knows　and　comprehends　all　things；　and　exhibits　them　to　our　view
  in　such　a　manner；　and　according　to　such　rules；　as　He　Himself　hath
  ordained；　and　are　by　us　termed　the　。
  。　Answer　me；　Philonous。　Are　all　our　ideas　perfectly
  inert　beings？　Or　have　they　any　agency　included　in　them？
  。　They　are　altogether　passive　and　inert。
  。　And　is　not　God　an　agent；　a　being　purely　active？
  。　I　acknowledge　it。
  。　No　idea　therefore　can　be　like　unto；　or　represent　the
  nature　of　God？
  。　It　cannot。
  。　Since　therefore　you　have　no　　of　the　mind　of
  God；　how　can　you　conceive　it　possible　that　things　should　exist　in
  His　mind？　Or；　if　you　can　conceive　the　mind　of　God；　without　having
  an　idea　of　it；　why　may　not　I　be　allowed　to　conceive　the　existence
  of　Matter；　notwithstanding　I　have　no　idea　of　it？
  。　As　to　your　first　question：　I　own　I　have　properly　no
  ；　either　of　God　or　any　other　spirit；　for　these　being
  active；　cannot　be　represented　by　things　perfectly　inert；　as　our
  ideas　are。　I　do　nevertheless　know　that　1；　who　am　a　spirit　or
  thinking　substance；　exist　as　certainly　a　s　I　know　my　ideas　exist。
  Farther；　I　know　what　I　mean　by　the　terms　I　；　and　I
  know　this　immediately　or　intuitively；　though　I　do　not　perceive　it
  as　I　perceive　a　triangle；　a　colour；　or　a　sound。　The　Mind；　Spirit；
  or　Soul　is　that　indivisible　unextended　thing　which　thinks；　acts；
  and　perceives。　I　say　；　because　unextended；　and
  ；　because　extended；　figured；　moveable　things　are
  ideas；　and　that　which　perceives　ideas；　which　thinks　and　wills；　is
  plainly　itself　no　idea；　nor　like　an　idea。　Ideas　are　things
  inactive；　and　perceived。　And　Spirits　a　sort　of　beings　altogether
  different　from　them。　I　do　not　therefore　say　my　soul　is　an　idea；
  or　like　an　idea。　However；　taking　the　word　　in　a　large
  sense；　my　soul　may　be　said　to　furnish　me　with　an　idea；　that　is；
  an　image　or　likeness　of　God　　though　indeed　extremely
  inadequate。　For；　all　the　notion　I　have　of　God　is　obtained　by
  reflecting　on　my　own　soul；　heightening　its　powers；　and　removing
  its　｛232｝　imperfections。　I　have；　therefore；　though　not　an
  inactive　idea；　yet　in　　some　sort　of　an　active　thinking
  image　of　the　Deity。　And；　though　I　perceive　Him　not　by　sense；　yet
  I　have　a　notion　of　Him；　or　know　Him　by　reflexion　and　reasoning。
  My　own　mind　and　my　own　ideas　I　have　an　immediate　knowledge　of；
  and；　by　the　help　of　these；　do　mediately　apprehend　the　possibility
  of　the　existence　of　other　spirits　and　ideas。　Farther；　from　my　own
  being；　and　from　the　dependency　I　find　in　myself　and　my　ideas；　I
  do；　by　an　act　of　reason；　necessarily　infer　the　existence　of　a
  God；　and　of　all　created　things　in　the　mind　of　God。　So　much　for
  your　first　question。　For　the　second：　I　suppose　by　this　time　you
  can　answer　it　yourself。　For　you　neither　perceive　Matter
  objectively；　as　you　do　an　inactive　being　or　idea；　nor　know　it；　as
  you　do　yourself；　by　a　reflex　act；　neither　do　you　mediately
  apprehend　it　by　similitude　of　the　one　or　the　other；　nor　yet
  collect　it　by　reasoning　from　that　which　you　know　immediately。　All
  which　makes　the　case　of　　widely　different　from　that　of
  the　。
  ＇。　You　say　your　own　soul　supplies　you　with　some　sort　of
  an　idea　or　image　of　God。　But；　at　the　same　time；　you　acknowledge
  you　have；　properly　speaking；　no　　of　your　own　soul。　You　even
  affirm　that　spirits　are　a　sort　of　beings　altogether　different
  from　ideas。　Consequently　that　no　idea　can　be　like　a　spirit。　We
  have　therefore　no　idea　of　any　spirit。　You　admit　nevertheless　that
  there　is　spiritual　Substance；　although　you　have　no　idea　of　it；
  while　you　deny　there　can　be　such　a　thing　as　material　Substance；
  because　you　have　no　notion　or　idea　of　it。　Is　this　fair　dealing？
  To　act　consistently；　you　must　either　admit　Matter　or　reject
  Spirit。　What　say　you　to　this？
  。　　say；　in　the　first　place；　that　I　do　not　deny　the
  existence　of　material　substance；　merely　because　I　have　no　notion
  of　it'　but　because　the　notion　of　it　is　inconsistent；　or；　in　other
  words；　because　it　is　repugnant　that　there　should　be　a　notion　of
  it。　Many　things；　for　aught　I　know；　may　exist；　whereof　neither　I
  nor　any　other　man　hath　or　can　have　any　idea　or　notion　whatsoever。
  But　then　those　things　must　be　possible；　that　is；　nothing　｛233｝
  inconsistent　must　be　included　in　their　definition。　I　say；
  secondly；　that；　although　we　believe　things　to　exist　which　we　do
  not　perceive；　yet　we　may　not　believe　that　any　particular　thing
  exists；　without　some　reason　for　such　belief：　but　I　have　no　reason
