that　the　｛223｝　immediate　objects　existed　without　the　mind；　then
  that　they　are　archetypes；　then　causes；　next　instruments；　then
  occasions：　lastly　；　which　being　interpreted
  proves　。　So　Matter　comes　to　nothing。　What　think　you；
  Hylas；　is　not　this　a　fair　summary　of　your　whole　proceeding？
  。　Be　that　as　it　will；　yet　I　still　insist　upon　it；　that
  our　not　being　able　to　conceive　a　thing　is　no　argument　against　its
  existence。
  。　That　from　a　cause；　effect；　operation；　sign；　or　other
  circumstance；　there　may　reasonably　be　inferred　the　existence　of　a
  thing　not　immediately　perceived；　and　that　it　were　absurd　for　any
  man　to　argue　against　the　existence　of　that　thing；　from　his　having
  no　direct　and　positive　notion　of　it；　I　freely　own。　But；　where
  there　is　nothing　of　all　this；　where　neither　reason　nor　revelation
  induces　us　to　believe　the　existence　of　a　thing；　where　we　have　not
  even　a　relative　notion　of　it；　where　an　abstraction　is　made　from
  perceiving　and　being　perceived；　from　Spirit　and　idea：　lastly；
  where　there　is　not　so　much　as　the　most　inadequate　or　faint　idea
  pretended　to　　I　will　not　indeed　thence　conclude　against　the
  reality　of　any　notion；　or　existence　of　anything；　but　my　inference
  shall　be；　that　you　mean　nothing　at　all；　that　you　employ　words　to
  no　manner　of　purpose；　without　any　design　or　signification
  whatsoever。　And　I　leave　it　to　you　to　consider　how　mere　jargon
  should　be　treated。
  。　To　deal　frankly　with　you；　Philonous；　your　arguments
  seem　in　themselves　unanswerable；　but　they　have　not　so　great　an
  effect　on　me　as　to　produce　that　entire　conviction；　that　hearty
  acquiescence；　which　attends　demonstration。　I　find　myself
  relapsing　into　an　obscure　surmise　of　I　know　not　what；　。
  。　But；　are　you　not　sensible；　Hylas；　that　two　things
  must　concur　to　take　away　all　scruple；　and　work　a　plenary　assent
  in　the　mind；？　Let　a　visible　object　be　set　in　never　so　clear　a
  light；　yet；　if　there　is　any　imperfection　in　the　sight；　or　if　the
  eye　is　not　directed　towards　it；　it　will　not　be　distinctly　seen。
  And　though　a　demonstration　be　never　so　well　grounded　and　fairly
  proposed；　yet；　if　there　is　withal　a　stain　of　prejudice；　or　a
  wrong　bias　on　the　understanding；　can　it　be　expected　on　a　sudden
  to　perceive　clearly；　and　adhere　firmly　to　the　truth？　No；　there　is
  need　of　time　and　pains：　the　attention　must　be　awakened　and
  detained　by　a　frequent　repetition　of　the　same　thing　placed　oft　in
  the　same；　oft　in　different　lights。　I　have　said　it　already；　and
  find　I　must　still　repeat　and　inculcate；　that　it　is　an
  unaccountable　licence　｛224｝　you　take；　in　pretending　to　maintain
  you　know　not　what；　for　you　know　not　what　reason；　to　you　know　not
  what　purpose。　Can　this　be　paralleled　in　any　art　or　science；　any
  sect　or　profession　of　men？　Or　is　there　anything　so　barefacedly
  groundless　and　unreasonable　to　be　met　with　even　in　the　lowest　of
  common　conversation？　But；　perhaps　you　will　still　say；　Matter　may
  exist；　though　at　the　same　time　you　neither　know
  by　；　or　by　its　。　This　indeed　is　surprising；
  and　the　more　so　because　it　is　altogether　voluntary　＇and　of　your
  own　head＇；＇6＇　you　not　being　led　to　it　by　any　one　reason；　for　I
  challenge　you　to　shew　me　that　thing　in　nature　which　needs　Matter
  to　explain　or　account　for　it。
  。　　of　things　cannot　be　maintained　without
  supposing　the　existence　of　Matter。　And　is　not　this；　think　you；　a
  good　reason　why　I　should　be　earnest　in　its　defence？
  。　The　reality　of　things！　What　things？　sensible　or
  intelligible？
  。　Sensible　things。
  。　My　glove　for　example？
  。　That；　or　any　other　thing　perceived　by　the　senses。
  。　But　to　fix　on　some　particular　thing。　Is　it　not　a
  sufficient　evidence　to　me　of　the　existence　of　this　；　that
  I　see　it；　and　feel　it；　and　wear　it？　Or；　if　this　will　not　do；　how
  is　it　possible　I　should　be　assured　of　the　reality　of　this　thing；
  which　I　actually　see　in　this　place；　by　supposing　that　some
  unknown　thing；　which　I　never　did　or　can　see；　exists　after　an
  unknown　manner；　in　an　unknown　place；　or　in　no　place　at　all？　How
  can　the　supposed　reality　of　that　which　is　intangible　be　a　proof
  that　anything　tangible　really　exists？　Or；　of　that　which　is
  invisible；　that　any　visible　thing；　or；　in　general　of　anything
  which　is　imperceptible；　that　a　perceptible　exists？　Do　but　explain
  this　and　I　shall　think　nothing　too　hard　for　you。
  。　Upon　the　whole；　I　am　content　to　own　the　existence　of
  matter　is　highly　improbable；　but　the　direct　and　absolute
