towards　the　moon　or　tower；　he　should　still　be　affected　with　the
  like　ideas；　he　is　mistaken。　But　his　mistake　lies　not　in　what　he
  perceives　immediately；　and　at　present；　（it　being　a　manifest
  contradiction　to　suppose　he　should　err　in　respect　of　that）　but　in
  the　wrong　judgment　he　makes　concerning　the　ideas　he　apprehends　to
  be　connected　with　those　immediately　perceived：　or；　concerning　the
  ideas　that；　from　what　he　perceives　at　present；　he　imagines　would
  be　perceived　in　other　circumstances。　The　case　is　the　same　with
  regard　to　the　Copernican　system。　We　do　not　here　perceive　any
  motion　of　the　earth：　but　it　were　erroneous　thence　to　conclude；
  that；　in　case　we　were　placed　at　as　great　a　distance　from　that　as
  we　are　now　from　the　other　planets；　we　should　not　then　perceive
  its　motion。
  。　I　understand　you；　and　must　needs　own　you　say　things
  plausible　enough。　But；　give　me　leave　to　put　you　in　mind　of　｛239｝
  one　thing。　Pray；　Philonous；　were　you　not　formerly　as　positive
  that　Matter　existed；　as　you　are　now　that　it　does　not？
  。　I　was。　But　here　lies　the　difference。　Before；　my
  positiveness　was　founded；　without　examination；　upon　prejudice；
  but　now；　after　inquiry；　upon　evidence。
  。　After　all；　it　seems　our　dispute　is　rather　about　words
  than　things。　We　agree　in　the　thing；　but　differ　in　the　name。　That
  we　are　affected　with　ideas　　is　evident；　and　it　is
  no　less　evident　that　there　must　be　（I　will　not　say　archetypes；
  but）　Powers　without　the　mind；　corresponding　to　those　ideas。　And；
  as　these　Powers　cannot　subsist　by　themselves；　there　is　some
  subject　of　them　necessarily　to　be　admitted；　which　I　call
  ；　and　you　call　。　This　is　all　the　difference。
  。　Pray；　Hylas；　is　that　powerful　Being；　or　subject　of
  powers；　extended？
  。　It　hath　not　extension；　but　it　hath　the　power　to　raise
  in　you　the　idea　of　extension。
  。　It　is　therefore　itself　unextended？
  。　I　grant　it。
  。　Is　it　not　also　active？
  。　Without　doubt。　Otherwise；　how　could　we　attribute
  powers　to　it？
  。　Now　let　me　ask　you　two　questions：　；　Whether
  it　be　agreeable　to　the　usage　either　of　philosophers　or　others　to
  give　the　name　　to　an　unextended　active　being？　And；
  ；　Whether　it　be　not　ridiculously　absurd　to　misapply
  names　contrary　to　the　common　use　of　language？
  。　Well　then；　let　it　not　be　called　Matter；　since　you
  will　have　it　so；　but　some　　distinct　from　Matter　and
  Spirit。　For　what　reason　is　there　why　you　should　call　it　Spirit？
  Does　not　the　notion　of　spirit　imply　that　it　is　thinking；　as　well
  as　active　and　unextended？
  。　My　reason　is　this：　because　I　have　a　mind　to　have
  some　notion　of　meaning　in　what　I　say：　but　I　have　no　notion　of　any
  action　distinct　from　volition；　neither。　can　I　conceive　volition
  to　be　anywhere　but　in　a　spirit：　therefore；　when　I　speak　of　an
  active　being；　I　am　obliged　to　mean　a　Spirit。　Beside；　what　can　be
  plainer　than　that　a　thing　which　hath　no　ideas　in　itself　cannot
  impart　them　to　me；　and；　if　it　hath　ideas；　surely　it　must　be　a
  Spirit。　To　make　you　comprehend　the　point　still　more　｛240｝　clearly
  if　it　be　possible；　I　assert　as　well　as　you　that；　since　we　are
  affected　from　without；　we　must　allow　Powers　to　be　without；　in　a
  Being　distinct　from　ourselves。　So　far　we　are　agreed。　But　then　we
  differ　as　to　the　kind　of　this　powerful　Being。　I　will　have　it　to
  be　Spirit；　you　Matter；　or　I　know　not　what　（I　may　add　too；　you
  know　not　what）　Third　Nature。　Thus；　I　prove　it　to　be　Spirit。　From
  the　effects　I　see　produced；　I　conclude　there　are　actions；　and；
  because　actions；　volitions；　and；　because　there　are　volitions；
  there　must　be　a　。　Again；　the　things　I　perceive　must　have　an
  existence；　they　or　their　archetypes；　out　of　　mind：　but；　being
  ideas；　neither　they　nor　their　archetypes　can　exist　otherwise　than
  in　an　understanding；　there　is　therefore　an　。　But
  will　and　understanding　constitute　in　the　strictest　sense　a　mind
  or　spirit。　The　powerful　cause；　therefore；　of　my　ideas　is　in
  strict　propriety　of　speech　a　。
  。　And　now　I　warrant　you　think　you　have　made　the　point
  very　clear；　little　suspecting　that　what　you　advance　leads
  directly　to　a　contradiction。　Is　it　not　an　absurdity　to　imagine
  any　imperfection　in　God？
  。　Without　a　doubt。
  。　To　suffer　pain　is　an　imperfection？
  。　It　is。
  。　Are　we　not　sometimes　affected　with　pain　and
  uneasiness　by　some　other　Being？
  。　We　are。
  。　And　have　you　not　said　that　Being　is　a　Spirit；　and　is
  not　that　Spirit　God？
  。　I　grant　it。
