life；　without　any　regard　to　speculation。
  。　Methinks　I　apprehend　your　meaning。
  。　It　is　your　opinion　the　ideas　we　perceive　by　our
  senses　are　not　real　things；　but　images　or　copies　of　them。　Our
  knowledge；　therefore；　is　no　farther　real　than　as　our　ideas　are
  the　true　　of　those　。　But；　as　these
  supposed　originals　are　in　themselves　unknown；　it　is　impossible　to
  know　how　far　our　ideas　resemble　them；　or　whether　they　resemble
  them　at　all。　We　cannot；　therefore；　be　sure　we　have　any　real
  knowledge。　Farther；　as　our　ideas　are　perpetually　varied；　without
  any　change　in　the　supposed　real　things；　it　necessarily　follows
  they　cannot　all　be　true　copies　of　them：　or；　if　some　are　and
  others　are　not；　it　is　impossible　to　distinguish　the　former　from
  the　latter。　And　this　plunges　us　yet　deeper　in　uncertainty。　Again；
  when　we　consider　the　point；　we　cannot　conceive　how　any　idea；　or
  anything　like　an　idea；　should　have　an　absolute　existence　out　of　a
  mind：　nor　consequently；　according　to　you；　how　there　should　be　any
  real　thing　in　nature。　The　result　of　；all　which　is　that　we　are
  thrown　into　the　most　hopeless　and　abandoned　scepticism。　Now；　give
  me　leave　to　ask　you；　First；　Whether　your　referring　ideas　to
  certain　absolutely　existing　unperceived　substances；　as　their
  originals；　be　not　the　source　of　all　this　scepticism？　Secondly；
  whether　you　are　informed；　either　by　sense　or　reason；　of　the
  existence　of　those　unknown　originals？　And；　in　case　you　are　not；
  whether　it　be　not　absurd　to　suppose　them？　Thirdly；　Whether；　upon
  inquiry；　you　find　there　is　anything　distinctly　conceived　or　meant
  by　the　？　Lastly；　Whether；　the　premises　considered；　it　be　not
  the　wisest　way　to　follow　nature；　trust　your　senses；　and；　laying
  aside　all　anxious　thought　about　unknown　natures　or　substances；
  admit　with　the　vulgar　those　for　real　things　which　are　perceived
  by　the　senses？
  。　For　the　present；　I　have　no　inclination　to　the
  answering　part。　I　would　much　rather　see　how　you　can　get　over　what
  follows。　Pray　are　not　the　objects　perceived　by　the　｛247｝
  of　one；　likewise　perceivable　to　others　present？　If　there　were　a
  hundred　more　here；　they　would　all　see　the　garden；　the　trees；　and
  flowers；　as　I　see　them。　But　they　are　not　in　the　same　manner
  affected　with　the　ideas　I　frame　in　my　。　Does　not
  this　make　a　difference　between　the　former　sort　of　objects　and　the
  latter？
  。　I　grant　it　does。　Nor　have　I　ever　denied　a　difference
  between　the　objects　of　sense　and　those　of　imagination。　But　what
  would　you　infer　from　thence？　You　cannot　say　that　sensible　objects
  exist　unperceived；　because　they　are　perceived　by　many。
  。　I　own　I　can　make　nothing　of　that　objection：　but　it
  hath　led　me　into　another。　Is　it　not　your　opinion　that　by　our
  senses　we　perceive　only　the　ideas　existing　in　our　minds？
  。　It　is。
  。　But　the　　idea　which　is　in　my　mind　cannot　be　in
  yours；　or　in　any　other　mind。　Doth　it　not　therefore　follow；　from
  your　principles；　that　no　two　can　see　the　same　thing？　And　is　not
  this　highly；　absurd？
  。　If　the　term　　be　taken　in　the　vulgar
  acceptation；　it　is　certain　（and　not　at　all　repugnant　to　the
  principles　I　maintain）　that　different　persons　may　perceive　the
  same　thing；　or　the　same　thing　or　idea　exist　in　different　minds。
  Words　are　of　arbitrary　imposition；　and；　since　men　are　used　to
  apply　the　word　　where　no　distinction　or　variety　is
  perceived；　and　I　do　not　pretend　to　alter　their　perceptions；　it
  follows　that；　as　men　have　said　before；　；　so　they　may；　upon　like　occasions；　still　continue　to　use
  the　same　phrase；　without　any　deviation　either　from　propriety　of
  language；　or　the　truth　of　things。　But；　if　the　term　　be　used
  in　the　acceptation　of　philosophers；　who　pretend　to　an　abstracted
  notion　of　identity；　then；　according　to　their　sundry　definitions
  of　this　notion　（for　it　is　not　yet　agreed　wherein　that　philosophic
  identity　consists）；　it　may　or　may　not　be　possible　for　divers
  persons　to　perceive　the　same　thing。　But　whether　philosophers
  shall　think　fit　to　　a　thing　the　　no；　is；　I
  conceive；　of　small　importance。　Let　us　suppose　several　men
  together；　all　endued　with　the　same　faculties；　and　consequently
  affected　in　like　sort　by　their　senses；　and　who　had　yet　never
  known　the　use　of　language；　they　would；　without　question；　agree　in
  their　perceptions。　Though　perhaps；　when　they　came　to　the　use　of
  speech；　some　regarding　the　uniformness　of　what　was　perceived；
