there　should　be　room　for　all　those　trees　and　houses　to　exist　in
  your　mind。　Can　extended　things　be　contained　in　that　which　is
  unextended？　Or；　are　we　to　imagine　impressions　made　on　a　thing
  void　of　all　solidity？　You　cannot　say　objects　are　in　your　mind；　as
  books　in　your　study：　or　that　things　are　imprinted　on　it；　as　the
  figure　of　a　seal　upon　wax。　In　what　sense；　therefore；　are　we　to
  understand　those　expressions？　Explain　me　this　if　you　can：　and　I
  shall　then　be　able　to　answer　all　those　queries　you　formerly　put
  to　me　about　my　。
  。　Look　you；　Hylas；　when　I　speak　of　objects　as　existing
  in　the　mind；　or　imprinted　on　the　senses；　I　would　not　be
  understood　in　the　gross　literal　sense；　as　when　bodies　are　said　to
  exist　in　a　place；　or　a　seal　to　make　an　impression　upon　wax。　My
  meaning　is　only　that　the　mind　comprehends　or　perceives　them；　and
  that　it　is　affected　from　without；　or　by　some　being　distinct　from
  itself。　This　is　my　explication　of　your　difficulty；　and　how　it　can
  serve　to　make　your　tenet　of　an　unperceiving　material
  intelligible；　I　would　fain　know。
  。　Nay；　if　that　be　all；　I　confess　I　do　not　see　what　use
  can　be　made　of　it。　But　are　you　not　guilty　of　some　abuse　of
  language　in　this？
  。　None　at　all。　It　is　no　more　than　common　custom；　which
  you　know　is　the　rule　of　language；　hath　authorised：　nothing　being
  more　usual；　than　for　philosophers　to　speak　of　the　immediate
  objects　of　the　understanding　as　things　existing　in　the　mind。　'Nor
  is　there　anything　in　this　but　what　is　conformable　to　the　general
  analogy　of　language；　most　part　of　the　mental　operations　being
  signified　by　words　borrowed　from　sensible　things；　as　is　plain　in
  the　terms　；　reflect；　；　&。；　which；　being
  applied　to　the　mind；　must　not　be　taken　in　their　gross；　original
  sense。
  。　You　have；　I　own；　satisfied　me　in　this　point。　But
  there　still　remains　one　great　difficulty；　which　I　know　not　how
  you　will　get　over。　And；　indeed；　it　is　of　such　importance　that　if
  you　could　solve　all　others；　without　being　able　to　find　a　solution
  for　this；　you　must　never　expect　to　make　me　a　proselyte　to　your
  principles。
  。　Let　me　know　this　mighty　difficulty。
  。　The　Scripture　account　of　the　creation　is　what　appears
  to　me　utterly　irreconcilable　with　your　notions。　Moses　tells　us　of
  a　creation：　a　creation　of　what？　of　ideas？　No；　certainly；　but　of
  things；　of　real　things；　solid　corporeal　substances。　Bring　your
  principles　to　agree　with　this；　and　I　shall　perhaps　agree　with
  you。
  。　Moses　mentions　the　sun；　moon；　and　stars；　earth　and
  sea；　plants　and　animals。　That　all　these　do　really　exist；　and　were
  in　the　beginning　created　by　God；　I　make　no　question。　｛251｝　If　by
  you　mean　fictions　and　fancies　of　the　mind；　then　these　are
  no　ideas。　If　by　　you　mean　immediate　objects　of　the
  understanding；　or　sensible　things；　which　cannot　exist
  unperceived；　or　out　of　a　mind；　then　these　things　are　ideas。　But
  whether　you　do　or　do　not　call　them　；　　matters　little。
  The　difference　is　only　about　a　name。　And；　whether　that　name　be
  retained　or　rejected；　the　sense；　the　truth；　and　reality　of　things
  continues　the　same。　In　common　talk；　the　objects　of　our　senses　are
  not　termed　；　but　。　Call　them　so　still：　provided
  you　do　not　attribute　to　them　any　absolute　external　existence；　and
  I　shall　never　quarrel　with　you　for　a　word。　The　creation；
  therefore；　I　allow　to　have　been　a　creation　of　things；　of
  things。　Neither　is　this　in　the　least　inconsistent　with　my
  principles；　as　is　evident　from　what　I　have　now　said；　and　would
  have　been　evident　to　you　without　this；　if　you　had　not　forgotten
  what　had　been　so　often　said　before。　But　as　for　solid　corporeal
  substances；　I　desire　you　to　show　where　Moses　makes　any　mention　of
  them；　and；　if　they　should　be　mentioned　by　him；　or　any　other
  inspired　writer；　it　would　still　be　incumbent　on　you　to　shew　those
  words　were　not　taken　in　the　vulgar　acceptation；　for　things
  falling　under　our　senses；　but　in　the　philosophic　acceptation；　for
  Matter；　or　；　。
  When　you　have　proved　these　points；　then　（and　not　till　then）　may
  you　bring　the　authority　of　Moses　into　our　dispute。
  。　It　is　in　vain　to　dispute　about　a　point　so　clear。　I　am
  content　to　refer　it　to　your　own　conscience。　Are　you　not　satisfied
  there　is　some　peculiar　repugnancy　between　the　Mosaic　account　of
  the　creation　and　your　notions？
  。　If　all　possible　sense　which　can　be　put　on　the　first
  chapter　of　Genesis　may　be　conceived　as　consistently　with　my
  principles　as　any　other；　then　it　has　no　peculiar　repugnancy　with
  them。　But　there　is　no　sense　you　may　not　as　well　conceive；
  believing　as　I　do。　Since；　besides　spirits；　all　you　conceive　are
  ideas；　and　the　existence　of　these　I　do　not　deny。　Neither　do　you
  pretend　they　exist　without　the　mind。
  。　Pray　let　me　see　any　sense　you　can　understand　it　in。
  。　Why；　I　imagine　that　if　I　had　been　present　at　the
  creation；　I　should　have　seen　things　produced　into　being　　that
  is　become　perceptible　　in　the　order　prescribed　by　the　sacred
  historian。　I　ever　before　believed　the　Mosaic　account　of　the
  creation；　and　now　find　no　alteration　in　my　manner　of　believing
  it。　When　things　are　said　to　begin　or　end　their　existence；　we
  ｛252｝　do　not　mean　this　with　regard　to　God；　but　His　creatures。　All
  objects　are　eternally　known　by　God；　or；　which　is　the　same　thing；
  have　an　eternal　existence　in　His　mind：　but　when　things；　before
  imperceptible　to　creatures；　are；　by　a　decree　of　God；　perceptible
  to　them；　then　are　they　said　to　begin　a　relative　existence；　with
  respect　to　created　minds。　Upon　reading　therefore　the　Mosaic
  account　of　the　creation；　I　understand　that　the　several　parts　of
  the　world　became　gradually　perceivable　to　finite　spirits；　endowed
  with　proper　faculties；　so　that；　whoever　such　were　present；　they
  were　in　truth　perceived　by　them。　This　is　the　literal　obvious
  sense　suggested　to　me　by　the　words　of　the　Holy　Scripture：　in
  which　is　included　no　mention；　or　no　thought；　either　of
  ；