  。　But　you　have　asserted　that　whatever　ideas　we　perceive
  from　without　are　in　the　mind　which　affects　us。　The　ideas；
  therefore；　of　pain　and　uneasiness　are　in　God；　or；　in　other　words；
  God　suffers　pain：　that　is　to　say；　there　is　an　imperfection　in　the
  Divine　nature：　which；　you　acknowledged；　was　absurd。　So　you　are
  caught　in　a　plain　contradiction。
  。　That　God　knows　or　understands　all　things；　and　that
  He　knows；　among　other　things；　what　pain　is；　even　every　sort　of
  painful　sensation；　and　what　it　is　for　His　creatures　to　suffer
  pain；　I　make　no　question。　But；　that　God；　though　He　knows　and
  sometimes　causes　painful　sensations　in　us；　can　Himself　suffer
  pain；　I　positively　deny。　We；　who　are　limited　and　dependent
  spirits；　are　liable　to　impressions　of　sense；　the　effects　of　an
  ｛241｝　external　Agent；　which；　being　produced　against　our　wills；
  are　sometimes　painful　and　uneasy。　But　God；　whom　no　external　being
  can　affect；　who　perceives　nothing　by　sense　as　we　do；　whose　will
  is　absolute　and　independent；　causing　all　things；　and　liable　to　be
  thwarted　or　resisted　by　nothing：　it　is　evident；　such　a　Being　as
  this　can　suffer　nothing；　nor　be　affected　with　any　painful
  sensation；　or　indeed　any　sensation　at　all。　We　are　chained　to　a
  body：　that　is　to　say；　our　perceptions　are　connected　with
  corporeal　motions。　By　the　law　of　our　nature；　we　are　affected　upon
  every　alteration　in　the　nervous　parts　of　our　sensible　body；　which
  sensible　body；　rightly　considered；　is　nothing　but　a　complexion　of
  such　qualities　or　ideas　as　have　no　existence　distinct　from　being
  perceived　by　a　mind。　So　that　this　connexion　of　sensations　with
  corporeal　motions　means　no　more　than　a　correspondence　in　the
  order　of　nature；　between　two　sets　of　ideas；　or　things　immediately
  perceivable。　But　God　is　a　Pure　Spirit；　disengaged　from　all　such
  sympathy；　or　natural　ties。　No　corporeal　motions　are　attended　with
  the　sensations　of　pain　or　pleasure　in　His　mind。　To　know
  everything　knowable；　is　certainly　a　perfection；　but　to　endure；　or
  suffer；　or　feel　anything　by　sense；　is　an　imperfection。　The
  former；　I　say；　agrees　to　God；　but　not　the　latter。　God　knows；　or
  hath　ideas；　but　His　ideas　are　not　conveyed　to　Him　by　sense；　as
  ours　are。　Your　not　distinguishing；　where　there　is　so　manifest　a
  difference；　makes　you　fancy　you　see　an　absurdity　where　there　is
  none。
  。　But；　all　this　while　you　have　not　considered　that　the
  quantity　of　Matter　has　been　demonstrated　to　be　proportioned　to
  the　gravity　of　bodies。　And　what　can　withstand　demonstration？
  。　Let　me　see　how　you　demonstrate　that　point。
  。　I　lay　it　down　for　a　principle；　that　the　moments　or
  quantities　of　motion　in　bodies　are　in　a　direct　compounded　reason
  of　the　velocities　and　quantities　of　Matter　contained　in　them。
  Hence；　where　the　velocities　are　equal；　it　follows　the　moments　are
  directly　as　the　quantity　of　Matter　in　each。　But　it　is　found　by
  experience　that　all　bodies　（bating　the　small　inequalities；
  arising　from　the　resistance　of　the　air）　descend　with　an　equal
  velocity；　the　motion　therefore　of　descending　bodies；　and
  consequently　their　gravity；　which　is　the　cause　or　principle　of
  that　motion；　is　proportional　to　the　quantity　of　Matter；　which　was
  to　be　demonstrated。
  。　You　lay　it　down　as　a　self…evident　principle　that　the
  quantity　of　motion　in　any　body　is　proportional　to　the　velocity
  ｛242｝　and　　taken　together；　and　this　is　made　use　of　to
  prove　a　proposition　from　whence　the　existence　of　　is
  inferred。　Pray　is　not　this　arguing　in　a　circle？
  。　In　the　premise　I　only　mean　that　the　motion　is
  proportional　to　the　velocity；　jointly　with　the　extension　and
  solidity。
  。　But；　allowing　this　to　be　true；　yet　it　will　not
  thence　follow　that　gravity　is　proportional　to　；　in　your
  philosophic　sense　of　the　word；　except　you　take　it　for　granted
  that　unknown　；　or　whatever　else　you　call　it；　is
  proportional　to　those　sensible　qualities；　which　to　suppose　is
  plainly　begging　the　question。　That　there　is　magnitude　and
  solidity；　or　resistance；　perceived　by　sense；　I　readily　grant；　as
  likewise；　that　gravity　may　be　proportional　to　those　qualities　I
  will　not　dispute。　But　that　either　these　qualities　as　perceived　by
  us；　or　the　powers　producing　them；　do　exist　in　a　；　this　is　what　I　deny；　and　you　indeed　affirm；　but；
  notwithstanding　your　demonstration；　have　not　yet　proved。
  。　I　shall　insist　no　longer　on　that　point。　Do　you　think；
  however；　you　shall　persuade　me　that　the　natural　philosophers　have
  be