attempt　to　get　at　one　common　notion　of　virtue　as　of　other　things。
  Soc。　No　wonder；　but　I　will　try　to　get　nearer　if　I　can；　for　you
  know　that　all　things　have　a　common　notion。　Suppose　now　that　some　one
  asked　you　the　question　which　I　asked　before：　Meno；　he　would　say；
  what　is　figure？　And　if　you　answered　〃roundness；〃　he　would　reply　to
  you；　in　my　way　of　speaking；　by　asking　whether　you　would　say　that
  roundness　is　〃figure〃　or　〃a　figure〃；　and　you　would　answer　〃a　figure。〃
  Men。　Certainly。
  Soc。　And　for　this　reason…that　there　are　other　figures？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　if　he　proceeded　to　ask；　What　other　figures　are　there？　you
  would　have　told　him。
  Men。　I　should。
  Soc。　And　if　he　similarly　asked　what　colour　is；　and　you　answered
  whiteness；　and　the　questioner　rejoined；　Would　you　say　that　whiteness
  is　colour　or　a　colour？　you　would　reply；　A　colour；　because　there　are
  other　colours　as　well。
  Men。　I　should。
  Soc。　And　if　he　had　said；　Tell　me　what　they　are？…you　would　have
  told　him　of　other　colours　which　are　colours　just　as　much　as　whiteness。
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　suppose　that　he　were　to　pursue　the　matter　in　my　way；　he
  would　say：　Ever　and　anon　we　are　landed　in　particulars；　but　this　is　not
  what　I　want；　tell　me　then；　since　you　call　them　by　a　common　name；　and
  say　that　they　are　all　figures；　even　when　opposed　to　one　another；
  what　is　that　common　nature　which　you　designate　as　figure…which
  contains　straight　as　well　as　round；　and　is　no　more　one　than　the
  other…that　would　be　your　mode　of　speaking？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　in　speaking　thus；　you　do　not　mean　to　say　that　the　round
  is　round　any　more　than　straight；　or　the　straight　any　more　straight
  than　round？
  Men。　Certainly　not。
  Soc。　You　only　assert　that　the　round　figure　is　not　more　a　figure　than
  the　straight；　or　the　straight　than　the　round？
  Men。　Very　true。
  Soc。　To　what　then　do　we　give　the　name　of　figure？　Try　and　answer。
  Suppose　that　when　a　person　asked　you　this　question　either　about　figure
  or　colour；　you　were　to　reply；　Man；　I　do　not　understand　what　you
  want；　or　know　what　you　are　saying；　he　would　look　rather　astonished　and
  say：　Do　you　not　understand　that　I　am　looking　for　the　〃simile　in
  multis〃？　And　then　he　might　put　the　question　in　another　form：　Mono；
  he　might　say；　what　is　that　〃simile　in　multis〃　which　you　call　figure；
  and　which　includes　not　only　round　and　straight　figures；　but　all？　Could
  you　not　answer　that　question；　Meno？　I　wish　that　you　would　try；　the
  attempt　will　be　good　practice　with　a　view　to　the　answer　about　virtue。
  Men。　I　would　rather　that　you　should　answer；　Socrates。
  Soc。　Shall　I　indulge　you？
  Men。　By　all　means。
  Soc。　And　then　you　will　tell　me　about　virtue？
  Men。　I　will。
  Soc。　Then　I　must　do　my　best；　for　there　is　a　prize　to　be　won。
  Men。　Certainly。
  Soc。　Well；　I　will　try　and　explain　to　you　what　figure　is。　What　do　you
  say　to　this　answer？…Figure　is　the　only　thing　which　always　follows
  colour。　Will　you　be　satisfied　with　it；　as　I　am　sure　that　I　should
  be；　if　you　would　let　me　have　a　similar　definition　of　virtue？
  Men。　But；　Socrates；　it　is　such　a　simple　answer。
  Soc。　Why　simple？
  Men。　Because；　according　to　you；　figure　is　that　which　always
  follows　colour。
  （Soc。　Granted。）
  Men。　But　if　a　person　were　to　say　that　he　does　not　know　what　colour
  is；　any　more　than　what　figure　is…what　sort　of　answer　would　you　have
  given　him？
  Soc。　I　should　have　told　him　the　truth。　And　if　he　were　a
  philosopher　of　the　eristic　and　antagonistic　sort；　I　should　say　to　him：
  You　have　my　answer；　and　if　I　am　wrong；　your　business　is　to　take　up　the
  argument　and　refute　me。　But　if　we　were　friends；　and　were　talking　as
  you　and　I　are　now；　I　should　reply　in　a　milder　strain　and　more　in　the
  dialectician's　vein；　that　is　to　say；　I　should　not　only　speak　the
  truth；　but　I　should　make　use　of　premisses　which　the　person
  interrogated　would　be　willing　to　admit。　And　this　is　the　way　in　which　I
  shall　endeavour　to　approach　you。　You　will　acknowledge；　will　you　not；
  that　there　is　such　a　thing　as　an　end；　or　termination；　or
  extremity？…all　which　words　use　in　the　same　sense；　although　I　am
  aware　that　Prodicus　might　draw　distinctions　about　them：　but　still　you；
  I　am　sure；　would　speak　of　a　thing　as　ended　or　terminated…that　is　all
  which　I　am　saying…not　anything　very　difficult。
