in　the　strict　and　proper　sense　of　the　word。　A　Being　whose
  spirituality；　omnipresence；　providence；　omniscience；　infinite
  power　and　goodness；　are　as　conspicuous　as　the　existence　of
  sensible　things；　of　which　（notwithstanding　the　fallacious
  pretences　and　affected　scruples　of　Sceptics）　there　is　no　more
  reason　to　doubt　than　of　our　own　being。　　Then；　with　relation　to
  human　sciences。　In　Natural　Philosophy；　what　intricacies；　what
  obscurities；　what　contradictions　hath　the　belief　of　Matter　led
  men　into！　To　say　nothing　of　the　numberless　disputes　about　its
  extent；　continuity；　homogeneity；　gravity；　divisibility；　&c。　　do
  they　not　pretend　to　explain　all　things　by　bodies　operating　on
  bodies；　according　to　the　laws　of　motion？　and　yet；　are　they　able
  to　comprehend　how　one　body　should　move　another？　Nay；　admitting
  there　was　no　difficulty　in　reconciling　the　notion　of　an　inert
  being　with　a　cause；　or　in　conceiving　how　an　accident　might　pass
  from　one　body　to　another；　yet；　by　all　their　strained　thoughts　and
  extravagant　suppositions；　have　they　been　able　to　reach　the
  production　of　any　one　animal　or　vegetable　body？　Can
  they　account；　by　the　laws　of　motion；　for　sounds；　tastes；　smells；
  or　colours；　or　for　the　regular　course　of　things？　Have　they
  accounted；　by　physical　principles；　for　the　aptitude　and
  contrivance　even　of　the　most　inconsiderable　parts　of　the
  universe？　But；　laying　aside　Matter　and　corporeal；　causes；　and
  admitting　only　the　efficiency　of　an　All…perfect　Mind；　are　not　all
  the　effects　of　nature　easy　and　intelligible？　If　the
  are　nothing　else　but　；　God　is　a　；　but　Matter　an
  unintelligent；　unperceiving　being。　If　they　demonstrate　an
  unlimited　power　in　their　cause；　God　is　active　and　omnipotent；　but
  Matter　an　inert　mass。　If　the　order；　regularity；　and　usefulness　of
  them　can　｛258｝　never　be　sufficiently　admired；　God　is　infinitely
  wise　and　provident；　but　Matter　destitute　of　all　contrivance　and
  design。　These　surely　are　great　advantages　in　。　Not　to
  mention　that　the　apprehension　of　a　distant　Deity　naturally
  disposes　men　to　a　negligence　in　their　moral　actions；　which　they
  would　be　more　cautious　of；　in　case　they　thought　Him　immediately
  present；　and　acting　on　their　minds；　without　the　interposition　of
  Matter；　or　unthinking　second　causes。　　Then　in　：
  what　difficulties　concerning　entity　in　abstract；　substantial
  forms；　hylarchic　principles；　plastic　natures；　substance　and
  accident；　principle　of　individuation；　possibility　of　Matter's
  thinking；　origin　of　ideas；　the　manner　how　two　independent
  substances　so　widely　different　as　；　should
  mutually　operate　on　each　other？　what　difficulties；　I　say；　and
  endless　disquisitions；　concerning　these　and　innumerable　other　the
  like　points；　do　we　escape；　by　supposing　only　Spirits　and　ideas？　…
  …　Even　the　　themselves；　if　we　take　away　the　absolute
  existence　of　extended　things；　become　much　more　clear　and　easy；
  the　most　shocking　paradoxes　and　intricate　speculations　in　those
  sciences　depending　on　the。　infinite　divisibility　of　finite
  extension；　which　depends　on　that　supposition　　But　what　need　is
  there　to　insist　on　the　particular　sciences？　Is　not　that
  opposition　to　all　science　whatsoever；　that　frenzy　of　the　ancient
  and　modern　Sceptics；　built　on　the　same　foundation？　Or　can　you
  produce　so　much　as　one　argument　against　the　reality　of　corporeal
  things；　or　in　behalf　of　that　avowed　utter　ignorance　of　their
  natures；　which　doth　not　suppose　their　reality　to　consist　in　an
  external　absolute　existence？　Upon　this　supposition；　indeed；　the
  objections　from　the　change　of　colours　in　a　pigeon's　neck；　or　the
  appearance　of　the　broken　oar　in　the　water；　must　be　allowed　to
  have　weight。　But　these　and　the　like　objections　vanish；　if　we　do
  not　maintain　the　being　of　absolute　external　originals；　but　place
  the　reality　of　things　in　ideas；。　fleeting　indeed；　and　changeable；
  however；　not　changed　at　random；　but　according　to　the　fixed
  order　of　nature。　For；　herein　consists　that　constancy　and　truth　of
  things　which　secures　all　the　concerns　of　life；　and　distinguishes
  that　which　is　real　from　the　　the　fancy。
  ｛259｝
  。　I　agree　to　all　you　have　now　said。；　and　must　own　that
  nothing　can　incline　me　to　embrace　your　opinion　more　than　the
  advantages　I　see　it　is　attended　with。　I　am　by　nature　lazy；　and
  this　would　be　a　mighty　abridgment　in　knowledge。　What　doubts；　what
  hypotheses；　what　labyrinths　of　amusement；　what　fields　of
  disputation；　what　an　ocean　of　false　learning；　may　be　avoided　by
