。　I　shall　insist　no　longer　on　that　point。　Do　you　think；
  however；　you　shall　persuade　me　that　the　natural　philosophers　have
  been　dreaming　all　this　while？　Pray　what　becomes　of　all　their
  hypotheses　and　explications　of　the　phenomena；　which　suppose　the
  existence　of　Matter？
  。　What　mean　you；　Hylas；　by　the　？
  。　I　mean　the　appearances　which　I　perceive　by　my　senses。
  。　And　the　appearances　perceived　by　sense；　are　they　not
  ideas？
  。　I　have　told　you　so　a　hundred　times。
  。　Therefore；　to　explain　the　phenomena；　is；　to　shew　how
  we　come　to　be　affected　with　ideas；　in　that　manner　and　order
  wherein　they　are　imprinted　on　our　senses。　Is　it　not？
  。　It　is。
  。　Now；　if　you　can　prove　that　any　philosopher　has
  explained　the　production　of　any　one　idea　in　our　minds　by　the　help
  of　；　I　shall　for　ever　acquiesce；　and　look　on　all　that
  hath　been　said　against　it　as　nothing；　but；　if　you　cannot；　it　is
  vain　to　urge　the　explication　of　phenomena。　That　a　Being　endowed
  with　knowledge　and　will　should　produce　or　exhibit　ideas　is　easily
  understood。　But　that　a　Being　which　is　utterly　destitute　of　these
  faculties　should　be　able　to　produce　ideas；　or　in　any　sort　to
  affect　an　intelligence；　this　I　can　never　understand。　This　I　say；
  though　｛243｝　we　had　some　positive　conception　of　Matter；　though　we
  knew　its　qualities；　and　could　comprehend　its　existence；　would　yet
  be　so　far　from　explaining　things；　that　it　is　itself　the　most
  inexplicable　thing　in　the　world。　And　yet；　for　all　this；　it　will
  not　follow　that　philosophers　have　been　doing　nothing；　for；　by
  observing　and　reasoning　upon　the　connexion　of　ideas；　they
  discover　the　laws　and　methods　of　nature；　which　is　a　part　of
  knowledge　both　useful　and　entertaining。
  。　After　all；　can　it　be　supposed　God　would　deceive　all
  mankind？　Do　you　imagine　He　would　have　induced　the　whole　world　to
  believe　the　being　of　Matter；　if　there　was　no　such　thing？
  。　That　every　epidemical　opinion；　arising　from
  prejudice；　or　passion；　or　thoughtlessness；　may　be　imputed　to　God；
  as　the　Author　of　it；　I　believe　you　will　not　affirm。　Whatsoever
  opinion　we　father　'　on　Him；　it　must　be　either　because　He　has
  discovered　it　to　us　by　supernatural　revelation；　or　because　it　is
  so　evident　to　our　natural　faculties；　which　were　framed　and　given
  us　by　God；　that　it　is　impossible　we　should　withhold　our　assent
  from　it。　But　where　is　the　revelation？　or　where　is　the　evidence
  that　extorts　the　belief　of　Matter？　Nay；　how　does　it　appear；　that
  Matter；　；　is　thought　to　exist　by　all　mankind；　or　indeed；　by
  any　except　a　few　philosophers；　who　do　not　know　what　they　would　be
  at？　Your　question　supposes　these　points　are　clear；　and；　when　you
  have　cleared　them；　I　shall　think　myself　obliged　to　give　you
  another　answer。　In　the　meantime；　let　it　suffice　that　I　tell　you；
  I　do　not　suppose　God　has　deceived　mankind　at　all。
  。　But　the　novelty；　Philonous；　the　novelty！　There　lies
  the　danger。　New　notions　should　always　be　discountenanced；　they
  unsettle　men's　minds；　and　nobody　knows　where　they　will　end。
  。　Why　the　rejecting　a　notion　that　has　no　foundation；
  either　in　sense；　or　in　reason；　or　in　Divine　authority；　should　be
  thought　to　unsettle　the　belief　of　such　opinions　as　are　grounded
  on　all　or　any　of　these；　I　cannot　imagine。　That　innovations　in
  government　and　religion　are　dangerous；　and　ought　to　be
  discountenanced；　I　freely　own。　But　is　there　the　like　reason　why
  they　should　be　discouraged　in　philosophy？　The　making　anything
  known　which　was　unknown　before　is　an　innovation　in　knowledge：
  and；　if　all　such　innovations　had　been　forbidden；　｛244｝　men　would
  have　made　a　notable　progress　in　the　arts　and　sciences。　But　it　is
  none　of　my　business　to　plead　for　novelties　and　paradoxes。　That
  the　qualities　we　perceive　are　not　on　the　objects：　that　we　must
  not　believe　our　senses：　that　we　know　nothing　of　the　real　nature
  of　things；　and　can　never　be　assured　even　of　their　existence：　that
  real　colours　and　sounds　are　nothing　but　certain　unknown　figures
  and　motions：　that　motions　are　in　themselves　neither　swift　nor
  slow：　that　there　are　in　bodies　absolute　extensions；　without　any
  particular　magnitude　or　figure：　that　a　thing　stupid；　thoughtless；
  and　inactive；　operates　on　a　spirit：　that　the　least　particle　of　a
  body　contains　innumerable　extended　parts：　　these　are　the
  novelties；　these　are　the　strange　notions　which　shock　the　genuine
  uncorrupted　judgment　of　all　mankind；　and　being　once　admitted；
  embarrass　the　mind　with　endless　doubts　and　difficulties。　And　it
