use　of　the　vulgar：　we　must　not　therefore　wonder　if　expressions
  adapted　to　exact　philosophic　notions　seem　uncouth　and　out　of　the
  way。
  。　Is　it　come　to　that？　I　assure　you；　I　imagine　myself
  to　have　gained　no　small　point；　since　you　make　so　light　of
  departing　from　common　phrases　and　opinions；　it　being　a　main　part
  of　our　inquiry；　to　examine　whose　notions　are　widest　of　the　｛183｝
  common　road；　and　most　repugnant　to　the　general　sense　of　the
  world。　But；　can　you　think　it　no　more　than　a　philosophical
  paradox；　to　say　that　；　and　that　the
  idea　of　them　is　obtained　by　some　other　sense？　And　is　there
  nothing　in　this　contrary　to　nature　and　the　truth　of　things？
  。　To　deal　ingenuously；　I　do　not　like　it。　And；　after　the
  concessions　already　made；　I　had　as　well　grant　that　sounds　too
  have　no　real　being　without　the　mind。
  。　And　I　hope　you　will　make　no　difficulty　to
  acknowledge　the　same　of　。
  。　Pardon　me：　the　case　of　colours　is　very　different。　Can
  anything　be　plainer　than　that　we　see　them　on　the　objects？
  。　The　objects　you　speak　of　are；　I　suppose；　corporeal
  Substances　existing　without　the　mind？
  。　They　are。
  。　And　have　true　and　real　colours　inhering　in　them？
  。　Each　visible　object　hath　that　colour　which　we　see　in
  it。
  。　How！　is　there　anything　visible　but　what　we　perceive
  by　sight？
  。　There　is　not。
  。　And；　do　we　perceive　anything　by　sense　which　we　do
  not　perceive　immediately？
  。　How　often　must　I　be　obliged　to　repeat　the　same　thing？
  I　tell　you；　we　do　not。
  。　Have　patience；　good　Hylas；　and　tell　me　once　more；
  whether　there　is　anything　immediately　perceived　by　the　senses；
  except　sensible　qualities。　I　know　you　asserted　there　was　not；　but
  I　would　now　be　informed；　whether　you　still　persist　in　the　same
  opinion。
  。　I　do。
  。　Pray；　is　your　corporeal　substance　either　a　sensible
  quality；　or　made　up　of　sensible　qualities？
  。　What　a　question　that　is！　who　ever　thought　it　was？
  。　My　reason　for　asking　was；　because　in　saying；　；　you　make
  visible　objects　to　be　corporeal　substances；　which　implies　either
  that　corporeal　substances　are　sensible　qualities；　or　else　that
  there　is　something　besides　sensible　qualities　perceived　by　sight：
  but；　as　this　point　was　formerly　agreed　between　us；　and　is　still
  maintained　by　you；　it　is　a　clear　consequence；　that　your
  is　nothing　distinct　from　。　｛184｝
  。　You　may　draw　as　many　absurd　consequences　as　you
  please；　and　endeavour　to　perplex　the　plainest　things；　but　you
  shall　never　persuade　me　out　of　my　senses。　I　clearly　understand　my
  own　meaning。
  。　I　wish　you　would　make　me　understand　it　too。　But；
  since　you　are　unwilling　to　have　your　notion　of　corporeal
  substance　examined；　I　shall　urge　that　point　no　farther。　Only　be
  pleased　to　let　me　know；　whether　the　same　colours　which　we　see
  exist　in　external　bodies；　or　some　other。
  。　The　very　same。
  。　What！　are　then　the　beautiful　red　and　purple　we　see
  on　yonder　clouds　really　in　them？　Or　do　you　imagine　they　have　in
  themselves　any　other　form　than　that　of　a　dark　mist　or　vapour？
  。　I　must　own；　Philonous；　those　colours　are　not　really
  in　the　clouds　as　they　seem　to　be　at　this　distance。　They　are　only
  apparent　colours。
  。　　call　you　them？　how　shall　we　distinguish
  these　apparent　colours　from　real？
  。　Very　easily。　Those　are　to　be　thought　apparent　which；
  appearing　only　at　a　distance；　vanish　upon　a　nearer　approach。
  。　And　those；　I　suppose；　are　to　be　thought　real　which
  are　discovered　by　the　most　near　and　exact　survey。
  。　Right。
  。　Is　the　nearest　and　exactest　survey　made　by　the　help
  of　a　microscope；　or　by　the　naked　eye？
  。　By　a　microscope；　doubtless。
  。　But　a　microscope　often　discovers　colours　in　an
  object　different　from　those　perceived　by　the　unassisted　sight。
  And；　in　case　we　had　microscopes　magnifying　to　any　assigned
  degree；　it　is　certain　that　no　object　whatsoever；　viewed　through
  them；　would　appear　in　the　same　colour　which　it　exhibits　to　the
  naked　eye。
  。　And　what　will　you　conclude　from　all　this？　You　cannot
  argue　that　there　are　really　and　naturally　no　colours　on　objects：
  because　by　artificial　managements　they　may　be　altered；　or　made　to
  vanish。
  。　I　think　it　may　evidently　be　concluded　from　your　own
  concessions；　that　all　the　colours　we　see　with　our　naked　eyes　are
  only　apparent　as　those　on　the　clouds；　since　they　vanish　upon　a
  more　close　and　accurate　inspection　which　is　afforded　us　by　a
