out　of　his　mind：　what　answer　think　you　he　would　make？
  。　The　same　that　I　should　myself；　to　wit；　that　it　doth
  exist　out　of　his　mind。　But　then　to　a　Christian　it　cannot　surely
  be　shocking　to　say；　the　real　tree；　existing　without　his　mind；　is
  truly　known　and　comprehended　by　（that　is　）　the
  infinite　mind　of　God。　Probably　he　may　not　at　first　glance　be
  aware　of　the　direct　and　immediate　proof　there　is　of　this；
  inasmuch　as　the　very　being　of　a　tree；　or　any　other　sensible
  thing；　implies　a　mind　wherein　it　is。　But　the　point　itself　he
  cannot　deny。　The　question　between　the　Materialists　and　me　is　not；
  whether　things　have　a　　existence　out　of　the　mind　of　this　or
  that　person；　but　whether　they　have　an　　existence；
  distinct　from　being　perceived　by　God；　and　exterior　to　all　minds。
  This　indeed　some　heathens　and　philosophers　have　affirmed；　but
  whoever　entertains　notions　of　the　Deity　suitable　to　the　Holy
  Scriptures　will　be　of　another　opinion。
  。　But；　according　to　your　notions；　what　difference　is
  there　between　real　things；　and　chimeras　formed　by　the
  imagination；　or　the　visions　of　a　dream　　since　they　are　all
  equally　in　the　mind？
  。　The　ideas　formed　by　the　imagination　are　faint　and
  indistinct；　they　have；　besides；　an　entire　dependence　on　the　will。
  But　the　ideas　perceived　by　sense；　that　is；　real　things；　are　more
  vivid　and　clear；　and；　being　imprinted　on　the　mind　by　a　spirit
  distinct　from　us；　have　not　the　like　dependence　on　our　will。　There
  is　therefore　no　danger　of　confounding　these　with　the　foregoing：
  and　there　is　as　little　of　confounding　them　with　the　visions　of　a
  dream；　which　are　dim；　irregular；　and　confused。　And；　though　they
  should　happen　to　be　never　so　lively　and　natural；　yet；　by　their
  not　being　connected；　and　of　a　piece　with　the　preceding　and
  subsequent　transactions　of　our　lives；　they　might　easily　be
  distinguished　from　realities。　In　short；　by　whatever　method　you
  distinguish　　on　your　scheme；　the　same；　it
  is　evident；　will　hold　also　upon　mine。　For；　it　must　be；　I　presume；
  by　some　perceived　difference；　and　I　am　not　for　depriving　you　of
  any　one　thing　that　you　perceive。
  。　But　still；　Philonous；　you　hold；　there　is　nothing　in
  the　world　but　spirits　and　ideas。　And　this；　you　must　needs
  acknowledge；　sounds　very　oddly。
  。　I　own　the　word　；　not　being　commonly　used　for
  ；　sounds　something　out　of　the　way。　My　reason　for　using　it
  was；　because　a　necessary　relation　to　the　mind　is　understood　to
  ｛236｝　be　implied　by　that　term；　and　it　is　now　commonly　used　by
  philosophers　to　denote　the　immediate　objects　of　the
  understanding。　But；　however　oddly　the　proposition　may　sound　in
  words；　yet　it　includes　nothing　so　very　strange　or　shocking　in　its
  sense；　which　in　effect　amounts　to　no　more　than　this；　to　wit；　that
  there　are　only　things　perceiving；　and　things　perceived；　or　that
  every　unthinking　being　is　necessarily；　and　from　…the　very　nature
  of　its　existence；　perceived　by　some　mind；　if　not　by　a　finite
  created　mind；　yet　certainly　by　the　infinite　mind　of　God；　in　whom
  〃we　five；　and　move；　and　have　our　being。〃　Is　this　as　strange　as　to
  say；　the　sensible　qualities　are　not　on　the　objects：　or　that　we
  cannot　be　sure　of　the　existence　of　things；　or　know　any　thing　of
  their　real　natures　　though　we　both　see　and　feel　them；　and
  perceive　them　by　all　our　senses？
  。　And；　in　consequence　of　this；　must　we　not　think　there
  are　no　such　things　as　physical　or　corporeal　causes；　but　that　a
  Spirit　is　the　immediate　cause　of　all　the　phenomena　in　nature？　Can
  there　be　anything　more　extravagant　than　this？
  。　Yes；　it　is　infinitely　more　extravagant　to　say　　a
  thing　which　is　inert　operates　on　the　mind；　and　which　is
  unperceiving　is　the　cause　of　our　perceptions；　＇without　any　regard
  either　to　consistency；　or　the　old　known　axiom；　＇。＇9＇　Besides；　that
  which　to　you；　I　know　not　for　what　reason；　seems　so　extravagant　is
  no　more　than　the　Holy　Scriptures　assert　in　a　hundred　places。　In
  them　God　is　represented　as　the　sole　and　immediate　Author　of　all
  those　effects　which　some　heathens　and　philosophers　are　wont　to
  ascribe　to　Nature；　Matter；　Fate；　or　the　like　unthinking
  principle。　This　is　so　much　the　constant　language　of　Scripture
  that　it　were　needless　to　confirm　it　by　citations。
  。　You　are　not　aware；　Philonous；　that　in　making　God　the
  immediate　Author　of　all　the　motions　in　nature；　you　make　Him　the
  Author　of　murder；　sacrilege；　adultery；　and　the　like　heinous　sins。
  。　In　answer　to　that；　I　observe；　first；　that　the
