　has　an　end；　which　is　termed　dying；　and　at
  another　time　is　born　again；　but　is　never　destroyed。　And　the　moral
  is；　that　a　man　ought　to　live　always　in　perfect　holiness。　〃For　in　the
  ninth　year　Persephone　sends　the　souls　of　those　from　whom　she　has
  received　the　penalty　of　ancient　crime　back　again　from　beneath　into　the
  light　of　the　sun　above；　and　these　are　they　who　be