  is　against　these　and　the　like　innovations　I　endeavour　to
  vindicate　Common　Sense。　It　is　true；　in　doing　this；　I　may　perhaps
  be　obliged　to　use　some　；　and　ways　of　speech　not　common。
  But；　if　my　notions　are　once　thoroughly　understood；　that　which　is
  most　singular　in　them　will；　in　effect；　be　found　to　amount　to　no
  more　than　this。　　that　it　is　absolutely　impossible；　and　a　plain
  contradiction；　to　suppose　any　unthinking　Being　should　exist
  without　being　perceived　by　a　Mind。　And；　if　this　notion　be
  singular；　it　is　a　shame　it　should　be　so；　at　this　time　of　day；　and
  in　a　Christian　country。
  。　As　for　the　difficulties　other　opinions　may　be　liable
  to；。　those　are　out　of　the　question。　It　is　your　business　to　defend
  your　own　opinion。　Can　anything　be　plainer　than　that　you　are　for
  changing　all　things　into　ideas？　You；　I　say；　who　are　not　ashamed
  to　charge　me　。　This　is　so　plain；　there　is　no
  denying　it。
  。　You　mistake　me。　I　am　not　for　changing　things　into
  ideas；　but　rather　ideas　into　things；　since　those　immediate
  objects　of　perception；　which；　according　to　you；　are　only
  appearances　of　things；　I　take　to　be　the　real　things　themselves。
  。　Things！　You　may　pretend　what　you　please；　but　it　is
  certain　you　leave　us　nothing　but　the　empty　forms　of　things；　the
  outside　only　which　strikes　the　senses。
  。　What　you　call　the　empty　forms　and　outside　of　things
  seem　to　me　the　very　things　themselves。　Nor　are　they　empty　or
  incomplete；　otherwise　than　upon　your　supposition　　that　Matter
  ｛245｝　is　an　essential　part　of　all　corporeal　things。　We　both；
  therefore；　agree　in　this；　that　we　perceive　only　sensible　forms：
  but　herein　we　differ　　you　will　have　them　to　be　empty
  appearances；　I；　real　beings。　In　short；　you　do　not　trust　your
  senses；　I　do。
  。　You　say　you　believe　your　senses；　and　seem　to　applaud
  yourself　that　in　this　you　agree　with　the　vulgar。　According　to
  you；　therefore；　the　true　nature　of　a　thing　is　discovered　by　the
  senses。　If　so；　whence　comes　that　disagreement？　Why　is　not　the
  same　figure；　and　other　sensible　qualities；　perceived　all　manner
  of　ways？　and　why　should　we　use　a　microscope　the　better　to
  discover　the　true　nature　of　a　body；　if　it　were　discoverable　to
  the　naked　eye？
  。　Strictly　speaking；　Hylas；　we　do　not　see　the　same
  object　that　we　feel；　neither　is　the　same　object　perceived　by　the
  microscope　which　was　by　the　naked　eye。　But；　in　case　every
  variation　was　thought　sufficient　to　constitute　a　new　kind　of
  individual；　the　endless　number　of　confusion　of　names　would　render
  language　impracticable。　Therefore；　to　avoid　this；　as　well　as
  other　inconveniences　which　are　obvious　upon　a　little　thought；　men
  combine　together　several　ideas；　apprehended　by　divers　senses；　or
  by　the　same　sense　at　different　times；　or　in　different
  circumstances；　but　observed；　however；　to　have　some　connexion　in
  nature；　either　with　respect　to　co…existence　or　succession；　all
  which　they　refer　to　one　name；　and　consider　as　one　thing。　Hence　it
  follows　that　when　I　examine；　by　my　other　senses；　a　thing　I　have
  seen；　it　is　not　in　order　to　understand　better　the　same　object
  which　I　had　perceived　by　sight；　the　object　of　one　sense　not　being
  perceived　by　the　other　senses。　And；　when　I　look　through　a
  microscope；　it　is　not　that　I　may　perceive　more　clearly　what　I
  perceived　already　with　my　bare　eyes；　the　object　perceived　by　the
  glass　being　quite　different　from　the　former。　But；　in　both　cases；
  my　aim　is　only　to　know　what　ideas　are　connected　together；　and　the
  more　a　man　knows　of　the　connexion　of　ideas；　the　more　he　is　said
  to　know　of　the　nature　of　things。　What；　therefore；　if　our　ideas
  are　variable；　what　if　our　senses　are　not　in　all　circumstances
  affected　with　the　same　appearances。　It　will　not　thence　follow
  they　are　not　to　be　trusted；　or　that　they　are　inconsistent　either
  with　themselves　or　anything　else：　except　it　be　with　your
  preconceived　notion　of　（I　know　not　what）　one　single；　unchanged；
  unperceivable；　real　Nature；　marked　by　each　name。　Which　prejudice
  seems　to　have　taken　its　rise　from　not　rightly　｛246｝　understanding
  the　common　language　of　men；　speaking　of　several　distinct　ideas　as
  united　into　one　thing　by　the　mind。　And；　indeed；　there　is　cause　to
  suspect　several　erroneous　conceits　of　the　philosophers　are　owing
  to　the　same　original：　while　they　began　to　build　their　schemes　not
  so　much　on　notions　as　on　words；　which　were　framed　by　the　vulgar；
  merely　for　conveniency　and　dispatch　in　the　common　actions　of
  life；　without　any　regard　to　speculation。
  。　Methinks　I　apprehend　your　meaning。