support　your　body？
  。　No；　that　is　the　literal　sense。
  。　Pray　let　me　know　any　sense；　literal　or　not　literal；
  that　you　understand　it　in。　　How　long　must　I　wait　for　an　answer；
  Hylas？
  。　I　declare　I　know　not　what　to　say。　I　once　thought　I
  understood　well　enough　what　was　meant　by　Matter's　supporting
  accidents。　But　now；　the　more　I　think　on　it　the　less　can　I
  comprehend　it：　in　short　I　find　that　I　know　nothing　of　it。
  。　It　seems　then　you　have　no　idea　at　all；　neither
  relative　nor　positive；　of　Matter；　you　know　neither　what　it　is　in
  itself；　nor　what　relation　it　bears　to　accidents？
  。　I　acknowledge　it。
  。　And　yet　you　asserted　that　you　could　not　conceive　how
  qualities　or　accidents　should　really　exist；　without　conceiving　at
  the　same　time　a　material　support　of　them？
  。　I　did。
  。　That　is　to　say；　when　you　conceive　the　real　existence
  of　qualities；　you　do　withal　conceive　Something　which　you　cannot
  conceive？
  。　It　was　wrong；　I　own。　But　still　I　fear　there　is　some
  fallacy　or　other。　Pray　what　think　you　of　this？　It　is　just　come
  into　my　head　that　the　ground　of　all　our　mistake　lies　in　your
  treating　of　each　quality　by　itself。　Now；　I　grant　that　each
  quality　cannot　singly　subsist　without　the　mind。　Colour　cannot
  without　extension；　neither　can　figure　without　some　other　sensible
  quality。　But；　as　the　several　qualities　united　or　blended　together
  form　entire　sensible　things；　nothing　hinders　why　such　things　may
  not　be　supposed　to　exist　without　the　mind。
  。　Either；　Hylas；　you　are　jesting；　or　have　a　very　bad
  memory。　Though　indeed　we　went　through　all　the　qualities　by　name
  one　after　another；　yet　my　arguments　or　rather　your　concessions；
  nowhere　tended　to　prove　that　the　Secondary　Qualities　did　not
  subsist　each　alone　by　itself；　but；　that　they　were　not　｛200｝　　without　the　mind。　Indeed；　in　treating　of　figure　and　motion
  we　concluded　they　could　not　exist　without　the　mind；　because　it
  was　impossible　even　in　thought　to　separate　them　from　all
  secondary　qualities；　so　as　to　conceive　them　existing　by
  themselves。　But　then　this　was　not　the　only　argument　made　use　of
  upon　that　occasion。　But　（to　pass　by　all　that　hath　been　hitherto
  said；　and　reckon　it　for　nothing；　if　you　will　have　it　so）　I　am
  content　to　put　the　whole　upon　this　issue。　If　you　can　conceive　it
  possible　for　any　mixture　or　combination　of　qualities；　or　any
  sensible　object　whatever；　to　exist　without　the　mind；　then　I　will
  grant　it　actually　to　be　so。
  。　If　it　comes　to　that　the　point　will　soon　be　decided。
  What　more　easy　than　to　conceive　a　tree　or　house　existing　by
  itself；　independent　of；　and　unperceived　by；　any　mind　whatsoever？
  I　do　at　this　present　time　conceive　them　existing　after　that
  manner。
  。　How　say　you；　Hylas；　can　you　see　a　thing　which　is　at
  the　same　time　unseen？
  。　No；　that　were　a　contradiction。
  。　Is　it　not　as　great　a　contradiction　to　talk　of
  a　thing　which　is　？
  。　It　is。
  。　The；　tree　or　house　therefore　which　you　think　of　is
  conceived　by　you？
  。　How　should　it　be　otherwise？
  。　And　what　is　conceived　is　surely　in　the　mind？
  。　Without　question；　that　which　is　conceived　is　in　the
  mind。
  。　How　then　came　you　to　say；　you　conceived　a　house　or
  tree　existing　independent　and　out　of　all　minds　whatsoever？
  。　That　was　I　own　an　oversight；　but　stay；　let　me
  consider　what　led　me　into　it。　　It　is　a　pleasant　mistake　enough。
  As　I　was　thinking　of　a　tree　in　a　solitary　place；　where　no　one　was
  present　to　see　it；　methought　that　was　to　conceive　a　tree　as
  existing　unperceived　or　unthought　of；　not　considering　that　I
  myself　conceived　it　all　the　while。　But　now　I　plainly　see　that　all
  I　can　do　is　to　frame　ideas　in　my　own　mind。　I　may　indeed　conceive
  in　my　own　thoughts　the　idea　of　a　tree；　or　a　house；　or　a　mountain；
  but　that　is　all。　And　this　is　far　from　proving　that　I　can　conceive
  them　。
  。　You　acknowledge　then　that　you　cannot　possibly
  conceive　how　any　one　corporeal　sensible　thing　should　exist
  otherwise　than　in　the　mind？　｛201｝
  。　I　do。
  。　And　yet　you　will　earnestly　contend　for　the　truth　of
  that　which　you　cannot　so　much　as　conceive？
  。　I　profess　I　know　not　what　to　think；　but　still　there
  are　some　scruples　remain　with　me。　Is　it　not　certain　I　　a　distance？　Do　we　not　perceive　the　stars　and　moon；　for
