objects；　perceived　by　the　mediation　of　ideas；　which　are　their
  images　and　representations。　Now；　I　own　ideas　do　not　exist　without
  the　mind；　but　the　latter　sort　of　objects　do。　I　am　sorry　I　did　not
  think　of　this　distinction　sooner；　it　would　probably　have　cut
  short　your　discourse。
  。　Are　those　external　objects　perceived　by　sense　or　by
  some　other　faculty？
  。　They　are　perceived　by　sense。
  。　Howl　Is　there　any　thing　perceived　by　sense　which　is
  not　immediately　perceived？
  。　Yes；　Philonous；　in　some　sort　there　is。　For　example；
  when　I　look　on　a　picture　or　statue　of　Julius　Caesar；　I　may　be
  said　after　a　manner　to　perceive　him　（though　not　immediately）　by
  my　senses。
  。　It　seems　then　you　will　have　our　ideas；　which　alone
  are　immediately　perceived；　to　be　pictures　of　external　things：　and
  that　these　also　are　perceived　by　sense；　inasmuch　as　they　have　a
  conformity　or　resemblance　to　our　ideas？
  。　That　is　my　meaning。
  。　And；　in　the　same　way　that　Julius　Caesar；　in　himself
  invisible；　is　nevertheless　perceived　by　sight；　real　things；　in
  themselves　imperceptible；　are　perceived　by　sense。
  。　In　the　very　same。
  。　Tell　me；　Hylas；　when　you　behold　the　picture　of
  Julius　Caesar；　do　you　see　with　your　eyes　any　more　than　some
  colours　and　figures；　with　a　certain　symmetry　and　composition　of
  the　whole？
  。　Nothing　else。
  。　And　would　not　a　man　who　had　never　known　anything　of
  Julius　Caesar　see　as　much？　｛204｝
  。　He　would。
  。　Consequently　he　hath　his　sight；　and　the　use　of　it；
  in　as　perfect　a　degree　as　you？
  。　I　agree　with　you。
  。　Whence　comes　it　then　that　your　thoughts　are　directed
  to　the　Roman　emperor；　and　his　are　not？　This　cannot　proceed　from
  the　sensations　or　ideas　of　sense　by　you　then　perceived；　since　you
  acknowledge　you　have　no　advantage　over　him　in　that　respect。　It
  should　seem　therefore　to　proceed　from　reason　and　memory：　should
  it　not？
  。　It　should。
  。　Consequently；　it　will　not　follow　from　that　instance
  that　anything　is　perceived　by　sense　which　is　not；　immediately
  perceived。　Though　I　grant　we　may；　in　one　acceptation；　be　said　to
  perceive　sensible　things　mediately　by　sense：　that　is；　when；　from
  a　frequently　perceived　connexion；　the　immediate　perception　of
  ideas　by　one　sense　　to　the　mind　others；　perhaps
  belonging　to　another　sense；　which　are　wont　to　be　connected　with
  them。　For　instance；　when　I　hear　a　coach　drive　along　the　streets；
  immediately　I　perceive　only　the　sound；　but；　from　the　experience　I
  have　had　that　such　a　sound　is　connected　with　a　coach；　I　am　said
  to　hear　the　coach。　It　is　nevertheless　evident　that；　in　truth　and
  strictness；　nothing　can　be　；　and　the　coach　is
  not　then　properly　perceived　by　sense；　but　suggested　from
  experience。　So　likewise　when　we　are　said　to　see　a　red…hot　bar　of
  iron；　the　solidity　and　heat　of　the　iron　are　not　the　objects　of
  sight；　but　suggested　to　the　imagination　by　the　colour　and　figure
  which　are　properly　perceived　by　that　sense。　In　short；　those
  things　alone　are　actually　and　strictly　perceived　by　any　sense；
  which　would　have　been　perceived　in　case　that　same　sense　had　then
  been　first　conferred　on　us。　As　for　other　things；　it　is　plain　they
  are　only　suggested　to　the　mind　by　experience；　grounded　on　former
  perceptions。　But；　to　return　to　your　comparison　of　Caesar's
  picture；　it　is　plain；　if　you　keep　to　that；　you　must　hold　the　real
  things；　or　archetypes　of　our　ideas；　are　not　perceived　by　sense；
  but　by　some　internal　faculty　of　the　soul；　as　reason　or　memory。　I
  would　therefore　fain　know　what　arguments　you　can　draw　from　reason
  for　the　existence　of　what　you　call　。　Or；　whether　you　remember　to　have　seen　them　formerly　as
  they　are　in　themselves；　or；　if　you　have　heard　or　read　of　any　one
  that　did。　｛205｝
  。　I　see；　Philonous；　you　are　disposed　to　raillery；　but
  that　will　never　convince　me。
  。　My　aim　is　only　to　learn　from　you　the　way　to　come　at
  the　knowledge　of　。　Whatever　we　perceive　is
  perceived　immediately　or　mediately：　by　sense；　or　by　reason　and
  reflexion。　But；　as　you　have　excluded　sense；　pray　shew　me　what
  reason　you　have　to　believe　their　existence；　or　what　　you
  can　possibly　make　use　of　to　prove　it；　either　to　mine　or　your　own
  understanding。
  。　To　deal　ingenuously；　Philonous；　now　I　consider　the
  point；　I　do　not　find　I　can　give　you　any　good　reason　for　it。　But；
  thus　much　seems　pretty　plain；　that　it　is　at　least　possible　such