  might　call　it　the　　thing：　others；　especially　｛248｝
  regarding　the　diversity　of　persons　who　perceived；　might　choose
  the　denomination　of　　things。　But　who　sees　not　that　all
  the　dispute　is　about　a　word？　to　wit；　whether。　what　is　perceived
  by　different　persons　may　yet　have　the　term　　applied　to　it？
  Or；　suppose　a　house；　whose　walls　or　outward　shell　remaining
  unaltered；　the　chambers　are　all　pulled　down；　and　new　ones　built
  in　their　place；　and　that　you　should　call　this　the　；　and　I
  should　say　it　was　not　the　　house。　　would　we　not；　for　all
  this；　perfectly　agree　in　our　thoughts　of　the　house；　considered　in
  itself？　And　would　not　all　the　difference　consist　in　a　sound？　If
  you　should　say；　We　differed　in　our　notions；　for　that　you　super…
  added　to　your　idea　of　the　house　the　simple　abstracted　idea　of
  identity；　whereas　I　did　not；　I　would　tell　you；　I　know　not　what
  you　mean　by　；　and　should　desire
  you　to　look　into　your　own　thoughts；　and　be　sure　you　understood
  yourself。　　Why　so　silent；　Hylas？　Are　you　not　yet　satisfied　men
  may　dispute　about　identity　and　diversity；　without　any　real
  difference　in　their　thoughts　and　opinions；　abstracted　from　names？
  Take　this　farther　reflexion　with　you：　that　whether　Matter　be
  allowed　to　exist　or　no；　the　case　is　exactly　the　same　as　to　the
  point　in　hand。　For　the　Materialists　themselves　acknowledge　what
  we　immediately　perceive　by　our　senses　to　be　our　own　ideas。　Your
  difficulty；　therefore；　that　no　two　see　the　same　thing；　makes
  equally　against　the　Materialists　and　me。
  。　＇Ay；　Philonous；＇＇10＇　But　they　suppose　an　external
  archetype；　to　which　referring　their　several　ideas　they　may　truly
  be　said　to　perceive　the　same　thing。
  。　And　（not　to　mention　your　having　discarded　those
  archetypes）　so　may　you　suppose　an　external　archetype　on　my
  principles；　　；　；　：　though
  indeed　it　must　be'　supposed　to　exist　in　that　Mind　which
  comprehends　all　things；　but　then；　this　serves　all　the　ends　of
  ；　as　well　as　if　it　existed　out　of　a　mind。　And　I　am　sure
  you　yourself　will　not　say　it　is　less　intelligible。
  。　You　have　indeed　clearly　satisfied　me　　either　that
  there　is　no　difficulty　at　bottom　in　this　point；　or；　if　there　be；
  that　it　makes　equally　against　both　opinions。
  。　But　that　which　makes　equally　against　two
  contradictory　opinions　can　be　a　proof　against　neither。
  。　I　acknowledge　it。　But；　after　all；　Philonous；　when　I
  consider　｛249｝　the　substance　of　what　you　advance　against
  ；　it　amounts　to　no　more　than　this：　We　are　sure　that
  we　really　see；　hear；　feel；　in　a　word；　that　we　are　affected　with
  sensible　impressions。
  。　And　how　are　　concerned　any　farther？　I　see　this
  cherry；　I　feel　it；　I　taste　it：　and　I　am　sure　　cannot　be
  seen；　or　felt；　or。　tasted：　it　is　therefore　red。　Take　away　the
  sensations　of　softness；　moisture；　redness；　tartness；　and　you　take
  away　the　cherry；　since　it　is　not　a　being　distinct　from
  sensations。　A　cherry；　I　say；　is　nothing　but　a　congeries　of
  sensible　impressions；　or　ideas　perceived　by　various　senses：　which
  ideas　are　united　into　one　thing　（or　have　one　name　given　them）　by
  the　mind；　because　they　are　observed　to　attend　each　other。　Thus；
  when　the　palate　is　affected　with　such　a　particular　taste；　the
  sight　is　affected　with　a　red　colour；　the　touch　with　roundness；
  softness；　&c。　Hence；　when　I　see；　and　feel；　and　taste；　in　such
  sundry　certain　manners；　I　am　sure　the　cherry　exists；　or　is　real；
  its　reality　being　in　my　opinion　nothing　abstracted　from　those
  sensations。　But　if　by　the　word　　you；　mean　an　unknown
  nature；　distinct　from　all　those　sensible　qualities；　and　by　its
  something　distinct　from　its　being　perceived；　then；
  indeed；　I　own；　neither　you　nor　I；　nor　any　one　else；　can　be　sure
  it　exists。
  。　But；　what　would　you　say；　Philonous；　if　I　should　bring
  the　very　same　reasons　against　the　existence　of　sensible　things
  ；　which　you　have　offered　against　their　existing　？
  。　When　I　see　your　reasons；　you　shall　hear　what　I　have
  to　say　；to　them。
  。　Is　the　mind　extended　or　unextended？
  。　Unextended；　without　doubt。
  。　Do　you　say　the　things　you　perceive　are　in　your　mind？
  。　They　are。
  。　Again；　have　I　not　heard　you　speak　of　sensible
  impressions？
  。　I　believe　you　may。
  。　Explain　to　me　now；　0　Philonous！　how　it　is　possible
  there　should　be　room　for　all　those　trees　and　houses　to　exist　in
  your　mind。　Can　extended　things　be　contai