  that　single　notion　of　！
  。　After　all；　is　there　anything　farther　remaining　to　be
  done？　You　may　remember　you　promised　to　embrace　that　opinion　which
  upon　examination　should　appear　most　agreeable　to　Common　Sense　and
  remote　from　Scepticism。　This；　by　your　own　confession；　is　that
  which　denies　Matter；　or　the　　existence　of　corporeal
  things。　Nor　is　this　all；　the　same　notion　has　been　proved　several
  ways；　viewed　in　different　lights；　pursued　in　its　consequences；
  and　all　objections　against　it　cleared。　Can　there　be　a　greater
  evidence　of　its　truth？　or　is　it　possible　it　should　have　all　the
  marks　of　a　true　opinion　and　yet　be　false？
  。　I　own　myself　entirely　satisfied　for　the　present　in
  all　respects。　But；　what　security　can　I　have　that　I　shall　still
  continue　the　same　full　assent　to　your　opinion；　and　that　no
  unthought…of　objection　or　difficulty　will　occur　hereafter？
  。　Pray；　Hylas；　do　you　in　other　cases；　when　a　point　is
  once　evidently　proved；　withhold　your　consent　on　account　of
  objections　or　difficulties　it　may　be　liable　to？　Are　the
  difficulties　that　attend　the　doctrine　of　incommensurable
  quantities；　of　the　angle　of　contact；　of　the　asymptotes　to　curves；
  or　the　like；　sufficient　to　make　you　hold　out　against　mathematical
  demonstration？　Or　will　you　disbelieve　the　Providence　of　God；
  because　there　may　be　some　particular　things　which　you　know　not
  how　to　reconcile　with　it？　If　there　are　difficulties　；　there　are　at　the　same　time　direct　and　evident
  proofs　of　it。　But　for　the　existence　of　Matter　there　is　not　one
  proof；　and　far　more　numerous　and　insurmountable　objections　lie
  against　it。　But　where　are　those　mighty　difficulties　you　insist
  on？　Alas！　you　know　not　where　or　what　they　are；　something　which
  may　possibly　occur　hereafter。　If　this　be　a　sufficient　pretence
  for　withholding　your　full　assent；　you　should　never　yield　it　to
  any　proposition；　how　free　soever　from　exceptions；　how　clearly　and
  solidly　soever　demonstrated。
  。　You　have　satisfied　me；　Philonous。
  。　But；　to　arm　you　against　all　future　objections；　do
  but　consider：　That　which　bears　equally　hard　on　two　contradictory
  ｛260｝　opinions　can　be　proof　against　neither。　Whenever；　therefore；
  any　difficulty　occurs；　try　if　you　can　find　a　solution　for　it　on
  the　hypothesis　of　the　。　Be　not　deceived　by　words；
  but　sound　your　own　thoughts。　And　in　case　you　cannot　conceive　it
  easier　by　the　help　of　；　it　is　plain　it　can　be　no
  objection　against　。　Had　you　proceeded　all　along　by
  this　rule；　you　would　probably　have　spared　yourself　abundance　of
  trouble　in　objecting；　since　of　all　your　difficulties　I　challenge
  you　to　shew　one　that　is　explained　by　Matter：　nay；　which　is　not
  more　unintelligible　with　than　without　that　supposition；　and
  consequently　makes　rather　　for　it。　You　should
  consider；　in　each　particular；　whether　the　difficulty　arises　from
  the　…。　If　it　doth　not；　you　might　as
  well　argue　from　the　infinite　divisibility　of　extension　against
  the　Divine　prescience；　as　from　such　a　difficulty　against
  。　And　yet；　upon　recollection；　I　believe　you　will
  find　this　to　have　been　often；　if　not　always；　the　case。　You　should
  likewise　take　heed　not　to　argue　on　a　。　One　is
  apt　to　say　　The　unknown　substances　ought　to　be　esteemed　real
  things；　rather　than　the　ideas　in　our　minds：　and　who　can　tell　but
  the　unthinking　external　substance　may　concur；　as　a　cause　or
  instrument；　in　the　productions　of　our　ideas？　But　is　not　this
  proceeding　on　a　supposition　that　there　are　such　external
  substances？　And　to　suppose　this；　is　it　not　begging　the　question？
  But；　above　all　things；　you　should　beware　of　imposing　on　yourself
  by　that　vulgar　sophism　which　is　called　。　You
  talked　often　as　if　you　thought　I　maintained　the　non…existence　of
  Sensible　Things。　Whereas　in　truth　no　one　can　be　more　thoroughly
  assured　of　their　existence　than　I　am。　And　it　is　you　who　doubt；　I
  should　have　said；　positively　deny　it。　Everything　that　is　seen；
  felt；　heard；　or　any　way　perceived　by　the　senses；　is；　on　the
  principles　I　embrace；　a　real　being；　but　not　on　yours。　Remember；
  the　Matter　you　contend　for　is　an　Unknown　Somewhat　（if　indeed　it
  may　be　termed　）；　which　is　quite　stripped　of　all
  sensible　qualities；　and　can　neither　be　perceived　by　sense；　nor
  apprehended　by　the　mind。　Remember　I　say；　that　it　is　not　any
  object　which　is　hard　or　soft；　hot　or　cold；　blue　or　white；　round
  or　square；　&c。　For　all　these　things　I　affirm　do　exist。　Though
  indeed　I　deny　they　have　an　existence　distinct　from　being
  perceived；　or　that　they　exist　out