  things　may　really　exist。　And；　as　long　as　there　is　no　absurdity　in
  supposing　them；　I　am　resolved　to　believe　as　I　did；　till　you　bring
  good　reasons　to　the　contrary。
  。　What！　Is　it　come　to　this；　that　you　only
  the　existence　of　material　objects；　and　that　your　belief　is
  founded　barely　on　the　possibility　of　its　being　true？　Then　you
  will　have　me　bring　reasons　against　it：　though　another　would　think
  it　reasonable　the　proof　should　lie　on　him　who　holds　the
  affirmative。　And；　after　all；　this　very　point　which　you　are　now
  resolved　to　maintain；　without　any　reason；　is　in　effect　what　you
  have　more　than　once　during　this　discourse　seen　good　reason　to
  give　up。　But；　to　pass　over　all　this；　if　I　understand　you　rightly；
  you　say　our　ideas　do　not　exist　without　the　mind；　but　that　they
  are　copies；　images；　or　representations；　of　certain　originals　that
  do？
  。　You　take　me　right。
  。　They　are　then　like　external　things？
  。　They　are。
  。　Have　those　things　a　stable　and　permanent　nature；
  independent　of　our　senses；　or　are　they　in　a　perpetual　change；
  upon　our　producing　any　motions　in　our　bodies　　suspending；
  exerting；　or　altering；　our　faculties　or　organs　of　sense？
  。　Real　things；　it　is　plain；　have　a　fixed　and　real
  nature；　which　remains　the　same　notwithstanding　any　change　in　our
  senses；　or　in　the　posture　and　motion　of　our　bodies；　which　indeed
  may　affect　the　ideas　in　our　minds；　but　it　were　absurd　to　think
  they　had　the　same　effect　on　things　existing　without　the　mind。
  。　How　then　is　it　possible　that　things　perpetually
  fleeting　and　variable　as　our　ideas　should　be　copies　or　images　of
  anything　fixed　and　constant？　Or；　in　other　words；　since　all
  sensible　｛206｝　qualities；　as　size；　figure；　colour；　&c。；　that　is；
  our　ideas；　are　continually　changing；　upon　every　alteration　in　the
  distance；　medium；　or　instruments　of　sensation；　how　can　any
  determinate　material　objects　be　properly　represented　or　painted
  forth　by　several　distinct　things；　each　of　which　is　so　different
  from　and　unlike　the　rest？　Or；　if　you　say　it　resembles　some　one
  only　of　our　ideas；　how　shall　we　be　able　to　distinguish　the　true
  copy　from　all　the　false　ones？
  。　I　profess；　Philonous；　I　am　at　a　loss。　I　know　not　what
  to　say　to　this。
  。　But　neither　is　this　all。　Which　are　material　objects
  in　themselves　　perceptible　or　imperceptible？
  。　Properly　and　immediately　nothing　can　be　perceived　but
  ideas。　All　material　things；　therefore；　are　in　themselves
  insensible；　and　to　be　perceived　only　by　our　ideas。
  。　Ideas　then　are　sensible；　and　their　archetypes　or
  originals　insensible？
  。　Right。
  。　But　how　can　that　which　is　sensible　be　like　that
  which　is　insensible？　Can　a　real　thing；　in　itself　；　be
  like　a　；　or　a　real　thing；　which　is　not　；　be　like
  a　？　In　a　word；　can　anything　be　like　a　sensation　or　idea；
  but　another　sensation　or　idea？
  。　I　must　own；　I　think　not。
  。　Is　it　possible　there　should　be　any　doubt　on　the
  point？　Do。　you　not　perfectly　know　your　own　ideas？
  。　I　know　them　perfectly；　since　what　I　do　not　perceive
  or　know　can　be　no　part　of　my　idea。
  。　Consider；　therefore；　and　examine　them；　and　then　tell
  me　if　there　be　anything　in　them　which　can　exist　without　the　mind：
  or　if　you　can　conceive　anything　like　them　existing　without　the
  mind。
  。　Upon　inquiry；　I　find　it　is　impossible　for　me　to
  conceive　or　understand　how　anything　but　an　idea　can　be　like　an
  idea。　And　it　is　most　evident　that　。
  。　You　are　therefore；　by　your　principles；　forced　to
  deny　the　　of　sensible　things；　since　you　made　it　to
  consist　in　an　absolute　existence　exterior　to　the　mind。　That　is　to
  say；　you　are　a　downright　sceptic。　So　I　have　gained　my　point；
  which　was　to　shew　your　principles　led　to　Scepticism。　｛207｝
  。　For　the　present　I　am；　if　not　entirely　convinced；　at
  least　silenced。
  。　I　would　fain　know　what　more　you　would　require　in
  order　to　a　perfect　conviction。　Have　you　not　had　the　liberty　of
  explaining　yourself　all　manner　of　ways？　Were　any　little　slips　in
  discourse　laid　hold　and　insisted　on？　Or　were　you　not　allowed　to
  retract　or　reinforce　anything　you　had　offered；　as　best　served
  your　purpose？　Hath　not　everything　you　could　say　been　heard　and
  examined　with　all　the　fairness　imaginable？　In　a　word　have　you　not
  in　every　point　been　convinced　out　of　your　own　mouth？　And；　if　you
  can　at　present　discover　any　flaw　in　any　of　your　former
  concessions；　or