  impossibility　of　it　does　not　appear　to　me。
  。　But　granting　Matter　to　be　possible；　yet；　upon　that
  account　merely；　it　can　have　no　more　claim　to　existence　than　a
  golden　mountain；　or　a　centaur。
  。　I　acknowledge　it；　but　still　you　do　not　deny　it　is
  possible；　and　that　which　is　possible；　for　aught　you　know；　may
  actually　exist。
  。　I　deny　it　to　be　possible；　and　have；　if　I　mistake
  not；　｛225｝　evidently　proved；　from　your　own　concessions；　that　it
  is　not。　In　the　common　sense　of　the　word　；　is　there　any
  more　implied　than　an　extended；　solid；　figured；　moveable
  substance；　existing　without　the　mind？　And　have　not　you
  acknowledged；　over　and　over；　that　you　have　seen　evident　reason
  for　denying　the　possibility　of　such　a　substance？
  。　True；　but　that　is　only　one　sense　of　the　term
  。
  。　But　is　it　not　the　only　proper　genuine　received
  sense？　And；　if　Matter；　in　such　a　sense；　be　proved　impossible；　may
  it　not　be　thought　with　good　grounds　absolutely　impossible？　Else
  how　could　anything　be　proved　impossible？　Or；　indeed；　how　could
  there　be　any　proof　at　all　one　way　or　other；　to　a　man　who　takes
  the　liberty　to　unsettle　and　change　the　common　signification　of
  words？
  。　I　thought　philosophers　might　be　allowed　to　speak　more
  accurately　than　the　vulgar；　and　were　not　always　confined　to　the
  common　acceptation　of　a　term。
  。　But　this　now　mentioned　is　the　common　received　sense
  among　philosophers　themselves。　But；　not　to　insist　on　that；　have
  you　not　been　allowed　to　take　Matter　in　what　sense　you　pleased？
  And　have　you　not　used　this　privilege　in　the　utmost　extent；
  sometimes　entirely　changing；　at　others　leaving　out；　or　putting
  into　the　definition　of　it　whatever；　for　the　present；　best　served
  your　design；　contrary　to　all　the　known　rules　of　reason　and　logic？
  And　hath　not　this　shifting；　unfair　method　of　yours　spun　out　our
  dispute　to　an　unnecessary　length；　Matter　having　been　particularly
  examined；　and　by　your　own　confession　refuted　in　each　of　those
  senses？　And　can　any　more　be　required　to　prove　the　absolute
  impossibility　of　a　thing；　than　the　proving　it　impossible　in　every
  particular　sense　that　either　you　or　any　one　else　understands　it
  in？
  。　But　I　am　not　so　thoroughly　satisfied　that　you　have
  proved　the　impossibility　of　Matter；　in　the　last　most　obscure
  abstracted　and　indefinite　sense。
  。。　When　is　a　thing　shewn　to　be　impossible？
  。　When　a　repugnancy　is　demonstrated　between　the　ideas
  comprehended　in　its　definition。
  。　But　where　there　are　no　ideas；　there　no　repugnancy
  can　be　demonstrated　between　ideas？
  。　I　agree　with　you。
  。　Now；　in　that　which　you　call　the　obscure　indefinite
  sense　of　the　word　；　it　is　plain；　by　your　own　confession；
  there　｛226｝　was　included　no　idea　at　all；　no　sense　except　an
  unknown　sense；　which　is　the　same　thing　as　none。　You　are　not；
  therefore；　to　expect　I　should　prove　a　repugnancy　between　ideas；
  where　there　are　no　ideas；　or　the　impossibility　of　Matter　taken　in
  an　　sense；　that　is；　no　sense　at　all。　My　business　was
  only　to　shew　you　meant　；　and　this　you　were　brought　to
  own。　So　that；　in　all　your　various　senses；　you　have　been　shewed
  either　to　mean　nothing　at　all；　or；　if　anything；　an　absurdity。　And
  if　this　be　not　sufficient　to　prove　the　impossibility　of　a　thing；
  I　desire　you　will　let　me　know　what　is。
  。　I　acknowledge　you　have　proved　that　Matter　is
  impossible；　nor　do　I　see　what　more　can　be　said　in　defence　of　it。
  But；　at　the　same　time　that　I　give　up　this；　I　suspect　all　my　other
  notions。　For　surely　none　could　be　more　seemingly　evident　than
  this　once　was：　and　yet　it　now　seems　as　false　and　absurd　as　ever
  it　did　true　before。　But　I　think　we　have　discussed　the　point
  sufficiently　for　the　present。　The　remaining　part　of　the　day　I
  would　willingly　spend　in　running　over　in　my　thoughts　the　several
  heads　of　this　morning's　conversation；　and　tomorrow　shall　be　glad
  to　meet　you　here　again　about　the　same　time。
  。　　will　not　fail　to　attend　you。　｛227｝
  THE　THIRD　DIALOGUE
  Tell　me；　Hylas；＇7＇　what　are　the　fruits　of
  yesterday's　meditation？　Has　it　confirmed　you　in　the　same　mind　you
  were　in　at　parting？　or　have　you　since　seen　cause　to　change　your
  opinion？
  。　Truly　my　opinion　is　that　all　our　opinions　are　alike
  vain　and　uncertain。　What　we　approve　to…day；　we　condemn　to…morrow。
  We　keep　a　stir　about　knowledge；　and　spend　our　lives　in　the
  pursuit　of　it；　when；　alas　I　we　know　nothing　all　the　while：　nor　do
  I　think　it　possible　for　us　ever　t