  microscope。　Then'　as　to　what　you　say　by　way　of　prevention：　｛185｝
  I　ask　you　whether　the　real　and　natural　state　of　an　object　is
  better　discovered　by　a　very　sharp　and　piercing　sight；　or　by　one
  which　is　less　sharp？
  。　By　the　former　without　doubt。
  。　Is　it　not　plain　from　　that　microscopes
  make　the　sight　more　penetrating；　and　represent　objects　as　they
  would　appear　to　the　eye　in　case　it　were　naturally　endowed　with　a
  most　exquisite　sharpness？
  。　It　is。
  。　Consequently　the　microscopical　representation　is　to
  be　thought　that　which　best　sets　forth　the　real　nature　of　the
  thing；　or　what　it　is　in　itself。　The　colours；　therefore；　by　it
  perceived　are　more　genuine　and　real　than　those　perceived
  otherwise。
  。　I　confess　there　is　something　in　what　you　say。
  。　Besides；　it　is　not　only　possible　but　manifest；　that
  there　actually　are　animals　whose　eyes　are　by　nature　framed　to
  perceive　those　things　which　by　reason　of　their　minuteness　escape
  our　sight。　What　think　you　of　those　inconceivably　small　animals
  perceived　by　glasses？　must　we　suppose　they　are　all　stark　blind？
  Or；　in　case　they　see；　can　it　be　imagined　their　sight　hath　not　the
  same　use　in　preserving　their　bodies　from　injuries；　which　appears
  in　that　of　all　other　animals？　And　if　it　hath；　is　it　not　evident
  they　must　see　particles　less　than　their　own　bodies；　which　will
  present　them　with　a　far　different　view　in　each　object　from　that
  which　strikes　our　senses？　Even　our　own　eyes　do　not　always
  represent　objects　to　us　after　the　same　manner。　In　the　jaundice
  every　one　knows　that　all　things　seem　yellow。　Is　it　not　therefore
  highly　probable　those　animals　in　whose　eyes　we　discern　a　very
  different　texture　from　that　of　ours；　and　whose　bodies　abound　with
  different　humours；　do　not　see　the　same　colours　in　every　object
  that　we　do？　From　all　which；　should　it　not　seem　to　follow　that　all
  colours　are　equally　apparent；　and　that　none　of　those　which　we
  perceive　are　really　inherent　in　any　outward　object？
  。　It　should。
  。　The　point　will　be　past　all　doubt；　if　you　consider
  that；　in　case　colours　were　real　properties　or　affections　inherent
  in　external　bodies；　they　could　admit　of　no　alteration　without
  some　change　wrought　in　the　very　bodies　themselves：　but；　is　it　not
  evident　from　what　hath　been　said　that；　upon　the　use　of
  microscopes；　upon　a　change　happening　in　the　burnouts　of　the　eye；
  or　a　variation　of　distance；　without　any　manner　of　real　alteration
  ｛186｝　in　the　thing　itself；　the　colours　of　any　object　are　either
  changed；　or　totally　disappear？　Nay；　all　other　circumstances
  remaining　the　same；　change　but　the　situation　of　some　objects；　and
  they　shall　present　different　colours　to　the　eye。　The　same　thing
  happens　upon　viewing　an　object　in　various　degrees　of　light。　And
  what　is　more　known　than　that　the　same　bodies　appear　differently
  coloured　by　candle…light　from　what　they　do　in　the　open　day？　Add
  to　these　the　experiment　of　a　prism　which；　separating　the
  heterogeneous　rays　of　light；　alters　the　colour　of　any　object；　and
  will　cause　the　whitest　to　appear　of　a　deep　blue　or　red　to　the
  naked　eye。　And　now　tell　me　whether　you　are　still　of　opinion　that
  every　body　hath　its　true　real　colour　inhering　in　it；　and；　if　you
  think　it　hath；　I　would　fain　know　farther　from　you；　what　certain
  distance　and　position　of　the　object；　what　peculiar　texture　and
  formation　of　the　eye；　what　degree　or　kind　of　light　is　necessary
  for　ascertaining　that　true　colour；　and　distinguishing　it　from
  apparent　ones。
  。　I　own　myself　entirely　satisfied；　that　they　are　all
  equally　apparent；　and　that　there　is　no　such　thing　as　colour
  really　inhering　in　external　bodies；　but　that　it　is　altogether　in
  the　light。　And　what　confirms　me　in　this　opinion　is；　that　in
  proportion　to　the　light　colours　are　still　more　or　less　vivid；　and
  if　there　be　no　light；　then　are　there　no　colours　perceived。
  Besides；　allowing　there　are　colours　on　external　objects；　yet；　how
  is　it　possible　for　us　to　perceive　them？　For　no　external　body
  affects　the　mind；　unless　it　acts　first　on　our　organs　of　sense。
  But　the　only　action　of　bodies　is　motion；　and　motion　cannot　be
  communicated　otherwise　than　by　impulse。　A　distant　object
  therefore　cannot　act　on　the　eye；　nor　consequently　make　itself　or
  its　properties　perceivable　to　the　soul。　Whence　it　plainly　follows
  that　it　is　immediately　some　contiguous　substance；　which；
  operating　o