  for　believing　the　existence　of　Matter。　I　have　no　immediate
  intuition　thereof：　neither　can　I　immediately　from　my　sensations；
  ideas；　notions；　actions；　or　passions；　infer　an　unthinking；
  unperceiving；　inactive　Substance　　either　by　probable　deduction；
  or　necessary　consequence。　Whereas　the　being　of　my　Self；　that　is；
  my　own　soul；　mind；　or　thinking　principle；　I　evidently　know　by
  reflexion。　You　will　forgive　me　if　I　repeat　the　same　things　in
  answer　to　the　same　objections。　In　the　very　notion　or　definition
  of　；　there　is　included　a　manifest　repugnance
  and　inconsistency。　But　this　cannot　be　said　of　the　notion　of
  Spirit。　That　ideas　should　exist　in　what　doth　not　perceive；　or　be
  produced　by　what　doth　not　act；　is　repugnant。　But；　it　is　no
  repugnancy　to　say　that　a　perceiving　thing　should　be　the　subject
  of　ideas；　or　an　active　thing　the　cause　of　them。　It　is　granted　we
  have　neither　an　immediate　evidence　nor　a　demonstrative　knowledge
  of　the　existence　of　other　finite　spirits；　but　it　will　not　thence
  follow　that　such　spirits　are　on　a　foot　with　material　substances：
  if　to　suppose　the　one　be　inconsistent；　and　it　be　not　inconsistent
  to　suppose　the　other；　if　the　one　can　be　inferred　by　no　argument；
  and　there　is　a　probability　for　the　other；　if　we　see　signs　and
  effects　indicating　distinct　finite　agents　like　ourselves；　and　see
  no　sign　or　symptom　whatever　that　leads　to　a　rational　belief　of
  Matter。　I　say；　lastly；　that　I　have　a　notion　of　Spirit；　though　I
  have　not；　strictly　speaking；　an　idea　of　it。　I　do　not　perceive　it
  as　an　idea；　or　by　means　of　an　idea；　but　know　it　by　reflexion。
  。　Notwithstanding　all　you　have　said；　to　me　it　seems
  that；　according　to　your　own　way　of　thinking；　and　in　consequence
  of　your　own　principles；　it　should　follow　that　　are　only　a
  system　of　floating　ideas；　without　any　substance　to　support　them。
  Words　are　not　to　be　used　without　a　meaning。　And；　as　there　is　no
  more　meaning　in　　than　in　；　the　one　is　to　be　exploded　as　well　as　the　other。
  。　How　often　must　I　repeat；　that　I　know　or　am　conscious
  of　my　own　being；　and　that　　am　not　my　ideas；　but
  somewhat　else；　a　thinking；　active　principle　that　perceives；
  knows；　wifls；　and　operates　about　ideas。　I　know　that　I；　one　｛234｝
  and　the　same　self；　perceive　both　colours　and　sounds：　that　a
  colour　cannot　perceive　a　sound；　nor　a　sound　a　colour：　that　I　am
  therefore　one　individual　principle；　distinct　from　colour　and
  sound；　and；　for　the　same　reason；　from　aft　other　sensible　things
  and　inert　ideas。　But；　I　am　not　in　like　manner　conscious　either　of
  the　existence　or　essence　of　Matter。　On　the　contrary；　I　know　that
  nothing　inconsistent　can　exist；　and　that　the　existence　of　Matter
  implies　an　inconsistency。　Farther；　I　know　what　I　mean　when　I
  affirm　that　there　is　a　spiritual　substance　or　support　of　ideas；
  that　is；　that　a　spirit　knows　and　perceives　ideas。　But；　I　do　not
  know　what　is　meant　when　it　is　said　that　an　unperceiving　substance
  hath　inherent　in　it　and　supports　either　ideas　or　the　archetypes
  of　ideas。　There　is　therefore　upon　the　whole　no　parity　of　case
  between　Spirit　and　Matter。＇＇8＇
  。　I　own　myself　satisfied　in　this　point。　But；　do　you　in
  earnest　think　the　real　existence　of　sensible　things　consists　in
  their　being　actually　perceived？　If　so；　how　comes　it　that　all
  mankind　distinguish　between　them？　Ask　the　first　man　you　meet；　and
  he　shall　tell　you；　　is　one　thing；　and
  is　another。
  。　　am　content；　Hylas；　to　appeal　to　the　common　sense
  of　the　world　for　the　truth　of　my　notion。　Ask　the　gardener　why　he
  thinks　yonder　cherry…tree　exists　in　the　garden；　and　he　shall　tell
  you；　because　he　sees　and　feels　it；　in　a　word；　because　he
  perceives　it　by　his　senses。　Ask　him　why　he　thinks　an　orange…tree
  not　to　be　there；　and　he　shall　tell　you；　because　he　does　not
  perceive　it。　What　he　perceives　by　sense；　that　he　terms　a　real；
  being；　and　saith　it　；　but；　that　which　is　not
  perceivable；　the　same；　he　saith；　hath　no　being。
  。　Yes；　Philonous；　I　grant　the　existence　of　a　sensible
  thing　consists　in　being　perceivable；　but　not　in　being　actually
  perceived。
  。　And　what　is　perceivable　but　an　idea？　And　can　an　idea
  exist　without　being　actually　perceived？　These　are　points　long
  since　agreed　between　us。
  。　But；　be　your　opinion　never　so　true；　yet　surely　you
  will　not　deny　it　is　shocking；　and　contrary　to　the　common　sense　of
  men。　｛235｝　Ask　the　fellow　whether　yonder　tree　hath　an　existence
  out　of　his　mind：　what　answer　think　you　he　would　make？
  。　The　sam