  imputation　of　guilt　is　the　same；　whether　a　person　commits　an
  action　with　or　without　an　instrument。　In　case　therefore　you
  suppose　God　to　act　by　the　mediation　of　an　instrument　or　occasion；
  called　；　you　as　truly　make　Him　the　author　of　sin　as　I；
  who　think　Him　the　immediate　agent　in　all　those　operations
  vulgarly　ascribed　to　Nature。　I　farther　observe　that　sin　or　moral
  turpitude　｛237｝　doth　not　consist　in　the　outward　physical　action
  or　motion；　but　in　the　internal　deviation　of　the　will　from　the
  laws　of　reason　and　religion。　This　is　plain；　in　that　the　killing
  an　enemy　in　a　battle；　or　putting　a　criminal　legally　to　death；　is
  not　thought　sinful；　though　the　outward　act　be　the　very　same　with
  that　in　the　case　of　murder。　Since；　therefore；　sin　doth　not
  consist　in　the　physical　action；　the　making　God　an　immediate　cause
  of　all　such　actions　is　not　making　Him　the　Author　of　sin。　Lastly；
  I　have　nowhere　said　that　God　is　the　only　agent　who　produces　all
  the　motions　in　bodies。　It　is　true　I　have　denied　there　are　any
  other　agents　besides　spirits；　but　this　is　very　consistent　with
  allowing　to　thinking　rational　beings；　in　the　production　of
  motions；　the　use　of　limited　powers；　ultimately　indeed　derived
  from　God；　but　immediately　under　the　direction　of　their　own　wills；
  which　is　sufficient　to　entitle　them　to　all　the　guilt　of　their
  actions。
  。　But　the　denying　Matter；　Philonous；　or　corporeal
  Substance；　there　is　the　point。　You　can　never　persuade　me　that
  this　is　not　repugnant　to　the　universal　sense　of　mankind。　Were　our
  dispute　to　be　determined　by　most　voices；　I　am　confident　you　would
  give　up　the　point；　without　gathering　the　votes。
  。　I　wish　both　our　opinions　were　fairly　stated　and
  submitted　to　the　judgment　of　men　who　had　plain　common　sense；
  without　the　prejudices　of　a　learned　education。　Let　me　be
  represented　as　one　who　trusts　his　senses；　who　thinks　he　knows　the
  things　he　sees　and　feels；　and　entertains　no　doubts　of　their
  existence；　and　you　fairly　set　forth　with　all　your　doubts；　your
  paradoxes；　and　your　scepticism　about　you；　and　I　shall　willingly
  acquiesce　in　the　determination　of　any　indifferent　person。　That
  there　is　no　substance　wherein　ideas　can　exist　beside　spirit　is　to
  me　evident。　And　that　the　objects　immediately　perceived　are　ideas；
  is　on　all　hands　agreed。　And　that　sensible　qualities　are　objects
  immediately　perceived　no　one　can　deny。　It　is　therefore　evident
  there　can　be　no　　of　those　qualities　but　spirit；　in
  which　they　exist；　not　by　way　of　mode　or　property；　but　as　a　thing
  perceived　in　that　which　perceives　it。　I　deny　therefore　that　there
  is　…　of　the　objects　of　sense；　and　　that　there　is　any　material　substance。　But　if　by
  is　meant　only　；　　which
  is　seen　and　felt　（and　the　unphilosophical　part　of　the　world；　I
  dare　say；　mean　no　more）　　then　I　am　more　certain　of　matter's
  existence　than　you　or　any　other　philosopher　pretend　to　be。　If
  there　be　anything　which　makes　；die　generality　of　mankind　｛238｝
  averse　from　the　notions　I　espouse；　it　is　a　misapprehension　that　I
  deny　the　reality　of　sensible　things。　But；　as　it　is　you　who　are
  guilty　of　that；　and　not　1；　it　follows　that　in　truth　their
  aversion　is　against　your　notions　and　not　mine。　I　do　therefore
  assert　that　I　am　as　certain　as　of　my　own　being；　that　there　are
  bodies　or　corporeal　substances　（meaning　the　things　I　perceive　by
  my　senses）；　and　that；　granting　this；　the　bulk　of　mankind　will
  take　no　thought　about；　nor　think　themselves　at　all　concerned　in
  the　fate　of　those　unknown　natures；　and　philosophical　quiddities；
  which　some　men　are　so　fond　of。
  。　What　say　you　to　this？　Since；　according　to　you；　men
  judge　of　the　reality　of　things　by　their　senses；　how　can　a　man　be
  mistaken　in　thinking　the　moon　a　plain　lucid　surface；　about　a　foot
  in　diameter；　or　a　square　tower；　seen　at　a　distance；　round；　or　an
  oar；　with　one　end　in　the　water；　crooked？
  。　He　is　not　mistaken　with　regard　to　the　ideas　he
  actually　perceives；　but　in　the　inference　he　makes　from　his
  present　perceptions。　Thus；　in　the　case　of　the　oar；　what　he
  immediately　perceives　by　sight　is　certainly　crooked；　and　so　far
  he　is　in　the　right。　But　if　he　thence　conclude　that　upon　taking
  the　oar　out　of　the　water　he　shall　perceive　the　same　crookedness；
  or　that　it　would　affect　his　touch　as　crooked　things　are　wont　to
  do：　in　that　he　is　mistaken。　In　like　manner；　if　he　shall　conclude
  from　what　he　perceives　in　one　station；　that；　in　case　he　advances
  towards　the　moon　or　tower；　he　should　still　be　affected　with　the
  like　ideas；　he　is