  Men。　Yes；　I　should；　and　I　believe　that　I　understand　your　meaning。
  Soc。　And　you　would　speak　of　a　surface　and　also　of　a　solid；　as　for
  example　in　geometry。
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　Well　then；　you　are　now　in　a　condition　to　understand　my
  definition　of　figure。　I　define　figure　to　be　that　in　which　the　solid
  ends；　or；　more　concisely；　the　limit　of　solid。
  Men。　And　now；　Socrates；　what　is　colour？
  Soc。　You　are　outrageous；　Meno；　in　thus　plaguing　a　poor　old　man　to
  give　you　an　answer；　when　you　will　not　take　the　trouble　of
  remembering　what　is　Gorgias'　definition　of　virtue。
  Men。　When　you　have　told　me　what　I　ask；　I　will　tell　you；　Socrates。
  Soc。　A　man　who　was　blindfolded　has　only　to　hear　you　talking；　and
  he　would　know　that　you　are　a　fair　creature　and　have　still　many　lovers。
  Men。　Why　do　you　think　so？
  Soc。　Why；　because　you　always　speak　in　imperatives：　like　all　beauties
  when　they　are　in　their　prime；　you　are　tyrannical；　and　also；　as　I
  suspect；　you　have　found　out　that　I　have　weakness　for　the　fair；　and
  therefore　to　humour　you　I　must　answer。
  Men。　Please　do。
  Soc。　Would　you　like　me　to　answer　you　after　the　manner　of　Gorgias；
  which　is　familiar　to　you？
  Men。　I　should　like　nothing　better。
  Soc。　Do　not　he　and　you　and　Empedocles　say　that　there　are　certain
  effluences　of　existence？
  Men。　Certainly。
  Soc。　And　passages　into　which　and　through　which　the　effluences　pass？
  Men。　Exactly。
  Soc。　And　some　of　the　effluences　fit　into　the　passages；　and　some　of
  them　are　too　small　or　too　large？
  Men。　True。
  Soc。　And　there　is　such　a　thing　as　sight？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　now；　as　Pindar　says；　〃read　my　meaning〃　colour　is　an
  effluence　of　form；　commensurate　with　sight；　and　palpable　to　sense。
  Men。　That；　Socrates；　appears　to　me　to　be　an　admirable　answer。
  Soc。　Why；　yes；　because　it　happens　to　be　one　which　you　have　been　in
  the　habit　of　hearing：　and　your　wit　will　have　discovered；　I　suspect；
  that　you　may　explain　in　the　same　way　the　nature　of　sound　and　smell；
  and　of　many　other　similar　phenomena。
  Men。　Quite　true。
  Soc。　The　answer；　Meno；　was　in　the　orthodox　solemn　vein；　and
  therefore　was　more　acceptable　to　you　than　the　other　answer　about
  figure。
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　yet；　O　son　of　Alexidemus；　I　cannot　help　thinking　that　the
  other　was　the　better；　and　I　am　sure　that　you　would　be　of　the　same
  opinion；　if　you　would　only　stay　and　be　initiated；　and　were　not
  compelled；　as　you　said　yesterday；　to　go　away　before　the　mysteries。
  Men。　But　I　will　stay；　Socrates；　if　you　will　give　me　many　such
  answers。
  Soc。　Well　then；　for　my　own　sake　as　well　as　for　yours；　I　will　do　my
  very　best；　but　I　am　afraid　that　I　shall　not　be　able　to　give　you　very
  many　as　good：　and　now；　in　your　turn；　you　are　to　fulfil　your　promise；
  and　tell　me　what　virtue　is　in　the　universal；　and　do　not　make　a
  singular　into　a　plural；　as　the　facetious　say　of　those　who　break　a
  thing；　but　deliver　virtue　to　me　whole　and　sound；　and　not　broken　into　a
  number　of　pieces：　I　have　given　you　the　pattern。
  Men。　Well　then；　Socrates；　virtue；　as　I　take　it；　is　when　he；　who
  desires　the　honourable；　is　able　to　provide　it　for　himself；　so　the　poet
  says；　and　I　say　too…
  Virtue　is　the　desire　of　things　honourable　and　the　power　of
  attaining　them。
  Soc。　And　does　he　who　desires　the　honourable　also　desire　the　good？
  Men。　Certainly。
  Soc。　Then　are　there　some　who　desire　the　evil　and　others　who　desire
  the　good？　Do　not　all　men；　my　dear　sir；　desire　good？
  Men。　I　think　not。
  Soc。　There　are　some　who　desire　evil？
  Men。　Yes。
  Soc。　Do　you　mean　that　they　think　the　evils　which　they　desire；　to
  be　good；　or　do　they　know　that　they　are　evil　and　yet　desire　them？
  Men。　Both；　I　think。
  Soc。　And　do　you　really　imagine；　Meno；　that　a　man　knows　evils　to　be
  evils　and　desires　them　notwithstanding？
  Men。　Certainly　I　do。
  Soc。　And　desire　is　of　possession？
  Men。　Yes；　of　possession。
  Soc。　And　does　he　think　that　the　evils　will　do　good　to　him　who
  possesses　them；　or　does　he　know　that　they　will　do　him　harm？
  Men。　There　are　some　who　think　that　the　evils　will　do　them　good；
  and　others　who　know　that　they　will　do　them　harm。
  Soc。　And；　in　your　opinion；　do　those　who　think　that　they　will　do　them
  good　know　that　they　are　evils？
  Men。　Certainly　not。
  Soc。　Is　it　not　obvious　that　those　who　are　ignorant　of　their　nature
  do　not