  example；　to　be　a　great　way　off？　Is　not　this；　I　say；　manifest　to
  the　senses？
  。　Do　you　not　in　a　dream　too　perceive　those　or　the　like
  objects？
  。　I　do。
  。　And　have　they　not　then　the　same　appearance　of　being
  distant？
  。　They　have。
  。　But　you　do　not　thence　conclude　the　apparitions　in　a
  dream　to　be　without　the　mind？
  。　By　no　means。
  。　You　ought　not　therefore　to　conclude　that　sensible
  objects　are　without　the　mind；　from　their　appearance；　or　manner
  wherein　they　are　perceived。
  。　I　acknowledge　it。　But　doth　not　my　sense　deceive　me　in
  those　cases？
  。　By　no　means。　The　idea　or　thing　which　you　immediately
  perceive；　neither　sense　nor　reason　informs　you　that　it　actually
  exists　without　the　mind。　By　sense　you　only　know　that　you　are
  affected　with　such　certain　sensations　of　light　and　colours；　&c。
  And　these　you　will　not　say　are　without　the　mind。
  。　True：　but；　beside　all　that；　do　you　not　think　the
  sight　suggests　something　of　？
  。　Upon　approaching　a　distant　object；　do　the　visible
  size　and　figure　change　perpetually；　or　do　they　appear　the　same　at
  all　distances？
  。　They　are　in　a　continual　change。
  。　Sight　therefore　doth　not　suggest；　or　any　way　inform
  you；　that　the　visible　object　you　immediately　perceive　exists　at　a
  distance；　or　will　be　perceived　when　you　advance　farther　onward；
  there　being　a　continued　series　of　visible　objects　succeeding　each
  other　during　the　whole　time　of　your　approach。
  。　It　doth　not；　but　still　I　know；　upon　seeing　an　object；
  what　object　I　shall　perceive　after　having　passed　over　a　certain
  distance：　｛202｝　no　matter　whether　it　be　exactly　the　same　or　no：
  there　is　still　something　of　distance　suggested　in　the　case。
  。　Good　Hylas；　do　but　reflect　a　little　on　the　point；
  and　then　tell　me　whether　there　be　any　more　in　it　than　this：　from
  the　ideas　you　actually　perceive　by　sight；　you　have　by　experience
  learned　to　collect　what　other　ideas　you　will　（according　to　the
  standing　order　of　nature）　be　affected　with；　after　such　a　certain
  succession　of　time　and　motion。
  。　Upon　the　whole；　I　take　it　to　be　nothing　else。
  。　Now；　is　it　not　plain　that　if　we　suppose　a　man　born
  blind　was　on　a　sudden　made　to　see；　he　could　at　first　have　no
  experience　of　what　may　be　　by　sight？
  。　It　is。
  。　He　would　not　then；　according　to　you；　have　any　notion
  of　distance　annexed　to　the　things　he　saw；　but　would　take　them　for
  a　new　set　of　sensations；　existing　only　in　his　mind？
  。　It　is　undeniable。
  。　But；　to　make　it　still　more　plain：　is　not
  a　line　turned　endwise　to　the　eye？
  。　It　is。
  。　And　can　a　line　so　situated　be　perceived　by　sight？
  。　It　cannot。
  。　Doth　it　not　therefore　follow　that　distance　is　not
  properly　and　immediately　perceived　by　sight？
  。　It　should　seem　so。
  。　Again；　is　it　your　opinion　that　colours　are　at　a
  distance？
  。　It　must　be　acknowledged　they　are　only　in　the　mind。
  。　But　do　not　colours　appear　to　the　eye　as　coexisting
  in　the　same　place　with　extension　and　figures？
  。　They　do。
  。　How　can　you　then　conclude　from　sight　that　figures
  exist　without；　when　you　acknowledge　colours　do　not；　the　sensible
  appearance　being　the　very　same　with　regard　to　both？
  。　I　know　not　what　to　answer。
  。　But；　allowing　that　distance　was　truly　and
  immediately　perceived　by　the　mind；　yet　it　would　not　thence　follow
  it　existed　out　of　the　mind。　For；　whatever　is　immediately
  perceived　is　an　idea：　and　can　any　idea　exist　out　of　the　mind？
  。　To　suppose　that　were　absurd：　but；　inform　me；
  Philonous；　can　we　perceive　or　know　nothing　beside　our　ideas？
  。　As　for　the　rational　deducing　of　causes　from　effects；
  ｛203｝　that　is　beside　our　inquiry。　And；　by　the　senses　you　can　best
  tell　whether　you　perceive　anything　which　is　not　immediately
  perceived。　And　I　ask　you；　whether　the　things　immediately
  perceived　are　other　than　your　own　sensations　or　ideas？　You　have
  indeed　more　than　once；　in　the　course　of　this　conversation；
  declared　yourself　on　those　points；　but　you　seem；　by　this　last
  question；　to　have　departed　from　what　you　then　thought。
  。　To　speak　the　truth；　Philonous；　I　think　there　are　two
  kinds　of　objects：　　the　one　perceived　immediately；　which　are
  likewise　called　；　the　other　are　real　things　or　external
  objects；　perceived　by　the　mediation　of　ideas；　which　are　their
  images　and　representations。　Now；　I　own